

Sri Garib Das Oriental Series No. 311

UMĀPATI'S COMMENTARY
ON THE PAUṢKARATANTRA

CHAPTER 7 : PRAMĀṆA

AN ANNOTATED TRANSLATION

USHA COLAS-CHAUHAN

Sri Satguru Publications
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Indian Books Centre
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
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INTRODUCTION

Umāpati, the author of the commentary (*bhāṣya*) on the *Paṣṣkaratantra*, is generally identified with the 14th-century Śaiva preceptor Umāpati who wrote several major Śaiva doctrinal texts in Tamil.¹ But S. S. Sūryanarayana Sastri² drew the attention of scholars to the fact that the *Paṣṣkarabhāṣya* refers to the *Nyāyāmṛta*, a 16th-century Dvaita work. He proposed three possible explanations for this fact: the existence of another earlier Dvaita work bearing the same name as that of the 16th century work, the interpolation of the reference to the *Nyāyāmṛta* in the *Paṣṣkarabhāṣya* and finally, rejection of the idea that the Umāpati of the 14th century was the author of the *Paṣṣkarabhāṣya*. To this, B. N. K. Sharma replied³ that there was only one work called *Nyāyāmṛta* in Dvaita literature, the one written by Vyāsarāya (1478-1539),⁴ that the partly misquoted *Nyāyāmṛta* verse did not seem to be an interpolation in the *Paṣṣkarabhāṣya* and that, as a consequence, the attribution of the *Paṣṣkarabhāṣya* to a 14th century author needed to be reconsidered.

Sharma also argued that the expression "the followers of Madhva" (*mādhvāḥ*) could not have become current during the lifetime of Madhva (1238-1317) and that Umāpati, who employs that expression (in *PaṣṣkaraBh* on 7.6"), must

¹ See Thirugnanasambandhan, *Śataratnasāṅgraha*, pp. xi-xv; Sivaraman, *Saivism in Philosophical Perspective*, pp. 36-38; and Gangadaran, *Saiva Siddhānta with special reference to Sivaprakāśam*, pp. 6-23 for the date and works of this Umāpati.

² *The Śivādvaita of Śrikanṭha*, p. 68.

³ Sharma, "The date of Umāpati's *Paṣṣkara-bhāṣya*", pp. 65-68.

⁴ See Sharma, *History of the Dvaita School and its Literature*, vol. 2, pp. 24-60, for the date and works of Vyāsarāya also known as Vyāsātīrtha.

therefore belong to a later period. He pointed out that the polemical style of the *Pauṣkarabhāṣya*, similar to that of the 15th and 16th century dialectics, supported the idea that it was composed at a later date. Sharma concluded on these grounds that Umāpati, the author of the *Pauṣkarabhāṣya*, was different from the Umāpati who composed the Tamil Śaiva text *Caṅkaṇpanirākaraṇam* in 1313, and that the author of the *Pauṣkarabhāṣya* "lived probably about the close of the XVI century".

Sharma's supposition about Umāpati's date is confirmed by a study of the *Pauṣkarabhāṣya*. The style and argumentation of this commentary on the chapter on epistemology (*pramāṇapaṭala*) prove that its author was acquainted with the method and technical terminology of *navyanyāya* developed by Gaṅgeśa (1320 A.D.)¹ in the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. For instance, the inference formulated in the *Pauṣkarapramāṇapaṭalabhāṣya* to establish indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpakapratyakṣa*) is the same as that which was proposed for the first time² by Gaṅgeśa.³ Its discussions of the validity of cognition (*prāmāṇya*),⁴ inherence (*samavāya*),⁵ cognition of absence (*abhāvapratyakṣa*)⁶ and means of apprehending invariable concomitance (*vyāptigrahopāya*)⁷ closely follow those of Gaṅgeśa. Its demonstration which

¹ For the dates of Gaṅgeśa, Pakṣadhara and Rucidatta, see Potter and Bhattacharyya, *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies* 6.

² Compare *PauṣkaraBh* on 7.27-28^a with *Tattvacintāmaṇi* [=TC], vol. 1, pp. 817-822.

³ See Ramanuja Tatacharya, *Pratyakṣatattvacintāmaṇivimarśaḥ*, pp. 320-321.

⁴ *PauṣkaraBh* on 7.5^a: compare the definition of the validity of cognition with TC, vol. 1, pp. 381 sqq.; intrinsicity of the cognition of validity with TC, vol. 1, pp. 170 sqq. (*pūrvapakṣa* in TC); refutation of the intrinsicity of the cognition of validity with TC, vol. 1, pp. 184 sqq. (*siddhānta* in TC); extrinsicity of the cognition of validity (*pūrvapakṣa* in *PauṣkaraBh*) with TC, vol. 1, pp. 246 sqq.; extrinsic production of validity with TC, vol. 1, pp. 287 sqq.

⁵ *PauṣkaraBh* on 7.35^b-36^a: comp. with TC, vol. 1, pp. 648 sqq.

⁶ *PauṣkaraBh* on 7.35^b-36^a: comp. with TC, vol. 1, pp. 707 sqq.

⁷ *PauṣkaraBh* on 7.40^a: comp. with TC, vol. 2, pt i, pp. 174 sqq.

establishes *śabda* as an independent *prāmāṇa* is strikingly similar to that of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*.¹

Umāpati also seems to be acquainted with several commentaries on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. For example, his definition of the validity of cognition is obviously based on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* definition as developed by Pakṣadhara (1500 A.D.) in the *Tattvacintāmaṇyāloka*;² he also adopts Pakṣadhara's definition of qualifier (*prakāra*).³ His interpretation of the inferences which establish the extrinsic origin of validity⁴ and perceptibility of absence⁵ follows that of Pakṣadhara, for he adopts Pakṣadhara's expressions explaining the purpose served by the constituents of the inference (*dalaprayojana*). It appears that Umāpati was also aware of the *Tattvacintāmaṇiprakāśa* of Rucidatta (1505 A.D.). For example, he borrows Pakṣadhara's inference to prove the perceptibility of absence as improved by Rucidatta.⁶ His stand that the cognition of non-contradiction (*abādhitatvapramā*) produces validity in inference⁷ follows that of Rucidatta, who introduced it into his commentary on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*.⁸ Umāpati also seems to be aware, directly or indirectly, of the refutation of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* by Vyāsarāya (1478-1539). For example, he refers to two objections against the thesis that true consideration (*yathārthalingaparāmarśa*) produces validity in inference.⁹ These are among the objections raised by Vyāsarāya against

¹ *PauṣkaraBh* on 7.60^a: comp. with TC, vol. 4, pt i, pp. 22 sqq.

² *PauṣkaraBh* on 7.5^a: comp. with *Tattvacintāmaṇi-āloka* [=TCĀ], p. 437.

³ *PauṣkaraBh* on 7.5^a: comp. with TCĀ, p. 193.

⁴ *PauṣkaraBh* on 7.5^a: comp. with TCĀ, p. 354.

⁵ *PauṣkaraBh* on 7.35^b-36^a: comp. with *Āloka* in TC, vol. 1, p. 691.

⁶ *PauṣkaraBh* on 7.35^b-36^a: comp. with *Tattvacintāmaṇi-prakāśa* [=TCP], vol. 1, pp. 725-726.

⁷ *PauṣkaraBh* on 7.5^a.

⁸ See TCP, vol. 1, p. 355, and vol. 2, pt ii, pp. 146-147.

⁹ *PauṣkaraBh* on 7.5^a.

the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* in his *Tarkatāṇḍava*.¹ That Umāpati knew Vyāsarāya's other works is evident from his reference to the *Nyāyāmṛta* verse mentioned above. Thus, it may be concluded that the author of the *Pauṣkarabhāṣya* belonged to a period later than the first half of the 16th century and that he is not the same as the Umāpati who wrote the *Caṅkaṣpanirākaraṇam* in 1313.

Umāpati occasionally records alternative interpretations of *Pauṣkara* verses in his commentary.² Although two such interpretations in the *pramāṇapaṭala* match Jñānaprakāśa's *Vṛtti* on the same verses,³ it is not possible to conclude, without a complete examination of the two commentaries, whether the reference here is to Jñānaprakāśa's commentary, or to another written or oral tradition. If these are proved to refer to Jñānaprakāśa's commentary, it would confirm that Umāpati's commentary postdates that of Jñānaprakāśa, who belonged to the 16th century.

One of the five introductory verses of the *Pauṣkarabhāṣya* announces the name of the author⁴ but does not provide any information about him. The colophon of the edited text, however, is replete with references to different episodes of the life of Umāpati, the 14th-century Tamil author-preceptor. In the light of the above discussion about the author of the *Pauṣkarabhāṣya*, the colophon of the edited text should be considered spurious.⁵ Neither is there any

¹ See Ramanuja Tatacharya, *Pratyakṣatattvacintāmanivimarśaḥ*, pp. 40-41.

² Of course, the possibility of their being interpolated needs to be examined seriously.

³ On verses 18 and 80-81^a and perhaps also on 20-22 and 37^a.

⁴ *PauṣkaraBh* on 1.1, p. 1: *viśveśvaraṃ praṇamyādaḥ viśvamūrtim umāpatim/ pauṣkare jñānapādāṃśaṃ vyākhyāsyē 'ham umāpatiḥ*.

⁵ The colophon of a complete but untraceable manuscript of the *Pauṣkarabhāṣya* does not contain these biographical details (see Mahadevasastri, *A Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts* ..., p. 150): *iti śrīmatpauṣkare jñānapāde tantrāvatāraṇaṃ nāma aṣṭamaḥ evaṃ śrīman mahopādhyāyena sakalavedāgamābhijñāna śaṅkarmanirātēna siddhāntaśaivaśikhāmaṇinā umāpatiśivācāryeṇa*

evidence to prove that Umāpati, the author of the *Pauṣkarabhāṣya*, belonged to South India.

Umāpati, the author of the *Pauṣkarabhāṣya*, is accredited with authorship of the *Śataratnasamgraha*¹ and a Sanskrit commentary on it, the *Śataratnollekhanī*.² But the *Śataratnasamgraha*, which is a compilation of about hundred verses collected from eleven Śaiva texts known as Tantras, mentions the name of neither the compiler nor the compilation.³ In the absence of any definite internal or external evidence about its author, all discussion about his identity can only be conjectural, and pointless for the present purpose. As regards the *Śataratnollekhanī*, it is evident from its introductory verses that the commentator, who does not mention his name, is not the same as the compiler because he distinguishes himself from the compiler, whom he names Umāpati.⁴ The commentator also refers to the latter as *saṃ-*

krīṭā pauṣkaravyākhyā sampūrṇā. The text of this manuscript, and that of another complete manuscript recorded by Hultsch (n° 968 in his *Reports on Sanskrit Manuscripts in South India*, II) but now untraceable, begins with the verse *viśveśvaraṃ praṇamyādaḥ*, etc. which is the last of the five introductory verses of the printed edition. This also raises suspicion about the authenticity of the first four introductory verses of the printed text. However, all the five verses are found in two other incomplete manuscripts of the *Pauṣkarabhāṣya*: that of the Sri Venkateswara Oriental Research Institute Library (stock n° 6417) and of the Thiruvavaduthurai Adheenam Library (Ms n° 414 / 2075-P 752 5118).

¹ Thirugnanasambandhan, *Śataratnasamgraha*, p. xv; Sivaraman, *Śaivism in Philosophical Perspective*, p. 37; Janaki (ed.), *Śrī Umāpati Śivācārya*, "Bibliography", p. 299.

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⁴ *ibid.*, p. 1: *umāpatiḥ ... cakāra bandhaṃ śataratnarūpam... amīśaṃ śataratnānāṃ ullekhaḥ kriyate mayā*.

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⁴ *ibid.*, p. 1: *umāpatiḥ ... cakāra bandhaṃ śataratnarūpam... amīśaṃ śataratnānām ullekhaḥ kriyate mayā*.

grahakāra in a manner which suggests that they are different.¹ Above all, the *Śataratnollekhanī* sometimes reproduces, verbatim and without acknowledgement, passages from well-known commentaries on different Śaiva works.² This also renders difficult the attribution of this work to an author of the stature of Umāpati, the commentator of the *Pauṣkara*. Three more Sanskrit works, *Śrīmanṇaṭarājasahasranāma-bhāṣya*, *Pātañjalasūtrabhāṣya* and *Vāyusaṃhitābhāṣya*, are attributed to Umāpati by the editor of the *Pauṣkarabhāṣya*.³ Umāpati is also said to have written various hymns and commentaries on religious texts.⁴ But the identity of the author(s) of these works with that of the *Pauṣkarabhāṣya* remains to be proved.

Some passages of the *Pauṣkarabhāṣya* are very similar to, and sometimes identical with, several passages of the *Śivajñānabodhavaristārabhāṣya*⁵ and the *Śaivaparibhāṣā*.⁶ These

¹ See, for example, pp. 3, 6, 45.

² Thus compare, for example, *Śataratnollekhanī*, pp. 4-5 with Sadyojyotiḥ's *Vṛtti* on *Svāyambhuvasūtrasaṃgraha*, pp. 4-8; *Śataratnollekhanī*, pp. 17-19 with Rāmakaṇṭha's *Vṛtti* on *Matāṅgapāramēśvara*, *vidyāpāda*, pp. 39-46; *Śataratnollekhanī*, pp. 55-56 with Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha's *Vṛtti* on *Mrgendra* (*vidyā- and yoga-pādas*) pp. 182-184. Yet the *Śataratnollekhanī* could be a valuable work for the study of Śaiva traditions, because its author belongs to a tradition which is apparently different from that of Sadyojyotiḥ, Rāmakaṇṭha, and others: *tasya saṃgrahasya sadyojyotiḥpādarāmakaṇṭhanārāyaṇakaṇṭhāghoraśivādivyākhyānusāreṇa asmadgurusampradāyānusāreṇa ca vyākhyā kriyate* (p. 2).

³ See the communication (*vijñāpanam*) preceding the Tamil introduction in the Cidambaram edition of the *Pauṣkarabhāṣya*.

⁴ See Thirugnanasambandhan, *Śataratnasāṅgraha*, p. xv.

⁵ Compare, for example, *PauṣkaraBh* on 7.5^a (*prāmānya*) with *Śivajñānabodhavaristārabhāṣya*, pp. 98-108; *PauṣkaraBh* on 7.27-28^a (*nirvikalpapratiyākṣa*) with *Śivajñānabodhavaristārabhāṣya*, pp. 109-11; *PauṣkaraBh* on 7.60^a (*śabda*) with *Śivajñānabodhavaristārabhāṣya*, pp. 120-121; *PauṣkaraBh* on 4.48^a, p. 232-240 (*mokṣa*) with *Śivajñānabodhavaristārabhāṣya*, pp. 481-494, etc.

⁶ Compare *PauṣkaraBh* on 4.48^a, pp. 232-234 (*mokṣa*) with *Śaivaparibhāṣā* (Madras edn), pp. 343-346 (parts of this are similar to *Śivajñānabodhavaristārabhāṣya*, pp. 483-486).

two works are ascribed to Śivāgrayogin,¹ who belonged to the second half of the 16th century.² A quick survey of some passages common to the *Śivajñānabodhavaristārabhāṣya* and the *Pauṣkarabhāṣya* shows that the discussions in the former are often more elaborate and better organised than those in the latter, and that they seem to agree on most of the topics treated in the *Pauṣkarapramāṇapaṭalabhāṣya*.³ Only an extensive study would reveal whether the *Śivajñānabodhavaristārabhāṣya* develops the arguments of the *Pauṣkarabhāṣya* or the latter summarises the discussion of the *Śivajñānabodhavaristārabhāṣya* or whether they are indebted to a third work. The possibility of their being written by the same person also requires serious consideration.⁴

Another commentary on the *Pauṣkara*, the *Pauṣkaravṛtti* of Jñānaprakāśa, is still unpublished.⁵ Jñānaprakāśa flourished in the 16th century and wrote several Śaiva doctrinal

¹ The attribution of these two works to a single author however, needs to be re-examined because they differ on many important topics like the origin of the validity of cognition (*prāmānyotpatti*), types of sense-object contacts (*sannikarṣa*), etc.

² See Devasenapathi, *Śaiva Siddhānta*, pp. 11-12 and Iyengar, *Śaivaparibhāṣā*, p. x.

³ But these two works disagree on a major issue: the *Pauṣkarabhāṣya* accepts four *pramāṇas*, whereas the *Śivajñānabodhavaristārabhāṣya* admits only three *pramāṇas* and subsumes *arthāpatti* in *anumāna* *pramāṇa*.

⁴ The divergence referred to in the previous note could be explained by the fact that as commentator, Umāpati has to conform to the thesis of the *Pauṣkara*. But Umāpati, who readily expresses his disagreement with the *Pauṣkara* on certain occasions, does not do so with regard to the four-*pramāṇa* thesis and explains away the three-*pramāṇa* theory without much discussion. See *PauṣkaraBh* on 7.4^b.

⁵ In the manuscript T 110 at the Institut Français de Pondichéry, the name of the commentator is not mentioned in the introductory verse of the work : *gaṇeśaṃ sānujaṃ sām̐baṃ śivaṃ vāgīśvaraṃ gurūṃ/ pranamya pauṣkarīm vyākhyāṃ vidyāṃśān tu karomy aham*. I. is given in the colophon which is typical of Jñānaprakāśa's works: *itī śrīśālivāṭipuranivāsijñānaprakāśācāryaviracitāyāṃ śrīmatpauṣkara-jñānapādavṛttau*, etc.

works in Tamil and Sanskrit.¹ His commentary on the *pramāṇapaṭala*, as on the other chapters of the *Pauṣkara*, is brief and to the point. He appears to confine himself to the epistemological views expressed by the *Pauṣkara*, whereas Umāpati sometimes reinterprets them and introduces new elements. The question of why two commentaries came to be written on the *Pauṣkara* in the 16th century is intriguing, especially since the two commentators, Umāpati and Jñānaprakāśa, seem to follow the same line of interpretation as regards metaphysical matters. Also, there is no evidence to prove the existence of an earlier commentary.

The *Pauṣkara* is said to be a subsidiary (*upabhedā*) of the *Pārameśvara*,² one of the twenty-eight texts generally known as *tantra*,³ *āgama* or *samhitā* which are recognized as authoritative by the Śaiva school. Jñānaprakāśa informs us that the *Pauṣkara* is an abridged version of the *Pārameśvara*.⁴ Only that section of the *Pauṣkara*, which deals with doctrine and is referred to as *jñānapāda*,⁵ is known and is edited with Umāpati's commentary. The statement of the sages at the beginning of the *Pauṣkara*⁶ that they wish to learn the *jñānapāda*, after having been taught the *kriyāpāda* and *caryāpāda*, suggests that the doctrinal section was preceded by the sections which discussed ritual and conduct.

¹ See Devasenapathi, *Śaiva Siddhānta*, p. 11 and Michael, *Śivayogaratna*, pp. 1-4.

² See the *Table des āgama et des upāgama* facing p. xix of the *Rauravāgama*, vol. I.

³ The *Pauṣkara* designates itself as *tantra*. See *Pauṣkara* 7.67^a: *tatredaṃ pauṣkaraṃ tantram arthavādādīlopataḥ*.

⁴ According to Jñānaprakāśa, Pārameśa taught the *Pārameśvaratantra* to Ananta, who abridged it and instructed it to Śrīkaṇṭha, who further summarised it as *Pauṣkara* and taught it to Sanaka and other sages. See *PauṣkaraV*, pp. 1 and 891. This could explain the great similarity of some *Pauṣkara* verses with those of the *Mataṅgapārameśvara*, another subsidiary of the *Pārameśvara*. Jñānaprakāśa also refers to the *Pauṣkara* as *Pauṣkarapārameśvara* (see, for example, *PauṣkaraV*, p. 68).

⁵ *Pauṣkara* 1.4^b: *adhunā jñānapādaṃ tu śroṇum icchā garīyaśi*.

⁶ *Pauṣkara* 1.4^a: *kriyācarye prasādena tavāsmābhiḥ śrute purā*.

This reference to *kriyāpāda* and *caryāpāda* cannot be rejected as fiction.¹ Mention in the *jñānapāda* (and in the commentary on them by Umāpati and Jñānaprakāśa) of discussions on initiation in the earlier parts of the *Pauṣkara* attests to the existence of its *kriyāpāda*.² The *Pauṣkariyapadadīkṣā-saṃgrahakārikā* cited by Rāmakaṇṭha in his *Mataṅgapārameśvaravṛtti* must have been, as noted by Bhatt,³ based on the ritual described in the *Pauṣkara*. Many verses concerning ritual or conduct, attributed to the *Pauṣkara* by Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha and Rāmakaṇṭha⁴ but not found in the *jñānapāda* of the *Pauṣkara*, also prove that the *Pauṣkara* possesses *kriyā* and *caryā* sections.

Some scholars believe that the *Pauṣkara* commented upon by Umāpati and published from Cidambaram is not "the original".⁵ Goodall, who does not include the *Pauṣkara* in his list of "demonstrably early Saiddhāntika scriptures" since it does not satisfy any criterion of the relative antiquity of a "*Siddhāntatantra*" fixed by him,⁶ believes that it is a

¹ Compare Goodall, *Kiraṇa*, p. xlv, note 102.

² See, for example, *Pauṣkara* 1.45^a: *dīkṣāyām bhagavaṃs tattvaṃ śivākhyam śodhyam iritam*; *Pauṣkara* 6.7^a: *dīkṣāyām tu purā pumsī bhuvanāny uditāni hi*. See also *PauṣkaraBh*, pp. 8 and 39; *PauṣkaraV*, pp. 11-12.

³ *Mataṅgapārameśvara, kriyā-, yoga- and caryā-pādas*, Introduction, p. lxxxiii.

⁴ See, for example, the "Index des ouvrages et des auteurs ..." in *Mrgendra, kriyā- and caryā-pādas*, p. 282; "Mataṅgavṛttāṃ udāhṛta ...", in *Mataṅgapārameśvara, kriyā-, yoga- and caryā-pādas*, p. 485.

⁵ See H. Brunner, "Jñāna and kriyā: Relation between Theory and Practice in the Śaivāgamas", p. 53 (note 178): "the extant *Pauṣkara* (similar to the one commented on by Umāpati in the fourteenth century) ... has little to do with its namesake quoted by old commentators"; H. Brunner, "The Four pādas of Śaivāgamas", p. 262 (note 7): "the text printed as the vp [that is, *vidyāpāda*] of *Pauṣkara* and commented upon by Umāpati in the 14th century does not belong to the original Āgama of this name"; Goodall, *Kiraṇa*, pp. xliii-xlv: "A later, probably South Indian, *Pauṣkara* that has received commentaries by Umāpatiśivācārya and by [Śālivāṇinivāsi-] Jñānaprakāśa ... bears no relation to the original".

⁶ Which are: its transmission also in early Nepalese and Kashmiri manuscripts, the existence of attributed quotations by early authors up

"South Indian" Pauskara which is unknown to Rāmakāṇḍha and postdates him.¹ Interestingly, he rejects the evidence which contradicts his conclusion from a standpoint based on his own conclusion.² It may be noted for the present purpose³ that a verse of the Pauskara cited with attribution by Nārāyaṇakāṇḍha, Rāmakāṇḍha and Aghoraśiva,⁴ and several verses cited without attribution by Rāmakāṇḍha and Aghoraśiva,⁵ are found in the printed text. Evidence from their works seems to indicate that they knew this text directly or indirectly.⁶ Moreover, the nature of certain theological and epistemological doctrines of the Pauskara testifies

to and including Aghoraśiva and the existence of commentaries by early authors up to and including Aghoraśiva. See Goodall, *Kirāṇa*, pp. xxxix-xli.

² See Goodall, *Kirāṇa*, pp. xlii-xlii (notes 101-102); "The Saiddhāntika Parāṅgāpāla", pp. 329; Goodall, *Parāṅgāpāla*, p. ii.

³ For example, according to him, a verse cited and attributed by the 9th and 10th century authors to the "original" Pauskara and which is found in the "new" Pauskara, has been deliberately incorporated by the composer of the "new" Pauskara in his work; with regard to the verses which are common to the Pauskara and other Tantras and manuals, it is the composer of the "new" Pauskara who is suspected to be the borrower; the author of the "new" Pauskara adopted in his work, the fiction of the *kṛtya* and *carya* sections of the Pauskara in order to justify the existence of verses concerning ritual which are attributed to the Pauskara by early authors, and which he could not incorporate in his work, etc. See Goodall, *Kirāṇa*, p. xlii (note 102).

⁴ I intend to discuss this subject in detail in a future article.

⁵ See Goodall, *Kirāṇa*, pp. xlii-xlii (notes 101-102).

⁶ For example, Rāmakāṇḍha cites Pauskara 6.124⁷ without attribution in the *Maṅgalaśivaśaśvara*, *vidyāpāda*, p. 389. The absence of attribution by Aghoraśiva (see Goodall, *Kirāṇa*, p. xlii, note 101) is of no significance because he also cites well-known Tantras without attribution and preceded by expressions such as *āhuh*, *uktam ca*. See, for instance, his *Migendraparāṅgāpāla*, pp. 81, 197, 295 (*Svāyam-bhūva*), p. 64 (*Kirāṇa*), p. 349 (*Parāṅgāpāla*), etc.; his *Tatvaparakāśa-vṛtti*, pp. 7, 10, 47, 217 (*Migendra*), p. 243 (*Kaurava*), etc.

⁷ For example, from the close similarity of wording, Rāmakāṇḍha's commentary on the *Maṅgalaśivaśaśvara*, *vidyāpāda*, 17.2, could be a paraphrase of Pauskara, 6.43⁸-44 and 45⁹-48. Aghoraśiva cites this passage of Rāmakāṇḍha in his *Migendraparāṅgāpāla* (p. 279) but following his habit, without acknowledgement. See also his *Bhogakāṇḍavṛtti*, pp. 214-215.

against its late redaction. Above all, there is no reason to doubt its "authenticity" because the contrary proof presented up to now fails to convince.

The Pauskara is an important text for the cognizance of the Śaiva doctrine. It holds certain views which distinguish it from the other known Śaiva Tantras.¹ It also discusses topics which are referred to, but not discussed in the other known Śaiva Tantras. For example, the *Kirāṇa* holds that the simultaneous fructification of karma (*karmasāmya*) is the prerequisite for receiving Śiva's grace. Two other views, one attributed to Sadyojyotiḥ that Śiva's grace presupposes the maturity of the mala of selves (*malapāka*), and the other, that it depends on Śiva's will, are known from various sources. It is said that neither the works of Sadyojyotiḥ nor any "demonstrably early scriptural source" clearly propound the first view and that the second view is only known from a citation.² But the Pauskara describes in detail how the maturity of mala (and not the fructification of karma)³ leads to the descent of Śiva's grace in the case of *sakala* and *pralaya* selves.⁴ The *viṇāṇakevala* selves, which are free from karma, are chosen by Śiva either by His free will or

¹ For example, the Pauskara is among the Tantras which name bindu as *kundaḥ*. Rāmakāṇḍha's reference to this group of Tantras (*Maṅgalaśivaśaśvara*, *vidyāpāda*, p. 71), though casual, should be due to its doctrinal specificity.

² See Goodall, *Kirāṇa*, pp. xxxiii-xxxvi.

³ Goodall's comprehension of the Pauskara doctrine in this matter is erroneous. See *Kirāṇa*, p. xxxv (note 80). The Pauskara categorically rejects *karmasāmya* as the cause. It states that if a particular state of karma were the prerequisite for Śiva's grace, the *viṇāṇakevala* selves, which do not have karma, would never receive grace. See Pauskara 4.23: *sarvatra karmasāmyam tu yad anugrahaheṭuā / viṇāṇakevala-nam tu bhavet kaṭham anugrahaḥ*.

⁴ See Pauskara 4.21 (about *pralaya* grace): *samāvam karmāṇāṁ nātra nimitāṁ tadānugrahe / paripāko malasyaiva kim tv anugraha-kāraṇam* and 4.24⁵ (about *sakala* self): *sakalāṇāṁ tu sarvatra karma-sāmyam na kāraṇam*.

according to the maturity of their mala.¹ Another singularity of the *Pauṣkara* is its methodology, for it frequently employs inferential argumentation to support its thesis and to refute that of the opponent. The *Pauṣkara* is also remarkable from the point of view of epistemology because it reflects the state of several logical concepts before they became fixed under the influence of different systematized philosophical schools. Particularly notable are the *Pauṣkara*'s similarity with texts like the *Nyāyasāra* which stands apart in the field of logic² and its refutation of concepts such as *ekendriyavāda*, *svabhāvavāda*, etc. which called forth considerable debate in early philosophical works.

The *Pauṣkara* devotes one chapter each to describing the Lord (*pati*), the material cause of the pure realm (*bindu*), that of the impure realm (*māyā*), bound selves (*paśu*) and bonds (*pāśa*), which are five of the six admitted categories (*padārtha*).³ The other three chapters discuss 'the state of being an individual' of the self (*pumstva*), the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and the descent of scripture from the higher to the lower realm (*tantrāvatāra*) respectively.

The presence of a full-fledged chapter on *pramāṇas* in the *Pauṣkara* is remarkable⁴ because apart from brief

¹ See *Pauṣkara* 2.56: *karmādinairapeksyena malapākānusārataḥ / anugrhnāti vijñānakevalān aparān api*, and 4.49: *icchayaivānugrhyādau śivo vijñānakevalān / malapākam apeksyaiva kāmścic chuddhādhvagocare*.

² Compare, for example, the *Pauṣkara* definitions of *hetvābhāsa* with those of the *Nyāyasāra*. Also note the similarities between *Pauṣkara* 7.6^a and *Yogasūtra* 1.8, *Pauṣkara* 7.16^b and *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* 1.4^a, etc.

³ The means (*kāraka*), which is the sixth category, is defined but not discussed in the *jñānapāda*. Umāpati states that a chapter on *kāraka* is absent in the *jñānapāda* because *kāraka* (that is, *dikṣā*) being an action (*kriyā*), the varieties of *dikṣā* and the results ensuing from them are described in *kriyāpāda*. See *PauṣkaraBh* on 7.1-3^a.

⁴ Both Umāpati and Jñānaprakāśa justify its presence (qualified by Jñānaprakāśa (*PauṣkaraV*, p. 807) as incidental : *prāsaṅgikah pāṭalaḥ*) on the grounds that the cognition of the means of knowledge is a precondition for the cognition of objects of knowledge.

descriptions or passing remarks,¹ no other published dualist Śaiva Tantra treats epistemological topics. The *Pauṣkara* thesis that perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), verbal testimony (*śabda*) and presumption (*arthāpatti*) are *pramāṇas* is also unique, for no known orthodox or heterodox philosophical school seems to admit this combination of *pramāṇas*. Also, the four-*pramāṇa* theory differs from the generally admitted thesis that Śaivas recognize *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, and *śabda* as *pramāṇas*.² Moreover, the schools which do not accept *arthāpatti* as an independent *pramāṇa* generally reduce it to the inference consisting of an only-negative reason (*kevalavyatirekin*), while those who admit *arthāpatti* *pramāṇa* do not also admit this type of reason. The *Pauṣkara*, however, recognizes *arthāpatti* as a distinct *pramāṇa* and also admits only-negative reason. This perhaps indicates that the *arthāpatti* *pramāṇa* held by the *Pauṣkara* does not correspond to the *arthāpatti* *pramāṇa* as it is generally known. The exact nature of *arthāpatti* recognized by the *Pauṣkara* is difficult to understand because this *pramāṇa* is not defined.

From the point of view of epistemology, a considerable gap of time seems to separate the *Pauṣkarapramāṇapāṭala* and Umāpati's commentary on it. The *Pauṣkara* clearly represents an earlier period of logic whereas Umāpati's commentary reflects the changes which many logical

¹ For example, the *Mataṅgapārameśvara*, *yogapāda*, 4.14-39^a (on three *pramāṇas*, *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *āgama*); the *Suprabheda*, *vidyāpāda*, 12-18 (on how *śiva* tattva cannot be known through the six *pramāṇas*). Commentaries and sub-commentaries of Nārāyaṇa-kaṇṭha, Rāmakaṇṭha and Aghoraśiva on different Tantras sometimes touch upon epistemological matters. Doctrinal works of Śaḍyojyotiḥ, Bhoja and others, grouped under the title *Aṣṭaprakaraṇa*, contain some information. There is a long discussion about epistemological topics in the *Śaivaparibhāṣā* of Śivāgrayogin and the *Tātparyadīpikā* of Śrīkumāra. Commentaries on the *Śivajñānabodha* also discuss *pramāṇas*.

² Suggested for example, in the *Mataṅgapārameśvara*, *vidyāpāda*, 3.4-5, the *Mrgendra*, *vidyāpāda*, 5.16, etc.

concepts underwent. Moreover, the epistemological concepts of the *Pauṣkara* are eclectic. Besides those proper to the Śaiva school, the *Pauṣkara* holds views which are today identified as Sāṃkhya, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika or Mīmāṃsā tenets. Umāpati's approach (often from the point of view of a fully developed Nyāya doctrine) sometimes obliterates the specificity of certain *Pauṣkara* theories. For example, according to the *Pauṣkara*, doubt is an indefinite cognition, such as "The tallness which I perceive, belongs to a man or a pillar", in which the mind cannot decide between two objects which are recalled on the perception of a common feature. This definition, similar to those of the ancient texts, refers to the presence of two substantives (man and pillar) in doubt, and to its character of uncertainty.¹ Umāpati interprets the *Pauṣkara* definition of doubt as a cognition of multiple contradictory features in an object, for example, "This (object which I perceive) is either a man or a pillar", where the reference is to the incompatible nature of two possibilities (being a man or a pillar) with regard to the same substantive (referred to by "this").

Umāpati's commentary on the *pramāṇapaṭala* is extensive. He elaborates topics such as the definitions of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) and authoritative statement (*āptokti*), which are explained briefly in the *pramāṇapaṭala*. He supplies arguments which prove the existence of indeterminate cognition (*nirvikalpakapratyakṣa*), inherence (*samavāya*), cyclic destruction of the universe (*pralaya*), etc. He also introduces certain modifications to the theories of the *Pauṣkara*. For instance, according to Umāpati, the causes which produce doubt are three and not, as affirmed by the *Pauṣkara*, one. He classifies inference (*anumāna*), refers to many fallacies of proposition (*pratijñābhāsa*) and example

¹ For example, the *Prasastapādabhāṣya*, p. 174: *ubhayāvalambī vi-marśaḥ saṃśayaḥ*, and p. 239: *saṃśayotpattau viśayadvaitadarśanaṃ kāraṇaṃ*; *Nyāyasāra*, p. 12: *anavadhāraṇajñānaṃ saṃśayaḥ*.

(*drṣṭāntābhāsa*) which are not discussed in the *Pauṣkara*. He reinterprets the set of fallacious reasons (*hetvābhāsa*) described in the *Pauṣkara* and redefines some of them. He treats subjects such as the validity of cognition (*pramāṇya*), perception of absence (*abhāvapratyakṣa*), inference as an independent *pramāṇa* (*anumānapramāṇya*), means to cognize pervasion (*vyāptigrahopāya*), etc., which are not dealt with in the *Pauṣkara*. He discusses *anyathākhyāti*, criticises *bhedāgrahakhyāti* and other theories of error. He does not explicitly discuss the *pramāṇa* named non-apprehension (*abhāva*), but supplies arguments which prove that verbal testimony (*śabda*) is an independent *pramāṇa*, and shows how comparison (*upamāna*) could be subsumed in verbal testimony (*śabda*) or in inference (*anumāna*), inclusion (*saṃbhava*) in inference, and finally, tradition (*aitihya*) in verbal testimony, thus confirming the four-*pramāṇa* thesis.

Umāpati twice distinguishes between the point of view of the accepted doctrine (*siddhānta*) and that of the *Pauṣkara* in his commentary on the *pramāṇapaṭala*.¹ The *Pauṣkara* defines perception as the sense-object contact. But Umāpati states that according to the accepted doctrine, consciousness (*cit-śakti*), delimited by the intellectual operation (*buddhivṛtti*) produced by the sense-object contact, is perception, and not the insentient sense-object contact. While the connection of the senses with objects is sixfold according to the *Pauṣkara*, Umāpati specifies that it is fourfold according to the accepted doctrine.

Umāpati's reference to the tenets of the *Pauṣkara* as others' doctrine (*paramata, matāntara*), which he distinguishes from the accepted doctrine (*siddhānta*) on the one hand and from his own position (*svamata*)² on the other,

¹ On *Pauṣkara* 7.32-36^a.

² For example, on 6.242, p. 453-454; on 4.48^a, p. 238 (refers also to *paramasiddhānta* that is, the ultimate accepted doctrine); on 7.50 (Umāpati qualifies the *Pauṣkara* view as *svamata*), etc.

raises questions about the place of the *Pauṣkara* in the Śaiva and other philosophical schools, the identity of Umāpati's own tradition, the relevance of the *Pauṣkarabhāṣya* to Śaivism, and so forth. The position of the *Pauṣkara* cannot be precisely situated in the Śaiva tradition with regard to its epistemological concepts, for discussions on this subject are too brief in the other published Śaiva Tantras. It is also difficult to assess the authority of the commentaries on Tantras and of Śaiva manuals in this matter. For example, Śrīkumāra cites a *Bhūtaśuddhitāntra* verse according to which the Śaivas, like the Sāṃkhyas, follow the *anyathākhyāti* theory of error.¹ But he goes on to explain that the word *sāṃkhya* in the verse refers to *śeṣvarasāṃkhya*, that is Yoga. While the similarity of the Śaiva ontology with that of Sāṃkhya is well known, the nature of the Śaiva epistemology in relation to other schools remains to be studied. Moreover, as pointed out by Dvivedī, the *Bhūtaśuddhitāntra* statement is enigmatic because *anyathākhyāti* is generally attributed to the Naiyāyikas.²

No information with regard to the sectarian affiliation of Umāpati emerges from his commentary. He does not appear to be a zealous devotee of Śiva. He employs plain expressions such as *mūlakāra*³ and *granthakāra*⁴ to refer to the author of the *Pauṣkara*. He seems to be well acquainted with the doctrine and literature of the Śaiva and other philosophical schools. He refers to Śālikanātha, Bhoja and Trilocanaśiva in his commentary on the *pramāṇapaṭala*. He cites in the same chapter, without attribution, from the *Tārīkarakṣā*, *Śrībhāṣya*, *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, *Prakarāṇapañcikā*, *Pramāṇavārttikā*, *Vākyapadīya*, *Svāyaṃbhūva*, *Nyāya-*

¹ See *Tātparyadīpikā*, p. 41: *anythākhyām upāśritya sāṃkhyavac chivaśāsanam*.

² Dvivedī, *Aṣṭaprakarāṇa*, Introduction, p. 11. But compare *Pauṣkara* 7.6^a with *Yogasūtra* 1.8 and see *PauṣkaraBh* on 7.6^a.

³ Whose thesis he rejects in *PauṣkaraBh* on 6.44^a, p. 371.

⁴ See, for example, *PauṣkaraBh*, pp. 305, 306, etc.

sūtra, *Suprabhedā*, *Ratnatrayaparīkṣā* and, with attribution, from the *Nyāyāmṛta*, *Mataṅgapārameśvara*, *Vāyavyasaṃhitā*, *Mrgendra* and *Siddhāntasārāvalī*. He also cites the *Chāndogya*- and *Śvetāśvatara-upaniṣads* and the *Sūtasamhitā*. The nature of Umāpati's commentary on the *pramāṇapaṭala* also raises further questions. Does Umāpati represent a specific Śaiva group, or a school of logic with a penchant for Śaiva religion? Was the Śaiva milieu of that period such that it could accommodate different points of view on the same logical issue, some of them even in conflict with the general Śaiva doctrine? For example, the thesis that the validity of a cognition is produced from extraneous causes is clearly in contradiction with the *satkāryavāda*, which is considered to be a fundamental principle of the Śaiva philosophy.

The *Pauṣkarapramāṇapaṭala* is taken up for translation not only because it is an important source of information on the subject of Śaiva epistemology, but also because it contains significant uncommon elements valuable for the study of early Indian logic. Umāpati's commentary is chosen because of its dialectical character. The translation is as literal as possible because it aims at accuracy, especially with regard to the technical aspects of arguments, rather than elegance. The translation of the *Pauṣkara* verses follows Umāpati's interpretation. The printed text (Cidambaram, 1925, Grantha script) appears to be generally coherent, though a fresh look at the manuscripts could benefit some passages and, certified beyond all doubts of interpolation,¹ the text would confirm Umāpati as the author of the proposed innovations.

¹ For example, the alternative explanation of *Pauṣkara* 7.72 about the evolution of speech from bindu, interwoven with *paśyanti*, *madhyamā*, etc., appears to be problematic. Some text seems to be missing in the discussion on śabda as an independent pramāṇa in *PauṣkaraBh* on 7.60^a. The inclusion of a variety of fallacies of examples in the commentary on 7.58^b-59 seems suspect.

This translation intends to bring out an important aspect of the Śaiva doctrine to those who are not well versed in Sanskrit, and to facilitate comparative studies on Śaiva epistemology from Sanskrit and Tamil sources. Epistemological discussions in the *Civañānacittiyār*, a 13th century Śaiva doctrinal work written in Tamil, established epistemology as an important subject in Śaiva doctrinal works in Tamil. Not only is the *Civañānacittiyār* said to be based on Sanskrit texts,¹ but also several of its 16th century commentators, Vedajña, Śivāgrayogin, Jñānaprakāśa, and others wrote doctrinal treatises in Tamil and Sanskrit. A comparative study of these works in the light of the pre-13th century Śaiva Sanskrit works would give an objective picture of the history of the Śaiva doctrine.

The present work is a mere translation with explanatory footnotes. No attempt is made at an analytical or comparative study because the rich material, epistemological and doctrinal, contained in the *pramāṇapaṭala* and its commentary calls for an extensive study which oversteps the scope of this work.

Brief remarks about the nature of the individual self and cognition according to the *Pauṣkara*

Some doctrines of the *Pauṣkara* may be recalled here for a better comprehension of its discussion of *pramāṇas*. According to the *Pauṣkara*, the individual self is omniscient, omnipotent, all-pervasive, subtle and similar to, but not identical with, Śiva. It is said to be bound when its natural state is obstructed by *mala* or *paśutva*.² Bound selves are of three kinds: *sakala* is the self whose capacities are obstructed by *mala*, which is furnished with a cognitive and conative

¹ Devasenapathi, *Śaiva Siddhānta*, p. 5.

² *Pauṣkara* 4.1-2^a: *paśuḥ paśutvasamyogāt na muktaḥ paśur ucyate / yasmāt svadrkkriyāśālī kalāhīne py anīśvaraḥ // vyāpakaś cinmayas sūkṣmaś śivavat saṃvyavasthitaḥ*; 114^a: *niruddhaṃ yena sārvañjīyaṃ sa malaḥ paripaṭhyate*.

apparatus by *māyā* (the material cause of the impure realm), and which is forced by its karma to function in the universe created out of *māyā*. The self whose capacities are obstructed by *mala*, but which is dissociated from *māyā*'s creation due to the dissolution of the universe or due to the annihilation of its matured karma, is the *pralayākala* self. *Vijñānākala* is the self which is free from the limitations created by *māyā* and karma but in which some traces of *mala* persist.¹

Only the *sakala*, whose beginningless natural *mala* attracts further bondage (*pāśa*) consisting of *kalā*, etc. from *māyā* and which undergoes experience in the universe helped by this bondage, has the 'state of being an individual' (*pumstva*) and is named 'person' (*puruṣa*). Neither the *vijñānākala* which lives in the pure path which transcends *māyā*, nor the *pralayākala* which exists in the state in which the evolutes of *māyā* are dissolved, is the knower described in the *pramāṇapaṭala*; for they have neither the instruments to know and act provided by *māyā*, nor the objects of cognition and action also supplied by *māyā*.² The liberated self too is not a 'person' because it is beyond the pure and impure realms created respectively by *bindu* and *māyā*.

The cognitive and conative apparatus of the *sakala* consists of *kalā*, *vidyā*, *rāga*, *kāla* and *niyati*,³ which are the subtle creation of *māyā*. These are specific to each self and

¹ *Pauṣkara* 4.2^b-6^a.

² *Pauṣkara* 6.1^b-3: *pañcakañcukasamyuktaḥ prakṛtiṃ bhoktum udyataḥ // avidyādisamāyuktaḥ puruṣaḥ parikīrtitaḥ / na vijñānākalas tena nāpi pralayaakevalaḥ // puruṣākhyāṃ labhed yasmān nāvidyādivivarjitaḥ / tasmāt sakala evānūr labhate puruṣāhvayam*.

³ While *niyati* and *kāla* could be translated respectively as 'destiny' and 'time', the other three terms can hardly be rendered by a single word because they are complex concepts. Thus, *kalā* is the 'remover' (of the obstruction produced by *mala* to the self's capacity to act); *vidyā* is the 'revealer' (of *buddhivṛtti* that is, cognition, to the self); *rāga* is '(the manifestor of the self's capacity to) attachment'. These functions are also partial and temporary; because, if *kalā* were to destroy *mala*-obstruction completely and for ever, the self would become omnipotent, and so on.

constitute its bondage.¹ Nevertheless, they favour the self, for *kalā* restrains the mala which obstructs the capacity of action of the bound self; *vidyā* helps the self to cognize the function of the intellect, as well as the objects which feature in it. These two, namely *kalā* and *vidyā*, allow the self to act and know in the world according to its karma.² *Rāga* lifts the obstruction to the faculty of attachment of the self. It thus impels the self to crave for objects and to undergo experience.³ Finally, *niyati* connects the self to the results of its karma and, along with *kāla*, forces the self activated by *kalā*, *vidyā* and *rāga*, to experience as destined and timed by its karma.⁴ These operate together to help the self to exhaust its karma. *Kalā* and *vidyā* are connected on the one hand with *rāga*, which associates the self to the world, and on the other, with *kāla* and *niyati* which make the operation of *kalā*, *vidyā* and *rāga* viable. *Māyā* also provides *prakṛti* and its evolutes which produce the senses, etc., which constitute the gross cognitive and conative apparatus specific to each *sakala* self.⁵ Thus, the *sakala* self is a knower of objects only

¹ Pauṣkara 5.1-2^a: *atha pāsāḥ puroddiṣṭāś śrūyatām munipuṅgavāḥ / kalā vidyā ca rāgaś ca kālo niyatir eva ca // pañcāitāni ca tattvāni māyeyāni dvijottamāḥ*; 5.21^b: *kalāvidyāvayavau bandhau kartur evopakāraḥ*.

² Pauṣkara 5.2^b-5^a: *malān sarvān manāḥ bhitvā caitanyaprasarātmanah // caitanyavyañjikā hy atra kalā malanivartanāt / caitanyam jñātva-kartṛtvarūpaṁ tad balam ātmanah // kalayā vyajyate tat tu tasyaiva hi tiraskṛtam / sarvātmanā kalā naitac caitanyam vyañjayaty aṇoḥ // kim tu karmānusāreṇa kalā vṛtyaikadeśataḥ*; 5.9: *kalayā kartṛbhūtasya buddhilakṣaṇakarmanah / ālokane yat kārṇam sā vidyā śivaśāśane*.

³ Pauṣkara 5.22-23^a: *pravṛttasya prasaktyartham api rāgaḥ pravartate / bhogābhāvād asaktasya bhuñjānasya malimasān // bhogān atṛptes tasyātaḥ kartur evopakārū*.

⁴ Pauṣkara 5.23^b-24: *kālāḥ pravṛttam evāṇum kalayaty ātmavṛttibhiḥ / niyatīś ca tathā karmaphale niyamayaty aṇum / tasmān niyatikālau ca sthītau kartrūpakāraḥ*.

⁵ Pauṣkara 3.60^b-61: *māyāto dvividhā sṛṣṭiḥ sthūlā sūkṣmātmikety api // drkchaktivyañjikā sūkṣmā sthīṭā tattvātmanātmāni / sthūlā bhuvana-rūpeṇa śarīrādyātmanā sthīṭā*; 4.18^b-19^a: *sakalās tu kalāyogāt sūkṣmā sthūlā ca sā dvividhā // pratipuṇniyatam tattvaṁ kalādyavani-pāścimam*.

when it is an actor, possesses instruments of experience, is attached to objects of cognition and action created by *māyā*, exists in time, and is guided by its destiny to experience according to its karma.

The capacity to know (*jñātṛtva*), together with the capacity to act (*kartṛtva*), is the natural property of the self. It forms its very consciousness (*caitanya*)¹; the self remains a knower and doer even when its capacity is obstructed by mala. It should be noted that the *Pauṣkara* distinguishes two aspects of consciousness: capacity (*śakti*) and function (*kārya*).² Bondage affects neither the self nor its consciousness, it merely prevents the capacity of consciousness from functioning, thus preventing the self from knowing and acting. But these functions are regained, though temporarily and in a limited manner, in bondage with the help of *māyā*.

The cognitive capacity which is consciousness of the self, is also as eternal and all-pervasive as the self; the self knows itself and everything else. The *Pauṣkara* declares that this awareness cannot belong to the intellect (*buddhi*) because, being constituted of inert *prakṛti*, the intellect cannot know itself. And, as the manifestor of objects, intellect is logically proved to be different from the self for which it manifests objects. It cannot be said that the cognitive capacity of the self is reflected in the intellect. If the insentient intellect were to reflect the cognitive capacity of the self, it would become conscious and the self, then reduced to a reflection, would cease to be conscious. Moreover, only tangible entities can be reflected. The formless self cannot be reflected in the insentient intellect, neither can the insentient intellect be reflected in the self. Nor can it be said that the capacity to know is superimposed on the self, for superimposition

¹ Pauṣkara 5.3^b: *caitanyam jñātvakartṛtvarūpaṁ tad balam ātmanah*.

² Pauṣkara 4.163^b: *śaktir eva na kartavyam śaktidrkkriyayor yataḥ*.

implies the pre-existence, elsewhere, of the superimposed attributes; awareness, however, is found only in the self.¹

The cognitive capacity (also known as *cit-śakti*) of the self is said to be the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) because it procures awareness of objects for the self. The self, helped by its *cit-śakti* activated by *kalā*, etc., cognizes the operation of its intellect (*buddhivṛtti*, also called *jñāna*²) and becomes aware of the objects featuring in it. According to the *Pauṣkara*, the role of the senses is to fetch sensation (*ālocana*), which is an awareness devoid of all particularities (*vikalpavidhura*). The function of the mind (*manas*) is to focus attention on a particular sensation (*vikalpa*), thus preventing simultaneous cognition of multiple objects, and to recognize, helped by past experience, that the attributes featuring in awareness belong to a particular object (*samkalpa*). The mind also supplies the name of the object learnt in the past. The object seized by the mind is then appropriated, i.e. connected with the self (*grāhakasamgati*) by the egoity (*ahamkāra*) and finally, it is apprehended by the intellect.³ Although the intellect cognizes an object, it is not aware of itself because it is made up of the *sattva* element of inert *prakṛti*. The self, which is conscious, is aware of itself, of the cognizing intellect and of the object cognized by the intellect.⁴ While the intellect cognizes an object by means of the senses, mind, etc., the self cognizes this cognition of the intellect through its subtler cognitive apparatus consisting of *kalā*, *vidyā*, etc., and becomes aware of the object featuring in it.

¹ *Pauṣkara* 4.93-100.

² *Pauṣkara* 6.49^a: *dharmo jñānam ca vairāgyam aiśvaryaṃ buddhivṛttayah*.

³ See *Pauṣkara* 6.204^b-210.

⁴ *Pauṣkara* 6.43^b-44^a: *bodho 'tra dvividho bhāvo vyavasāyātmakas tathā // ādya 'nadyavasāyātmā vyavasāyātmakas tu yaḥ / sā buddhir itaras tv ātmasvabhāvo grāhakātmanah*; 4.95^a: *paraprakāśakatvaṃ ca nityaṃ nityaguno yataḥ*; 4.100^b: *jñātrtvam api tan nityaṃ dharmatvān nityavastunaḥ*. See also *Pauṣkara* 6.204^b-210.

The *Pauṣkara* refers to a kind of perception which arises independent of *kalā*, the senses, etc., and which is natural to the self's consciousness free from *mala*. According to Umāpati, it is twofold: the self-awareness of the liberated self and its intuition of Śiva. The *Pauṣkara*, however, does not explicitly refer to the nature of the cognition of the liberated self. It merely states that Śiva is to be reached through the knowledge of Śiva (*patijñāna*), and that Śiva is the only means.¹

A short summary of the *Pauṣkarapramāṇapaṭala* and Umāpati's commentary on it

The *pramāṇa paṭala* of the *Pauṣkara* begins with the request of the sages (headed by Sanatkumāra) to the Lord (Śrīkaṇṭha) to explain to them the nature of the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). They state that the six categories (*padārtha*) described in the earlier chapters would not be well apprehended if the means employed to cognize them were not known (verses 1-3^a).

The rest of the chapter forms Śrīkaṇṭha's reply, which explains the nature of *pramāṇas*. *Pramāṇas* are four: perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), verbal testimony (*śabda*) and presumption (*arthāpatti*). Consciousness-power (of the self) (*cit-śakti*) free from doubt, etc., is *pramāṇa* (3^b-5^a).

According to Umāpati, the statement that Śaivism recognizes three *pramāṇas*, namely *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *śabda*, implies that *anumāna* *pramāṇa* includes *arthāpatti* *pramāṇa*. He defines *pramāṇa* as the consciousness of the self (*cit-śakti*) delimited by a valid intellectual operation (*buddhivṛtti* that is, cognition), and undertakes a detailed discussion of the validity of cognition (*prāmāṇya*) and of the apprehension (*jñapti*) and origination (*utpatti*) of this validity. He rejects the definitions of validity based on the

¹ *Pauṣkara* 1.94^a: *patijñānaikagamyo 'yaṃ patis tad dhetur eva ca*.

correspondence between an object and its cognition (*arthasādrśya*), those based on the absence of contradiction (*arthāvyabhicāritva*), and those based on the notions of qualifier (*prakāra*) and substantive (*viśeṣya*). Some of these definitions fail in the case of partially valid cognitions (for example, an erroneous cognition which is valid with regard to the substrate) and in the case of the cognition of an object partly pervaded by the qualifier (such as the cognition of a connected object because contact, which is the qualifier here, exists only in a part of the connected objects). Other definitions of validity, constituted of the object-qualifier relation in positive and negative terms, also prove to be defective. According to Umāpati, the validity of a cognition signifies the apprehension of an object as qualified by a qualifier which belongs to the object, and which is cognized as related to the object by the very relation existing between the object and the qualifier.

Umāpati declares that the validity of a cognition is known intrinsically (*svataḥ*), that the invalidity of a cognition is known extrinsically (*parataḥ*) and that the validity of a cognition is produced extrinsically. The validity of a cognition is known by the same means which cognizes that cognition; for when the mind knows a cognition in the introspective cognition (*anuvyavasāya*), it also knows the validity of that cognition. Umāpati defends this thesis of intrinsic validity against the critics and refutes the theory that the validity of cognition is known extrinsically (*parataḥ*) by inference (*anumāna*). The invalidity (*aprāmāṇya*) of cognition, however, is known extrinsically (*parataḥ*), i.e. through inference. As regards the origination (*utpatti*) of validity in cognition, it is extrinsic (*parataḥ*) because it is produced by certain causes which are different from the general causes which produce cognition. Thus, the conjunction of the senses with all aspects of the object (*bhūyo'vayavendriya-sannikarṣa*) produces validity in perceptual cognition. The

cognition of non-contradiction (*abādhitatva*), or the cognition which has a reason as its qualifier (*hetu-prakāra*) and 'something possessing the thing to be proved (by that reason)' as its substantive (*sādhyavad-viśeṣyaka*), produces truth in inferential cognition. True cognition of the meaning of the utterances of the speaker (*vaktṛvākyārtha-yathārthajñāna*) produces validity in verbal cognition.

According to the *Pauṣkara*, doubt (*saṁśaya*) is a cognition based on two entities due to the perception of a feature common to both of them. Error (*viparyaya*) is the cognition of an object (for example, a piece of shell) as possessing a form (for example, silver) which does not belong to it. Memory (*smṛti*) is the cognition of objects experienced in the past. Cit-śakti, which is not delimited by these, is the means of knowledge (5^b-7^a). Umāpati introduces two more causes, perception of special features (*asādhāraṇadharmadarśana*) and cognition of contradictory statements (*vipratipatti-śravaṇa*), which produce doubt. He defines error as a cognition which has a particular attribute (for example, silverness) as its qualifier (*prakāra*) while having something devoid of that attribute (for example, shell), as its object (*viśeṣya*). He identifies the theory of error defined in the *Pauṣkara* as *anyathākhyātivāda* (generally ascribed to the Naiyāyikas), and defends it against the criticism of those who hold *bhedāgrahavāda* (attributed to the Prābhākaras).

According to the Prābhākaras, error is not a single cognition but two cognitions which are understood to be one due to the non-apprehension of the difference between the two (*bhedāgraha*). For example, in the perception of a piece of shell as silver, the person desirous of silver cognizes the shell in its general form, that is to say as brilliant, etc., and not in its specific characteristics which differentiate it from another brilliant object like silver. At the same time, influenced by this general feature, the cognizer remembers silver, and due to the absence of discrimination between perception and

remembrance, picks up the shell thinking it to be silver. Thus, non-apprehension of difference induces exertion in error. The *anyathākhyātivādin*, however, believes that the cognition qualified by the features of a desired object (silver in the above example) induces action in error because such qualified cognition (*viśiṣṭajñāna*) is the inducer to all action. The *bhedāgrahāvādin* disagrees because, according to him, the features of an object (here, silver) which is absent at the time of error, cannot be perceived. Umāpati points out that if non-apprehension of difference induced exertion in error, it would lead to an illogical situation in which a person would act and simultaneously refrain from acting. For example, in the erroneous cognition "these are silver and shell" about a shell and silver, a person would pick up the shell because the non-apprehension of difference from the desired object (namely, silver) is present. At the same time, he would not pick up the shell, because the non-apprehension of difference from the undesired object (namely, shell) is also present.

Umāpati refutes the theory of error of the Dvaitins that a non-existent (*asat*) silver appears as existent in the shell, that of the Viśiṣṭādvaitins that the silver perceived in the shell is real (*sat*), that of the Buddhists (*ātmakhyātivādins*) that the silver, which is mental (*jñānākāra*), appears as if external in the shell and, finally, the theory of the Advaitins that the silver perceived in the shell is neither real nor unreal (*sad-asadvilakṣaṇa*).

Umāpati specifies that memory is the cognition produced not directly from an experience (as is stated in the *Pauṣkara*), but from the impressions (*saṃskāra*) left by an experience. According to him, hypothetical argument (*tarka*) is a kind of error. He explains that the word 'consciousness-power' (*cit-śakti*) in the definition of *pramāṇa* prevents the overpervasion of the definition with regard to the self which is the conscious possessor of that power.

The *Pauṣkara* states that the word 'cit-śakti' in the definition of *pramāṇa* refers to the object-directed consciousness of the self, and not to the other consciousness (7^b). According to Umāpati, the distinction here is between the consciousness which is directed towards objects, and the consciousness which is prevented from turning outwards due to mala-obstruction.

The consciousness which is the knower is not object-directed, while the consciousness which is the means of knowledge is directed outwards (8^a).

Producing the state of being an object of cognition (*prameyabhāva*), etc. in the object is the result of *pramāṇa*. (8^b). This replies to the objection that if knowledge, which constitutes knowing (*jñapti*), were the *pramāṇa*, the distinction between the means of knowing (*pramāṇa*) and the result of knowing (*pramiti*) would disappear, and as a consequence, there would be nothing which would correspond to an object of knowing (*prameya*). Umāpati explains that *cit-śakti* brings objects to the awareness of the knower and reveals them. And this is the result, which is different from the means. Thus *cit-śakti*, which is directed to objects and delimited by intellectual operation in the form of objects, is the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*); the self which possesses such *cit-śakti* is the knower (*pramātṛ*); objects like pot are the objects of knowledge (*prameya*); and the operation of *cit-śakti*, which consists of forging an object-cognition relation and creating awareness about an object, is the result (*phala*) of *pramāṇa*.

The *Pauṣkara* declares that its definition of *pramāṇa* is free from the three possible defects of definition, namely underpervasion, overpervasion and impossibility; the definition applies to *pramāṇas* like perception (which are the entities to be defined), and does not apply to objects of knowledge, etc. (which are not intended to be defined by it) (9-11^a).

Having defined *pramāṇa*, the *Pauṣkara* refutes the definitions proposed by others. An instrument of cognition (*pramiti-sādhana*) cannot be held to be a *pramāṇa* because instruments of cognition such as the intellect, senses, etc., would also have to be accepted as *pramāṇas*, but these are objects of cognition, not means of cognition. A *pramāṇa* is not something to be known through a *pramāṇa*, whereas objects like sound are known through a *pramāṇa*. Inversely, an object cannot be a *pramāṇa*, because only that through which an object is known can be a *pramāṇa*. (11^b-13). The common verbal usage "I see with my eyes" only signifies that the instruments of cognition such as eyes are auxiliary to *pramāṇas*; it does not prove that they are *pramāṇas* (14^a). Umāpati explains that although the intellect, senses, lamps, etc. participate in the cognitive process, they cannot be accepted as *pramāṇas*. In fact, *anumāna*, *śabda*, etc. are said to be *pramāṇas* only figuratively, for *cit-śakti* alone is the *pramāṇa* in reality. It is referred to as different *pramāṇas* depending on the limiting adjuncts which are the modes in the cognitive process. Thus, *cit-śakti* is known as *pratyakṣa* when the operation of the senses is the instrument, as *anumāna* when the cognition of pervasion (*vyāpti-jñāna*) is the instrument, and so on.

According to the *Pauṣkara*, only that of which the absence leads to the absence of cognition should be accepted as *pramāṇa*. The senses cannot be *pramāṇa* because they are not indispensable towards all cognition. They cognize only those objects which come within the range of their capacity; the eye can see, it cannot hear; the ear can hear, it cannot see. *Cit-śakti*, on the other hand, is fit to be *pramāṇa* because it is the means to all types of cognition. It is proved to be indispensable towards all cognition because cognition arises only when it functions and nothing is known when it does not function (14^b-16).

The *Pauṣkara* declares that although intellect (*buddhi*) is the ultimate means to all kinds of cognition, it too cannot be *pramāṇa* because, being a product of *prakṛti*, it is as insentient as the senses. Moreover, intellect is not exclusively a means of cognition because it also becomes an object of cognition when it is cognized in the form of happiness, sorrow, etc. by the self (17-19^a). Umāpati agrees that the intellect apprehends that which is sensed by the senses and determined by the mind. Yet, it cannot be considered to be *pramāṇa* (in the Śaiva doctrine) because it too becomes an object of cognition for the self. Moreover, it is not an indispensable means to all cognitions since *vidyā*, and not the intellect, is the instrument that cognizes the function of the intellect. Although *cit-śakti* too becomes an object of cognition through inference, etc., unlike objects and the intellect, which would remain unknown if they were not revealed by a *pramāṇa*, *cit-śakti* does not depend on another means to prove its existence, because it is self-luminous consciousness.

It could be said that although the senses, etc. cannot individually be *pramāṇas*, the totality of these cognitive causes (*sāmagrī*) could be *pramāṇa*, since cognition arises when all the causes which produce cognition, namely the knower, the object, the senses, etc. are present. The *Pauṣkara* rejects this thesis on the grounds that if *pramāṇa* was comprised of these, it would not be possible to distinguish the knower from the object, etc. It cannot be claimed that they are *pramāṇa* collectively, and the knower, etc., individually; for a totality does not exist over and above the collected. That which is never found separated from something, is not different from it; like one's own nature. The *Pauṣkara* concludes that only *cit-śakti*, which is free from doubt, etc., should be accepted as *pramāṇa* (19^b-22). Umāpati discusses and rejects the definition of the Bhāṭṭas that *pramāṇa* is the means to the cognition of a previously unknown entity, that of the Prābhākaras that all experience is

pramāṇa, and that of the Buddhists that uncontradicted cognition, namely the cognition which produces a successful activity, is pramāṇa.

Conjunctions of cit-śakti with objects through the senses are said to be perception (*adhyakṣa*). It may be objected that since cit-śakti cannot conjoin with objects by itself (due to obstruction by mala), its contact with objects requires some other means. The *Pauṣkara* admits that cit-śakti cannot conjoin with objects by itself in the state of bondage. But when it conjoins with objects with the help of instruments like *kalā*, it is called perception (*pratyakṣa*), since the connection occurs through the senses. Sense-object conjunctions themselves cannot be perception because, devoid of consciousness, they are incapable of producing awareness about anything (23-26). Umāpati adds that neither the senses, nor *kalā* and other constituents of the cognitive apparatus can be accepted as pramāṇas because they too are insentient.

The same cit-śakti, which is perception, is said to be twofold on account of its connection with determining factors: the cognition of mere objects (*vastusvarūpamātra*) is indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka*) and the cognition of objects together with their connection with determining factors like name, universal, etc. (*nāmajātyādisambandhasahita*) is determinate perception (*savikalpaka*) (27-28^a). Umāpati states that *nirvikalpakapratyakṣa* cannot be known through perception, but can be inferred to be the perception which invariably precedes all determinate perception. Its existence is proved thus: since all qualified cognition (*viśiṣṭajñāna*) is produced through the cognition of the qualification (*viśeṣajñāna*), determinate perception, which is a qualified cognition, is also produced from the cognition of the qualification. And this cognition of qualification, which produces determinate cognition, is argued to be indeterminate because if it were determinate, it would have

to be preceded by another cognition of qualification, thus leading to infinite regress.

In this context, he discusses the cognition of absence which is a determinate cognition qualified by absence (*abhāvaviśiṣṭa-jñāna*). Since an absence invariably refers to an absent entity (namely, the counterpositive), all cognitions of absence presuppose the cognition of the counterpositive. Consequently, the cognition of absence cannot be preceded by a cognition of qualification which is indeterminate. Umāpati mentions two views in this regard. The first accepts that the cognition of absence could be produced from a cognition which is determinate. The second holds that the cognition of the counterpositive is necessary only for the cognition which has absenceness as the qualifier (*abhāvatva-prakāra*) and not for the cognition which grasps absence as "this" that is, without reference to its determinate and negative nature. Thus, an indeterminate cognition of absence could arise which could produce a determinate cognition of absence. Umāpati also refers to the theory of those who believe, to escape the above difficulty, that a qualified cognition need not be produced from the cognition of the qualification (*viśeṣajñāna*). It could also be produced from the cognition of the substantive (*viśeṣajñāna*). Umāpati presents another argument (which may be attributed to the Vaiśeṣikas) which proves the existence of indeterminate perception: since every determinate cognition is delineated by speech which (speech) can neither be perceived nor inferred during the cognition, it is assumed that there is a pre-cognition in which a bare awareness of the object arises, which (object) revives the memory of the word signifying that object. And this pre-cognition, which supplies the word that appears in determinate cognition as inseparably connected with the object, is indeterminate perception.

Perception is also threefold according to another mode of classification: 'dependent on the senses' (*indriya-sāpekṣa*),

'non-dependent on the senses' (*indriya-nirapekṣa*) and 'dependent on the internal organ' (*antahkaraṇa-sāpekṣa*). 'Non-dependent on the senses' is the natural conjunction with the infinite being by the cit-śakti which is absolutely free from bondage (28^b-30^a). Umāpati explains that since the cit-śakti of the released self is free from mala-obstruction, it perceives itself and others without the help of the senses, mind, etc. The intuition of Śiva by the self, however, occurs through a special capacity bestowed on it by Śiva.

'Dependent on the senses' is the perception in which cit-śakti requires the senses, etc. to connect with objects through the operation of the senses. 'Dependent on the internal organ' arises when the external senses are overcome and cit-śakti perceives objects fit to be contemplated through the mind (30^b-32^a). Umāpati specifies that 'dependent on the internal organ' is twofold: the extraordinary perception of yogins and the perception of happiness, etc. by the bound self.

The connection of each sense, which is called perception (*adhyakṣa*), is sixfold: the perception of substances like a pot is through conjunction (*saṃyoga*) of the sense of sight; the perception of the quality (*guṇa*) and universal (*sāmānya*) is by inherence-in-what-is-conjoined (*saṃyukta-samavāya*); the perception of qualityness (*guṇatva*) is by inherence-in-what-is-inherent-in-what-is-conjoined (*saṃyukta-samaveta-samavāya*); the perception of sound is as inherent (*samaveta*) in the sense of hearing; soundness is perceived by inherence-in-what-is-inherent (*samavetārthasamavāya*); inherence and absence are cognized either as a qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) or as a substantive (*viśeṣya*) (32^b-36^a).

Umāpati declares that according to the accepted doctrine (*siddhānta*), the connection of the senses with objects cannot be considered as perception. It is called perception metaphorically because it helps cit-śakti to conjoin with objects. He further states that the declaration in the *Pauṣkara*

that the sense-object contact is sixfold is according to others' doctrine (*paramata*). It is fourfold according to the accepted doctrine (*siddhānta*) because sound and soundness are cognized through inherence-in-what-is-conjoined (*saṃyukta-samavāya*) and inherence-in-what-is-inherent-in-what-is-conjoined (*saṃyukta-samaveta-samavāya*) respectively. He defends the relation of inherence (*samavāya*) and presents the following reasoning to prove its existence: since the cognition of a qualified object is produced by the presence of a relation between the object and its qualification, the cognition of an object qualified by name, universal, etc. is also produced by a relation. The relation established by this inference cannot be conjunction (*saṃyoga*) because it only connects separable entities; so a relation which connects inseparable entities such as an object and its qualities must be accepted and that is inherence. Umāpati also discusses 'being qualified' (*vaiśiṣṭya*) (which is recognized by the Bhāṭṭas as a distinct contact) and rejects it. Some (who may be identified as the Prābhākaras) hold that 'being a qualification or a substantive' (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva*) need not be admitted as the connection in the perception of absence because absence is not different from the substrate, etc. where it is perceived. Some others (namely, the Bhāṭṭas) believe that although absence is a distinct category, it is not perceived but known through a specific pramāṇa named non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*). Umāpati refutes these two theories and proves that absence is different from its substrate, etc., and that it is perceived either as an object or as a qualification.

The pramāṇa called inference (*anumāna*) is the means to the cognition of mediate objects through a well-established pervasion (36^b). Umāpati reminds us that this is a metaphorical definition of *anumāna* pramāṇa. In fact, inference is cit-śakti delimited by the cognition of the presence of the reason (*hetu*) in the subject (*pakṣa*), which

(cognition) is qualified by the cognition of the pervasion (*vyāpti*). He also classifies *anumāna* into two: 'for oneself' (*svārtha*) and 'for others' (*parārtha*).

According to the *Pauṣkara*, *anumāna* consists of five members: proposition (*pratijñā*), reason (*hetu*), example (*drṣṭānta*), application (*upanaya*) and conclusion (*nigama*). *Pratijñā* is the declaration of the thing which is desired to be proved. *Hetu* is the elucidative statement of the reason which possesses pervasion. *Drṣṭānta* is that by which the reason (*liṅga*), positively and negatively connected to the thing to be proved (*sādhya*), is illustrated. *Upanaya* is the statement of the presence in the subject (*pakṣa*) of the reason (*hetu*) illustrated in the example (*drṣṭānta*). *Nigama* is the re-statement of the proposition (*pratijñā*) accompanied by the reason (37-39). Umāpati discusses the purpose of these five members and rejects the opinion of the Mīmāṃsakas who believe that inference consists of either the first three or the last three of the five members, and that of the Buddhists who hold that inference contains only two members, namely example and application.

The *Pauṣkara* defines pervasion (*vyāpti*) as the natural relation between the thing which proves (*sādhana*, i.e. reason) and the thing to be proved (*sādhya*) (40^a). Umāpati explains that a natural relation is that which is free from a vitiating condition (*upādhi*). Here, a condition-free relation signifies that the reason does not co-exist with an absence whose counterpositive is not the counterpositive of the absence co-existing with the thing to be proved. He also defines it as: the relation of the reason with the thing to be proved which (thing to be proved) has all the substrates of the reason as its substrate. Umāpati refutes the arguments of those who do not accept *anumāna* as an independent *pramāṇa*. Some believe that inference, which contains the cognition of pervasion, is not a *pramāṇa* because pervasion cannot be known. Umāpati replies that pervasion is

apprehended by perception aided by the cognition of the co-existence (*sahacāragrahasacivādhyakṣa*) between the reason and the thing to be proved, which (cognition of co-existence) is accompanied by the absence of the cognition of non-co-existence (*vyabhicārajñāna-viraha*). Some others believe that inference is not a *pramāṇa* because it only proves that which is already proved (*siddha-sādhana*). Umāpati rejects this criticism and concludes that it would not be possible for the opponent to prove that *anumāna* is not a *pramāṇa* without resorting to one.

Umāpati explains why comparison (*upamāna*) and inclusion (*sambhava*) need not be admitted as independent *pramāṇas*. *Upamāna* is defined by some as the means to the cognition of the relation of a word with the object meant by it. Umāpati points out that since this cognition depends on the cognition of similarity which is known from the statement of a trustworthy person, *upamāna* could be subsumed in *śabda pramāṇa*. *Upamāna* is defined by some others as the means to the cognition of the relation of a word with the universal of the object meant by that word, for example the relation of the word *gavaya* with *gavaya-hood*. Umāpati demonstrates how the same cognition could be derived though inference, and concludes that *upamāna* need not be accepted as a distinct *pramāṇa*. Inclusion (*sambhava*), which is defined as the means to the cognition of the presence of a part in a whole through the cognition of the whole, is not an independent *pramāṇa* either, because the cognition derived through *sambhava* could be known through *anumāna*.

Pervasion (*vyāpti*) is of two kinds: negative (*vyatireka*) and positive (*anvaya*). Positive pervasion is the connection of the thing to be proved (*sādhya*) with the reason (*sādhana*) through affirmation, and negative pervasion is the connection through negation (40^b-41).

Reason (*sādhana*) is of two kinds: 'seen' (*drṣṭa*) and 'generally-seen' (*sāmānyatodrṣṭa*). The former is that which gives rise to the inference of objects fit to be perceived by the senses, and the latter is that which gives rise to the inference of objects which are imperceptible by nature. According to another classification, reason (*sādhana*) is threefold: positive-negative (*anvayavyatirekin*), only-negative (*kevalavyatirekin*), and only-positive (*kevalānvayin*) (42-44^a). According to Umāpati, these refer to three kinds of inference, for he interprets the word *sādhana* as inference (*anumāna*). The *Pauṣkara*, however, does not mention any classification of inference.

The positive-negative reason is that which is the attribute of the subject, resides in a similar instance, is absent from a dissimilar instance, is not contradicted, and does not have a counterbalancing reason. Subject (*pakṣa*) is that which possesses the thing to be proved by the inference. Similar instance (*sapakṣa*) is that which has the same thing to be proved. Dissimilar instance (*vipakṣa*) is that which does not have that thing to be proved. Contradiction (*bādhā*) is the contrary proof obtained through another pramāṇa. The state of having a counterbalancing reason (*vipakṣatā*) arises when two reasons concerning the same subject are found to possess only three characteristics (of the five characteristics of the positive-negative reason) with regard to their respective things to be proved. Only-positive reason is that which is devoid of a dissimilar instance and only-negative reason is that which is devoid of a similar instance (44^b-47^a).

The reason of the inference "A particular place has fire; because it has smoke; like a kitchen" is positive-negative. "All (materials) become effects supervised by someone; because they are entities; like mud supervised by a potter" contains an only-positive reason (because a dissimilar instance, that is to say an entity which is created without being supervised by someone, does not exist which could

demonstrate a negative connection of the reason with the thing to be proved). "Every effect comes into existence only being (pre)existent (in its cause); because it is produced; an effect which is non-existent (in its cause), cannot be produced; like a hare's horn" contains an only-negative reason (since all effects are included in the subject of the inference, a similar instance cannot be shown which could demonstrate a positive connection of the reason with the thing to be proved) (47^b-49).

Fallacious reasons are classified into five by the *Pauṣkara*: unestablished (*asiddha*), contradictory (*viruddha*), deviating (*anaikāntika*), inconclusive (*anadhyavasāyika*) and time-lapsed (*kālātīta*). The fallacy of unestablishedness (*asiddhi*) arises when the presence of the reason (*hetu*) in the subject (*pakṣa*) is not certain. The unestablishedness of the reason in the inference "Atoms are the cause; because they are eternal" is due to the nature of the reason (since atoms are non-eternal according to Śaivism, the reason 'being eternal' is absent in 'atoms', the subject of the inference). Corresponding fallacies arise due to the unestablishedness of the attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*), substantive (*viśeṣya*), etc. (50-51). Umāpati subsumes inconclusive reason (*anadhyavasāyika*) in deviating reason (*anaikāntika*), and recognizes 'identical with the question' (*prakaraṇasama*), which is not mentioned in the *Pauṣkara*, as a fallacious reason. His definition of several fallacies differs from those of the *Pauṣkara*; he also adds several sub-varieties which are not mentioned in the *Pauṣkara*. Umāpati classifies *asiddhi* into four varieties: 'unestablishedness due to the nature of the reason' (*svarūpā-siddhi*), 'due to the pervasion' (*vyāpyatvāsiddhi*), 'due to the subject' (*āśrayāsiddhi*), and 'due to the cognition of the reason, pervasion and subject of the inference' (*jñānāsiddhi*). 'Unestablishedness due to pervasion' is twofold: caused by the absence of the means to know the pervasion, and caused by the presence of a vitiating condition (*upādhi*). He

includes the fallacies which arise due to the attribute and substantive of the reason in *svarūpāsiddhi* and those due to the attribute, etc. of the subject, in *āśrayāsiddhi*.

The reason which is present in the subject (*pakṣa*) and a dissimilar instance (*vipakṣa*) is contradictory (*viruddha*). The reason is contradictory in the inference "The pervading is not all-pervasive; because it is not limited by space" (the reason 'being not limited by space' is found both in the subject and in the dissimilar instance; for example, the all-pervasive self is a dissimilar instance because it lacks non-pervasion) (52). Umāpati defines contradictory as the reason which resides only in a dissimilar instance.

Deviating (*anaikāntika*) is the reason which is present in the subject (*pakṣa*), the similar (*sapakṣa*) and dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa*). It is illustrated by the inference "The self is eternal; because it is knowable" (since everything is knowable, the reason is found in everything which could be the subject, the similar and dissimilar instances) (53). According to Umāpati, deviating reason (which he calls *avyabhicāra*) is three-fold: too general (*sādhāraṇa*), inconclusive (*anadhyavasita*) and too specific (*asādhāraṇa*). The deviating reason (*anaikāntika*) mentioned in the *Pauṣkara* is an independent fallacy, but Umāpati identifies it as the too general deviating reason (*sādhāraṇa-savyabhicāra*).

According to the *Pauṣkara*, inconclusive (*anadhyavasāyika*), the fourth fallacious reason, is that which is present only in the subject; it does not lead to the thing to be proved (54"). In this half-verse, Umāpati finds the definitions of two varieties of deviating: *anadhyavasita* (inconclusive) and *asādhāraṇa* (too specific). According to him, inconclusive (*anadhyavasita*) is the reason which does not lead to the thing to be proved because its co-existence with the thing to be proved is not known, and too specific (*asādhāraṇa*) is the reason which resides only in the subject although it has a similar instance.

According to the *Pauṣkara*, the inference "The universe exists constantly; because it is a product" illustrates *anadhyavasāyika* (as the reason 'being a product' exists only in the subject, 'the universe', its relation to the thing to be proved 'constant existence' cannot be cognized anywhere else, and so it cannot lead to the thing to be proved) (54"). Umāpati considers this as an illustration of inconclusive (*anadhyavasita*) and states that the example of too specific (*asādhāraṇa*) is not given because it is well known.

According to the *Pauṣkara*, time-lapsed (*kālāṭīta*) occurs when a reason is attributed to a subject (*pakṣa*) which is contradicted by a *pramāṇa*. The reason in the inference "The universe which is devoid of a material cause, is a product; because it is adventitious" is time-lapsed (since the reason 'being adventitious' is attributed to the subject, 'the universe devoid of a material cause', which is contradicted by scriptural authority that declares that the universe has a material cause) (55). But Umāpati interprets the fallacy time-lapsed (*kālāṭīta*) as the fallacy sublated (*bādhita*) that arises when a reason is ascribed to a subject which is devoid of the thing to be proved by that reason. He illustrates it with the inference "Fire is cool; because it is a substance" (the reason 'being a substance' is attributed to the subject 'fire' which is devoid of the thing to be proved 'coolness'). According to him, the definition of the fifth fallacy, namely 'identical with the question' (*prakaraṇasama*) is not given in the *Pauṣkara* in this context because it was described earlier (while discussing the characteristics of a positive-negative reason).

Since a reason operates through pervasion (*vyāpti*) to prove the presence of the thing to be proved (*sādhya*) in the subject (*pakṣa*), the disruption of pervasion, caused by a fallacious reason, is the main impediment to inference (56-57"). Umāpati states that the cognition of the presence of the reason in the subject (*pakṣadharma*) is also a cause to inference, and declares that inference is also impeded by the

breakdown of consideration (*parāmarśa*), namely the cognition of the presence in the subject, of the reason as qualified by the pervasion.

According to the *Pauṣkara*, fallacies like ill-enunciated (*sadurdiṣṭa*) arise on the transposition of the first two of the five members of the inference, etc.; for example, the statement along with the reason, "Not hot, is fire; because it is a substance". The example in the inference "The self is eternal; because it is all-pervasive; like the sky" is 'deficient of the thing to be proved' (*sādhyavikala*) (because the sky is not eternal). It is also 'deficient of the reason' (*sādhana-vikala*) (sky is not all-pervasive because as a product of prakṛti, it pervades the impure realm and not the pure realm) (57^b-59). Umāpati presents a variety of fallacies of example (*drṣṭāntābhāsa*) and refers to the grounds of defeat (*nigrahassthāna*), quibble (*chala*) and false rejoinder (*jāti*) which obstruct inference. These are not mentioned in the *Pauṣkara*.

Verbal testimony (*āgama*) is the utterance of a trustworthy person, and it is the ultimate means to the cognition of objects not given to immediate perception. A trustworthy person is the one who utters the sense well ascertained by perception or by inference; Śiva is the most trustworthy of all trustworthy persons (60-61^a). According to Umāpati, a trustworthy person is the one who knows the true meaning of the uttered statement, and who speaks true. A valid sentence is a group of words, possessing expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*) and juxtaposition (*āsatti*), uttered by a trustworthy person. Umāpati refers to two inferences put forward by those (who may be identified as the Vaiśeṣikas) who believe that the *pramāṇa* named *śabda* is not different from the *anumāna* *pramāṇa* because meaning, which is the connection between the words (*pada*) or the word-meanings (*padārtha*) of a sentence, could be known through inference. A third inference (which could be attributed to the Prābhākaras) is presented: it attempts to prove that the meaning of a sentence

is inferable through the cognition of the intention of the speaker (*sandarbhā*). The Prābhākaras believe that while Vedic statements are authoritative because they are not uttered by a human being, secular statements are unreliable, for they could be rendered invalid by the defects of the speaker. According to them, only Vedic sentences are *śabda* *pramāṇa* and all mundane utterances are *anumāna* *pramāṇa*. Umāpati rejects these three inferences. According to him, the reason (*hetu*) of the first two inferences is unsound. Neither is the third inference a proof, because only the meaning which is known directly from words induces action and not the meaning understood indirectly through inference. Therefore verbal testimony, which is the means to the direct cognition of meaning, should be accepted as an independent *pramāṇa*. Umāpati states that since gesture (*ceṣṭā*) conveys meaning through convention (*saṃketa*), it should be subsumed in *śabda* *pramāṇa*. Tradition (*aitihya*) which is true, is to be accepted as *śabda* *pramāṇa*, while untrue tradition is to be rejected.

According to the *Pauṣkara*, the utterances of Śiva are the most authoritative and the veritable means to liberation because Śiva is the most trustworthy. His knowledge is perfect, for He is omniscient, free from all sense deficiencies, changeless, cognizer of everything and eternal perceiver of the truth; He is also independent, impartial and compassionate (61^b-63^a). Umāpati notes that Śiva does not possess a body composed of *māyā* or *bindu*, which produce respectively, the bodies of the selves in the impure and pure realms; but it is admitted that He possess a body constituted of His capacity (*śakti*) and it is also supported by verbal testimony (*śabda*).

Having transformed the knowledge of the six categories, which arose in the form of the inaudible *nāda*, into audible verses, and having endowed some perfected selves in the pure path with special powers, Śiva taught them the tenfold

Śaiva texts and the eighteenfold Raudra texts. The same knowledge came down to the earth in the form of scripture (*tantra*) through the intermediary of preceptors (63^b-66). Umāpati specifies that Śiva taught the ten Śaiva texts to the ten Śivas led by Praṇava and the eighteen Raudra texts to the eighteen Rudras headed by Ananta.

Śrīkaṇṭha declares that, having selected this *Pauṣkara* from those texts, setting aside the eulogical statements, he transmitted it to the sages. He enjoins them to promote it on the earth among the eligible selves devoted to preceptors (67-68^a). According to Umāpati, although the purport of scripture could be learnt from the well-known texts like the *Kāmika*, since they are extensive, inaccessible and complex, the *Pauṣkara* is composed to render the teaching of scripture accessible to all. He explains that this *tantra*, which is the essence of Śaiva scripture, is named *Pauṣkara* due to its similarity with the *pauṣkara* honey, which is the essence of the *puṣkara* lotus.

Although Veda and other scriptures are another path (*anyamārga*), they lead to the bondage of the individual self; the authority of the scriptures composed by Brahmā, Viṣṇu and others is limited to the realities (*tattva*) admitted in the respective scriptures. The path to liberation is beyond the enjoyment of heaven, etc. (68^b-69). Umāpati does not seem to make the distinction which is made in the verse, for he explains that the states of liberation promised in the Vedic ritualistic passages (*karmopāsanopadeśabhāga*), and in scriptures composed by Brahmā and others, are situated within the realm of bondage. Since these authors have a limited knowledge, the state of release taught by them is confined to the attainment of different lower states. However, the teaching of the Upaniṣads, like those of the *Kāmika* and other Śaiva treatises, is another means (*upāyāntara*) to liberation. Umāpati adds that while both the Vedic scripture (*vedāgama*) and Śaiva scripture (*śaivāgama*) are authoritative

for those who belong to the first three social classes (*trivarna*), only Śaiva scripture is authoritative for the other classes.

The statement that scripture in the form of *nāda* comes forth from that which is beyond differentiation (*niṣkala*) may not seem appropriate, due to the absence of the sense of speech. The *Pauṣkara* states that Śiva's power does not require the sense of speech; being absolutely pure, it is operative everywhere. And the function of speech signifies the capacity to induce bindu to produce *nāda* and to provoke the emergence of words (*śabda*) from *nāda* (70-72). Umāpati identifies *niṣkala* with Śiva and not His power bindu, which is the origin of *nāda* and *śabda*. He also identifies *nāda* with *paśyantī* speech and *śabda* with *vaikhārī* speech, and explains the evolution of speech as follows: from the *nāda* which comes into being from bindu, arises another bindu (which he calls *aparabindu* in the *tantrāvatārapaṭala*) which is the origin of the *madhyamā* speech, which in turn produces the audible *vaikhārī* speech.

The *Pauṣkara* states that words (*śabda*) are indirect indicators to the knowledge of Śiva. (73^a). Umāpati explains that since the audible words do not come from Śiva, it may be objected that the scripture, which is composed of these words, cannot lead to the knowledge of Śiva. It is therefore stated in the *Pauṣkara* that words can only indirectly be traced to the knowledge of Śiva. And this, according to Umāpati, is through the inference of the existence of intermediary states like *madhyamā* from which words arise.

The words which describe the pure categories of the pure realm (*śivagocara*) were not acquired with attention by some sages; the words which issue from some other sages are confined to the lower realm constituted of *prakṛti*. Therefore, the utterance of Śiva cannot be understood through the compositions of authors possessing limited knowledge; nor can it be overruled by them. For the words

of the sages cannot be set aside by those of ordinary human beings; nor the words of the divine beings by those of the sages; nor those of Brahmā by those of the divine beings; nor those of Viṣṇu by those of Brahmā; nor those of Rudra by those of Viṣṇu; nor those of Śiva by those of Rudra, due to the excellence of the successively superior. But the successively inferior statements are set aside by the successively superior (73^b-76). Umāpati states that the discussion of the comparative superiority of scriptures does not arise because Śiva Himself is the redactor of all scriptures. The above discussion concerns the treatises of secondary authors such as Brahmā and Viṣṇu. Also, the declaration in certain texts that the Śaiva scripture overrules the Veda (composed by Himself) does not signify opposition. It only means that the teachings of the Veda are to be supplemented with those of the Śaiva scripture with regard to the subjects which are not found in the Veda, in order to render the Vedic and Śaiva scriptures compatible. If the Śaiva scripture were opposed to the Veda, the importance given to Vedic duties in certain texts, and the declaration in some other texts that the teaching of the Śaiva scripture is the essence of the Veda, would be meaningless.

The *Pauṣkara* declares that all scriptures are constituted unopposed to the Śaiva scripture. The Śaiva scripture is authoritative by itself; it should not be declared to be valid because it is unopposed to another scripture, nor because it is in conformity with it. Since the Śaiva scripture contains the knowledge of other scriptures, it is said to be the pervader (*vyāpaka*) and other scriptures are said to be the pervaded (*vyāpya*) by it (77-78^a). According to Umāpati, when a scripture like Sāṃkhya is in contradiction with the Śaiva scripture, it should be interpreted in accordance with the Śaiva scripture. Śaiva scripture, on the other hand, should not be modified in the light of another doctrine, nor should its authority be upheld on the grounds that it conforms to

other scriptures, because it is composed by Śiva, who possesses more knowledge than the authors of other scriptures and is, consequently, more authoritative.

According to the *Pauṣkara*, the authority of the different scriptures is only as great as the pervasion proclaimed by the respective scripture (78^b-79^a). Umāpati explains that the declaration of the supremacy of the Śaiva scripture and the admission, at the same time, of the authority of all scriptures, is not contradictory. In the case of difference of opinion with regard to doctrine, where an alternative standpoint cannot be admitted, the doctrines which conflict with the Śaiva scripture are to be rejected. But with regard to action, where an alternative to the prescribed rules is permitted in accordance with the qualification of the performer etc., other scriptures are considered authoritative.

The *Pauṣkara* does not define presumption (*arthāpatti*), the fourth pramāṇa, but only gives two examples. The first is: the fact that the Śaiva scripture describes a state of liberation which is superior to that described in other scriptures leads to the cognition that these other scriptures are composed by someone who is not omniscient (79^b-81^a). Umāpati also gives a slightly different explanation of this illustration: since the statements which describe liberation cannot exist without an author who is conversant with their meaning, it is first presumed that these statements have an author. Subsequently, as the Śaiva scripture proclaims a state of liberation which is superior to the states described in these statements, through the presumption of the absence of omniscience of their authors, it is presumed that these statements are composed by authors who are not omniscient.

The second example of presumption proposed by the *Pauṣkara* is as follows: as omniscience is proclaimed by the scripture, the absence of omniscience which is experienced implies the existence in the selves of something called *paśutva*, which produces that absence of omniscience (81^b).

82). Umāpati explains: since the absence of omniscience which is experienced by the omniscient self is inexplicable, an obstruction which explains that absence is presumed first. Subsequently, on the authority of the scripture which declares that the omniscience of Śiva is never obstructed, it is presumed that the obstruction named *paśutva* exists only in the selves. He gives an alternative explanation: since the scripture declares that omniscience exists only in the sentient selves (and not in buddhi, etc.), it is presumed that the factor which obstructs the omniscience also exists in the selves. He defines *arthāpatti* as the presumption, from the cognition of something which is inexplicable, of something else which explains it. Umāpati considers the first example as presumption from words (*śrutārthāpatti*) and the second illustration as presumption from perception (*drṣṭārthāpatti*), but this classification is not made in the *Pauṣkara*.

The *Pauṣkara* states that the *arthāpatti* *pramāṇa* is different from the *anumāna* *pramāṇa* because they produce distinct results (83^a). Umāpati presents and refutes the inference proposed by those who believe that the knowledge derived through *arthāpatti* *pramāṇa* could be derived through *anumāna* *pramāṇa* and that *arthāpatti* is not an independent *pramāṇa*.

The discussion of *pramāṇas* in the *pramāṇapaṭala* concludes with a description of the withdrawal of the universe known through these *pramāṇas*. The *Pauṣkara* declares that the dissolution should be admitted to be in an order inverse to that of the creation because the evolutes are causally connected. The effect, which merges into its cause on destruction, would be rendered baseless if its cause disappeared first. Since dissolution begins with the final effect, the earth element (*prthivī*) is the first to disappear (83^b-85^a). Umāpati presents and refutes the viewpoint of those who believe that the universe exists continuously, that it is neither created nor dissolved. He also proves, with the

help of scriptural statements, that Śiva undertakes dissolution not out of cruelty, but to give respite to selves tired by transmigration, to restore to *māyā* and bindu the inclination to create, and to allow the karma of selves to ripen.

According to the *Pauṣkara*, the five elements (*bhūta*) merge into the subtle elements (*tanmātra*) during the dissolution; the subtle elements, the senses (*indriya*) and mind (*manas*) into egoity (*ahamkāra*); egoity into intellect (*matī*); intellect into the *guṇas*; the *guṇas* into *prakṛti*; *prakṛti*, as well as the group of five *tattvas* beginning with *rāga*, merge into *māyā*. *Māyā*, however, does not disappear, because it is eternal (85^b-87^a). Umāpati specifies that the subtle elements merge into the egoity predominated by *tamas*, the senses of action (*karmendriya*) into the egoity predominated by *rajas* and the senses of knowledge (*jñānendriya*) and *manas* into the egoity predominated by *sattva*.

The pure path (*śuddhādhvan*), which exists beyond *māyā*, merges into bindu. Bindu, the material cause of (pure) *kalā*, etc., supervised by Śiva, remains forever in His presence as His sphere of activity; and the universe comes into existence again in the regular order, beginning with bindu (87^b-89^a).

TRANSLATION

UMĀPATI'S COMMENTARY
ON THE PAUṢKARAPRAMĀṆAPĀṬALA

[1] Now begins the *pramāṇapāṭala*. Now, after the discussion of all the six categories (*padārtha*)¹ through the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), statement (*uddeśa*), definition (*lakṣaṇa*), examination (*parikṣā*), etc.,² since there is difference of opinion among the disputants about the nature of the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and since, in the absence of that certainty, due to lack of discrimination between the true and pseudo-pramāṇas, the discussion of the things to be known (*prameya*)³ would also be as if incomplete, the sages⁴ desirous of knowing it, with a recapitu-

¹ According to the *Pauṣkara*, the Lord (*pati*), the material cause of the pure realm (*kuṇḍalinī*, that is *bindu*), the material cause of the impure realm (*māyā*), the selves (*paśu*), the bonds (*pāśa*) and the means (*kāraṇa*), in short, are the six categories declared by the Śaiva texts. See *Pauṣkara* 1.8: *patiḥ kuṇḍalinī māyā paśuḥ pāśaś ca kāraṇaḥ / iti proktāḥ padārthāḥ śaī śaivatantre samāsataḥ*.

² The cognition of the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is fundamental because the cognition of objects depends on the means employed to acquire it. Naming the category (*uddeśa*), presenting the feature which distinguishes the category from others (*lakṣaṇa*) and examining the applicability of the definition (*parikṣā*) too are necessary to assure the infallibility of cognition (see *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 27). The expression 'etc.' should refer to the classification of the objects under examination (*vibhāga*), which is sometimes proposed as the fourth prerequisite of an enquiry into the nature of an object. See *Tarkabhāṣā-prakāśikā*, p. 101.

³ The six categories mentioned above.

⁴ Sanatkumāra and others to whom the *Pauṣkara* is instructed by Śrīkaṇṭha (whom Umāpati identifies as a form of Śiva; see the following note). See *PauṣkaraBh* on 1.1, p. 2: ... *auṣkarākhyam tantram upadiśataḥ śrīkaṇṭhaparamēśvarāt sanatkumārādayaḥ ... prēcchanti*. According to Jñānaprakāśa, Paramēśa (that is, Śiva) taught the *Pāramēśvara* to Ananta (that is, Brahma), who abridged it and instructed it to Śrīkaṇṭha. Śrīkaṇṭha further summarized it into *Pauṣkara* and transmitted it to a group of sages headed by Sanatkumāra. See *PauṣkaraV*, pp. 1 and 891.

lation of the subjects already discussed, request (Īśāna to explain to them) the nature of pramāṇa.

O Lord! lord of the chiefs of gods! engaged in bestowing grace on devotees! the six categories are explained through many arguments (by you) out of compassion. O merciful! now we wish to hear about the means of knowledge without knowing the nature of which the knowable would be dubious. Therefore O Īśāna! kindly explain those (pramāṇas) to us. (1-3^a)

Bhagavan, O Lord, endowed with the six (auspicious) qualities;¹ ruler also of Brahmā, Viṣṇu and other chiefs of gods; *bhaktānugraha* *atpara*, engaged in bestowing grace on devotees. He also undertakes the creation, etc. (of the universe), but these are performed out of grace,² for conferring grace is His main intention. Such is the meaning. Or the significance is that He is engaged in bestowing devotees with a specific grace consisting of protection, instruction of knowledge, etc. *Padārthāḥ*, categories, the six categories beginning with pati and concluding with kāraka; *samuddiṣṭāḥ*, explained, well examined. Although the entities which belong to the category of kāraka are not examined separately, it is stated that the six (categories) are explained because initiation, which is of the nature of kāraka

¹ Śrīkaṇṭha is addressed as *bhagavan* because he has the six qualities known as *bhaga*: sovereignty (*aiśvarya*), valour (*vīrya*), glory (*yaśas*), prosperity (*śrī*), wisdom (*jñāna*) and freedom from all worldly desires (*vairāgya*). See *PauṣkaraBh* on 1.1, p. 2. Umāpati explains that when applied to others, the title *bhagavan* refers to the possessor not of these six qualities, but of excellence of knowledge, etc. acquired through the grace of Īśvara (*ibid.*, p. 3).

² The purpose of the creation of the universe is to provide the bound selves (*paśu*) with bodies, worlds filled with objects and the means to experience them, in order that they exhaust the karma which binds them; for the self cannot attain liberation unless its karma is annihilated through experience. The aim of the dissolution of the universe is to give repose to the selves tired of transmigration. See *PauṣkaraBh* on 7.85^a.

category, is described in detail in the *kriyāpāda* (of the *Pauṣkara*) and because its definition is also declared here (in the *vidyāpāda*) while discussing the categories pati and paśu, by (the verses) "That which gives rise to enjoyment (in the pure worlds), release (from bondage) and manifestation (of śiva-hood)"¹ and "Only initiation slackens bondages".² *Kṛpayā*, out of compassion, with the desire of removing the sorrow of others and not with the intention of any personal gain; *anekayuktibhiḥ*, through many arguments, means, according to the intellectual capacity of the hearer, for it is said, "The wise are to be taught through reasoning".³ Having thus praised the Supreme Lord, the sages state the inquired object, *adhunā*, etc.

But then, after the examination (in the previous chapters) of the objects to be known such as pati, together with the means of knowing them, it is improper to inquire now about the nature of the means of knowledge; moreover, its discussion is fruitless. This is answered, *yad*, etc. *Avijñāya*, without knowing, not knowing the nature and extent of which, namely of pramāṇas; *prameyaḥ*, the knowable, pati and other categories; *vyarthah*, would be dubious, (knowledge about them) would be uncertain; *vyarthah* means 'that which has diverse meaning'. In other words, although explained, pati and other categories would be as if unexplained; for there could be doubt and error about (the nature of) pati and other (categories discussed earlier) in the event of a doubt whether inference, etc. are pramāṇas or not, of uncertainty about their nature and scope, and of erroneous employment of a pramāṇa towards objects to be known. *Tasmāt*, therefore, to prevent this; since pramāṇas are to be discussed necessarily; *Īśāna*, Īśāna, O lord of all

¹ *Pauṣkara* 1.14^a.

² *Pauṣkara* 4.47^b.

³ *Pauṣkara* 1.78^c.

knowledge; *asmākam*, to us, desirous of knowing; *tāni*, those, pramāṇas; *vaktum arhasi*, kindly explain.

[2] Thus requested, Parameśvara explains (the nature of) pramāṇas preceded by the statement of proposition (*pratijñā*).

Listen now if you desire to hear about the means of knowledge. O twice-born! those means of knowledge (*māṇa*), perception, etc., are four: perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), verbal testimony (*śabda*) and presumption (*arthāpatti*). Consciousness-power (*cit-śakti*) free from doubt, etc. is said to be the means of knowledge. (3^b-5^a)

Atha, now, after the examination of the six categories; *mānāni*, the means of knowledge, pramāṇas; *śrotum kautūhalam*, desire to hear, if you wish (to know them); *śṛṇudhvam*, hear, 'which are being explained' is to be supplied (to the verse). *Ātmanepada* (in the word *śṛṇudhvam*) is archaistic. [The author] answers the inquiry about the nature and number of pramāṇas, *catvāri*, etc.; *he dvijāḥ*, O twice-born; *tāni pratyakṣādīni*, those pramāṇas, perception, etc. are *catvāri*, four, only four. We will accordingly discuss the intended inclusion or exclusion of pramāṇas such as comparison (*upamāna*) among the (accepted) pramāṇas while examining the respective pramāṇas. [The author] states, *pratyakṣam*, in order to explain that which is meant by the word 'etc.'. The declaration "Perception and inference together with verbal testimony (are the pramāṇas) in Śaivism" in a certain text¹ signifies that (the pramāṇa known as) presumption (*arthāpatti*) is included in (the pramāṇa called) inference (*anumāna*). Although classification is always presented after the statement of the general definition, if inference, etc. were not declared here at the

¹ Not traced. Also cited in the *Śaivaparibhāṣā* (Madras edn), p. 2; the *Śivajñānabodhavarabhāṣya*, p. 108, etc.

outset as (forming part of) the accepted pramāṇas, the proposed general definition being common to inference, etc. may bring the opponent to suspect the overpervasion (of the definition) with regard to those (pramāṇas). Therefore, a classification is announced beforehand to ward off this (doubt) and to indicate that inference, etc. also are included in the thing to be defined. Following the maxim "(The statement of) the specific definitions should be preceded by that of the general definition",¹ [the author] states the general definition of pramāṇa, *saṁśaya*, etc.; *vinirmuktā*, free from, doubt, etc., that is to say doubt, error and memory. This means, it (namely *citśakti*)² being devoid of objects (of cognition) featuring in the intellectual operation (that is, cognition)³ such as doubt; in other words, it (namely *citśakti*) being that which has objects (of cognition) featuring in the intellectual operation which is true experience (*yathārthānubhūti*).

[3] But then, what is this state of possessing truth (*yathārthakatva*) (or trueness) of an intellectual operation

¹ Compare *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 11.

² *Cit-śakti* is the consciousness of the self. It is said to be a power because it is made up of the cognitive and conative capacities of the self. See *Pauṣkara* 5.3^b: *caitanyaṁ jñatvakartṛtvarūpaṁ tad balam ātmanah*. Consciousness is said to be the means of knowledge because it procures awareness of objects for the self.

³ Cognition, according to the *Pauṣkara*, is an operation (*vṛtti*) of the intellect (*buddhi*) of the self. See *Pauṣkara* 6.49^a: *dharmo jñānaṁ ca vairāgyam aiśvaryaṁ buddhivṛttayah*. Like the senses, mind and ego, *buddhi* too is produced from *prakṛti* and, along with them, forms the gross cognitive apparatus. For an object is grasped by the senses, identified by the mind, appropriated by the ego and cognized by the *buddhi*. But this cognition by the *buddhi* (also known as *buddhivṛtti* and *jñāna*) is inert because *buddhi* can know an object but not itself. While the *buddhi* cognizes objects through the senses, mind, etc., the self cognizes this cognition of *buddhi* through a subtler cognitive apparatus (also supplied by bondage) consisting of *kalā*, *vidyā*, etc. The cognition of the self, however, is conscious, that is to say it knows objects and itself, because it is the property of a conscious self. See *Pauṣkara* 6.43^b-44: *bodho 'tra dvividho bhāvo vyavasāyatmakas tathā || ādya 'nadyavasāyātmā vyavasāyatmakas tu yaḥ / sā buddhir itaras tv ātmasvabhāvo grāhakātmanah*.

(that is, cognition) ? It cannot be (its) similarity to (its) object¹ because similarity in some way or other is also found in error,² while complete similarity is absent even in the (true) cognition.³

[4] Nor (can it be said that the trueness of a cognition is) its having as its qualifier (*prakāra*),⁴ a property which is not the counterpositive of an absence (*abhāvāpratiyogin*) located in the substantive (*viśeṣya*);⁵ for there would be underpervasion in (true) cognitions such as "The ground possesses a pot". This cognition has pot as its qualifier which is the counterpositive of a mutual absence (*anyonyābhāvāpratiyogin*)⁶ located on the ground (which is the substantive of that cognition).

[5] Nor (can it be said that the trueness of a cognition is) its having as its qualifier, a property which is not the counterpositive of an absolute absence (*atyantābhāvāpratiyogin*)⁷ located in the substantive; for there would be

¹ For, if the adjective *yathārtha* (which literally means 'as the object is') were to signify the similarity of the cognition with its object, the definition would be overpervasive with regard to error and underpervasive with regard to true cognition.

² Because some aspects of similarity such as existence (*sattva*), knowability (*prameyatva*) could be found between an erroneous cognition and the object of that cognition, since both exist, are knowable, etc.

³ Since the cognition of an object is not identical with the object.

⁴ *Viśeṣya* (substantive) is the object which is the content of a cognition and *prakāra* (qualifier) is the feature as qualified by which that object is cognized in that cognition. In the cognition "This is silver", the object referred to by 'this' is the substantive of the cognition and silverness is the qualifier of the cognition because the object (referred to by 'this') is being cognized as qualified by silverness.

⁵ Thus, the trueness of the cognition "This is silver" would consist in its having as its qualifier (*prakāra*) a property (silverness) which is not the counterpositive of an absence located in the object (of that cognition), namely silver, designated by 'this' (*viśeṣya*).

⁶ Mutual absence perceived, for example, in the cognition "The ground is not the pot".

⁷ The underpervasion pointed above is removed by the clause 'absolute absence' because although pot is the counterpositive of a mutual absence (*anyonyābhāva*), it is not the counterpositive of an

overpervasion in the error "This is now red" about a black *badara* fruit. Since redness would appear in it (when *badara* ripens), its absolute absence (that is to say the absolute absence of redness) is not admitted there (in the *badara*)¹ and (consequently) that cognition has the above property (namely redness which is not the counterpositive of an absolute absence located in the *badara*) as its qualifier.²

[6] Nor (can it be said that the trueness of a cognition is) its having as its qualifier, a property which is not the counterpositive of a relational absence (*samsargābhāvāpratiyogin*)³ located in the substantive; for there would be underpervasion in the true cognition "The *badara* is red" (about a black *badara*); because that true cognition is predicated of redness which is a property which is the counterpositive of a prior absence (*prāgabdhāvāpratiyogin*) located in the *badara*.⁴ Moreover, (the above definitions are not tenable because) there would be underpervasion in the true collective cognition (*samūhālambanapramā*)⁵ "These are a pot and a cloth"; for that cognition has, as its qualifier, clothness and potness

absolute absence (*atyantābhāva*) since it is perceived on the ground. Thus, the revised definition of trueness would include the cognition in question.

¹ By the rule that the absolute absence (*atyantābhāva*) of an object cannot occur in a substrate where the prior absence (*prāgabdhāva*) of the same object is located. See *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī*, p. 98.

² Here redness is not the counterpositive of the absolute absence (*atyantābhāvāpratiyogin*) located in the substantive (the black *badara*) simply because the absolute absence of redness (*raktātyantābhāva*) cannot be spoken of in the black *badara* which possesses the prior absence of redness (*raktapragabhāva*).

³ Relational absence (*samsargābhāva*) here refers to prior absence (*prāgabdhāva*). This modified definition prevents overpervasion in the error "This is now red" about a black *badara* thus: since the qualifier (redness) is the counterpositive of a prior absence (of redness) (*raktapragabhāvāpratiyogin*) located in the substantive (the black *badara*), it could be said that it (namely redness) is not a property which is not the counterpositive of that absence (*raktapragabhāvāpratiyogin*).

⁴ Redness, which is an effect (because it is something which is produced in the *badara*), is the counterpositive of its prior absence (*prāgabdhāvāpratiyogin*).

⁵ A cognition which has several independent objects as its content.

which are the counterpositives of the absence located in the pot and the cloth.¹ There would also be underpervasion in the true cognition of conjunction (*saṃyogapramā*).²

[7] Nor (can it be said that the trueness of a cognition is its) non-deviation from (its) object (*arthāvyabhicāritva*). If non-deviation (*avyabhicāritva*) were to signify (the cognition) not being present in a substrate which is not the substrate of the object (*arthānadhikaraṇāvṛttitva*), there would be underpervasion (in a true cognition, for example that of a pot); for its operation (intellectual operation in the form of a pot) (in other words, a cognition) appears in the intellect, which is not a substrate of objects like pot; and (to prevent this underpervasion) if it (that is, non-deviation) were defined as '(the cognition) not being present in a substrate which is not a substrate of the relation with the object' (*arthasaṃbandhānadhikaraṇāvṛttitva*),³ there would be overpervasion (in doubt and error) thus: since doubt and error occur in the intellect, which is a substrate of the relation with the object (*arthasaṃbandha*), (it could be said that) they do not occur in that which is not its substrate (namely the substrate of the relation with the object).

¹ Which absence is perceived in the cognitions "The pot is not the cloth" and "The cloth is not the pot".

² The above definition of trueness would fail to include the true cognition "The tree has monkey-conjunction" about a tree with a monkey sitting on its branch. Since conjunction (*saṃyoga*) is of incomplete occurrence (*avyāpyavṛtti*), that is to say, is something which occurs in one part of an entity and not in another part of the same entity, it could be said that the tree has monkey-conjunction as well as the absence of monkey-conjunction. Thus, the above cognition has monkey-conjunction as its qualifier which is the counterpositive of the absence of 'monkey-conjunction delimited by the tree roots' which is found in the substantive (the tree).

³ Though intellect is not a substrate of objects like pot, it is a substrate of intellectual operation, that is to say, of cognition. And since a content-container relation (*viśayaviśayibhāvasaṃbandha*) exists between a cognition and the object which features in it, intellect could, through the cognition which arises in it, be considered a substrate of the relation with the object (*arthasaṃbandha*). Thus, the modified definition would remove the underpervasion pointed above.

[8] Nor (is the trueness of a cognition its) having as its qualifier, a property (for example, silverness) which is present in the substantive (in the 'this' of the true cognition "This is silver"); for there would be overpervasion in the error "These are two fires" about a collection of fire and a heap of *guñjā*¹ and in the error of inversion (*vyatyastabhrama*) (about the same), "These are a heap of *guñjā* and fire".²

[9] Nor (can it be said that the trueness of a cognition is its) not having something as its substantive which is not the substrate of the qualifier (of that cognition); for there would be underpervasion in a true collective cognition (*saṃūhā-lambanapramā*).³

[10] Nor (can it be said that the trueness of a cognition is its) having a property as the qualifier, while having 'something possessing that property' as the substantive; for there would be underpervasion in the true cognition "Here (in the pot) potness" because it does not have a substantive possessing pot.⁴ And there would be overpervasion in the erroneous cognition "pot" in potness.⁵ Therefore the state of

¹ A red berry which is generally used as a measure of weight by jewellers.

² Because these two errors have fireness as the qualifier and fireness is present in the substantive referred to by the expression 'these'.

³ The cognition, "These are a cloth and a pot", about a pot and a cloth, has a pot and a cloth as the substantive which are not the substrate of the qualifiers of that cognition, namely clothness and potness.

⁴ As the possessive suffix *vant* in the expression *tadvat* signifies something which is a substrate (*adhiparāṇa*), the substantive (referred to by the word *tadvat*) is required to be the substrate of the qualifier according to the definition of trueness; but potness, which is the substantive of the above cognition, cannot be the substrate of pot (which is the qualifier of the above cognition) nor of any other qualifier. Thus the definition is defective.

⁵ This cognition would be true according to the definition because it has potness as its qualifier while having a pot possessing that property (namely potness) as the substantive. But it is erroneous because a pot does not exist in potness; qualities, genus, etc. exist in a substance and not vice versa.

possessing truth (*yathārthakatva*) (of a cognition) cannot be explained.*

[11] It is replied that the trueness (of a cognition) is having a particular property as the qualifier, while being delimited by the fact of having as the substantive, something which possesses that particular qualifier (as its property) or a relation with it, which (property and relation) are being apprehended (*ullikhyamāna*) as not delimited by a property contrary to them.¹

[12] The purpose of the clause 'not delimited by a property contrary to them' is to prevent overpervasion (of the definition of trueness) in the (erroneous) cognition "(The tree possesses) monkey-conjunction at the roots",² which (cognition) has a substantive (namely the tree) which possesses the property 'monkey-conjunction delimited by the branch'. It should not be said that this overpervasion could be prevented by the clause 'delimited by the property which is the delimitor of its own presence'³ and that the words 'not' and 'contrary' are redundant; for they are required to prevent underpervasion in the (true) cognition "Tree possesses monkey-conjunction", which does not refer

¹ Thus, the trueness of the cognition "This is silver" would consist in its having silverness as its qualifier while having as its substantive, silver, which is qualified by silverness or related to silverness; also, these (qualifier and relation) should not be delimited, respectively, by a property which is not silverness and by a relation which is not being apprehended in that cognition.

² In the absence of the clause 'not delimited by a property contrary to them', the definition would apply to this erroneous cognition because it has monkey-conjunction as its qualifier while having the tree, which is qualified by and connected to monkey-conjunction, as its substantive. But since the substantive (tree), which has monkey-conjunction delimited by the branch, is being apprehended as delimited by a contrary property (monkey-conjunction at the roots), it is removed from the range of the definition of trueness.

³ Since the presence of monkey-conjunction is delimited by the branch, the qualifier (namely monkey-conjunction) could claim to be that which is delimited by the property (branch) which is the delimitor of the presence of the monkey-conjunction.

to any delimitor. The clause 'being apprehended' prevents the overpervasion (of the definition), which a substantive possessing an indirect relation (with its property) would produce, in an error which apprehends a direct relation (for example) "red crystal".¹

[13] Underpervasion (pointed above) in the (true) cognition "here (in the pot) potness" is prevented by the clause 'having a particular property as the qualifier while being delimited by the fact of having as the substantive, something which possesses a relation'. Since it (that is to say the above cognition) has potness, which is not a substrate of pots, as its substantive, it does not have a substantive which possesses the qualifier, namely pot; yet, it has a substantive (potness) which is related to pot.² And this (clause) does not lead to overpervasion (of the definition) in the error "This is silver" (about a piece of shell),³ because it does not have silver which is related to silverness (which is the qualifier) as the substantive, but has only a shell (which is not related to the qualifier, namely silverness) as its substantive.

[14] Overpervasion in the error of inversion (mentioned earlier) is prevented by the clause 'having a particular property as its qualifier while being delimited, etc.'; it (namely that cognition) has fireness as the qualifier while being delimited by the fact of having a heap of *guñjā* as the

¹ The cognition "red crystal" about a colourless crystal placed near a red flower is erroneous because the redness, which is attributed to the crystal, belongs to the flower with which the crystal is in contact, and the relation is 'inherence-in-what-is-conjoined' (*samyuktasamavāya*). This error, which apprehends a direct relation (inherence or *samavāya*) in a substantive (colourless crystal) which has an indirect relation with its property (redness), would be considered valid if the definition does not specify that a cognition, to be true, should apprehend the relation as it really exists between the substantive and its property.

² By the relation of superstrateness (*ādheyatāsambandha*) by which potness exists in a pot.

³ The definition could apply to this error because it has a particular property (silverness) as the qualifier while being delimited by the fact of having as the substantive, something (shell) which possesses a relation with shellness, whiteness, etc.

substantive, and 'the state of being a heap of *guṇjā*' as the qualifier while being delimited by the fact of having fire as the substantive; and not having a particular property as its qualifier while being delimited by 'the state of having something which possesses relation with that particular property as the substantive'. It should be understood that error is nothing but a cognition contrary to this (cognition possessing trueness).

[15] And this validity (*prāmānya*), which is trueness, of the intellectual operation (namely cognition) is only cognized intrinsically (*svataḥ*)¹ that is to say mentally, and not extrinsically (*parataḥ*).² The validity of the consciousness

¹ The validity or trueness of a cognition is said to be apprehended intrinsically (*svataḥ*) when it is apprehended by the same means which apprehend that cognition. The main followers of the theory of intrinsic validity are the Mīmāṃsakas. See *Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi*, pp. 16-18; *Tarkāmṛta*, pp. 70-71. The Prābhākaras, who believe that cognition is self-revealing (*svaprakāśa*), hold that the validity of a cognition is apparent in the cognition when it arises. The Bhāṭṭas, who hold that cognition cannot be apprehended by the senses, reject the theory of the self-revelation of cognition. According to them, cognition is inferred by means of cognizedness (*jñātātā*, a special perceptible property which arises in the object when it is cognized) and the same inference reveals the validity of that cognition. To Mūrārimiśra, also believed to be a Mīmāṃsaka, is attributed the theory that a cognition and its validity are known by means of introspective perception (*anuvyavasāya*). The point of view of Umāpati is similar to that of Mūrārimiśra. Some ancient Naiyāyikas, followers of Mūrārimiśra, also held that the validity of a cognition is known through introspective perception. See Viśvabandhu Bhaṭṭācārya's commentary *Prabhā* (pp. 60-61) on the *Prāmāṇyavāda* of Harirāma, which identifies a theory of intrinsic cognition of validity as that of the ancient Naiyāyikas. Pakṣadhara and Dinakara also are said to have admitted the intrinsic apprehension of the validity of cognition. See Mohanty, *Gāṅgeśa's theory of truth*, pp. 44 (note 91), 67.

² The validity of a cognition is said to be apprehended extrinsically (*parataḥ*) when it is cognized through the means which are different from those which apprehend that cognition. The Naiyāyikas, for example, hold that a cognition is apprehended mentally, through an introspective perception, but its validity is known by means of an inference. See *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 55.

with regard to the specification brought about by objects, is cognized by the consciousness, which is self-luminous.¹

[16] The intrinsic-apprehension of the validity in the form of the trueness of a cognition means,² (validity) being cognized, prior to the appearance of any contradiction,³ by all ordinary perceptions which cognize its substrate (that is to say the substrate of validity).⁴

[17] This is to be proved to those who hold that validity is cognized extrinsically. It may be objected (by them) that there is failure (of the definition of intrinsic validity),⁵ because when the contrary (that is, a sublatant) cognition about silver "(I cognized this as silver but) this is not silver" arises, the validity of the cognition is not known by the perception

¹ The distinction here is between the cognition which is a transformation of the buddhi (*buddhivṛtti*) which takes the form of its object and the cognition which is the object-consciousness of the knowing self (*saṃvid*). The former and its validity are known by the mind in a subsequent cognition, while the latter and its validity are known by the self which knows itself.

² The following statement could be understood to be an inference whose subject (*pakṣa*) is 'validity (of a cognition)' and whose thing to be proved (*sādhya*) is 'being apprehended, prior to the appearance of any contrary cognition, by all ordinary perceptions which cognize its substrate'. The defects of contradiction (*bādha*) and of 'proving that what is already proved' (*siddhasādhana*), which will be pointed out in the course of the discussion, could be explained as the defects vitiating this inference.

³ Contradiction to the cognition which is being apprehended as valid. In other words, the validity of a cognition is known intrinsically so long as a cognition which refers to its falsity does not arise; for any contrariety automatically sets aside the intrinsic validity of the cognition of validity.

⁴ The substrate of validity is the primary cognition (*vyavasāya*) whose validity is being cognized.

⁵ Or *bādha*, a fallacy of reasoning which occurs when the subject (*pakṣa*) ('validity' in this inference) is proved to be devoid of the thing to be proved (*sādhya*) ('being apprehended by all ordinary perceptions which cognize its substrate'); the inference could be said to be defective because validity is not apprehended by the introspective cognition of an error. This is prevented by the clause 'prior to, etc.'.

which has the cognition of silver as its content.¹ This objection is warded off by the clause 'prior to the appearance of any contradiction'.² It may be objected that there is failure (of the definition)³ because the validity of the cognition of a pot is not apprehended by the (introspective) perception of the cognition of a cloth; it is prevented by the clause 'which cognizes its substrate'. In the absence of the word 'all', the defect of 'seeking to prove that which is already proved' (*siddhasādhana*)⁴ would arise because the Naiyāyikas also admit that validity (in certain kinds of perceptions) is apprehended by mind (that is to say intrinsically) when it (that is, the cognition of validity) is brought to it (namely mind) by another cognition.⁵ The word 'all' is to prevent this. The clause 'ordinary perceptions' prevents the

¹ It was stated that validity is apprehended by all ordinary perceptions which cognize the substrate of validity; but this cognition which apprehends a sublating cognition does not also apprehend its validity. The introspective perception of the above cognition does not reveal that the cognition of silver as non-silver is erroneous.

² In other words, the cognition which cognizes validity (namely the introspective cognition) should not be an error, doubt, etc.

³ Or the fallacy of *bādha*; validity cannot be claimed to be known by an ordinary perception since the validity of a cognition of a pot is not known by the introspective cognition of the cognition of a cloth.

⁴ *Siddhasādhana* is a defect because it is futile to set about to prove something which is already proved and accepted by the opponent. It is also an obstacle to inference because it dispels all doubts about the presence of the thing to be proved (*sādhya*) in the subject (*pakṣa*) and consequently, removes the desire to infer.

⁵ According to some Naiyāyikas, the cognition named *jñānalakṣaṇa* is the contact by which validity is apprehended. They explain that when the cognition "This is water" arises, its validity is known through the inference "My cognition 'this is water' is valid; because it produced an exertion leading to satisfaction" and it (namely the cognition of the validity) leaves the impression "I possess a cognition which is valid". When this impression of validity is revived, that is to say when this cognition is remembered, mind cognizes the self, the cognition (which inheres in the self), as well as the validity which is an attribute of that cognition. This validity which inheres in the cognition is perceivable not through ordinary means, but through *jñānalakṣaṇa*, which is a contact that gives rise to an extraordinary perception of the contents of a cognition (here, memory).

defect of 'seeking to prove that which is already proved' because (according to some Naiyāyikas) validity is known by mind in the cognition "(This cognition is) valid" by an extraordinary perception through a universal (*sāmānyalakṣaṇapratyāsatti*), etc.¹

[18] The totality of the causal conditions (*sāmagrī*) which produce introspective perception is the means which proves that validity is known intrinsically. To explain, it is nothing but an ordinary perception that apprehends a cognition, apprehending (the) cognition present in its mode (as its content). And when such (introspective) perception arises, it cognizes the substantive (of the primary cognition, for example 'this'), the attribute (silverness), as well as their relation (inherence) which are brought to it by the (primary) cognition which is its content. If not, silverness would not appear as the qualifier (in the cognition) of a given object (in the introspective cognition) as "I know this (namely the substantive of the primary cognition) as silver"; for only that relational adjunct (*vaiśiṣṭyapratīyogin*) which is being cognized (*bhāsamāna*) becomes the qualifier (of a cognition).³

¹ The extraordinary contact *sāmānyalakṣaṇapratyāsatti* admitted by some Naiyāyikas by which, in the perception of a universal (for example, potness in a pot), all other particulars possessing the same universal are known. Thus, validity could be said to be known mentally, that is intrinsically through extraordinary perception, by a person who would have experienced any one instance of validity in the past. It is therefore specified in the definition that validity is known through ordinary perception, and not through extraordinary perception as is held by the Naiyāyikas. The expression 'etc.' should refer to the third kind of contact recognized by the Naiyāyikas, namely merit produced by yogic practices (*yogaja*), through which yogins have extraordinary perception of everything.

² That is to say, an introspective perception (*anuvyavasāya*) which is a cognition of a cognition.

³ The instrumental case employed in the expression 'as silver' (*rajaṭatayā*) proves that the introspective cognition cognizes the substantive (of the primary cognition), namely the object (referred to by 'this'), as qualified by silverness; for a word by which a particular state of an entity is indicated, assumes the instrumental case. This proves that the introspective cognition cognizes the substantive of the

[19] Now, it may be objected that although 'the property of possessing that' (*tadvattva*)¹ is apprehended as the content of a cognition,² it is not cognized independently. It is answered that the Naiyāyika theory that validity (of a cognition) is known through inference³ too would be impeded by the same (objection); validity cannot be claimed by them to be cognized independently because also in the inference (proposed by them), "(This) cognition of water is valid; because it has the capacity of producing successful activity", it is cognized as the content of a cognition.

[20] But then, (it may be objected that) if validity were cognized intrinsically, doubt about the validity of a cognition ("Is this cognition valid or not?") would not arise. For, when the substantive (*dharmin*)⁴ is cognized, its validity also is cognized; and if the cognition of the substantive (*dharmijñāna*) does not arise (that is to say, if the substantive is not known), doubt also would not arise since the cause (which gives rise to doubt) does not exist;⁵ and if the

primary cognition as qualified by its attribute. If this were not the case, the introspective cognition would be that of a collective cognition "I know this and silverness", and not that of a qualified cognition "I know (this as) silver". Thus, the introspective perception is said to cognize validity because it cognizes an attribute (for example, silverness) which forms the qualifier in the cognition of a substantive (silver) possessing that attribute.

¹ The cognition of the property of possessing 'that' (*tadvattva*) signifies the cognition of validity; because the cognition that the substantive (for example, silver) possesses 'that' means that it possesses the attribute (silverness) which is the qualifier of the cognition ("This is silver").

² That is to say, validity is known as the content of an introspective cognition.

³ See *Tarkadīpikā*, pp. 55-56.

⁴ Here, the substantive (*dharmin*) is the primary cognition (*vyavasthāya*) whose validity is under discussion. The objection is threefold: if a cognition is known, its validity also is known; if a cognition is not known, the doubt about its validity would not arise; and if a cognition is known but not its validity, the claim to intrinsic validity would fail.

⁵ Because the doubt "Is this cognition valid or not?" cannot arise if the cognition is not known.

substantive is known but not its validity, intrinsic validity would break down.

[21] If it is said so, the answer is, no. The doubt about (the validity of) a cognition arises merely due to the doubt of (that cognition) being produced from a defect.¹ If this were not the case, the doubt about the invalidity (of a cognition) would not arise even according to your theory; for (also according to you, the Naiyāyika), the doubt about invalidity, which arises from (the defect in the form of) a doubt about the absence of 'the property of possessing that' (*tadvattvābhāva*), is prevented by (the absence of the defect in the form of) the cognition of the presence of 'the property of possessing that' (*tadvattva*). It should not be explained (by the Naiyāyika) that, since the primary cognition (which cognizes *tadvattva* and obstructs doubt) is destroyed before doubt could come into being, the conditions which prevent doubt are destroyed and thus, doubt arises;² for, like the cognition of the absence (of an obstruction) (which inhibits doubt), undeleted impressions produced from that (cognition) also inhibit doubt; if not, doubt would arise in the very third moment³ even about a well cognized object. Further, if being produced from a defect were not the cause of doubt, as in the case of the cognition of water in a distant place (for example, a mirage), in the case of the cognition of an *āmalaka* berry in one's own palm too, doubt would arise

¹ The doubt "Is this cognition caused by a defect or not?" would produce the doubt about the validity of the cognition which forms its content: "Is this cognition valid or not?"

² The Naiyāyikas believe that all cognition last three moments: those of origination, duration and cessation. They explain that doubt about a cognition could originate only when that cognition (which cognizes *tadvattva* and obstructs doubt) is existent, that is to say when it is in its second moment. Since the doubt-obstructing cognition and doubt thus differ by one moment, doubt could arise at the moment when the doubt-obstructing cognition is in its third moment, that is, when it is destroyed.

³ In other words, as soon as the cognition which obstructs doubt is destroyed.

about the validity (of the cognition) and also about the object, (which doubt about the object is) brought about by it (namely by the doubt about the validity of the cognition).¹

[22] Moreover, the very principle that the cognition of the substantive is the cause of doubt is not admitted, by which (cognition of substantive) doubt about validity is said to arise.² It should not be said (by the opponent) that, if the cognition of the substantive were not admitted as the cause of doubt, it would be difficult to explain why, in spite of the contact of the sense of sight with many trees by a person going along a path, doubt arises about only a particular kind of tree ("Is this a jackfruit tree or not?"); for this criticism is also applicable to the upholder of the theory that the cognition of the substantive is the cause; because it is possible to retort: why does the cognition of the substantive, which is said to be the cause (of doubt), not arise about all (trees but only about a particular tree)? If (it were said that the perception of) the distinctive characteristics of objects (*viśayamāhātmya*) is the cause which gives rise to the cognition of the substantive of a particular object (and not of another object), then (it is replied that) the same (namely the perception of the distinctive characteristics of objects) is the cause of doubt about a particular object.

[23] It should not be said (by the opponent) that since the distinctive characteristics of objects, etc.³ vary, the cognition

¹ Because the doubt about the validity of the cognition, "Is my cognition of berry true or not?" would naturally lead to the doubt about the object of that cognition as, "Is that a berry or not?" Thus, if the presence of a defect were not accepted as the cause of doubt, it would arise about all cognitions and about all cognized objects in spite of excellent conditions like the proximity of the object, attention of the knower, etc., which produce valid cognitions.

² This answers the objection raised above, that if the cognition of the substantive does not arise, doubt about its validity too would not occur.

³ The word 'etc.' would include other causes such as defective senses, distance between the senses and the object, absence of attention, etc., which produce doubt.

of the substantive, which is constant towards all (doubts), could be the cause (of doubt); for although they vary, they are established (as the cause) while the causality of the cognition of the substantive is to be proved. Moreover, even if (the perception of) the distinctive characteristics of objects, etc. were admitted as the cause of the cognition of the substantive (as claimed by the opponent), the delimitor of 'the property of having origination' (*janyatā*) (in other words, the delimitor of effectness) is only substantive-cognition-hood (*dharmijñānatva*) and not substantive-cognition-hood-which-is-other-than-doubt (*saṁśayānya-dharmijñānatva*),¹ which would be cumbersome. And since it (namely *dharmijñānatva*) also exists in doubt,² it is settled that they (namely the distinctive characteristics of objects) are the cause of doubt.

[24] It may be said that, in spite of the resolution of the difficulty connected with the apprehension of the cognition of the substantive, which is said to be the cause of doubt, there is failure (of the definition of intrinsicity) because validity is not apprehended through doubt (for example, about validity, "Is this cognition valid or not?"), although it is an ordinary perception which apprehends the substrate (of validity, namely the primary cognition) and which arises prior to the appearance of any contrary cognition.³ It should not be said that since it (namely validity) forms one of the alternatives, it is cognized there (in the doubt); for it may be

¹ In other words, the delimitor of the effectness (found in the effect, namely the cognition of the substantive) should be only substantive-cognition-hood (*dharmijñānatva*); it should not be qualified by the attribute 'other-than-doubt' (*saṁśayānya*) which precludes doubt.

² Since the cognition of substantive constitutes one of the alternatives in doubt and has substantive-cognition-hood as its delimitor, the causal relation between the distinctive characteristics of objects and doubt is maintained even if distinctive characteristics of objects are held to be the cause of the cognition of the substantive.

³ Thus, the two conditions required for the intrinsicity of the apprehension of validity are present in doubt.

pointed out that in spite of being one of the alternatives in the doubt of invalidity and its absence (for example, "Is this cogniton invalid or not?"), validity (which is the absence of invalidity) is not cognized. And the criticism of failure remains. If it is said so, the answer is, no. The cognition (referred to by the definition) is that which arises 'prior to the appearance of any contrary cognition' while being that which arises 'prior to the appearance of the totality of conditions leading to the cognition of the absence of the property of possessing that'. Since doubt has 'the absence of the property of possessing that' as its content,¹ it occurs after 'the appearance of the totality of the conditions leading to the cognition of the absence of the property of possessing that' (and therefore, doubt does not cognize validity). Thus, as there is no hindrance to intrinsicity, it is proved to be sound.

[25] Extrinsicity (with regard to the cognition of validity), however, cannot be maintained because the (very) first inference of validity² can be drawn neither positively nor negatively. These two (positive and negative inferences) cannot arise because the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) cannot be known since validity, the thing to be proved (*sādhya*), is unknown (*aprasiddha*) and since the cognition of the thing to be proved, which is the cause (of inference), is non-existent.³

[26] It should not be said that although validity, which is the absence of invalidity, is not known as the thing to be proved, it could be known through the cognition of (its)

¹ In the alternative 'or not (valid)'.

² Which makes validity known for the very first time.

³ Invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*), which is the cognition of the un-failing connection between a reason (*hetu*) and the thing to be proved (*sādhya*), cannot arise if one of them is not known. Moreover, inference cannot take place if the cause, namely the thing to be proved, does not exist.

contrary, namely invalidity (*aprāmāṇya*),¹ thus: as pervading which, the absence of the reason is cognized,² by the absence of the same,³ the absence of that is known.⁴ This (explanation) is not acceptable because invalidity also is extrinsic and that too is unknown (as the thing to be proved).⁵ Moreover, in spite of the demonstration of the inference of the absence of invalidity, the inference of validity remains unexplained.⁶

[27] Nor should it be said that the thing to be proved is known, since validity is apprehended by mind when 'the property of possessing that' (*tadvattva*) is brought to it by another cognition;⁷ for if it were the case, (it should also be admitted that) since the primary cognition (which reveals 'the property of possessing that' to the introspective perception) too is a cognition which brings another cognition (*upanāyaka*), validity is known through introspective

¹ That is to say, if a positive concomitance (*anvayavyāpti*), which is the relation between the reason and the thing to be proved, cannot be formed because the thing to be proved is not known, a negative concomitance (*vyatirekavyāpti*), which is the relation between the absence of the thing to be proved and the absence of the reason, could be formed because they are known.

² While the thing to be proved is the pervader and the reason is the pervaded in a positive concomitance, the absence of the reason is the pervader and the absence of the thing to be proved is the pervaded in a negative concomitance. Thus, the absence of the capacity of producing successful activity pervades the absence of validity in the negative concomitance: 'wherever there is absence of validity, there is the absence of the capacity of producing successful activity'.

³ 'By the absence of the absence of the reason' means 'by the absence of the absence of the capacity of producing successful activity'; in other words, 'by the capacity of producing successful activity'.

⁴ Since the absence of the reason pervades the contrary (namely absence of validity), the absence of the absence of the reason should pervade the absence of that contrary (which is validity). Therefore validity, which is the thing to be proved, is known.

⁵ Thus, the criticism that the thing to be proved is unknown (*aprasiddha*) remains unanswered.

⁶ Because the subject matter of the two inferences is different.

⁷ For example, through the memory of validity produced from latent impressions.

perception; (and) it would not be possible (for the opponent) to deny the intrinsicity of the cognition of validity. Moreover, (inference is not a proof to extrinsicity also because) it is not possible to ascertain that the cognition which produces the inference of validity has something which possesses the capacity of burning (*dāhasāmarthyavat*) as its substantive.¹ Thus, extrinsicity (with regard to the cognition of validity) is not sound.

[28] Invalidity (of a cognition), however, is known extrinsically (through inference). It should not be said that since invalidity (which is the thing to be proved) is unknown, it cannot be inferred for the reasons discussed above; because it could be known mentally in 'the property of possessing the absence of that' (*tadabhāvavattva*) revealed in a sublating cognition (*bādha*).² It should not be said that, since it (namely the cognition of 'the property of possessing the absence of that') could also be apprehended by means of an introspective perception, this would render the cognition of invalidity intrinsic; for introspective perception is inoperative with regard to this because 'the property of

¹ In other words it cannot be known that the substantive (*viśeṣya*) (namely 'cognition of fire') of the inference "My cognition of fire is true; because, etc." has an object possessing the capacity of burning as its content. It cannot be known mentally because mind cannot directly know external objects; perception cannot be the means, for it would render the cognition of validity intrinsic, nor inference is the means, as it would require another inference to prove the nature of its own object, thus leading to infinite regress. Therefore, the validity of a cognition cannot be known through inference.

² Invalidity, in the form of 'the property of possessing the absence of that' (*tadabhāvavattva*), is known when an error is realized, for example, "I perceived this object (shell) which possesses the absence of 'that' (absence of silverness), as possessing 'that' (possessing silverness)". When the latent impressions left by this experience of error are kindled, invalidity is remembered and forms the thing to be proved by the inference "This cognition is invalid; because, etc."

possessing the absence of that' is not brought to it by the primary cognition (*vyavasāya*).¹

[29] The origination (*utpatti*) of validity (in a cognition), however, is extrinsic only.² The extrinsicity of validness (with regard to its origination) means, its (that is, of the validity) being the delimitor of 'the property of having origination' (*janyatā*) from a cause which is different from the totality of the general causes that produce cognition (*jñānasāmānyasāmagrī*).³

[30] Although the 'being the delimitor, etc.' of validness cannot be proved through the reason 'because it possesses the property of being present in all (its) effects' since it deviates in the case of bluepotness (*nīlaghaṭatva*) and non-eternal-cognition-hood (*anityajñānatva*),⁴ it could be proved

¹ In other words, the incapacity of an introspective perception to apprehend anything which is not brought to it by the primary cognition (which forms its content) proves that the invalidity of a cognition cannot be known intrinsically.

² Umāpati now explains how the validity of a cognition is produced not by the causes which produce that cognition, but by an additional factor, namely an excellence (*guṇa*).

³ Validity is produced by a cause which is over and above the common causes like attention, conjunction of the sense with the object, etc. which produce cognition in general. And this is proved by the inference whose subject (*pakṣa*) is 'validity', whose thing to be proved (*sādhya*) is 'being the delimitor of the property of having origination from a cause which is different from the totality of the general causal conditions which produce cognition' and the reason (*hetu*) is 'because, while there being no obstacle, it possesses the property of being present in all (its) effects'. This inference, which proves that validity in a cognition is produced by a particular cause, also proves that the particularity of that cause consists in the presence of an excellence (*guṇa*) in it.

⁴ The reason 'because it possesses the property of being present in all (its) effects' is not invariably connected with the thing to be proved 'being the delimitor, etc.', for the reason is seen in non-eternal-cognition-hood and bluepotness (which are present in their respective effects, namely a non-eternal-cognition and a blue pot), but the thing to be proved is not found in them. Non-eternal-cognition-hood and bluepotness are not delimitors of the property of having origination from a cause (*kāraṇajanyatāvacchedaka* or simply, *kāryatāvacchedaka*, that is to say delimitors of effectness) because they are not, as it will be explained, delimitors of effectness found in non-

through (the reason) 'because, while there being no obstacle, it possesses the property of being present in all (its) effects'. The clause 'while there being no obstacle' does not signify the absence of all obstacles, since it would lead to (the defect of) 'the non-establishment (of the reason) due to the (absence of) the object of doubt' (*saṃdigdhāsiddhi*),¹ and to the futility of the substantive (namely the reason) (*viśeṣya-vaiyarthya*).² It only signifies the absence of two kinds (of obstacles): that of the presence in the substrate of an effectness (namely in an effect) (*kāryatvādhikaraṇavṛttitva*) which is (also) produced from another delimitor (*avaccheda-kāntara*)³ and that of the impossibility of being the unique-causeness (*ekakāraṇatva*) with reference to the effectness residing in all effects delimited by it.⁴ The first part (of the reason, namely 'while there being no obstacle') prevents failure with regard to bluepotness and non-eternal-

eternal-cognition and blue pot respectively. Thus, the clause 'while there being no obstacle' specifies that the reason operates provided there is no obstacle to the presence of the thing to be proved (*sādhyā*) in the subject (*pakṣa*).

¹ 'The object of doubt' is the subject of inference (*pakṣa*) in which the presence of the reason is known and the presence of the thing to be proved is doubted, which doubt induces an inference. The clause 'while there being no obstacle' cannot signify the absence of all obstacles because such absence could be ascertained only after the inference has arisen. But at the same time, this clause would remove the doubt which induced the inference. Thus, the reason would be rendered futile due to the absence of the object of doubt and due to the absence of the very inference.

² If the adjectival clause (*viśeṣaṇa*) 'while there being no obstacle' were to exclude every obstacle, the reason would be unnecessary. In other words, this adjective could replace all reasons of all inferences for, in the absence of an obstacle, anything could prove anything else.

³ Bluepotness is not a delimitor of effectness because its presence in the effect (blue pot) is due to the fact that it (namely the effect) has another delimitor: pot is produced from the causes which are delimited by potness while blue colour is produced from the causes which are delimited by blueness.

⁴ Non-eternal-cognition-hood too cannot be a delimitor of effectness because it cannot be the sole cause of all effects which are delimited by it since cognitions have multiple causes.

cognition-hood and the second (part of the reason, namely 'because it possesses the property of being present in all (its) effects') prevents failure with regard to substanceness (*dravyatva*).¹ It should not be said that since validness (which is the subject of the inference) is eternal, it cannot be qualified with (the reason) 'presence in all (its) effects'; for the subject (of this inference) is the trueness pertaining to the intellectual operation which has 'that' (for example, silverness) as its qualifier (*tatprakāra*) while having something possessing 'that' (silver possessing silverness) as the substantive (*tadvadviśeṣyaka*).²

[31] Although a particular cause common to all instances of validity does not exist, this (inference) is not fallacious³ because the subject (*pakṣa*) of this inference is delimited by 'the property of being a true perceptual cognition, etc.' and because these (namely true perceptual cognition, true inferential cognition, etc.) have a respective cause (which produces validity in them). To illustrate, conjunction of the sense of sight with all aspects (of the object) (*bhūyovayavendriyasannikarṣa*) is the excellence (*guṇa*) (which produces validity) in perceptual cognition.

¹ The first part of the reason specifies two kinds of obstacles whose absence is essential for the reasoning to be valid. It does not, however, refer to the obstacle 'presence in those which are not effects' (*akāryavṛttitva*). Therefore, the second part of the reason is required to remove substance-hood (*dravyatva*) and other eternal entities which are not effects (*akārya*) from the scope of the inference.

² The subject of the inference is a particular instance of validness, for example, the validity of the cognition "This is silver", which has silverness as its qualifier while having silver possessing silverness, as the substantive; and not validness which is a universal (*jāti*) and which, being eternal, can neither be produced from any cause nor be an effect.

³ This inference could be said to be defective since the subject (*pakṣa*) (that is, validity) does not possess the thing to be proved (being produced from an excellence), because validity in all cognitions is not produced by a single excellence. This criticism is replied.

[32] A true consideration (*liṅgaparāmarśa*)¹ cannot be said to be the excellence (which produces validity) in inferential cognition because the inference of fire about a fiery hill, though produced from the erroneous perception of mist as smoke, is true² while, in spite of a true consideration, the inference possessing a subject (*pakṣa*) delimited by the prior non-existence of fragrance (*gandha-prāgabdhāva*) is false;³ yet, the cognition of being not contradicted (*abādhitatva*)⁴ or the cognition which has the reason as the qualifier while being delimited by the fact of having something possessing the thing to be proved (by that reason) as the substantive,⁵ is the excellence (in inferential

¹ Consideration (*liṅgaparāmarśa*) is the cognition that the reason, which is invariably connected with the thing to be proved, is present in the subject; for example, "This hill possesses smoke which is invariably connected with fire" is the consideration which produces the inferential cognition of the presence of fire on the hill.

² That is to say, since a true consideration "This hill possesses smoke which is invariably connected with fire" could be produced from an erroneous perception of mist as smoke, it cannot be claimed to be the excellence which produces validity in inferential cognition.

³ The consideration "This newly made pot is pervaded by mud which is invariably connected with fragrance" is valid because mud, which is invariably connected with fragrance, is present in the pot. But the conclusion from this consideration, namely "This newly made pot is fragrant", is erroneous because according to the Nyāya doctrine all substances originate bereft of qualities and the qualities which inhere in them are produced in it subsequently. See *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 30.

⁴ Thus, in spite of a consideration based on an error, the first inference is valid because it is not contradicted (for fire, the thing to be proved, is found on the hill, the subject). And in spite of a true consideration, the second inference is not valid because it is contradicted (for fragrance, the thing to be proved, is not found in the newly made pot, the subject).

⁵ The cognition "This pot is pervaded by mud which is invariably connected with fragrance" has the reason ('being pervaded by mud which is invariably connected with fragrance') as the qualifier, but does not have the substantive possessing the thing to be proved (fragrance) because a newly made pot does not yet possess fragrance. The inference is not valid because it lacks excellence. The inference of fire produced from an erroneous consideration "This hill possesses smoke which is invariably connected with fire" is valid because it

cognition). The feature 'being not contradicted' is also present in the inference where the presence of the thing to be proved is doubted (for example, "This hill has fire or some luminous object"), because doubt is true with regard to that part which concerns the thing to be proved.¹ Although the cognition of the thing to be proved is absent in the case of the (inference from the) roar of thunder,² (the inference is not defective because) God possesses the cognition of the thing to be proved.³ The collective inferential cognition "These two are fiery (because they are smoky)" about something which possesses fire and the absence of fire (for example, a heap of *guñjā* and fire),⁴ could be considered partly valid and partly invalid; but this is prevented by the adjectival clause 'while being delimited by the fact of having something possessing the thing to be proved, as the substantive'.

[33] True cognition of the meaning of the utterances of the speaker (*vaktrvākyārthayathārthajñāna*) is the excellence (which produces validity) in verbal cognition (*śabda*). True

possesses excellence since the hill (the substantive) has fire which is the thing to be proved by that inference.

¹ Since the substantive (hill) possesses the thing to be proved (fire) as one of the alternatives, namely 'has fire', it could be said that the cognition is not contradicted.

² When, on hearing a thunder, a person in a confined area may spontaneously infer the presence of clouds in the sky. Such inferences are said to arise without the desire to infer and without any cognition of the thing to be proved.

³ Since it is believed that God knows all things to be proved, the requirement that the substantive should be known to be that which possesses the thing to be proved is fulfilled even if the thing to be proved is not known to the person who infers.

⁴ This cognition has a substantive (referred to here by the expression 'these two') which possesses the thing to be proved (namely fire) as well as the absence of the thing to be proved (for it also has *guñjā* which is not fire). This would render the cognition both valid and invalid. Since it is specified that an inference, to be valid, must have a substantive which possesses the thing to be proved, this inference, whose substantive (*pakṣa*) also possesses the absence of the thing to be proved, is not valid.

cognition derived from the Veda, which is not uttered by a human being, is not excluded (from this demonstration) because its (that is, of the Veda) being uttered by someone is accordingly assumed even in that case.¹ It should not be said that (semantic) compatibility (*yogyatā*) only is the excellence (which generates validity) in verbal cognition; because if it (namely compatibility) were the connection (*samsarga*) (between the word-meanings of a sentence), there would be failure with regard to the words of the past, future, etc.² And if it were 'the absence of the cognition of incompatibility' (*ananvayaniścayaviraha*), it is not fit to be an excellence because it is also found in error.³ And if it were 'a word sense not being the content of a true cognition which is the counterpositive of an absolute absence found in the sense of the other (correlative) word',⁴ there would be failure (namely underpervasion) with regard to compatibility comprising of mutual absence.⁵ Moreover, the true cognition of the meaning of the utterances of the speaker is parsimonious. It should not also be said that the cognition of

¹ Since validity in verbal cognition is generated by the true cognition of the meaning of the utterances of the speaker and since the Veda is valid, it has a speaker, namely God.

² The connection between words of the past and future cannot be known because they do not exist.

³ Because there could be erroneous statements which are devoid of incompatibility.

⁴ For example, words are semantically fit in the statement "Wets with water" because the sense of the word 'wets' is not the content of a cognition (for example, 'burns') which is the counterpositive of an absolute absence (the absence of burning) found in the sense of the word 'water'. The words "Wets with fire", on the other hand, are not fit because the sense of the word 'wets' is the content of the cognition (wetting) which is the counterpositive of an absolute absence (the absence of the capacity of wetting) found in the sense of the word 'fire'.

⁵ Since it is specified that the counterpositive is that of an absolute absence (*atyantābhāvapratiyogin*), the counterpositive of a mutual absence (*anyonyābhāvapratiyogin*) is excluded from the definition. Thus, it would not apply to the valid sentences in which a word sense is not the content of a true cognition which is the counterpositive of a mutual absence found in the sense of the other (correlative) word.

the compatibility of the nature of the connection between the word-meanings of a sentence is the excellence (which produces validity in verbal cognition). While its invariable precedence (*niyatapūrvavartitva*) is to be proved, the true cognition of the meaning of the utterances of the speaker, the invariable precedence of which is already proved, requires only its non-superfluity (*ananyathāsiddhi*) to be established¹ and so, it is parsimonious. Excellence should likewise be assumed in the case of other (*pramāṇas*) also.²

[34] [The author] defines doubt, etc., which constitute the definition of *pramāṇa*.

Doubt is the cognition which depends on two³ due to the perception of a common form; error is the otherwise-cognition which refers to that of which the form (appearing in it) is not its (true) nature; here (in this doctrine), memory is said to be the cognition of objects experienced (in the past). Cit-śakti free from these is held to be the means of knowledge. (5^b-7^a)

Dvyālaṃbā, which depends on two, which grasps multiple contrary properties in the same object (*dharmīn*); *buddhiḥ*, intellectual operation, mental cognition of the form of indecision (*vikalpa*); *saṁśayaḥ*, is doubt. [The author] states the cause (which produces doubt), *saṁāna*, etc.; due to

¹ For a cause is that which invariably precedes its effect and is not superfluous, that is to say not too remotely related to the effect. See *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 28.

² Umāpati does not discuss the excellence which produces validity in presumption (*arthāpatti*) which is admitted by the *Pauṣkara* as an independent *pramāṇa*.

³ The reference to two in the *Pauṣkara* is to two substantives, that is objects. The cognition "The tallness which I see belongs to a man or a pillar" is a doubt because the mind cannot decide between two objects (man and pillar) that are recalled on the perception of a feature (tallness) common to them (and the non-perception of features which differentiate them). Umāpati, however, explains doubt as the cognition of multiple contrary features in the same object. He also introduces two causes which produce doubt, namely perception of specific features and cognition of contradictory statements.

the perception of form, height, etc., which are common to a human being and a post; and this also implies two other causes, namely perceiving specific features¹ and hearing contradictory statements.² It is said, "Doubt is the cognition devoid of certitude; it arises from (the perception of) common and specific features and from difference of opinion";³ 'from difference of opinion' means 'from contradictory statements'. [The author] defines error, *viparyaya*, etc.; *atadrūpapratīṣṭhitam*, *atadrūpa* means that of which the form (appearing in it) is not its (true) nature; in other words, that which has the absence of that (form); *pratīṣṭhitam* means, has that as its substantive. *Anyathājñānam*, **otherwise-cognition**, (cognition) possessing a qualifier which is different (from that possessed by its substantive). In other words, error is the cognition which has a property (perceived elsewhere) as its qualifier (*prakāra*), while having something devoid of that (property) as its substantive (*viśeṣya*). It has been stated earlier, "Superimposition in a particular place could be only of properties cognized elsewhere".⁴

[35] But then (it may be objected that), this (explanation of error) cannot be admitted because it cannot be proved that error consists in cognizing something as something else (*anyathākhyāti*).⁵ It should not be said (by the *anyathākhyāti*-

¹ For example, the knowledge that smell is found neither in the eternal nor in the non-eternal entities but is specific to the earth element, produces the doubt whether the earth element is eternal or not.

² The statement of the Naiyāyikas that the senses are produced from the elements (*bhūta*) and the declaration of the Sāṃkhya that they evolve out of egoity (*ahamkāra*) produce a doubt in the hearer of these statements whether the senses are produced from the elements or not.

³ *Tārkikarākṣā*, 55.

⁴ See *Pauṣkara* 4.96^a.

⁵ Umāpati identifies the theory of error defined in the *Pauṣkara* as *anyathākhyāti* and proceeds to defend it against the criticism of the *bhedāgrahavādin*, who may be recognized as the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka. According to *anyathākhyāti*, which is held by the Naiyāyikas,

vādin) that all exertion (*pravṛtti*) is produced by a cognition which has the same qualifier as itself (namely that of the exertion) and that the exertion which has silverness as its qualifier and shell as its substantive (namely an error)¹ also is caused by a cognition which has the same qualifier as itself (namely that of the exertion). For (says the *bhedāgrahavādin*) although qualified cognition (that is to say qualified by the features of the desired object) (*viśiṣṭajñāna*) is the cause of exertion leading to success,² in the contrary case (that is, in error), since exertion is caused by the non-apprehension of difference (from the desired object) (*bhedāgraha*),³ the opponent (namely the *anyathākhyativādin*) also has to accept it (namely *bhedāgraha*) as the cause of the qualified cognition (which leads to exertion). It should not be said (by the *anyathākhyativādin*) that, if the non-apprehension of difference were the cause of exertion, there would be exertion even in deep sleep (during which there is non-

the perception of the features of a desired object (for example, silverness) in another object (for example, shell) induces a person to act in error. The Prābhākaras believe that error is nothing but the non-apprehension of the difference (*bhedāgraha*) between perception (of an object, for example shell) and memory (of another object, silver) and this non-apprehension of difference provokes action in error. See *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, p. 126; *Tarkāmṛta*, p. 46.

¹ Which is an act in which a person picks up a shell (the substantive of the exertion) thinking that it possesses silverness (the qualifier of the exertion). The object, with reference to which an act is performed, is the substantive of that act; silver is the substantive in an act which satisfies a seeker of silver and shell is the substantive in an exertion leading to failure to obtain silver. In both the cases, silverness is the qualifier of the exertion.

² The *bhedāgrahavādin* agrees with the *anyathākhyativādin* that exertion is caused by the cognition qualified by the attribute belonging to the desired object (*viśiṣṭajñāna*). But according to him, this is the case only with regard to exertion leading to success, for example, silver cognition leading to the acquisition of silver.

³ The non-apprehension of the difference between the cognition 'this' (for example, shell) and the cognition 'silver' (which is qualified by the features of the desired object, namely silverness). According to the *bhedāgrahavādin*, the confusion between these two cognitions leads to the error "This is silver" about a piece of shell.

apprehension of difference); for the cause of exertion is only that non-apprehension of difference which is being experienced.¹ It should not be said that (if that were the case) the cognition "This is not silver" about silver too would lead to exertion,² or (in the event of non-exertion) there would be the acceptance of *anyathākhyāti* as it (namely the non-exertion) would prove that the difference from the desired object is apprehended.³ It is answered that the inducer is the non-apprehension of difference from the desired object which (object) is grasped directly.⁴

Moreover, (*anyathākhyāti* is not tenable also because) all qualified perception (being cognition of a qualified object) is caused by the cognition of the qualification (*viśeṣaṇa-jñāna*), the contact (of the sense) with the object as well as with the qualification, and the non-apprehension of the absence of association between the two (that is, between the object and its qualification). Since one of the causes, namely contact (of the sense) with the qualification (silverness), is absent in the perception of silver in a shell, the totality of causal conditions which produce a qualified perception is absent; and a qualified perception in the form of an error (that is to say a perception qualified by silverness) cannot arise. It should not be said that contact with the qualification is a cause of only valid perceptions, for it would be cumbrous. It (that is contact with the qualification) must be the cause of all qualified perceptions for the sake of parsimony, and not of valid perceptions only. Further, if

¹ And the sleeper is not aware of the non-apprehension of difference between the remembered and the cognized object.

² Because the two conditions (proposed by the *bhedāgrahavādin*) which should lead to exertion, namely the cognition of the desired object (silver) in 'this' and the experience of the non-apprehension of difference in 'is not silver', are present.

³ For *anyathākhyāti* is nothing but the cognition of something as something else; in this case, the cognition of silver as non-silver.

⁴ That is to say, perceived in the cognition as the substantive ('this') and not as the qualifier ('is not silver').

contact with the qualification were not a cause towards every qualified perception, a hill (possessing smoke) would be perceived as qualified by fire.¹ It is thus: in the inference "The hill is fiery, etc.", the totality of causal conditions which gives rise to a qualified perception, that is, contact of the sense with the object, namely the hill, the cognition of the qualification, namely fire, and the non-apprehension of dissociation between the two, is present. It should not be said that for these very reasons, it (namely contact with the qualification) is a cause of only valid qualified perceptions; this was rejected (above) as being cumbrous. Thus, as *anyathākhyāti* cannot be proved, this stand (about error) is not tenable.

[36] The following is the reply: mere non-apprehension of difference cannot produce exertion; for if it were the case, collective errors such as "These are shell and silver" about a piece of silver and a shell² would lead to exertion and absence of exertion simultaneously towards each of them.³ Further,⁴ while declaring qualified cognition as the cause of exertion leading to success, the relation of cause and effect was established between the cognition of qualified object (*viśiṣṭaviśayakajñāna*) and exertion, for the sake of simpli-

¹ In other words, the distinction between inference and perception would disappear and all inference would be reduced to perception.

² Which are grasped directly and which are the desired and the undesired objects respectively.

³ Since the non-apprehension of difference from the desired object produces exertion, the contrary, that is the non-apprehension of difference from the undesired object, should result in the absence of exertion. In this particular error, a person would pick up the shell because he does not know that it is different from silver (which he desires); he should also desist from it because he does not know that it is different from shell (which he does not desire); at the same time, there would also be exertion and absence of exertion with regard to silver.

⁴ This is to reply to the *bhedāgrahavādin*, who may explain that the above situation would not arise because while qualified cognition produces successful exertion, non-apprehension of difference produces unsuccessful exertion, that is to say error.

city; and not, (as held by the *bhedāgrahavādin*), between the valid qualified cognitions and exertions leading to success (on the one hand), and between the non-apprehension of difference (*bhedāgraha*) and exertions leading to failure (on the other), since it is cumbrous. But (the defect of) cumbrousness does not arise (in our theory of *anyathākhyāti*) although qualified cognition is admitted (in addition to the non-apprehension of difference, which we also admit to be the cause of the erroneous qualified cognition) towards exertion leading to failure because such cumbrousness did not exist when causality was being determined; and the presence of such cumbrousness after the determination of causality is of no consequence.

It should not be said that qualified perception cannot arise because one of the causes, namely contact (of the senses) with the qualification, is absent; for contact in the form of a knowledge (*jñānalakṣaṇa*)¹ or of a (physical) defect² is admitted (through which the perception of the qualification could arise). It should not be said that, since *jñānalakṣaṇa* contact could operate with regard to (inferential) cognitions such as "The hill is fiery, etc." and since the totality of causal conditions that produce perception prevails (over that of inference) when the object (of the two cognitions) is identical, there would be visual perception of fire on the hill (through *jñānalakṣaṇa*); for *jñānalakṣaṇa* contact is extraordinary and (the rule in this case is that), when the object is identical, the totality of causal conditions

¹ *Jñānalakṣaṇa* is an extraordinary contact (admitted by some Naiyāyikas) which gives rise to the perception of the features of an object perceived in the past. See *Nyāyasiddhāntamukhāvālī*, p. 279; *Tarkakaumudī*, p. 9. Thus, the perception of silverness in the shell occurs through an extraordinary contact with the silverness seen previously.

² The perception of objects which are not present and the non-perception of objects which are present is said to be caused by a disequilibrium of body humours (*dhātu*) that affects the senses. See *Nyāyakandalī*, p. 178; *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 168.

which gives rise to inference prevails over that of the extraordinary perception. Or (it may be held that) contact with the qualification is a cause of all true perceptions. The criticism of cumbrousness (pointed above) does not apply (here) because this cumbrousness was accepted¹ while establishing the causality of qualified cognition towards all exertion, by the (same) reasoning which established the causality of qualified cognition; and a cumbrousness which is accepted is not a defect. Therefore, there is no obstacle to the acceptance of *anyathākhyāti*.

[37] But then (some say that), there could be a qualified cognition of silver ("This is silver") about a shell, yet the silver cognized there is absolutely unreal because it is proved (to be unreal) by the cognition "The silver is only unreal", and because it (that is, silver) is known to be the counterpositive of negation in the three times (past, present and future) as "Silver was not there (in that shell), is not and will not be". Such is the state of being an unreal according to the followers of Madhva, for it is said in the *Nyāyāmṛta*,² "Being the counterpositive of a negation in the three times and in all places is held to be unreal; that which is superimposed and non-existent in the (existent) counterpositive (also is unreal)".³ This (theory of error) is not sound

¹ By the generally accepted rule that a favourable cumbrousness is not a defect.

² Compare *Nyāyāmṛta*, p. 249: *trikālasarvadeśīyaṇīśedhāpratiyogitā / sattocyate'dhyastatucche tam prati pratiyoginī*. This verse defines the real as that which does not become the counterpositive of negation in the three times and in all places, and the unreal and the superimposed as those which become counterpositive of the said negation. The verse as cited by Umāpati, is pertinent to this discussion of unreal, although, as pointed out by B. N. K. Sharma, the meaning of the second part of the verse is not clear. This partly misquoted citation from the *Nyāyāmṛta* of Vyāsarāya is one of the elements which help to determine the date of the author of the *Pauṣkarabhāṣya*. See B. N. K. Sharma, "The date of Umāpati's *Pauṣkara-bhāṣya*".

³ The Dvaita theory of error, which is named *abhinava-anyathākhyāi*, is similar to the *anyathākhyāti*. However, the Dvaitins reject the extraordinary perception of silver through *jñānalakṣaṇa* and explain

because an unreal (entity) cannot be directly cognized. Also, a cognition qualified by it (that is to say, by an unreal attribute) cannot arise since an unreal attribute can neither be produced nor known (to exist) prior to any contact of the sense of sight (with it in an object).

But (some others say), the silver appearing in a shell could be real. The production of silver in a shell is not contrary to causal function. The followers of Rāmānuja believe that parts of silver exist in a shell which is similar to silver, because the presence of an object in another similar object is admitted on the authority of the scriptural statement of substitution.¹ It is said in their commentary, "The opinion of those who know the Veda is that all cognition is true (because according to the scripture, everything participates in the nature of everything by the process of quintuplication)".² This cannot be admitted because (if the silver be real), the sublating cognition "This is not silver" (which arises when the cognition "This is silver" is realized to be erroneous) would be inexplicable. It should not be said that the negative prefix (in the cognition "not silver") signifies minuteness as in the expression "Girl without belly";³ for the above sublating cognition would be inexplicable about a large lead caldron, etc., which are similar (to silver) in all aspects and which should (consequently,) contain a large amount of silver. Moreover, there would be exertion

that for example, an unreal silver is perceived in the shell. For according to them, error is the cognition of an unreal object as real and of a real object as unreal. See *Viṣṇutattvanirṇaya*, p. 153.

¹ Vedic ritualists admit that a substance may be replaced by another similar substance under certain circumstances; for example, in the absence of *soma*, it may be substituted by *pūtikā* which resembles *soma*. See Rāmānuja's *Bhāṣya* on *Brahmasūtra* 1.1.1, *jijñāsādhikaraṇa* (*samputa* 2), p. 31.

² Rāmānuja's *Bhāṣya* on *Brahmasūtra* 1.1.1, *jijñāsādhikaraṇa* (*samputa* 2), p. 29.

³ 'Without belly' does not signify the absence of that part of the body; it only implies the slenderness of the girl, for the negative prefix *nañ* is also employed to emphasize smallness.

(towards lead caldron, etc.) by a person desirous of silver even after the sublating cognition ("This is not silver"). Further, where an error is not based on similarity, for example the identification of the self with the body, the presence (of an object in another) is not possible and so, only *anyathākhyāti* should be accepted. Even with regard to error based on similarity, there is no evidence to prove the presence of the parts of an object in another object, or their production in it. Scriptural statement of substitution only implies the great similarity of the respective parts and not the (actual) presence of the parts of an object in another object; for if it were the case, *soma* creeper would grow in *pūtikā* and other creepers.

The theory of (error of) the *ātmakhyātivādins* (that is, the Yogācāra Buddhists)¹ that silver which is made up of consciousness and which is only internal, appears as if external, is rejected by the text "That cannot be; consciousness (is given a form) by the object (and not the contrary)",² which refutes the (Buddhist) thesis that objects are made up of consciousness. The *māyins* (namely the Advaitins), on the other hand, hold that, because the sublating cognition cannot be explained otherwise, the silver appearing in a shell is different from both the real and the unreal.³ This is not intended here by Śiva, who instructs according to the qualification (of the disciple).⁴ The maxim "When there is a mutual op-

¹ See *Nyāyakośa*, p. 256.

² *Pauṣkara* 6.237^a.

³ According to the Advaitins, the silver appearing in a shell cannot be real because it is sublating when the error is realized; it cannot be unreal because it was perceived. Thus, they conclude that it is something which can be described neither as absolutely real, nor as absolutely unreal. See *Advaitabrahmasiddhi*, p. 181.

⁴ It is said that Śiva, who is the redactor of all doctrines, instructs His disciples according to their capacity to comprehend and practise a doctrine: see *PauṣkaraBh* on 1.6^a, pp. 8-9. *Māyāvāda*, according to which the world is neither real nor unreal, too is taught by Śiva for those disciples whose intellect is not ripe. But it is rejected here

position, there is no possibility for something different (from the two) to appear"¹ proves that when the real and the unreal are mutually opposed, either of the two should result and the appearance of something different from the two is not acceptable. Therefore *anyathākhyāti* only should be admitted.

[38] [The author] defines memory, *anubhūtā*, etc. The intended meaning is that memory is the cognition which is produced from impressions (*saṃskāra*) and not the meaning which is understood from the verse,² for it would be over-pervasive in continuous cognition, etc.³ It should be noted that since 'production from impressions' (also) implies that that which is produced is in the form of impressions, over-pervasion with regard to the destruction, etc. of the same (namely impressions) is prevented.⁴ Having thus explained the counterpositives, since a definition not conditioned by these (counterpositives) is easily comprehensible, [the author] declares, *ebhiḥ*, etc. Hypothetical reasoning (*tarka*) of the nature of deliberate assumption (proceeding from

because the sages, to whom the *Pauṣkara* is instructed, are qualified to receive the Saiva doctrine which is the highest teaching.

¹ *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, 3.8.

² Umapati explains that memory is produced not from a past experience as held by the *Pauṣkara*, but from an impression left by that experience. Some Naiyāyikas believe that an experience cannot directly produce memory because it lasts only three moments; each experience leaves an impression which, when aroused, produces memory. See *Tarkāmṛta*, p. 44.

³ Continuous cognition of the same object (*dhārāvāhikajñāna*) and recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) also are produced from past experiences. The clause 'produced from impressions' removes them from the scope of the definition of memory because the former is produced from sense-object contact and the latter, though produced from impressions, is accompanied by sense-object contact.

⁴ If it were said 'memory is that which is produced from impressions', the destruction of impressions, which is also produced from impressions, would fall within the scope of this definition. Thus, it is specified that the cognition arising from impressions is of the nature of (further) impressions which produce memory.

contrary conclusion)¹ is not enumerated separately because it is a kind of error.

[39] But then (it may be said that), the definition of *pramāṇa* could be merely "cognition (*jñāna*) free from doubt, etc.". The word 'cit-śakti' is not required to prevent overpervasion (of the definition of *pramāṇa*) with regard to intellectual operation (also known as *jñāna* or cognition), for this could be achieved by the very word *jñāna* (formed with a suffix) signifying 'action' and thus, *jñāna* would mean 'the experience of cognizing' (in other words, consciousness).² It is replied that it would still be overpervasive with regard to the self (which is conscious) and that the word 'cit-śakti' is to prevent this (overpervasion).

[40] But then (it may be said that), cit-śakti would be considered to be *pramāṇa* even when it is obstructed by mala.³ Having raised the doubt, [the author] answers it.

And (here) cit-śakti is only that consciousness which refers to the other (that is, an object), and not the other (consciousness). (7^b)

Here (in the definition of *pramāṇa*), the word *cit-śakti* signifies, *parāpekṣaḥ*, which refers to the other, that is, which is directed to objects (helped by the entities which temporarily lift mala-obstruction); *bodhaḥ eva*, only that

¹ For example, the *tarka* about a hill with smoke 'If the hill did not have fire, it would not have smoke', which proceeds from the (contrary) conclusion 'the hill has absence of fire'. In this *tarka*, the absence of the pervader (absence of smoke) is assumed from the assumption of the absence of the pervaded (absence of fire).

² The affix *lyuṭ*, added to the root *jñā* to form the word *jñāna*, could express the sense of action (*bhāvārtha*), instrument (*karaṇārtha*), etc. The overpervasion of the meaning of the word *jñāna* with regard to *buddhivṛtti* could be prevented by resorting to the first sense of the affix. Thus, the word *jñāna* would signify an act of awareness or consciousness and not *buddhivṛtti* which is an insentient instrument.

³ Mala is the substance which obstructs the omniscience of the self in bondage. See *Pauṣkara* 4.114^a: *niruddhaṃ yena sārvaññyam sa malah paripaṭhyate*; 4.124 and 137^a. It prevents the cit-śakti of the self from functioning, thus depriving the self of all cognition.

consciousness; *na cāparaḥ*, and not the other,¹ the (consciousness) whose cit-śakti manifestation is obstructed (by mala).

[41] Now then, since the self also is consciousness, why cannot it also be accepted as pramāṇa ? [The author] answers.

Knower, (which) is consciousness, is not turned to it (namely the object of knowledge); the means of knowledge is turned to it. (8^a)

Mātā, knower, that which is the knower; *jñānam*, is consciousness, which is the self; *tasyābhimukhaṇa*, is not turned to it, to the object of knowledge, in other words, it is not that (consciousness) which reveals objects; *mānam*, the means of knowledge, if something were to be a means of knowledge; *paronmukhaṇa*, is turned to it, it must be that which reveals objects. Therefore it is not proper to accept the self as pramāṇa. Such is the meaning. The self's not turning to objects (to reveal them) and cit-śakti's turning to objects (to reveal them) are discussed in the *paśupata* by the verse "And the consciousness (*jñāna*), which is its nature (namely, that of the all-pervasive self), is pervasive and directed towards objects, etc."² and should be inquired there. Thus, it should be noted that there is no ambiguity in the usage of the terms 'knower' and 'the means of knowledge' (with regard to consciousness).

[42] But then, if cognizing (*jñapti*) itself were considered as pramāṇa, since nothing other than cognition (*jñāna*) (namely cognizing) arises from it, while a pramāṇa is required to bring about some results (different from itself), how

¹ Consciousness (referred to by the word *apara* in the verse) can be said to be not directed to objects either because it is obstructed by mala (the interpretation of Umāpati) or because it is the self which is the knower. The word *apara* understood in the latter sense better connects this half of the verse with the second half which defines the consciousness which is the self.

² Pauṣkara 4.108^b.

can it (that is, cit-śakti) be admitted to be pramāṇa; and, in the absence of any results arising from the pramāṇa, how can an object, devoid of that context, be considered an object (of knowledge) ? [The author] answers:

The operation of (bringing about) the state of being an object of knowledge, etc. in the other, is held to be the result. (8^b)

Pare means *parasmin*, in the other, in the object. The absence of the optional substitution in the pronoun is archaistic. [The author] explains, *prameyabhāva*, etc., being an object of knowledge means, being the content of a cognition; this indicates the object-cognition relation. The word 'etc.' refers to the state of being known (*sphurattā*), which belongs to the object. That very function¹ of cit-śakti, *phalam iṣyate*, is held to be the result, is recognized as the result (of pramāṇa). Its function of connecting (with objects) and revealing (them) is mentioned in the *paśupata* by (the verses) "Connection with particular objects is the function (of cit-śakti) (and the faculty of connection with objects in general is its capacity)"² and "When it (that is, the capacity) is obstructed, the function (of cit-śakti) of revealing particular objects does not take place; therefore, (it should be understood that) the suppression of the function is due to mala"³. If the reading (of the first part of the verse 8^b) is

¹ The Pauṣkara distinguishes between two aspects of the consciousness (namely cit-śakti) of the self: capacity (*śakti*) and function or activity (*kārya*). See Pauṣkara 4.163^b: *śaktir eva na kartavyam śakti-drkkriyayor yataḥ*. Mala, which obstructs the omniscience of the bound self, cannot directly affect the capacity and function of cit-śakti because they are eternal and unchanging. It can only stop the function of cit-śakti by obstructing its capacity. See Pauṣkara 4.158: *na cāvṛttir malaneṣṭā cicchakter vyāpakatvataḥ / nāpy aprakāśikāraṇaṁ kiṁ tu kāryāpravartanam*. When the bound self temporarily overcomes the mala-obstruction with the help of *vidyā*, the senses, etc., its cit-śakti connects with objects and brings them to the awareness of the self. This very function of cit-śakti, namely pramāṇa, is said to be the result produced from pramāṇa.

² Pauṣkara 4.164^b.

³ Pauṣkara 4.166.

param prameyam bhāvādi, the following is the meaning: the word *param* in the expression *paronmukham* (in the verse 8^a) could be erroneously considered to refer to the supremacy (*paratva*) found only in the most eminent Śiva. To prevent this, it is explained that the word *param* refers (not to Śiva but) to everything other than the self, that is to say all objects of knowledge (towards which *cit-śakti* is turned). Thus, the distinction is that the *cit-śakti*, which is directed to objects and delimited by the intellectual operation in the form of objects, is the means of knowledge; the self, which has such *cit-śakti*, is the knower; objects such as pot, cloth are the objects of knowledge; and the function of *cit-śakti*, namely bringing about object-knowledge relation and revealing objects, is the result.

[43] [The author] states that the three defects of definition, namely underpervasion, overpervasion and impossibility, do not occur in the proposed definition.

The possibility of defects such as underpervasion is absent here (in this definition). The defect of underpervasion does not arise because it (namely the definition) pervades (that is to say applies to) the means of knowledge such as perception; nor the defect of overpervasion, since it does not apply to different entities like the objects of knowledge; nor is there otherwise-underpervasion. A means of knowledge should indeed be such (as defined above). The definition of the means of knowledge is, therefore, well proposed. (9-11^a)

Atra, here, in this definition; *avyāptyādidoṣāṇām sambhavaḥ*, the possibility of the defects such as underpervasion, cannot even be supposed. Among these, underpervasion is the non-application of the definition to a part of entities to be defined. [The author] explains that this does not occur, *pratyakṣa*, etc.; *pratyakṣādipramāṇeṣu*, percep-

tion and other means of knowledge, all the four *pramāṇas* mentioned above; *vyāptyā*, because it pervades; *avyāptidūṣaṇam*, the defect of underpervasion, does not arise. The defect of overpervasion consists in the application of the definition to entities other than those to be defined. That too is absent; [the author] explains, *nānābhāveṣu*, to different entities, to entities other than those to be defined; *meyeṣu*, to objects of knowledge, pot, cloth, etc.; *avartanāt*, since it does not apply, overpervasion does not arise. The defect named impossibility is the non-application of the definition to the entities to be defined. That too is absent; [the author] says, *na*, etc. Otherwise-underpervasion is the non-application (of the definition) to any entity to be defined, in other words, impossibility; that too is not found (in this definition).

[The author] explains why (these defects do not occur in the proposed definition), *pramāṇa*, etc. Whatever is intended to be a true *pramāṇa*, *tad idr̥śam*, that should be such, should possess the characteristics mentioned above. *Cet* means 'indeed'. [The author] concludes (the topic of) the proposed general definition of *pramāṇa*, *tena*, therefore, since it is free from defects such as underpervasion; *pramāṇakathanam*, the definition of the means of knowledge; *kathanam* means definition because it is that by which something is described, that is, defined. *samīcīnam udāhṛtam*, well proposed, correctly set forth.

[44] But then, while other definitions exist, how can the present definition be claimed to be sound? Having raised the objection, [the author] presents an earlier definition (*pūrvoktalakṣaṇa*)¹ and refutes it.

But then, why cannot that which is an instrument of knowledge be a means of knowledge?

¹This is Naiyāyika's definition according to Jñānaprakāśa. See *PauṣkaraV*, p. 823: *tārīkikānām iṣṭavighāta kriyate*. Compare with *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 27: *pramākarāṇam pramāṇam*.

(It cannot be), because the state of being a *pramāṇa* would apply to the intellect (*sattva*¹), lamp, sense of sight, etc. (This is not acceptable because) that which is a means of knowledge cannot (also) be a knowable; the absence of (the state of being a) knowable (to the means of knowledge) is proved. Of these (two), sound, etc. are known through a means, because they are objects of knowledge. That which is a knowable is not a means, because a means is that by which (a knowable) is known. (11^b-13)

Nanu yat pramitisāadhanam, but then, that which is an instrument of knowledge, that which is the most efficient cause of knowledge; *tan mānam kuto na syāt*, why cannot it be a means (of knowledge), why should it not be considered as *pramāṇa*? If the reading is *nanu tasyā*, *tasyā* refers to *cit-śakti* and the meaning is as follows: how can *cit-śakti* be considered *pramāṇa*, since only an instrument of knowledge could be a *pramāṇa*. [The author] points out the defect of overpervasion in the above (definition), *sattva*, etc. *Sattva* (here) signifies the intellectual operation in which the *sattva guṇa* is predominant. The word 'etc.' in the expression 'the sense of sight, etc.' refers to (other) senses such as the sense of hearing. The state of being a *pramāṇa* would also apply to them, that is to say the above definition would be overpervasive. But then, since the sense of sight, etc. are the things to be defined here (by the definition of *pramāṇa*), how is the overpervasion with regard to them? Having raised the doubt, [the author] explains the predicament if the sense of sight, etc. were the things to be defined, *yat*, etc.; *yat pramāṇam*, that

¹ Intellect (*buddhi*) is named *sattva* because it is a state of *prakṛti* in which the *sattva guṇa* is predominant and the other two constituents, *rajas* and *tamas* are attenuated. See *Pauṣkara* 6.42^b-43^a: *rajastamo-bhyām nyagbhūtā vṛttis sattvena cotkaṭā // sā buddhir uditā tantre vi-sayādhyavasāyini*.

which is a means of knowledge, that which is held to be a *pramāṇa*; *tat*, that, is not a knowable; it cannot be said to be an object of knowledge, because the states of being a means of knowledge and a knowable, like light and darkness, cannot exist in the same substrate. Therefore, *meyā-bhāvaḥ*, the absence of (the state of) being a knowable, to that which is a *pramāṇa*; *sthitah*, is proved, is indeed established.

The etymology of the words *māna* and *meya* also proves that the states of being a means of knowledge and a knowable can only belong to distinct entities. [The author] explains, *mityā*, etc.; *tatra*, of these, among those which are a means and a knowable; *śabdādīḥ*, sound, etc., because they are objects of knowledge; *mityā anumīyate*, are known through a means. Therefore, that through which something is known is proved to be a means; *yan meyam*, that which is a knowable; *na hi tan mānam*, is not a means, cannot be a *pramāṇa*; *yataḥ mānena mīyate*, because a means is that by which (a knowable) is known, it cannot be a knowable. Since that through which something is known is a means of knowledge and that which is known is an object of knowledge, by the rule that those which are the means and those which are the knowables can only exist in distinct substrates, the sense of sight, etc. being the knowables, cannot be the means; and they cannot be the thing to be defined here. Thus, the overpervasion of the definition (of *pramāṇa* proposed by the opponent) is confirmed.

[45] But then (it may be objected that),¹ if the sense of sight, (words), etc. were not considered *pramāṇa*, because they are knowable, the common usage "I see through my

¹ The objection is that the non-admission of the senses, etc. as *pramāṇas* would go against perception which proves that the senses are the means to knowledge, and against scriptural authority which states that the speech of Śiva is the ultimate means of knowledge.

eyes," "I hear with my ears," which is approved by all, would be discredited. Moreover, His (namely Śiva's) own statement, "(Since) that which is uttered by Īśvara is true, His speech is the ultimate authority", would be contradicted.¹ [The author] explains:

The common usage in the world "I see through (my) eyes" is due to the help (rendered by the eyes). (14^a)

Dr̥ṣā paśyāmi, "I see through (my) eyes", "I perceive directly"; *loke, in the world*, the common usage; *upakārataḥ, is due to the help*, (rendered by the eyes to cit-śakti) through the function of sensing (*ālōcana*), etc. It should be understood that the instrumental case in the expression 'through eyes' (*dr̥ṣā*) signifies only a non-active cause (*hetu*); whereas the instrumental case (when it concerns buddhi) refers to an active cause (*kaṛaṇa*) because it is an instrument towards the manifestation (of the object) to the consciousness (of the self). Since objects like lamp, etc., which are distinct (from the above two kinds of causes), are admitted as indirect cause (*prayojakakaraṇa*) in the cognitive process, they too are not fit to be designated as such (that is, as *pramāṇa*). Similarly, the usage, such as "I infer through a mark", "I comprehend through words", also must be understood as conveying the help rendered (to cit-śakti by *anumāna* and *śabda*, respectively).²

[46] [The author] declares that only cit-śakti, which is unfailing with regard to all (kinds of) cognition, is fit to be a

¹ *Mataṅgapārameśvara, vidyāpāda*, 3.20^a. See also *Pauṣkara* 7.63^a.

² Perception, inference, verbal testimony, etc. are designated as *pramāṇas* merely because they help cit-śakti which is the real *pramāṇa*. The same cit-śakti, on the other hand, is referred to as different *pramāṇas* depending on the delimiting adjuncts which are the modes in the cognitive process. It is named perception when it is delimited by the *buddhivṛtti* arising from the operation of the senses; it is called inference when it is delimited by the *buddhivṛtti* in the form of the cognition of invariable concomitance, and so on.

pramāṇa, and not the sense of sight, etc., which fail with regard to the cognition specific to the other (sense).

Only that should be accepted as a means of knowledge without which there does not arise the cognition of any object. The sense of sight, etc. are not such. The sense of sight is not (the means) to the perception of sound; the sense of hearing is not (the means) to the cognition of colour. Consciousness is the cognizer everywhere; therefore, that alone is considered to be the means of knowledge. By the manifestation of which there is cognition of all this; by the non-manifestation of which nothing is (known). (14^b-16)

Yad vinā, without which, without accepting which as a *pramāṇa*; *kasyāpi padārthasya, of any object*, of objects of knowledge like sound, touch, etc.; *pramā, cognition*, that is, awareness; *na bhavati tad eva, does not arise, that alone*, should be admitted as a *pramāṇa*. This being the case, *caḥṣurādi, the sense of sight, etc.*; the expression 'etc.' refers to everything (buddhi, lamp, etc.) proposed to be *pramāṇa* by others; that, *na tādṛśam, is not so*; means, is not unfailing with regard to (all kinds of) cognition. [The author] explains that failure of constancy, *na caḥṣuḥ, etc.*; *śabdasamvittau na caḥṣuḥ, to the perception of sound, the sense of sight is not*; is not the means to the cognition of sound; *rūpavedane śrotram na, to the cognition of colour, the sense of hearing is not*, is not the means. So also, the failure of *anumāna*, etc. (with regard to the cognition produced by other *pramāṇas*) should be noted. Cit-śakti, on the other hand, is not such. [The author] explains, *sarvatra, etc.*; cit-śakti, on the other hand, *sarvatra grāhiṇī, cognizer everywhere*, is capable of creating awareness of (all) objects, sound, etc. *Atas saiva, therefore that alone*, only cit-śakti; *mānaṃ matam, is considered*

pramāṇa, is qualified to be considered **pramāṇa**. [The author] explains the infallibility (of *cit-śakti*) with regard to all kinds of knowledge, which is the reason for the admission of *cit-śakti* as **pramāṇa**. *Yatsiddhau*, by the **manifestation of which**, by the manifestation of *cit-śakti* only; *idamah*, **all this**, true cognition of objects of knowledge such as sound arises; *asiddhau*, **non-manifestation**, by the non-manifestation of which, namely of *cit-śakti*; *na kiṃcana*, **nothing**, nothing of objects like sound, is known. *Atas saiva*, **therefore only that**, *cit-śakti* only is fit to be considered as **pramāṇa**.

[47] Now then, if *cit-śakti* were accepted as **pramāṇa** because it is unfailing towards all cognition, why cannot the intellectual operation¹ which is likewise (competent towards all kinds of cognition) be admitted as **pramāṇa**?² [The author] raises the objection and rejects it.

But why cannot *buddhi*, which is the ultimate (cause) of all (cognition), be accepted as a means of knowledge? (It is replied that) the state of being a means of knowledge cannot belong to *buddhi* because, being not different from the products of *prakṛti*, it is insentient like the sense of sight, etc. Moreover, *buddhi* is known as happiness, sorrow, etc.; therefore, the state of invariably being a means of knowledge is not accorded also to *buddhi*. (17-19^a)

Buddhiḥ sarvāntimatvena, **buddhi**, as the ultimate (cause) of all (cognition), because it is the final cause

¹ The *Pauṣkara* refers to some theories of **pramāṇa** in these verses in order to refute them. Umāpati perhaps sees the reference not to opponents' views, but to the different elements which constitute the cognitive process described in the *Pauṣkara*. Thus, here he interprets *buddhi* as *buddhivṛtti*.

² Jñānaprakāśa believes that this verse refutes the Buddhist point of view. See *Pauṣkara*V, p. 827: *atha saugatamatam anūdyā pratikṣipati*. On the close similarity of the Sāṃkhya and Buddhist definitions of **pramāṇa**, see *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 24.

compared to the sense of sight, etc.; since it is admitted that *buddhi* apprehends that which is grasped by the senses like the sense of sight and identified by the mind,¹ because it is unfailing with regard to everything, that is to say with regard to all (kinds of) cognition; *mānam kasmān neṣyate*, **why is it not accepted as a means (of knowledge)**? Such is the doubt. [The author] answers, *prākṛta*, etc. Since it is a product of *prakṛti*, being not different from the sense of sight, etc. (which are products of *prakṛti*), *buddhi* too is not fit to be a **pramāṇa**. But it may be said that although intellectual operation is not different from the (other) products of *prakṛti*, it may be accepted as a **pramāṇa** because its (power of) illumination is greater than that of the sense of sight, etc.² [The author] answers, *asaṃvid*, etc. *Buddhi*, the illumination of which is inert,³ cannot be admitted, as in the case of the sense of sight, to be a **pramāṇa**.

Moreover, *buddhi* also is not unfailing towards all cognition because it is (not the means of cognition but) an

¹ Certain aspects of the cognitive process described in the *Pauṣkara* are similar to those of the Sāṃkhya doctrine. For example, according to the *Pauṣkara*, the role of the senses is to fetch sensation (*ālocana*). The function of the mind (*manas*) is to focus attention (*vikalpa*) on a particular sensation thus preventing the simultaneous cognition of multiple objects, and to ascertain, helped by past experience, the attributes such as the name, universal, etc. of the object (*saṃkalpa*). The object seized by the mind is then appropriated, that is to say connected with the self (*grāhakaśaṃgati*), by the egoity (*ahamkāra*) and finally, it is apprehended by the intellect. See *Pauṣkara* 6.204^b-210 and the *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī* on *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 37.

² Since *buddhi* is principally constituted of the *sattva guṇa* which is subtle, its revealing capacity could be said to be greater than that of the senses which are made up of egoity (*ahamkāra*) which is gross.

³ For *buddhi* reveals objects but, being as insentient as the eyes, lamp, etc., is not aware of itself. See *Pauṣkara* 6.214^b: *tan na buddher jaḍatvena jñānotpāḍakatā kutah*; 5.18^a and 19: *buddhyādayo jaḍatvena na bodhasya tu hetavaḥ / ... kim ca buddhyādayo 'nyebhyo ravivat saṃprakāśakāḥ / bodhātmakaprakāśe tu na teṣām api hetutā*. Umāpati recalls the rule that the illuminating capacity of the manifestor should be greater than that of the manifested. See *Pauṣkara*Bh on 5.18, p. 314.

object of cognition when it is known through *vidyā*.¹ This is explained, *buddhiś ca*, etc. Since *buddhi* is of the form of happiness, misery, etc., when it is known as happiness, etc., it is not the means because it is something which is being known in these cognitions; therefore, *buddheḥ pramāṇai-kāntatā*, to *buddhi*, the state of invariably being a means of knowledge, does not arise; in other words, it is not an invariable means to all cognition. Or (it may be understood that) by the statement *buddhiḥ*, etc., [the author] recalls the argument presented earlier² that *buddhi*, which assumes the form of happiness, etc., is an object of knowledge,³ and consequently, it is not fit to be a *pramāṇa*. Now, it may be objected that if *buddhi*, etc.⁴ are not admitted as *pramāṇa* because they are objects of knowledge, *cit-śakti*, which is known by *pramāṇas* such as inference and verbal testimony, also is an object of knowledge and therefore, it also cannot be accepted as a *pramāṇa*. It should not be replied that only the attributes of *cit-śakti*, like its pervasiveness, come within the range of a *pramāṇa* and not its essential nature; for it could be retorted that even in the case of *buddhi*, etc. only their attributes become the object

¹ The self cognizes external objects (pot, etc.) and internal objects (happiness, etc.) when the *buddhi* assumes the forms of these objects. Thus, *buddhi* becomes an object of cognition for the self. Moreover, *buddhi* cannot be the means to cognize this function of *buddhi*; hence the self cognizes it by means of *vidyā*, a subtle substance provided by *māyā* to help the bound selves. See *Pauṣkara* 5.11: *tatas tu cakṣur ā-dyais ca kramenārthe viniścite / buddhyantair niścitarthais tām pumān samvetti vidyayā*, and 5.9: *kalayā kartṛbhūtasya buddhilakṣaṇakarma-ṇah / ālokaṇe yat karaṇam sā vidyā śivaśāsane*.

² In *Pauṣkara* 7.13^b.

³ Also the inference "Buddhi is an object of cognition; because it is cognized by the self just as a pot, wall, etc. are cognized; all cognized objects presuppose a means of cognition; just as form, etc. (presuppose a means of cognition)" proves that *buddhi* is an object of cognition and that it is cognized through another means. See *Pauṣkara* 5.10: *buddhir hi karma grāhyatvād ātmano ghaṭakuḍyavat / grāhyam karaṇasāpekṣam drṣṭam rūpādikam yathā*.

⁴ 'Etc.' should refer to the senses and auxiliary causes such as lamp, which were rejected earlier.

of a *pramāṇa* and not their essential nature. This (objection) is answered: if the essential nature of *buddhi*, etc. were not made known by a *pramāṇa*, they would (remain unknown and would) be as non-existent as a hare's horn. But it is not the case with *cit-śakti*. Since it is self-luminous consciousness, like Śiva, it does not require a *pramāṇa* (other than its own self) to prove its existence.

[48] But then, even if the sense of sight, etc. cannot individually be accepted as *pramāṇa* because they fail towards (all kinds of) cognition, why cannot the totality of the (sentient and insentient) causes that produce cognition be accepted as *pramāṇa*¹ since it is unfailing towards cognition? [The author] raises the objection and answers it.

But then, since the cognition of a pot arises only in the presence of (causes) beginning with the knower and ending with pot, why cannot the totality of the causes be accepted (as the means) for the cognition of the objects of knowledge? This cannot be, for the usage 'the knower', 'the object of knowledge', etc. would be disturbed because the knower, the means of knowledge and the object of knowledge would be included in that (totality); and a totality distinct from these (constituents) is not found because that which is not distinct from something, is not different from it, like one's own nature. Therefore, *cit-śakti*, which is not doubt, etc., should be accepted as the means of knowledge.

(19^b-22)

Prameyasamsiddhau, for the cognition of the objects of knowledge, for true cognition; *sāmagrī*, the

¹ This thesis is usually attributed to Jayanta. See *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 12: *bodhābodhasvabhāvā sāmagrī pramāṇam*. Śaṅkarasvāmin and Trilocana also are said to have held the doctrine that every effect is produced by a collection of causes. See Potter (ed.), *Encyclopedia*, vol. 2, pp. 340 and 397.

totality, of the form of the aggregate of all the causes that produce cognition; *neṣyate*, is not accepted, as *pramāṇa*. *Pramātrādighaṭānteṣu*, beginning with the knower and ending with pot, which are the causes; *satsv eva*, only in the presence (of these) causes, the cognition of a pot arises. The meaning is that the totality is fit to be considered as *pramāṇa* because it is unfailing towards (all kinds of) cognition. [The author] rejects, *tan na*, etc. Because the distinct usage, "This is the knower", "This is the known", "This is the means of knowledge", "This is the auxiliary", would disappear. [The author] explains how, *mātrmāna*, etc., because the knower, etc. would be included in the *pramāṇa* of the form of totality. But then, why cannot the totality, comprising of the aggregate of all the causes, be referred to as *pramāṇa* and each constituent (of the aggregate) separately, be designated as the knower, etc.? [The author] answers, *teṣāṃ*, etc.; *vyatirekeṇa*, as distinct from, that is, as different from those which are collected; *sāmagrī na dr̥śyate*, a totality is not found. The meaning is that there is no proof for (the existence of) something known as a collection over and above those which are collected. On the contrary, there is (inferential) evidence to prove (their) non-difference; *yad yato avyatiriktam*, that which is not distinct from something, that which does not appear separately; *tat abhinnaṃ*, is not different (from it). (This is the invariable concomitance of the inference). The example (of the inference) is, *svarūpavat*, like one's own nature. Just as the nature of an object, which is never seen separated from the object, is not different from it, so also the totality, which is never found separated from the causes (constituting it) such as the knower, is not different from them. Thus, since the designation of *pramāṇa* would apply to all of them, it would not be possible to distinguish the knower (from the known) and so on. [The author]

concludes, *saṃśayādi*, etc., for the reasons discussed above, only the definition proposed by us is sound.

[49] Other definitions of *pramāṇa* should be considered rejected by this (discussion). Thus, the definition of *pramāṇa* proposed by the Bhāṭṭas, that a means of knowledge is that which produces the cognition of an object which is not cognized previously,¹ is not sound because it is underpervasive in continuous cognition, etc.² Neither is the definition of the followers of Guru (namely the Prābhākaras), that (all) experience is a means of knowledge,³ valid because it is overpervasive in error, etc. It should not be said (by the Prābhākaras) that error does not exist,⁴ for it is proved (to exist). They further define experience (namely *pramāṇa*) as a cognition which is not memory;⁵ in which case, there would be underpervasion (of the definition) with regard to that part of memory which concerns the cognizer and the cognition.⁶ This (underpervasion) would not be acceptable to them because it contradicts their own theory, for according to Śālikanātha, "That which is produced through every means of knowledge is true with regard to the

¹ See *Mīmāṃsākutūhala*, p. 72.

² Because in a continuous cognition (*dhārāvāhikajñāna*), which is admitted by them as a valid cognition, the content of the successive cognitions is the same as that of the first cognition. The definition also fails to include recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) like "This is the same person I met last year", which is based on the memory of a previously known person.

³ See *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, p. 124.

⁴ As seen earlier, the Prābhākaras reject the existence of error, for they believe that error which is accepted by others, is nothing but the non-apprehension of the difference between two cognitions.

⁵ See *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, p. 124.

⁶ According to the Prābhākaras, every cognition, for example "I know the pot", has three aspects (*tripuṭi*) because it reveals not only the object but also the cognizer and the cognition. They further hold that memory is not valid with regard to the object (because it lacks novelty which is the essential characteristic of a valid cognition), but it is valid with regard to the person who remembers and to the memory cognition itself because they are being cognized as such for the first time.

cognizer and the cognition; it (namely the cognition about the cognizer and the cognition) is considered to be perception since it is immediate awareness".¹

Pramāṇa is defined (by the Buddhists) as non-contradictory cognition; and non-contradiction is described as the capacity to produce successful activity. It is said, "Non-contradictory cognition is the means of knowledge; non-contradiction is the capacity to produce a successful activity".² This (definition) too is not sound because it is underpervasive with regard to (the cognition of the) objects of the past and future and also with regard to inference; for the objects of the past and future, which do not exist, (and those of inference) do not have any practical utility. Moreover, it is overpervasive in memory and determinate cognitions (which could produce successful activity). This (overpervasion) would not be acceptable to them because according to them, only indeterminate knowledge, which cognizes the bare object, is pramāṇa.

[50] The general definition of pramāṇa was discussed so far. Now, as perception (*pratyakṣa*) was enumerated first, the sages, apprehensive of the voluminousness of the work, themselves set forth the definition recognized by the followers of the accepted doctrine (*siddhāntin*) and proceed to raise (the possible) objections.

The contact of cit-śakti with objects through the senses is perception (*adhyakṣa*). (23^a)

The meaning is that, according to the accepted doctrine (*siddhānta*), the contact of cit-śakti with objects, through the senses, is said to be perception (*pratyakṣa*).

[51] Now if this were the case, the cit-śakti, which remains in itself,³ is not fit to be considered to be perception because

only that (cit-śakti), which is affected by objects through the (operation of the) senses, etc., could be considered as the pramāṇas such as perception; and, as this influence by objects is temporary, it should be held to be brought about by some means. Since cit-śakti itself cannot be that means because it is obstructed by mala, why cannot that other (means), which is indispensable (for cognition), be considered pramāṇa? Such is the intention of the following (objection):

But cit-śakti is not turned to objects on its own.
How is its contact with objects without another means? (23^b-24^a)

Since cit-śakti cannot connect with objects by itself because it is obstructed by mala, some cause other than (its) contact with objects is required for its manifestation. That very cause could be the pramāṇa named perception because it is fundamental and indispensable (for the connection of cit-śakti with objects). Such is the meaning.

[52] While admitting that internal means such as *kalā*, and external means such as the sense of sight,¹ are instrumental

revealing objects. See *Pauṣkara* 4.169: *evaṃ cicchaktir apy eṣā mala-śaktiḥ vidūṣitā / svaṇiṣṭhā viśayajñānakāryākārtṛi vyavasthitā*.

¹ *Kalā*, *vidyā*, *rāga*, *kāla* and *niyati* constitute the bondage (*pāśa*) of the self, but also favour it by removing, though partially and temporarily, the obstruction produced by mala to its capacities to act and know (see *Pauṣkara* 5.1-2^a: *atha pāśāḥ puroddiṣṭāś śrūyatām muni-puṃgavāḥ / kalā vidyā ca rāgaś ca kālo niyatir eva ca // pañcāitāni ca tattvāni māyeyāni dvijottamāḥ*, 4.3^b: *maloparuddhadṛkchaktis tat-prasṛtyai kalādimān*, and 5.21^b: *kalāvidyāhvayau bandhau kartur evopakāraḥ*). Of these, *kalā* restrains the mala which blocks the capacity of action of the bound self and allows the self to act in the world according to its karma (see *Pauṣkara* 5.2^b-5^a: *malān sarvān manāḥ bhitvā caitanyaprasarātmanah // caitanyavyañjikā hy atra kalā malanivartanāt / caitanyam jñatvakartṛvarūpaṃ tad balam ātmanah // kalayā vyajyate tat tu tasyaiva hi tiraskṛtam / sarvātmanā kalā naitac caitanyam vyañjayaty aṇoh // kiṃ tu karmānusāreṇa kalāvṛtyaika-deśataḥ*). The self, which is made fit to act by *kalā*, is helped by *vidyā* to know. *Vidyā* is the instrument through which the self cognizes the function of the intellect (*buddhi*) as well as its own experience. (*Pauṣkara* 5.9: *kalayā kartṛbhūtasya buddhilakṣaṇakar-*

¹ *Prakaranapañcikā*, p. 167.

² *Pramānavārttika* 1.3.

³ Cit-śakti is said to be isolated when it is deprived of connection with objects due to mala-obstruction and impeded in its function of

(respectively) in manifesting (cit-śakti)¹ and connecting it with objects, Īśvara states that they cannot be considered pramāṇas such as perception for the reasons mentioned above.

It is true that it remains in itself obstructed by mala; but when consciousness, manifested through the means such as *kalā*, conjoins with objects, it is called perception, (because) the sense operates towards the object. Mere sense-object contact, however, cannot be considered as perception due to the ineffectiveness of these (contacts) devoid of association with consciousness. (24^b-26)

Satyam, it is true, that it remains reposed in itself. But subsequently, when manifested through *kalā* and other means, *yadā arthaiḥ yuhyate*, when it conjoins with objects, objects of cognition such as sound; *tadā praty-*

maṇaḥ / ālokaṇe yat kārāṇam sāvīdyā śivaśāśane, and 5.14^b: *tasmād bhogasya samvittau vidyā kārāṇam ātmanah*). *Rāga* lifts the cover which conceals the faculty of attachment of the self and impels it to crave for worldly experience, thus helping it to exhaust its karma (see Pauṣkara 5.22-23^a: *pravṛttasya prasaktyartham api rāgaḥ pravartate / bhogābhāvād asaktasya bhuñjānasya malīmasān // bhogān atṛptes tasyātaḥ kartur evopakāritā*). Finally, *niyati* and *kālā* constrain the self to undergo experience as destined and timed by its karma (see Pauṣkara 5.23^b-24: *kālāḥ pravṛttam evāṇum kalayaty ātmavṛttibhiḥ // niyatiś ca tathā karmaphale niyamayaty aṇum / tasmān niyatikālau ca sthitau kartrupakāraḥ*).

Besides *kalā*, etc. which are the subtle creation of *māyā* specific to each self, the bound self also acquires body, etc. which constitute the gross creation of *māyā*, also specific to each self. See Pauṣkara 3.60^b-61: *māyāto dvidivdhā sṛṣṭiḥ sthūlā sūkṣmātmikety api // drkchaktivyañjīkā sūkṣmā sthitā tattvātmanātmani / sthūlā bhuvanarūpeṇa śarīrādy-ātmanā sthitā*. These internal and external means help the self to recover its faculties and to know and act in bondage.

¹ Mala, in no manner, can modify cit-śakti which is all-pervasive consciousness. It can only obstruct its capacity. Similarly, *kalā*, the senses, etc. too cannot affect the nature of cit-śakti, they only partly remove mala-obstruction and allow it to connect with objects and to function. This is said to be the manifestation of the cit-śakti of the bound self.

kṣam ity uktam, it is called perception. Cit-śakti reposes in itself because it is obstructed by mala; although *kalā*, etc. and the sense of sight, etc. are subsequently instrumental in manifesting consciousness, they cannot be accepted as the principal pramāṇa because they are insentient. Such is the meaning.

But then, how does cit-śakti acquire contact with external objects by mere self-manifestation? Also, how does it come to be known as perception by mere connection with objects, which also exists in the case of objects which are inferred, etc. ?¹ [The author] answers *akṣam*, etc.; *akṣam*, the sense, such as the sense of sight. The contact of cit-śakti with external object is made possible through the operation of the appropriate instrument (like the senses, invariable concomitance, words, etc.) and, conditioned by these (instruments), it acquires the appellation such as perception. Thus, cit-śakti, free from doubt, etc., when conjoined with objects through the senses, is (the pramāṇa) named perception. The same is to be understood with regard to inference, etc. [The author] declares that, as in the case of the senses, the sense-object contact too cannot be considered pramāṇa, *na ca*, etc. *indriyārthamātrasya saṃyogaḥ*, mere contact of the sense and the object, cannot be considered perception. [The author] explains why it is so, *cit*, etc.; *yataḥ*, due to; *akimcit-karatā*, the ineffectiveness, the absence of the capacity of revealing objects for those sense-object contacts which are insentient by nature and devoid of association with consciousness; therefore; they cannot be admitted as pramāṇa. Such is the meaning.

¹ In other words, the same cit-śakti is named as different pramāṇas as *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, etc., but this distinction cannot be due to its connection with objects because connection with objects is common to all pramāṇas.

[53] [The author] classifies the perception defined above into two kinds, as indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) and determinate (*savikalpaka*), and explains.

That one (*cit-śakti*) is said to be twofold due to connection with determining factors. The cognition of mere objects is indeterminate (perception); that (cognition of objects) along with (their) connection with name, universal, etc. is determinate (perception). (27-28^a)

Sā, that, *cit-śakti*; although *ekā*, one; *vikalpayogāt*, due to connection with determining factors, such as name, universal, etc. (of the object).¹ This also refers to the absence of connection with them. In other words, owing to its connection, or absence of connection with determining factors; *dvividham*, twofold, it (namely *cit-śakti*, which is perception) is said to be of two kinds, as determinate perception and indeterminate perception; the word *dvividham* is an adverb. [The author] defines indeterminate perception, *vas-tu*, etc. The expression 'mere' excludes (connection with) name, universal, etc., thus preventing overpervasion (of the definition) with regard to determinate perception.

[54] Although its existence (namely that of indeterminate perception) cannot be proved through perception because it is beyond the senses,² it can be proved by the (following)

¹ Just as the determinate perception "Devadatta" arises about a person because he is connected with the name Devadatta, so also the cognitions "cow", "white", "staff-bearing" and "walks" occur because the contents of these cognitions are connected respectively, with cowness (a universal), white colour (a quality), staff (a substance) and walking (an action) which are determining factors.

² Indeterminate perception, which is an awareness devoid of all qualifying attributes, cannot be cognized because the presence of an attribute, which differentiates one cognition from another, is required for a cognition to be known by another cognition. Its existence can only be inferred. This thesis is generally attributed to a group of Naiyāyikas. See *TC*, vol. 1, p. 817.

inference:¹ "The first produced qualified cognition (*janya-viśiṣṭajñāna*) about Devadatta (that is to say the qualified perception "This is Devadatta" arising for the very first time) is caused by a produced (prior) cognition of a qualification (*janyaviśeṣañajñānanya*);² because it is a produced qualified cognition; like inferential cognition, etc."³ The force of the word 'first', which is the attribute of the subject of the inference (*pakṣa*), establishes (to prevent infinite regress) that the cognition (of a qualification) which produces (the above determinate cognition) is devoid of a qualifier (*niṣprakāraka*); (and that is indeterminate perception). For

¹ This inference proves that since every qualified cognition is produced from the cognition of qualification, determinate perception which is a qualified cognition, also is produced from the cognition of qualification. It is further held that this cognition of qualification, which produces determinate cognition, has to be indeterminate because if it were determinate, and by consequence qualified, it would depend on the cognition of its own qualification, leading to infinite regress.

This passage of the commentary differs from the point of view of the *Pauṣkara* expressed here and in another part of the text. According to the *Pauṣkara*, indeterminate perception is that which grasps mere objects. The sense connects with objects in this type of perception, but the mind, which focuses attention on a particular object and identifies the determining factors, does not yet function; hence the perception is indeterminate. Moreover, according to the *Pauṣkara*, indeterminate perception is perceived by the self through *vidyā*. See *Pauṣkara* 5.15: *kimcākṣavastusamyogād yo bodho nirvikalpakaḥ / sa ca vidyātmako jñeyo buddhes tatrāpravṛttitah*.

² The cognition of the qualification is said to be the cause of qualified cognition because a qualified cognition (*viśiṣṭajñāna*) cannot arise without a prior cognition of the qualification (*viśeṣañajñāna*). For example, a person who does not know a staff cannot have the qualified cognition "The staff-bearing Devadatta".

³ In this inference, the subject (*pakṣa*) is 'The first produced qualified cognition about Devadatta', the thing to be proved (*sādhya*) is 'is caused by a produced prior cognition of qualification', the reason (*hetu*) is 'because it is a produced qualified cognition', and the example (*dṛṣṭānta*) is 'like inferential cognition, etc.'. Just as the inference "The hill is fiery" is produced from the cognition of the fire which qualifies the hill, the qualified cognition "This is Devadatta" about a person also is caused by the cognition of the qualification, namely 'devadatta-hood', which qualifies that person.

cognition of a qualification'. And since, 'being produced from that cognition' could be present in any other form, the inference is not defective. Or (the objection could be answered thus:) even if 'being produced from that cognition by virtue of its being a cognition of a qualification' were the thing to be proved of the above inference, according to the maxim "The causal relation prevailing between the particulars (*viśeṣa*) also prevails, in the absence of any obstacle, between the universals (*sāmanya*)", the causal relation existing between an inferential cognition (*anumitiṇāna*) (which is a qualified cognition) and a cognition of the thing to be proved (*sādhyaṇāna*) (which is a cognition of a qualification) would also apply to a qualified cognition (*viśiṣṭaṇāna*) and a cognition of a qualification (*viśeṣaṇaṇāna*); and the defect of '(the example) being deficient of the thing to be proved' would not arise.

[56] It should not be said that since the cognition of the subject (*pakṣaṇāna*) is a cause of inferential cognition, the above reasoning would prove that the cognition of a substantive (that is, the cognition of the object) (*viśeṣyaṇāna*) too is a cause of every qualified cognition (*viśiṣṭaṇāna*). For it is answered that there is no harm in accepting the cognition of a substantive as a cause (of qualified cognition) because indeterminate cognition has both (the substantive and the qualification)² as its content

¹ And here, the cognition of a qualification (*viśeṣaṇaṇāna*) is in the form of the cognition of the thing to be proved (*sādhyaṇāna*). In other words, it is said that a qualified cognition is produced from a cognition of a qualification but it is not required that it be the cognition of the qualification in its role of qualifier.

² This is according to those (for example, the Vaiśeṣikas) who believe that all the causes which produce determinate perception are cognized in the indeterminate perception, though it is not yet known at that moment whether they are the substantive or qualification. See *Nyāya-kandali*, p. 189. Or the word *ubhaya* could refer to an aspect known in the indeterminate perception, which could emerge either as the qualifier or as the substantive in the determinate perception which

the same reason (that is to say, because the *pakṣa* of the inference is qualified by the word 'first'), this inference excludes memory. The first perception qualified by it (namely 'devadatta-hood') cannot be claimed to be caused by memory, for 'devadatta-hood' was not experienced in the past and it cannot be said to be remembered.

The word 'Devadatta' (in the *pakṣa*) excludes memory acquired in prior births from being the subject intended here (namely being the cause of this qualified perception); for this person could not have been known in a previous life. The word 'produced' (in the *pakṣa*) is to prevent over-pervasion with regard to the cognition of *Īśvara* and *cit-śakti* (which, being eternal, are not produced). The word 'produced' in the thing to be proved (*sādhya*) is to prevent the application of the inference to the cognition of *Īśvara*. The word 'produced' in the reason (*hetu*) is to prevent deviation with regard to the same cognition (namely the cognition of *Īśvara*). The word 'qualified' (in the *hetu*) is to prevent over-pervasion with regard to indeterminate perception which is being proved. The word 'qualified' in the subject (*pakṣa*) is to prevent deviation in the same (namely indeterminate perception).

[55] Now, it may be objected that this inference is defective because its example is 'deficient of the thing to be proved' (*sādhya*), for every inferential cognition is produced from that which is the cognition of the thing to be proved (*sādhyaṇāna*) and not from that which is a cognition of a qualification (in fact) seeks to prove 'being produced from a cognition of a qualification' and not 'being produced from that cognition (of qualification) by virtue of its being the

¹ The thing to be proved ('being caused by a produced prior cognition of a qualification') is absent in the example ('inferential cognition'), for an inference is produced from the cognition of the thing to be proved and not from a prior cognition of a qualification (for example, fire as the qualifier of the subject, namely the hill).

and it is produced from the totality of causal conditions (including the cognition of the substantive). Nor is there any obstacle in admitting (as you do) that, since it leads to obstruction (*pratibandha*), the cognition of the substantive is not the cause. For also according to you¹, the (qualified) cognition "The ground is qualified by the absence of pot" cannot be preceded by an indeterminate cognition of absence; since the cognition of absence is produced from the cognition of the counterpositive (namely the object, the absence of which is being referred to), it is invariably produced from a causal apparatus which includes a qualified cognition (of the counterpositive), and an indeterminate cognition of absence cannot arise. Hence the cognition of absence should be admitted to be produced from a cognition which is only determinate. If this (cognition of qualification, namely 'the absence of pot', which is a determinate cognition of absence and which produces the qualified cognition "The ground is qualified by the absence of pot") were to have absence as its qualification, it would result in infinite regress. So it is admitted (by you, the Naiyāyika) that it (namely this cognition of absence) can have absence (only) as its substantive;² but now, if the cognition of substantive were said to be the cause (of qualified cognition), it would again lead to infinite regress;³ therefore

follows. Thus, there could be an indeterminate perception of the substantive as well as of the qualification and both could be the cause of qualified cognition, that is determinate perception. See the editor's note on p. 109 of the *Śivajñānabodhāvistarabhāṣya*.

¹ Later Naiyāyikas believe that the cognitions of absence (*abhāva*) and universal (*jāti*), which cannot be preceded by an indeterminate cognition of qualification for logical reasons, are produced from a determinate cognition of qualification. See *TC*, vol. 1, p. 822.

² As "The absence of pot on the ground" (where absence is the substantive) and not as "The ground has the absence of pot" (where absence is the qualification).

³ In other words, the above problem (raised by a qualification which is an absence) was solved by declaring that absence can only be the substantive of the cognition of absence. Now, if the substantive were

(it is concluded by you that) the cognition of substantive cannot be admitted as the cause (of qualified cognition). Thus, (due to the predicament faced by you,) it may be held that the cognition of substantive is not the cause (of qualified cognition), and this is favourable (to our position).

[57] And it may (also) be explained that the cognition of the counterpositive is the cause of the perceptions which have absenceness as the qualifier (*abhāvatvaprakāra-pratyakṣa*) and not of perceptions of absence (*abhāva-pratyakṣa*), for it (namely the cognition of the counterpositive) is not required towards perceptions which have 'thisness' (*idamtvā*), etc. as the qualifier.¹ Since such perceptions need not be preceded by an apparatus of qualified cognition (consisting of the cognition of the counterpositive, substrate, etc.), there could be an indeterminate cognition of absence and subsequently, there could be cognitions possessing that (absence) as the substantive or as the qualification. Thus, the cognition of substantive too can be the cause (of qualified cognition). This stand (also) is acceptable to us. Moreover, it is proper to admit indeterminate cognition also of absence; if not, it (namely absence) would not be held to be perceived by the senses. The admission that the senses are the means only of indeterminate cognition (including that of

said to be the cause of qualified cognition, the defect of infinite regress would reappear.

¹ For example, the cognition of the counterpositive is necessary for cognitions such as "The absence of pot" which have absenceness (*abhāvatva*) as the qualifier. But it is not required when the same absence is cognized as "this" (*idam*) or as "an object (of knowledge)" (*prameyam*) because the qualifiers of these cognitions are, respectively, thisness (*idamtvā*) and objectness (*prameyatva*), and not absenceness (*abhāvatva*). In other words, the cognition of the counterpositive is required when an absence is cognized to be that of a particular entity, but not when the absence is cognized as a mere something, or as an object of knowledge.

absence) is in agreement with the statement "Sensation indeed is the function of the senses".¹

[58] Or (the existence of indeterminate perception could be proved thus:) the maxim "There is no cognition in the world which is not penetrated by speech (*śabda*); all cognition is cognized as if infused with speech"² declares that all determinate cognition is delineated through speech. It should not be said that delineation by speech does not exist in the cognitions of babies, the dumb and such persons; for although delineation in distinct speech is absent in such cognitions, delineation in indistinct speech in the form of *nāda*³ is present also in these cognitions. If speech were not present, the cognition (of an object) as qualified by it (namely the word of the object) would not arise; therefore its presence should be accepted. And the presence (of the word) is only in the form of memory, for it cannot be in any other form.⁴ As it (namely the memory of the word) cannot arise without the perception of the corresponding object, the (necessity of the) perception of the corresponding object, which revives the memory of the word, proves (the existence of) indeterminate perception.⁵ [The author] defines determinate cognition, *nāma*, etc.; the expression 'etc.' refers to qualities and so on; *sambandhasahitam*, along with the connection, means, that (perception) which has the

¹ Compare *Pauṣkara* 6.206^b: *ālōcanatvaṃ vyāpāraś cākṣurādeś ca kevalaḥ*.

² Compare *Vākyapadīya* 1.115.

³ *Nāda* is the undifferentiated subtle speech which exists in all beings.

⁴ The word which signifies the object in a determinate perception can only be remembered. It can be known neither by perception nor by inference. This argument is to counter the objection that an object and the word signifying it are simultaneously grasped in determinate cognition and that an indeterminate cognition, which is a precognition which gives rise to the memory of the word signifying that object, need not be presumed.

⁵ This could be identified as the Vaiśeṣika point of view. See *Nyāya-kandalī*, p. 189; *Kaṇādarahasya*, p. 93.

connection (of the object with name, qualities, etc.) as its content.

[59] [The author] explains that perception is threefold according to another mode of classification.

And this (perception) is held to be threefold as 'dependent on the senses', 'non-dependent' (on the senses) and 'dependent on the internal organ'. (28^b-29^a)

Nirapekṣam, non-dependent; it is named 'non-dependent' because it depends neither on the external organs nor on the internal organ. It is said, "Perception is said to be of three kinds (derived) through the senses, mind and consciousness".¹ Of these 'non-dependent on the senses', which will be defined as that which is produced through unobstructed *cit-śakti*, should be enumerated first because it is pre-eminent; (but) it is mentioned in the middle of the verse due to metrical exigency.

[60] [The author] defines it.

Of these, 'non-dependent on the senses' arises on the conjunction with the infinite through the *cit-śakti* which is completely free from bondage; and this conjunction is held to be natural. (29^b-30^a)

Tatra, of these, three (kinds of perception); *indriyā-napekṣam*, (the perception named) 'non-dependent on the senses' arises; *sarvathā tyaktabandhayā cicchaktyā*, through the *cit-śakti* which is completely free from bondage, freed in every way from the bondage caused by mala, etc. This explains the absence of dependence on the senses in this kind of perception; *anantayogāt*, on the conjunction with the infinite, with the unlimited (that is, released) self, or with Śiva. *Svābhāviko yogaḥ*, the natural conjunction which arises through that (namely *cit-*

¹ Untraced. Also cited in the *Śaivaparibhāṣā* (Madras edn, p. 13), the *Śivajñānabodhavarāṇasya* (p. 111), the *Śivajñānabodhavarṇī* of Jñānaprakāśa (p. 5), etc.

śakti) which has severed connection (with mala)¹ or through the power of Śiva which transcends all association with mala.² It should be understood that this 'non-dependent perception' is thus twofold: it is self-awareness when it concerns the (released) self and self-revelation when it concerns Śiva.

[61] [The author] explains (the perception named) 'dependent on the senses'.

The other is 'dependent on the senses'; it is the cognition of objects through the senses by the cit-śakti which is dependent on them for the removal of the obstruction. (30^b-31^a)

Chādananivṛttaye, for the removal of the obstruction; by the cit-śakti which is dependent on the senses, such as the sense of sight, which remove the obstruction caused by mala;³ *taddvāreṇa*, through them, through the operation of the senses; *arthavikṣaṇam*, cognition of objects.

¹ The self whose consciousness is obstructed by mala is dependent on the senses, *vidyā*, *kalā*, etc. to cognize not only external objects such as pot, and internal states such as happiness, but also to be aware of its own nature (see *Pauṣkara* 5.6: *yataḥ kalām vinā teṣāṃ rūpaṃ tan na tu siddhyati / tatas tac chūnyakalpaṃ syāc caitanyaprasaraṃ vinā*). But when this obstruction is removed in release and the self regains its natural omniscience, it cognizes through its own consciousness and is not dependent on any other means.

² The senses, cit-śakti, *kalā*, etc. are ineffective means to know Śiva because He never becomes an object of cognition. Only Śiva is the means because He decides, out of compassion, to reveal Himself either directly by bestowing His own awareness on the selves, or indirectly through scriptures composed by Him. See *Pauṣkara* 1.94: *patijñānaikagamyo 'yaṃ patis tad dhetuḥ eva ca*, and 1.7: *śivāsya samavetā yā śaktir jñānātmikāmalā / saiva jñānam iti proktaṃ śābdam tadanumāpakam*.

³ The senses of cognition and action, as well as buddhi, temporarily free the consciousness of the self from mala-obstruction and allow it to act and know. See *Pauṣkara* 6.201-202: *jñānakriyā tu śaktir yā sā pudgalasamāśritā / saiva saṃlakṣyate śaktir buddhikarmendriyātmakāḥ // anekakālasamruddham ātmānam tamasoṣitam / vivekāt kurvate 'rthajñānam tad indriyaphalam dvijāh*. Umāpati explains that the senses of cognition help the function of the cognitive capacity while the senses of action help the function of the conative capacity of the self.

such as sound, is the perception named 'dependent on the senses'. Such is the meaning. *Anyat syāt*, is the other for it is different from the 'non-dependent' and 'dependent on the internal organ' (perceptions).

[62] [The author] defines (the perception named) 'dependent on the internal organ'.

While (the perception) 'dependent on the internal organ' is by overcoming the external senses; (whereby) the connection of cit-śakti with the objects fit to be contemplated is dependent on the internal organ. (31^b-32^a)

Bāhyendriyajayena, by overcoming the external senses, by overcoming means, by withdrawing the external senses such as the sense of sight from their objects so that there is dependence on the inner organ; connection, that is to say the relation of cit-śakti with the objects fit to be contemplated, is the perception named; *antahkaraṇasāpekṣam*, 'dependent on the internal organ'. And this 'dependent on the internal organ' perception is of two kinds: extraordinary perception through (the merit earned by) yogic practices and perception of happiness, etc. Of these (two), perception of happiness, etc. is not mentioned (in the verse) because it is well known.

[63] Now, 'dependent on the senses' is the perception which apprehends external objects. [The author] explains, with illustrations, the sense-object connection which procures contact with external objects for cit-śakti.

The connection of each sense, which is named perception (*adhyakṣa*), is sixfold. The cognition of substances like pot is through mere conjunction (*saṃyoga*) of the sense of sight; the cognition of its quality and universal is by inherence- in- what- is-conjoined (*saṃyuktasāmavāya*); the cognition of qualityness is by inherence- in- what- is- inherent- in- what-

is-conjoined (*saṃyuktasamavetasamavāya*); the cognition of sound is as inherent (*samaveta*) in the sense of hearing; soundness is perceived by inherence-in-what-is-inherent (*samavetasamavāya*); inherence and absence are cognized as a qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) or, inherence and absence are cognized as a substantive (*viśeṣya*).¹ (32^b-36^a)

Akṣamātreṇa, of each sense, the sense of sight, etc.; the word *mātra* signifies totality; *sambandhaḥ*, connection, the appropriate connection with objects like pot, (potness,) etc.; *adhyakṣasamjñitaḥ*, is named perception (according to others).² According to the accepted doctrine (*siddhānta*), however, as sense-object contact only manifests (the object), it is not a veritable *pramāṇa*; it is metaphorically named perception because it helps (*cit-śakti*). The connection which is named perception is, *śaḍvidhaḥ*, sixfold. But this is according to others' doctrine.³ It should be noted that it (namely the connection of the senses with their objects) is only fourfold according to the accepted doctrine. Since the sense of hearing is made up of egoity (*ahaṃkāra*),⁴ its contact with sound⁵ is of the form of inherence-in-what-is-conjoined (*saṃyuktasamavāya*) (and not *samavāya*); and with soundness, it is of the form of inherence-in-what-is-inherent-

¹ Jñānaprakāśa's commentary (*PauṣkaraV*, pp. 854-855) has the following extra verses: *viśeṣaṇatayā hy arthe viśeṣyatvena vā bhavet / samavāyamiti[?] sthitvā sphuṭam arthe prakāśyate // prāgabhāva-viśeṣeṇa samavetatayāthavā.*

² For example, according to the Naiyāyikas and some Mīmāṃsakas. See *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 33 and *Mānameyodaya*, p. 9.

³ For example, the Naiyāyikas. See *Tarkabhāṣā*, pp. 34-35.

⁴ Because it originates in *ahaṃkāra*. See *Pauṣkara* 6.142^b: *taijasād apy ahaṃkāraṇ mano buddhindriyāṇi ca.*

⁵ According to the *Pauṣkara*, sound is a quality (*guṇa*) that inheres in space (*ākāśa*) which is a substance (*dravya*). See *Pauṣkara* 6.283: *'am ca tivrādayaś śabdā guṇapekṣā guṇatvataḥ / guṇi cākāśam ity uktam tac ca nrñam atindriyam.* Since the sense of hearing which is a substance, conjoins with sound which is a quality, the perception of sound is through *saṃyuktasamavāya*.

in-what-is-conjoined (*saṃyuktasamavetasamavāya*) (and not *samavetasamavāya*). [The author] explains these contacts respectively, with illustrations, *ghaṭādi*, etc.; since pot, etc. are substances just as the sense of sight is a substance, *saṃyoga* is the connection between them.

[64] But then, it may be said that since inherence-in-what-is-conjoined (*saṃyuktasamavāya*) is admitted as the connection to the cognition of qualities, etc., and since it could also operate with regard to the cognition of substances (such as pot),¹ the same could be the connection (towards the cognition of substances).² This (objection) is rejected because inherence-in-what-is-conjoined cannot function in the perception of (substances like) the self, tertiary atom, etc.,³ and,⁴ when conjunction is admitted as the cause, its causality is generally conditioned by the perceptibility of the substance (in question). *Tadguṇasāmānyayoh*, of its quality and universal, quality and universal of (substances like) pot, etc. And this also implies action. In other words, since quality, action and universal inhere in the pot with which the sense of sight conjoins, inherence-in-what-is-conjoined is the connection. *Guṇatvadhīḥ*, the cognition of qualityness, arises through inherence-in-what-is-inherent-in-what-is-conjoined (*saṃyuktasamavetasamavāya*) because

¹ A pot could be said to be cognized through *saṃyuktasamavāya* because it inheres in the pot-halves with which the eyes conjoin.

² In other words, *saṃyuktasamavāya* could be the connection also for the cognition of substances and that *saṃyoga* need not be admitted as a connection.

³ The self and the tertiary atom cannot be cognized through *saṃyuktasamavāya* because the former does not inhere anywhere, and conjunction cannot arise with regard to the latter because it is bereft of dimension and visible qualities.

⁴ It may be objected that *saṃyoga* too is not the connection to the perception of substances because a pot in a dark room is not perceived through *saṃyoga*. It is replied that *saṃyoga* is the connection to the perception of only those substances which are fit to be perceived (*yogyā*), and that a pot in a dark room is not perceivable. Thus, the non-perception of a pot in the dark is not an obstacle to the acceptance of *saṃyoga* as the connection to perceive substances.

qualityness inheres in the quality which inheres in the pot, etc. with which the sense of sight conjoins. *Śabdasya*, of sound, since the sense of hearing is made up of ether (which is a substance) and since sound is its quality; as the contact between a quality and a substance is inherence, the perception of sound by the sense of hearing is through inherence.

[65] But then, it may be objected that there is no evidence whatsoever to (prove the existence of) inherence (*samavāya*).¹ It is answered that the following inference is the proof:² "The cognition 'that blue pot' has a connection (between the object and its qualification) as its content (*sambandhaviśaya-ka*), or is produced by a connection (between the object and its qualification) (*sambandhanimittaka*);³ because it is a cognition of a qualified object; like the cognition 'the staff-bearing man' ". The defect of '(the reason) not being different from the thing to be proved' (*sādhya*viśeṣa) does not arise here (in this inference) because 'being that' (that is to

¹ This objection could be ascribed to the Bhāttas, who do not admit inherence as an independent category and consequently, reject connection involving inherence. See *Mānameyodaya*, pp. 16-17.

² This inference proves that just as the qualified cognition "the staff-bearing man" has a connection (between the man and the staff) as its content or, is produced by that connection, the cognition "blue pot" too has a connection (between the pot and the colour) as its content or, is produced by that connection. It is then shown that this connection cannot be conjunction (*samyoga*) which connects only separable substances. Hence a connection which connects two inseparable entities (*ayutasiddha*) such as a substance and its quality, etc., is established, and that is inherence. This explanation of Umāpati follows that of the later Naiyāyikas. According to the *Pauṣkara* however, as stated in verses 35^b and 36^a, inherence is known through perception, either as a qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) or as a substantive (*viśeṣya*).

³ The second thing to be proved (*sādhya*) by this inference, namely 'is produced by a connection', also intends to prove that the cognition "blue pot" is produced by a connection between the object (pot) and its qualification (blue colour). As the law of parsimony requires that effects of the same nature should be produced from the same cause, it is proved that cognitions like "blue pot" are produced by a single cause, which is inherence.

say 'being a cognition of a qualified object', which is the reason of this inference) signifies 'being a cognition which apprehends a qualification' (*viśeṣaṇagocarabuddhitva*), or 'being a cognition which is produced from the cognition of a qualification' (*viśeṣaṇajñānanyabuddhitva*).¹ It may (also) be objected that, since this inference (also) proves the relation of self-linking-connection (*svarūpasambandha*), it is defective of 'proving something other than what it proposes to prove' (*arthāntara*);² and if, (to avoid this defect), it were said that it (namely the inference) does not concern a relation which is not a qualification-object relation (*viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyasambandha*), it would exclude cognition qualified by absence (*abhāvaviśiṣṭabuddhi*) (from its scope).³ It is answered that self-linking-connections, which are of the form of the qualification or the object, are infinite,⁴ whereas the above inference based on parsimony (*lāghava*) establishes a single connection (namely *samavāya*) common to quality, action, etc.⁵ It cannot be said that, in the cognition qualified by absence (*abhāvaviśiṣṭabuddhi*) too, the same reason would

¹ The objection is that the reason (*hetu*) and the thing to be proved (*sādhya*) are not different because a qualified cognition also has a connection as its content, or is produced from it. It is replied that the reason of this inference concerns a qualification and not a connection.

² The above inference could be said to be overpervasive because it also applies to self-linking-connection (*svarūpasambandha*), which it does not intend to prove. Self-linking-connection is that which exists between two entities which connect to each other without requiring a connection other than themselves.

³ The cognition of absence, which has a connection as its content, should form part of the thing to be proved (*sādhya*) by this inference. But the modified definition would exclude it from the above demonstration because the connection between an absence and its substrate is a self-linking-connection (*svarūpasambandha*) and not the connection of qualification-object (*viśeṣaṇaviśeṣya*). Thus, the inference could be said to be underpervasive.

⁴ Because objects and qualifications are infinite.

⁵ That is to say, this inference also proves the existence of self-linking-connections, but the law of parsimony requires that they should be rejected because they are infinite, and inherence, which is one, should be accepted.

prove that inherence is the relation of absence (with objects, etc.).¹ For if this were the case, as the absolute absence (of a pot) would inhere in the pot-halves, on the destruction of the inherent cause (namely the pot-halves), the absolute absence (of the pot) too would be destroyed² (and the destroyed pot would reappear).

[66] But then the above inference, with 'the cognition qualified by absence (*abhāvaviśiṣṭabuddhi*)' as its subject, would also prove 'being qualified' (*vaiśiṣṭya*) to be another connection of absence (with objects, etc.) as held by the Bhāṭṭas.³ This (objection) is answered. If that (*vaiśiṣṭya*) were identical in all absences, the cognition "The ground without a pot" would arise about a ground which was previously potless, but which has a pot at the time of the cognition. It is thus: although the absence of pot which existed before (the pot was brought in) is eternal, it is not cognized in the presence of the pot due to lack of connection (with absence). But if *vaiśiṣṭya* were that connection and if it were held to be identical (in all absences), later (in the presence of the pot), following the awareness of the absence of pot (which continues to exist, being eternal), 'being qualified by the absence of pot' (*ghaṭābhāvavaiśiṣṭya*) also would be present; and there would be the cognition of that (absence of pot) (through the connection *vaiśiṣṭya*). And if *vaiśiṣṭya* were numerous, the connection could as well be of the form of qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) or substantive (*viśeṣya*), which is already accepted by all, a superfluous connection named *vaiśiṣṭya* need not be assumed. Thus, as there is no obstacle

¹ In other words, the inference "The cognition 'the absence of pot' has a relation as its content, etc." would also prove that inherence is the relation between an absence and its substrate.

² By the rule that the destruction of the inherent cause should lead to the destruction of the effect which is connected to its cause by inherence.

³ Some Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas believe that an object is connected to absence by a relation named *vaiśiṣṭya*. See *Mīmāṃsākutūhala*, pp. 29-31.

to (the inference that establishes) inherence, it is proved to exist. It should not be said that the admission of inherence (as the connection) to quality, etc. would contradict the theory which recognizes identity (*tādātmya*) (to be the connection) in the elements;¹ for, whether *tādātmya* and inherence are believed to be identical or distinct, there is no conflict (with the above theory).²

[67] *Śabdātvaṃ*, **soundness**, the cognition of soundness; *samavetasamavāyāt*, inherence-in-what-is-inherent is the connection to perceive soundness since it inheres in sound, which is inherent in the sense of hearing. The cognition of absence and inherence is, *viśeṣaṇatayā*, **as a qualification**, that is, through the connection of the nature of a qualification, as "The ground has the absence of a pot", "The thread has inherence with the cloth", etc. Or, *viśeṣyatvena*, **as a substantive**, it is through the connection of the nature of a substantive when the cognition is "The absence of a pot on the ground" and "The inherence of colour in the pot".

[68] But then (it may be objected by some that), it cannot be said that absence is cognized through the connection of the nature of a qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) or a substantive (*viśeṣya*).³ Since the awareness (*prāpti*) of absence and verbal reference (*vyavahāra*) to absence arise inseparably connected with its substrate, cognition, or temporal relation, there is no evidence to prove that absence is an independent entity. It is answered that (absence is different from these because) absence is experienced as invariably associated with its counterpositive, whereas substrate, etc. do not possess a

¹ The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas and Advaitins believe that *tādātmya* connects universals, qualities, etc. to objects. See *Mānameyodaya*, pp. 15 and 296; Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* on *Brahmasūtra* 2.1.18, p. 266.

² Because *tādātmya* in their doctrine serves the same purpose as inherence.

³ This connection is now being defended against the criticism, which may be attributed to the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas, that absence is not different from its substrate, etc., and that a distinct connection need not be admitted.

counterpositive. The distinction (of absence) into four kinds, as prior-absence (*prāgabhāva*), etc., which is the content of cognitions such as "will come into being", is experienced; this does not happen with regard to substrate, etc. Further, if an absence were not different from its substrate, the state of being the support and the supported (*ādhārādheyabhāva*) (between the substrate and absence), which is irrefutably experienced in the cognition "There is absence of pot on the ground", would be unintelligible. And, if absence were the same entity as the cognition and temporal relation of absence, the visual perception "(Now) there is no pot on the ground" would be inexplicable.¹ Moreover, if an absence were identical with its substrate, the absence of a pot would be perceived even on the ground with a pot on it. It should not be said that the substrate in question (which is said to be identical with absence) is the bare substrate; for it may be retorted that the notion of bareness, without reference to an absence, is incomprehensible.

[69] Now (some others may object that), absence could be an independent entity; yet, it cannot be said that absence is perceived by the senses² because there is no evidence to prove that 'being a qualification' (*viśeṣaṇatā*) is the connection in that perception. It cannot be said (by those who hold that absence is perceived by the senses) that conformity to the co-presence and co-absence (*anvayavyatirekānuvidhāna*) of the senses³ is the proof, for it (namely the function of the co-presence and co-absence of the senses) ceases as soon as the cognition of the substrate (of absence) is produced. It is like the cognition of air according to the Naiyāyikas, who

¹ Because cognition and time are not visible.

² This objection may be attributed to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, who believe that though absence is an independent category, perception is not the means to cognize it because it is imperceptible. A distinct pramāṇa named non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*) must be accepted to cognize absence. See *Mānameyodaya*, pp. 133 sqq.

³ In other words, the cognition of absence arises when the senses function and it does not arise when the senses do not function.

believe that the role of the co-presence and co-absence of the sense of touch comes to an end as soon as touch, which is an attribute (of air), is known.¹ The instrumental case in the expression "I perceive absence by the sense of sight," like that in the expression "I perceive air by the sense of touch", is to be understood metaphorically, that is to say as referring to its (namely the sense) being a mere invariable antecedent (and not the means to the perception of absence). Further, even if absence were perceived by the senses, it should be admitted that the cause (to that perception) is an absence which is fit (to be cognized). And this fitness is nothing but the presence of all (the causes) which are conducive to the perception of the counterpositive (had it been present) and of all other factors which are pervaded by that (counterpositive). Since the senses too form part of the totality of causes that lead to it (namely the perception of the counterpositive), they constitute the fitness (described above) and as delimiters (of cause), they are dispensable (*anyathāsiddha*);² consequently, they cannot be held to be the cause (of the cognition of absence).

Moreover, when asked by someone, "Did you see Maitra in the hall?" a person (emerging from the hall) replies after some reflection, "Maitra was not there." Since this cognition of the absence of Maitra arises without the operation of the

¹ According to some Naiyāyikas, air is not perceptible because it does not have a manifest form. Its existence can only be proved by the inference: "The temperate touch which is experienced when wind blows, must exist in a substance; because it is a quality; since it cannot exist in the eight of the nine substances recognized in the doctrine, it exists in the ninth substance, namely air". See *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 62. The co-presence and co-absence of the sense of touch and the cognition of touch is useful for this argument only as far as it provides the cognition of touch which is the subject (*pakṣa*) of the inference.

² By the generally accepted rule that a cause which is very remotely connected to the effect is not the cause of that effect. For example, the stickiness, which delimits the stick used to produce a pot, cannot be considered to be the cause of that pot.

senses such as the sense of sight, it is brought about (not by *pratyakṣa* pramāṇa but) by (a pramāṇa named) non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*). It cannot be said that it (that is, the absence of Maitra) is inferred through the non-remembrance of the counterpositive (namely Maitra);¹ since there could be the non-remembrance even of a perceived entity, due to weakened impressions, it (namely the reason, 'non-remembrance of Maitra') does not pervade it (namely the thing to be proved, 'the absence of Maitra').²

[70] This (objection) is answered. If the function of the senses were to cease with the perception of the substrate (of absence), a blind man would perceive the absence of blue colour in a yellow pot by touch. It should not be said that the perception of the substrate (of absence) should arise through the (same) sense which perceives the counterpositive; for if it were the case, one would fail to perceive the absence of colour in air (by the sense of sight).³ Therefore, due to conformity to the co-presence and co-absence of the senses which are not dispensable, *viśeṣanātā* should be accepted as the connection to the perception (of absence). It was (also) said that the senses, which constitute

¹ It may be said that the absence of Maitra in the hall is known not through the *anupalabdhi* pramāṇa, as claimed by the Bhāṭṭas, but through the inference: "The hall (*pakṣa*, the subject of the inference) then had the absence of Maitra (*sādhya*, the thing to be proved); because there is the non-remembrance of the counterpositive, namely Maitra (*hetu*, the reason)".

² Since it is possible not to remember Maitra in spite of his presence in the hall, the reason cannot be said to be invariably connected with the thing to be proved; and an invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) between the two, 'wherever there is non-remembrance of the counterpositive (namely Maitra), there is the absence of Maitra', cannot be drawn. In other words, the non-remembrance of Maitra does not necessarily mean his absence; it could be due to the memory failure of the person. Therefore, the absence of Maitra cannot be inferred, it is known through *anupalabdhi* pramāṇa.

³ Since the substrate of colour (that is, air) is perceived by the sense of touch, colour too should be perceivable by the sense of touch, not by the sense of sight.

fitness, are dispensable; this is not tenable because, although they are delimiters (of causality), their causality is as unobstructed as the causality of the brightness of a light.¹

[71] Further, if fitness (of absence) were 'the presence of all causes that are conducive to the perception of the counterpositive and of all other factors which are pervaded by it', a person with closed eyes would perceive the absence of a pot on a well-lit ground because the means to perceive absence, namely non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*), is present. Although connection (with the object) is broken (here) by the closing of the eyes, contact (through *anupalabdhi*) and fitness consisting of the presence of all causes such as bright light, etc. that are conducive to the perception of the counterpositive too, are present. Therefore, fitness should be defined as 'having such counterpositive (the perception of) which is assumed on the assumption of the presence of the counterpositive'. Fitness of this nature is not present with regard to a person with closed eyes in front of a pot on a well-lit ground; although the counterpositive is present, its perception cannot be assumed due to the absence of contact (caused by the closing of the eyes).

[72] The cognition of the absence of Maitra, without the operation of the sense of sight, is derived through the following inference: "That hall then had the absence of Maitra; because, while possessing all the causes conducive to the perception of Maitra, it (namely the hall) is the content of my memory produced from the experience of that time, (but) of which (memory) Maitra is not the content". A person who saw Maitra in the hall, but did not pay special attention to him, could have the memory (of the hall) which does not include Maitra due to the non-revival or loss of latent impressions, which in turn could vitiate the inference

¹ Although the brightness of a light is only remotely connected with the cognition of an object, it is admitted to be a cause since an object cannot be cognized in dim light.

about the hall with Maitra's presence; but this failure is warded off by the clause 'my memory, etc.'¹

[73] Moreover, it is seen that the cognition of absence is affected by the defects of the senses. This also proves that it (namely the cognition of absence) is brought about by the senses, for an effect is never vitiated by a defect which does not belong to the cause. Therefore, as the senses cannot even be suspected of being dispensable, it is proved that absence is cognized by the senses. Consequently, it is also established that *viśeṣaṇatā* is the connection to the cognition of absence.

[74] [The author] discusses (the *pramāṇa* named) inference (*anumāna*), which follows in sequence.

Inference is that which gives rise to the cognition of mediate objects through a well-established pervasion. (36^b)

Inference is that which produces an inferential cognition (*anumiti*), that is to say, the cognition of the reason's being the qualifier of the subject (*pakṣadharmatājñāna*), which (cognition) is qualified by (the cognition of) pervasion (*vyāptiviśiṣṭa*) free from all doubt of invalidity.² Such is the meaning. But this is a figurative definition of inference. The primary definition, however, should be understood to be the *cit-śakti* delimited by the above described intellectual operation (namely cognition). Now, if the definition were merely 'that which gives rise to the cognition of mediate objects', there would be overpervasion in verbal testimony

¹ Thus, the reason of the inference is not 'non-remembrance of the counterpositive (namely Maitra)'. It is 'while possessing all the causes conducive to the perception of Maitra, it (namely the hall) is the content of my memory produced from the experience of that time (but) of which (memory) Maitra is not the content'. The failure of the inference, which could be produced by a memory failure, is prevented by including the memory of Maitra's absence within the reason.

² For example, the cognition that smoke (*hetu*, the reason) qualifies the hill (*pakṣa*, the subject) does not reveal that the hill is fiery, unless that cognition is accompanied by the cognition that smoke is invariably connected with fire.

(*śabda* *pramāṇa*); therefore, it is said 'through a well-established pervasion'. If this much were the definition, there would be overpervasion in perception effected to dissipate a doubt; therefore, it is said 'mediate'.¹ It should not be said that since one may desire to infer objects which are also directly perceived, this (definition) would fail to include (such) inferences; for the word 'mediate' implies that the cognition is that which is not produced through sense-object contact.² As this definition could apply to valid as well as erroneous inference, the definition of *anumāna* *pramāṇa* should be qualified by the adjective 'true'. And this inference is of two kinds: inference for oneself (*svārtha*) and inference for others (*parārtha*). *Svārthānumāna* is the means to one's own knowledge. *Parārthānumāna* is the five-membered sentence employed to instruct others after having known for one's own self. This (*parārthānumāna*), composed of sentence, is figuratively named inference because it produces consideration (*parāmarśa*) in others' mind.³

[75] [The author] now examines that *parārthānumāna*.

And here (according to this doctrine) it consists of five members: proposition (*pratijñā*), reason

¹ When in doubt whether something seen at a distance is a human being or a post, a person observes carefully, and perceiving hands and feet, determines that it is a human being. This cognition of an immediate object could be considered an inference because it is derived through the concomitance (*vyāpti*) 'whichever has hands and feet, is a human being'. The word 'mediate (objects)' removes such perceptions based on inference from the scope of the definition of inference.

² Inference about a directly perceived object also falls within the scope of the definition because it is produced through a concomitance and not through sense-object contact.

³ Since *parārthānumāna* is formed of a sentence, it could be held to be verbal testimony (*śabda*); but it is considered to be inference because it is the means to inferential cognition and not to word-meanings. It is the awareness that the cognition of the presence of the reason in the subject (*pakṣadharmatā*) and the cognition of the pervasion (*vyāpti*) are connected as the subject and attribute; for example, "This hill has smoke, which is invariably connected with fire".

(*hetu*), example (*drṣṭānta*), application (*upanaya*), conclusion (*nigama*) being the fifth. *Pratijñā* is the declaration of the thing which is desired (to be proved). *Hetu* is such (explanatory) statement of that which has pervasion (namely reason). *Drṣṭānta* is that by which the two-way connected reason (*hetu*) is so illustrated. *Upanaya* is the statement of the pervaded with reference to the example (*drṣṭānta*). *Nigama* is the restatement of the proposition (*pratijñā*) accompanied by (the statement of) reason. (37-39)

Tac ca, and it, *parārthānumāna*; *iha*, here, according to this doctrine (*śāstra*), consists of five members (*avayava*), *pratijñā*, etc. The opinion of others that inference consists of three and two members, referred to by the text "The Mīmāṃsakas hold (that inference is composed of) three members, concluding or beginning with illustration (*udāharana*); while the Buddhists believe (that it consists of) illustration (*udāhṛti*) accompanied by application (*upanīti*)",¹ should be considered rejected by this (statement). It is thus: the (Mīmāṃsaka) theory that inference begins with illustration is not sound. If the thing to be proved (*sādhya*) and the reason (*hetu*) are not stated in the first place, the desire to know the pervasion (*vyāpti*) is not kindled; consequently, the declaration of the illustration, etc. without expectancy (in the hearer) would lead to defeat in argument (*nigraha*). If, on the other hand, when fire (which is the thing to be proved) is announced, to satisfy the expectation to know why it is said so, the reason is presented; and to answer the inquiry about how it (that is, the reason) explains (the presence of fire), the pervasion which elucidates (the invariable relation between the reason and the thing to be proved) is made known; then the statement of the example

¹ *Tārikarakṣā* 65.

which demonstrates the pervasion is justified since it answers an expectation (*ākāṅkṣā*). Thus *pratijñā*, etc. should also be accepted (as the members of an inference) to generate expectancy (in the hearer).

The theory that inference consists of three members, concluding with illustration, also is not sound. If application (*upanaya*) is not declared, in the absence of the cognition of the attribute of the subject (*pakṣadharmā*), that is to say in the absence of the cognition of the reason qualified by the pervasion, inference too would not arise because consideration (*parāmarśa*), which reveals the presence in the subject, of the reason qualified by the pervasion, would not occur in the hearer's mind. Conclusion, which is the declaration (of the presence of the *sādhya* in the *pakṣa*) as if proved (*siddhahat*), is also required because it wards off (all doubts about the presence of defects such as) contradiction (*bādha*) and counterbalancing reason (*pratipakṣa*). The (Buddhist) theory that (inference consists of) illustration and application, (also) is rejected for the same reason. Therefore, the presence of five members in an inference is justified.

[76] The general definition of a member (of an inference) is that it is a sentence which produces the verbal cognition (*śabdajñāna*) that leads to consideration (*liṅgaparāmarśa*), which is the ultimate cause of inferential cognition. [The author] explains each of those members, *pratijñā*, etc. *Drṣṭānta* means example (*udāharana*). Of these, [the author] defines proposition, *iṣṭārtha*, etc. *Iṣṭārtha* is that where the thing which is desired, that is, wished to be proved, is found; (thus) the desired thing is the subject (*pakṣa*) and the declaration of this is *pratijñā*. In other words, *pratijñā* is the declaration of the *pakṣa* as qualified by the *sādhya*, such as "The hill has fire". This (definition) is not overpervasive in ordinary sentences which have the same sense as *pratijñā*, for the qualifying adjective 'while being a member of an inference' is supplied (to the definition). The same should be

understood with regard to the following (definitions).¹ [The author] defines reason, *hetu*, etc. In fact, reason is the statement bearing the (instrumental or ablative) case-ending which supplies an explanation. The expressions 'case-ending' and 'sentence' prevent overpervasion respectively, in conclusion (*upanaya*) which is a sentence but does not end in the ablative (or instrumental) case-ending, and in a part of the statement of conclusion (*nigamana*) "Therefore fiery".²

[The author] defines example, *drṣṭānta*, etc. *Drṣṭānta* is the sentence whereby that which, (observed) in kitchen, etc. as, *dvividhodyuktaḥ*, **two-way connected**, related in two ways, by pervasion in co-presence and co-absence, is so expressed. *Drṣṭānta* is the statement which demonstrates the pervasion of the reason, in other words, it is an illustration. "Whichever has smoke, has fire; like a kitchen" is an illustration in co-presence. "Whichever does not have fire, does not have smoke; like a lake" is an illustration which demonstrates pervasion in co-absence. [The author] defines application, *drṣṭānta*, etc. *Drṣṭāntāpekṣayā*, **with reference to example**, means, with reference to the pervasion demonstrated by the example; *vyāptaprastāraḥ*, **the statement of the pervaded**, the declaration of the reason as pervading the subject. In other words, *upanaya* is the statement which declares the presence in the subject, of the reason, the pervasion of which is demonstrated by the example; for example, "(Just as a kitchen has smoke which is pervaded by fire), this (hill) too has smoke which is pervaded by fire". [The author] defines conclusion, *punaḥ*, etc. *Punaḥ sahetukaḥ*, **again, together with the reason**, preceded by the statement of reason (namely 'therefore');

¹ The clause 'while being a member of an inference', supplied to the definitions of other members of inference, removes the sentences which are not part of an inference, from the scope of these definitions.

² The word 'therefore' (*tasmāt*) in the conclusion 'therefore fiery' (*tasmāt vahnimān*) ends in ablative case-ending, but it is not a complete sentence.

pratijñāniyamah, **the statement of the proposition**, the statement, that is, the assertion, as if proved, of the proposed subject. The same is *nigama*, namely conclusion (*nigamana*). Thus, *nigamana* is a sentence which, preceded by the statement of reason, declares as if proved, the presence of the thing to be proved in the subject; for example, "Therefore (since the hill has smoke that is invariably connected with fire), (the hill) has fire".

[77] But then (one may doubt that), the nature of inference which comprises of pervasion (*vyāpti*) is difficult to define because it is difficult to define pervasion; so also the *pramāṇa* (named) *anumāna*. Therefore, [the author] explains (the nature of pervasion).

Pervasion is the natural relation of the thing which proves (*sādhana*) with the thing to be proved (*sādhya*). (40^a)

Sādhanasya, **of the thing which proves**, that which is intended to be the thing which proves, smoke, etc.; *sādhyena*, **with the thing to be proved**, that which is intended to be the thing to be proved, fire, etc.; *svato'nvayaḥ*, **the natural relation**, the relation not caused by a vitiating condition (*upādhi*) is named pervasion.¹ In other words, *vyāpti* is an unconditioned relation. But then (one may object that), being unconditioned means being devoid of an *upādhi*; and an *upādhi* is that which, while pervading the *sādhya*, does not pervade the *sādhana* (namely *hetu*).² Since the absence of an *upādhi*, which pervades any

¹ For a relation between two entities could also be due to a condition whose presence produces that relation. Such unnatural, and consequently variable, relation cannot be considered as pervasion.

² For example, the inference "The hill has smoke; because it has fire" is invalid because fire is not always accompanied by smoke, for the relation of fire with smoke is conditioned by the presence of 'conjunction with wet fuel' (*ārdrendhanasamyoga*). This is recognized as an *upādhi* since it pervades the thing to be proved (smoke) (wherever there is smoke, there is 'conjunction with wet fuel') and

whatsoever *sādhya* and does not pervade any whatsoever *sādhana*, is also found in an erroneous inference,¹ the absence should be of an *upādhi* which, while pervading a specific *sādhya*, is absent from a specific *sādhana* (which intends to prove that specific *sādhya*). Since this (cognition of the absence of *upādhi*) depends on the cognition of the *upādhi*,² there would be contradiction irrespective of whether it is known or not.³ It is replied that an unconditioned relation signifies the following: the absence of the co-existence of the *sādhana* with an absolute absence whose counterpositive is not the counterpositive of absolute absences co-existing with the *sādhya*⁴; and here, counterpositiveness is a kind of self-linking-connection (*svarūpa-sambandha*).⁵ In fact, *vyāpti* is nothing but the relation (of the *sādhana*) with the *sādhya* which (*sādhya*) has all the

does not pervade the reason (fire) (fire is found in a hot iron ball, but not 'conjunction with wet fuel').

¹ For example, the *upādhi* 'manifested colour' (*udbhūtarūpa*) vitiates the inference "Air is perceptible; because it is the substrate of touch, which is perceptible". It pervades the *sādhya* (perceptibility) because all perceptible entities have manifested colour; and it does not pervade the *sādhana* (being the substrate of touch which is perceptible), for although air is the substrate of touch which is perceptible, it does not have a manifested colour. Since this *upādhi* ('manifested colour') is absent in the invalid inference "The hill has smoke; because it has fire", this inference could be said to be valid.

² Because unless the counterpositive, namely the *upādhi*, is known, its absence cannot be known.

³ For, if it were known to exist, it cannot be denied and that which is not known to exist cannot be said to be absent. Therefore, an unconditioned connection cannot be defined.

⁴ In other words, the *sādhana* never being the counterpositive of an absolute absence existing in the substrates of the *sādhya*, which *sādhya* is never the counterpositive of an absolute absence existing in the substrates of the *sādhana*. Thus, a natural relation is: the *sādhana* being present where *sādhya* is present and the *sādhya* not being present where the *sādhana* is not present.

⁵ In other words, this definition does not require the admission of a distinct category called counterpositiveness (to connect the absence and the counterpositive), for being counterpositive merely means being either of the two connected entities.

substrates of the *sādhana* as its substrate.¹ For it is the *vyāpti* of this nature which, demonstrated by the example, produces inferential cognition and is parsimonious. Therefore it should be understood that the very word 'natural' (in the verse) intends to convey the meaning of '(the *sādhya*) having all substrates (of the *sādhana*) as its substrate'. Now, although a particular *sādhya* (for example, a particular fire perceived in a kitchen) is not present in all substrates of the *sādhana* (namely in all smoky places which are substrates of smoke), yet since fireness, etc. (that is to say the universals), which are the delimiters of 'the state of being the thing to be proved' (*sādhyatā*), are the same (in their respective individuals), 'the state of possessing that' (namely 'possessing the presence in all the substrates of the thing which proves') (for the thing to be proved) occurs through its substrates (in the case of fire, through the individual fires which are the substrates of the universal fireness).² It should be understood that the above definition implies that the *sādhya* is so delimited.

[78] But then (it may be objected that), inference is not a *pramāṇa* because the means to apprehend pervasion (*vyāpti*) does not exist. It cannot be said that perception (*pratyakṣa*) is the means to the cognition of *vyāpti*; for (even) in the proximity of smoke (and fire), etc., *vyāpti* is not perceived by the person who is ignorant of (their) co-existence. Nor perception accompanied by the cognition of repeated observation of the co-existence (between the *sādhya* and the *sādhana*) is the means. In spite of the repeated observation of the co-existence of the states of 'being an earthen substance' and

¹ For example, the relation of smoke with fire, which (fire) has all the substrates of smoke as its substrate. Thus, wherever there is smoke, there is fire.

² In other words, fire is delimited by fireness which exists, through its substrates (which are individual fires), in all places where smoke exists.

'being scratchable by iron', there is doubt of deviation (of pervasion between the two).¹

Nor (perception) aided by hypothetical reasoning (*tarka*)² is the means. Since it (namely *tarka*) is based on pervasion,³ there would be infinite regress;⁴ and if it were not based on a pervasion, being of uncertain basis, it would be a fallacious hypothetical reasoning (*tarkābhāsa*). Nor (perception) accompanied by the cognition of the absence of a vitiating condition (*anaupādhikatvajñāna*) is the means. While the absence of a perceptible vitiating condition (*yogyopādhi*) can be known (through perception), the absence of an imperceptible vitiating condition cannot be ascertained (without resorting to inference, which would lead to the defect of infinite regress). Nor (perception) accompanied by the cognition of the co-existence (of the *sādhana* and the *sādhya*), aided by the absence of the cognition of deviation (*vyabhicārajñāna*)⁵ is the means; if the absence of the cognition of deviation were obtained through hypothetical reasoning, infinite regress would arise as noted above; if it were derived through the cognition of non-deviation, there would be mutual dependence;⁶ and if it were derived

¹ For although ascertained through repeated observations, the pervasion 'whatever is earthen, is scratchable by iron' fails with regard to gems which are earthen substances but are not markable by an iron spike.

² 'If smoke were not invariably connected with fire, it would not arise from fire' is the *tarka* which leads to the knowledge that smoke, which arises from fire, is invariably connected with it.

³ Because the above *tarka* is based on the *vyāpti*, 'whatever arises from fire is invariably connected with it'.

⁴ If *tarka*, which is based on a *vyāpti*, were the means to the cognition of *vyāpti*, it would require another *tarka* to cognize the *vyāpti* on which it is based, thus leading to infinite regress.

⁵ Deviation means the absence of co-existence; for instance, fire deviates from smoke because it is present (for example, in a hot iron ball) where smoke is absent. Thus, the cognition of co-existence and the absence of the cognition of non-co-existence could be the means to know pervasion.

⁶ Because the cognition of non-deviation depends on the cognition of deviation and vice versa.

through the absence of two alternatives (namely doubt¹), the cognition of invariable concomitance of fire (with donkey, etc.) would arise from (the perception of) donkey, etc. (which happen to be near by), in the absence of any doubt.²

Inference (*anumāna*) also is not the means to apprehend it because the validity of the same is being refuted. Nor verbal testimony (*śabda*) is the means; for, if inference were not a *pramāṇa*, *śabda* also would not be a *pramāṇa* because the cognition of the word-meaning is derived through inference.³ (Thus, *anumāna* is not a *pramāṇa* because *vyāpti* cannot be cognized). Moreover, the defect of 'proving that which is already proved' (*siddhasādhana*) would result (if *anumāna* were recognized as a *pramāṇa*) because when considerations (*parāmarśa*) such as "This (hill) has smoke which is pervaded by fire" arise, (the presence of) fire on the hill is also known; for, when the smoke perceived on a hill is known to co-exist with fire, the presence of fire on that hill is also known. And, it should not be said (by those who accept *anumāna* as a *pramāṇa*) that the exertion (based on inference, for example, that) of a person desirous of fire (who, perceiving smoke on the hill, infers the presence of fire and walks towards the hill to get fire) would be inexplicable if *anumāna* were not accepted as a *pramāṇa*; for

¹ Since doubt is a cognition constituted of two alternatives (for example, "Is smoke invariably related to fire or not?").

² Because the doubt "Is donkey invariably related to fire or not?" would never occur to a sane person. In other words, if mere absence of doubt were the means to know pervasion, any two unconnected objects like fire and donkey would be considered to be invariably connected.

³ Inference is held to be one of the means to learn word-meanings. For example, a child observes that certain words employed by adults induce certain actions in the hearer, and infers through those actions that those words have the capacity to convey a particular meaning.

exertion in that case could also arise from a strong supposition of the presence of fire.¹

[79] This objection is replied: means to apprehend pervasion is not lacking, for it is known by perception accompanied by the cognition of co-existence (of the *sādhana* and the *sādhya*) and by the absence of the cognition of deviation (that is, of non-co-existence) (between them). This absence of the cognition of deviation is sometimes known through hypothetical reasoning and sometimes, when doubt, etc. do not occur, it is self-evident.² It should not be said that hypothetical reasoning, which is based on pervasion, leads to infinite regress; it (namely hypothetical reasoning) is resorted to only in the event of doubt and there is no rule that doubt should arise in every case. It should not be said that if perception, helped by the absence of the doubt of deviation brought about by the absence of doubt, were the means to cognize pervasion, the perception of a donkey would lead to the cognition of pervasion (between donkey and fire); because the object also is a cause towards perceptual cognition and an object in the form of the pervasion of fire (and donkey) does not exist.³ Error⁴ (such as the invariable connection between donkey and fire) would not occur if defects which produce it were absent and it would occur if defects (such as the non-observation of non-co-

¹ In other words, it should not be said that all activity induced by inferential cognition would cease if *anumāna* were not recognized as a *pramāṇa*; for supposition could induce activity.

² That is to say, when all doubts are warded off by excellent conditions of cognition, the absence of deviation is evident and *tarka* need not be employed.

³ Pervasion between donkey and fire should exist in order to be cognized through perception. Since it does not exist, it cannot be perceived.

⁴ This wards off the criticism that if the perception of all connections between all entities were indispensable for inference, every inference would be true. It is answered that erroneous inferences do arise and that they are caused by defects.

existence between the two) which produce it (namely error) were present.

Further, if *anumāna* were not a *pramāṇa*, there would be self-contradiction (*svavyāghāta*) because the means of cognizing pervasion being non-existent (according to the opponent), *anumāna* (which depends on a pervasion) would not be the means to prove that *anumāna* is not a *pramāṇa*. It should not also be said that (the defect of) 'proving what is already proved' would arise since fire is known (to be present on the hill) when consideration (*parāmarśa*) is known; for the cognition which has the hill as its substantive and fire as the qualifier does not yet arise at that moment.¹ Moreover, all confident exertion (based on inference) would be inexplicable if *anumāna* were not admitted as a *pramāṇa*; even a strong presumption about the presence of fire cannot induce (a person desirous of fire) to a confident exertion towards fire. As *anumāna* is thus proved to be a *pramāṇa*, *śabda*, which is based on it for the cognition of word-meanings, also is proved to be a *pramāṇa*. Moreover, if *anumāna* were not a *pramāṇa*, invalidity itself being unknown, it would not be possible to prove (through inference) that *anumāna* is an invalid means of knowledge, for the thing to be proved by that inference is unknown; invalidity can be known only by inference, not by perception. Therefore, it is proved that *anumāna* is a *pramāṇa*.

[80] Comparison (*upamāna*)² and inclusion (*saṃbhava*) need not be admitted as independent *pramāṇas* because they

¹ Because consideration only reveals that the hill has smoke which is invariably connected with fire, it does not prove that the hill has fire.

² According to some Naiyāyikas, *upamāna* is the means to the cognition of a name as signifying an entity. It is based on the similarity of an unknown entity with a previously known object and on the remembrance of the statement of an authoritative person. For example, a person who does not know what a *gavaya* is, but who is told by a forester that *gavaya* is like a cow, comes across an animal resembling a cow. On seeing the resemblance and remembering the forester's words, he understands that the animal in front of him is the

exertion in that case could also arise from a strong supposition of the presence of fire.¹

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are subsumed herein (in *anumāna*). It is thus: *upamāna* need not be accepted as the means to the cognition that (for example) the animal *gavaya* is the entity which is signified by the word *gavaya*. This could also be known from authoritative statement (*atideśavākya*) just as the cognition of the meaning of (the word) 'Devadatta' is known from the statement "Devadatta is the best dressed man (in this group)". Nor is it (namely *upamāna*) required for the cognition that (for example) an entity possessing *gavaya*-hood is that which is signified (by the word *gavaya*).¹ The inference, "The word *gavaya* has the capacity of signifying an entity; because it is a word; like the word 'pot', etc.", proves, helped by parsimony, that an entity possessing *gavaya*-hood is that which is signified (by the word *gavaya*); here parsimony (which settles that the thing to be proved of the inference is the individual possessing a universal, and not infinite individuals) is only an ancillary to a *pramāṇa*.² For this very reason (of parsimony), the oneness (of the creator) is admitted in the inference "The earth, etc. have a creator".³ For the same reason (of parsimony), while establishing the causality of objects like stick by the method of agreement in

animal which is signified by the word *gavaya*. See *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 47.

¹ This is addressed to those Naiyāyikas who explain that *upamāna* is admitted not for the cognition that a word denotes an object, but is the means to the cognition that a word (for example, *gavaya*) denotes an object (the animal *gavaya*) which possesses a universal (*gavaya*-hood) of which it (namely, the object) is an individual. According to them, the cognition of this relation between a word and an object representing a universal can neither be perceived nor inferred, it can be known only through *upamāna* *pramāṇa*.

² It may be objected that instead of resorting to the notion of parsimony in addition to inference, *upamāna* may as well be admitted. It is replied that since parsimony is only an ancillary to an already accepted *pramāṇa* (namely *anumāna*), its admission is less cumbersome than the recognition of a new *pramāṇa*.

³ This inference proves that earth, etc. have a creator but not that the creator, proved by that inference, is one. Since the admission of numerous creators is cumbersome, for the sake of parsimony, it is concluded that the creator is one.

presence and in absence,¹ it is admitted that (universals like) stickness, etc. are the delimiters of the cause (*kāraṇatāvacchedaka*).² Or the cognition that the possession of *gavaya*-hood is the signification (of the word *gavaya*) could be said to be known through the inference "(Possession of) *gavaya*-hood is the signification of the word *gavaya*; because it is the basic characteristic which pervades the entity featuring in the cognition produced by that word".³ *Sambhava*⁴ also need not be recognized (as an independent *pramāṇa*), for the cognition produced by it can also be known through another (already accepted) means. It is thus: when an object delimited by (the number) thousand is known, the presence (in it) of the (same) object delimited by (the number) hundred could be known by inference.⁵

[81] [The author] states that the *vyāpti* discussed above is of two kinds.

And that pervasion should be known to be of two kinds, of negative (*vyatireka*) and of positive (*anvaya*) nature. Relation by means of similarity is said to be positive pervasion.

¹ For a cause is that in the presence of which the effect appears and in the absence of which the effect does not appear.

² As the declaration of each stick as the cause towards each pot would lead to the admission of infinite causes, for the sake of parsimony, it is said that the cause is that which is delimited by stickness.

³ Thus, the inclusion of the notion of parsimony within the reason of the inference wards off the above mentioned necessity of resorting to the law of parsimony.

⁴ The Paurāṇikas are said to recognize *sambhava* as an independent *pramāṇa*. See *Tārkikarākṣā* 10^a. It is the means to the cognition of a part through the cognition of the whole with which that part is inseparably connected; for example, the cognition of the number hundred through the cognition of the number thousand. See *Nyāya-mañjarī*, p. 59. *Sambhava* is also explained as the means to the cognition of probability (*sambhāvana*) like the cognition, "It is probable that this person is learned; because he is a brāhmaṇa". See *Tarkabhāṣāprakāśikā*, p. 184.

⁵ Because hundred, which forms part of thousand, is inseparably connected with it. See *Vaiśeṣikasūtrapaskāra*, p. 406 and *Niṣkaṇṭakā* on *Tārkikarākṣā* 24, p. 116.

Pervasion of the thing to be proved and the thing which proves by means of negation, is the other. (40^b-41)

Sā vyāptiḥ, that pervasion, of the nature described above; *vyatirekānvayātmikā*, of negative and of positive nature; that is to say, it should be understood to be of two kinds: negative pervasion and positive pervasion. [The author] explains the positive and negative pervasion, *sāmānya*, etc. The connection between those which are considered the thing to be proved and the thing which proves it; *sāmānyamukhataḥ*, by means of similarity, through resemblance (*sādrśya*), as "That which is so, is so",¹ namely by affirmation (*vidhi*); that relation is said to be positive pervasion. *Anveyaḥ* means *anvayaḥ*, that is, relation. *Sādhyasādhanāyoh*, the relation between those which are considered the thing to be proved and the thing which proves it; *abhāvamukhataḥ*, by means of negation, through negation, as "That which is not so, is not so";² *sāparā*, is the other, it is negative pervasion.

[82] [The author] states that inference, which comprises of pervasion described above, is of two kinds.

That inference³ (*sādhana*) is of two kinds as 'seen' and 'generally-seen'. Of these, the former is that which infers objects which are perceptible by the senses; the other is that which infers objects which are naturally imperceptible. (42-43^a)

¹ For example, "That which has smoke, has fire".

² For example, "That which does not have fire, does not have smoke".

³ According to both Umāpati and Jñānaprakāśa (*Pauṣkara*V, p. 862 sqq.), verses 42-44 concern inference and they interpret the word *sādhana* of this verse as 'inference'. The translation follows Umāpati's commentary. In fact, these verses describe reasons (*sādhana* or *hetu*). It should be noted that the *Pauṣkara* does not mention any classification of inference.

Tat, that which possesses the above mentioned *vyāpti*; *sādhanaṃ*, inference; *dvidhā*, is of two kinds; *drṣṭam*, 'seen', that is, *viśeṣatodrṣṭam* and; *sāmānyatodrṣṭam*, 'generally-seen'; *tatra ādyam*, of these, the former, the 'seen' inference; *akṣayogyasya padārthasya anumāpakam*, infers objects perceptible by the senses, fire, etc., which can be perceived by the senses; *anyat*, the other, the 'generally-seen' inference; *svato 'py adrṣṭasya padārthasya anumāpakam*, infers objects which are naturally imperceptible, of objects not perceived anywhere, the senses, etc., which cannot be perceived by the senses.¹

[83] Inference (*anumāna*),² which is thus twofold, is also of three kinds.

As positive-negative (*anvayavyatirekin*), as only-negative (*kevalavyatirekin*) and of the form of only-positive (*kevalānvayin*), (they) are defined successively. (43^b-44^a)

Kevalānvayirūpeṇa, of the form of only-positive means, as only-positive. The (meaning of the) rest (of the verse) is clear.

[84] It is said that they are defined; [the author] explains.

That which is of the nature of positive-negative, is the attribute of the subject, while being present in a similar instance, is absent from a dissimilar instance, has neither a contradiction, nor a counterbalancing reason. (44^b-45^a)

Among these, *vyatirekānvayātmakaḥ*, that which is of the nature of positive-negative, is positive-negative reason. It is defined as that which has five features. In other

¹ The senses can only be inferred to exist as the instruments through which perception takes place. See *Pauṣkara* 6.159 and *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 60.

² Verses 43^b-44^a should refer to reason (*hetu*) (and not to inference as explained in the commentaries) because their definitions in the following verses, namely the possession of the five features, etc., can only apply to reason, not to inference.

words, a positive-negative reason is that which is endowed with the (following) five features: being the property of the subject (*pakṣa*), being present in a similar instance (*sapakṣa*), being absent from any dissimilar instance (*vipakṣa*), having a content (that is to say the thing to be proved) which is not contradicted, and not having a counterbalancing reason.

[85] [The author] explains the nature of subject (*pakṣa*), etc., since being the attribute of the subject, and so on constituted the above definition.

Subject (*pakṣa*) is that which has the property that is to be proved (by the inference). A similar instance (*sapakṣa*) is that which has the same property as that (which is to be proved). A dissimilar instance (*vipakṣa*) is that which has the absence of that property (which is to be proved). Contradiction (*bādha*) is that which is caused by another means of knowledge. The state of having a counterbalancing reason (*vipakṣatā*) arises by the cognition of the possession of three features by two (reasons) with regard to the thing to be proved. (45^b-46)

Of these, *pakṣaḥ sādhyadharmayutaḥ*, subject is that which has the property that is to be proved (by the inference), (and) where the presence of the thing to be proved is doubted; *sapakṣaḥ tatsadharmanyuk*, a similar instance is that which has the same property as that (which is to be proved), that which is ascertained to possess the same property; *vipakṣaḥ tadvidharmah*, a dissimilar instance is that which has the absence of that property (which is to be proved), that which is ascertained not to possess the same property, in other words, that which has contrary properties; *bādhaḥ mānāntarodbhavaḥ*, contradiction is that which is caused by another means of knowledge, like the contradiction to (the content, namely the thing to be proved of) the falla-

cious reason (in the inference) "Fire is not hot; because it is a substance",¹ produced by *pramāṇas* such as tactile perception which prove that fire is hot. And having a counterbalancing reason is, *dvayoḥ*, by two, by two reasons (for example) 'being produced' (*kṛtakatva*) and 'being audible' (*śrāvaṇatva*);² *sādhye*, with regard to the thing to be proved, towards their respective things to be proved, namely non-eternity (*anityatva*) and eternity (*nityatva*); *trirūpatvaṃ*, the possession of three features, the possession of the (first) three features (of a valid reason) beginning with 'being the property of the subject'; since the (last) two features, namely 'not being contradicted' and 'not having a counterbalancing reason', do not exist in a counterbalanced reason.³

But the possession of the three features is not real because the two (reasons) actually do not have the three features towards the contrary thing to be proved.⁴ How does the state of being counterbalanced occur (to both of them) since they lack the three features in reality? [The author] explains, *tena*, etc. *Tena*, by (the cognition of) which, merely because they are known to possess three features (and not

¹ The reason which aims to prove the absence of heat in fire is contradicted by perception which reveals that fire is hot.

² In the inference "Sound is non-eternal; because it is produced" proposed by the debater and the inference "Sound is eternal; because it is audible" proposed by the opponent.

³ For example, the thing to be proved (non-eternity) by the reason ('being produced') is contradicted by the inference "Sound is eternal; because it is audible"; the same reason has a counterbalancing reason ('being audible') which intends to prove the eternity of sound. So also, the thing to be proved (eternity) by the reason ('being audible') is contradicted by the inference "Sound is non-eternal; because it is produced"; the same reason has a counterbalancing reason ('being produced').

⁴ The possession of the three features by both the reasons is not real because on examination, one of the two could turn out to be valid (possessing all the five features), thus rendering the other reason contradicted and counterbalanced (that is to say possessing only three features).

five); *vipakṣatā*, the state of having a counterbalancing reason arises, there is impediment to their respective inferential cognition.¹

[86] [The author] defines only-positive and only-negative reasons.

Positive reason is that which is devoid of a dissimilar instance; the one devoid of a similar instance is the other. (47^a)

Nirvipakṣaḥ, that which is devoid of a dissimilar instance, means, only-positive reason is that for which a dissimilar instance does not exist. This definition wards off the logical contradiction which would arise irrespective of whether it (namely *vipakṣa*) were known or not known to exist.² In other words, an only-positive reason (*kevalānvayin*) is that which has the four features (of the five described above); it lacks 'absence from dissimilar instance'. *Niḥsapakṣaḥ*, the one devoid of a similar instance, is different from that which has a positive instance; that is to say, it is the one whose pervasion is known only from co-existence in absence. This definition wards off the logical contradiction which would arise irrespective of whether it (namely *sapakṣa*) were known or not known to exist.; *paraḥ*, the other, is only-negative reason. In other words, only-negative reason is that which has the four features (of the five described above); it lacks 'presence in a similar instance'. Thus, this (definition of only-negative) and the earlier (definition of only-positive) are not overpervasive in fallacious reasons such as contradicted (*bādhita*).³

¹ The two inferences are, nevertheless, blocked because their respective reasons are reproached by the respective opponents to possess only three features, that is, to be fallacious.

² The definition ('that which does not have a dissimilar instance') would lead to logical contradiction because if a dissimilar instance is known to exist, it cannot be denied, and if it is not known to exist, it cannot be denied. This is prevented by the above definition.

³ Only-positive and only-negative reasons are absent in *vipakṣa* and *sapakṣa* respectively, because they do not have any; but they are valid

[87] [The author] illustrates the three respectively.

"A particular place has fire; because it has smoke; like a kitchen". "Everything becomes an effect supervised by someone; because of the state of being a product; like mud dependent on a potter" on the other hand, is (only-)positive reason. "(Every) effect arises being existent (in its cause); because it is produced; an effect which is not pre-existent (in its cause), cannot be produced; like a hare's horn". (47^b-49)

Anyo deśaḥ, a particular place, hill, etc., which is the topic of contention; this (specification) wards off (defects such as) 'proving that which is already proved' (*siddha-sādhana*);¹ *sāgniḥ*, has fire, is fiery; *sadhūmatvāt*, because it has smoke, because it is smoky. That which has the above mentioned thing which proves (namely smoke), is (also) that which has the above mentioned thing to be proved (namely fire); *yathā*, like; *rasavatī*, that which has flavour, namely a kitchen. That which does not have the above mentioned thing to be proved, is (also) that which does not have the above mentioned thing which proves; *yathā*, like; *rasavatī*, that which has water, namely a pond. Thus the two, namely the positive and negative examples, are obtained by the repetition (of the word *rasavatī*).² The words 'is positive-negative reason' are to be

reasons because they lead to their thing to be proved in spite of possessing only four features. A defective reason, on the other hand, is that which could possess all the five features of a valid reason, but does not possess one or more of these features, and as a result, does not lead to the thing to be proved.

¹ It is specified that the *pakṣa* is that where the presence of the *sādhya* is disputed, because the admission of the presence of the *sādhya* in the *pakṣa* by all interlocutors would render inference purposeless and would also lead to the defect of 'proving that which is already proved (through the same or another pramāṇa)'.

² The word *rasavatī* (literally, that which possesses *rasa*) signifies a kitchen as well as a lake because *rasa* means 'flavour' as well as 'water'.

supplied (to the verse). *Viśvaṃ*, everything, all matter; *ke-nāpi adhyāsitaṃ*, supervised by someone, governed by a conscious person; *kāryaṃ syāt*, becomes an effect, attains the state of an effect; *vastubhāvataḥ*, because of the state of being a product, because it is a product. That which is so, is so; *yathā*, like; *kulālasāpekṣā mṛt*, mud dependent on a potter, mud handled by a potter; this reason is, *anvayī*, positive, means, it is an only-positive reason.¹

But then, it may be objected that this (reason which aims to prove the existence of God) cannot be an only-positive reason because the thing to be proved (*sādhya*), namely '(becoming an effect) being supervised by someone', is absent with regard to (the body of) God.² It is replied that though the thing to be proved is absent in the case of God, since it was not known at the time of proving the existence of God, the presence of the above feature, namely 'being devoid of a dissimilar instance', is not an obstacle (to the inference). It should not be objected that this reason deviates in the case of God;³ as the deviation was not known before proving the existence of God, it does not impede the inference; and that knowledge (of deviation) is of no significance after the inference is drawn. It should not be said that the above inference is fallacious because it is produced from a reason which is actually devious,⁴ for its

¹ The reason 'because it is a product' is only-positive because something which becomes an effect without being governed by a conscious person (that is to say a *vipakṣa*) does not exist, which could demonstrate the negative connection 'whichever is not governed by a conscious person, is not a product'.

² The objection is as follows: as God's body is constituted of parts, it is created at a given point of time, like any other product. But since it is not governed by a conscious agent, the thing to be proved is absent in its case; thus, it forms a *vipakṣa* of this reason. Consequently, the reason cannot be only-positive.

³ It could be said that the reason ('being a product') of the inference is defective because it is present (in God's body) where the thing it claims to prove ('being governed by a conscious agent') is absent.

⁴ Because this only-positive reason, which is supposed to be devoid of a *vipakṣa*, actually has one.

validity arises from the irrefutable nature of the subject (namely God). Or it may be understood that the word *punaḥ* (in the verse) refers to (the well-known) only-positive reasons (of inferences) such as "Pot is nameable, because it is a product", "[Pot is nameable], because it is a substance".¹ Thus, while the feature 'being devoid of a dissimilar instance' is intended, there is no defect if 'possessing an only-positive concomitance' also is implied.

Kāryaṃ, effect; *sad eva*, being existent, every effect; *utpadyate*, arises, while existing (in its cause); the reason 'because it is produced' means, 'because it is an object of action; *dharmāṁśaḥ*² *pūrvam aśan*, an effect which is not pre-existent (in the cause); *na kriyate*, cannot be produced, an effect which does not pre-exist cannot become an object of action just as a hare's horn, etc. (cannot become an object of action).³ The words 'this reason is only-negative' are to be supplied (to the verse). (It is only-negative) because it does not have a similar instance. This same inference⁴ is, accordingly, the example also of *sāmānyatodrṣṭa* and *viśeṣatodrṣṭa*; it is not mentioned separately.

¹ While it is possible to have a positive *vyāpti* 'whatever is a product, whatever is a substance, is nameable; like a piece of cloth', it is not possible to have a negative *vyāpti* 'whatever is not nameable, is not a product, is not a substance' because everything is nameable; and in the absence of such *vyāpti*, a *vipakṣa* which could demonstrate it cannot be shown. Thus, they are only-positive reasons.

² Literally, 'that whose aspects are manifest', for according to the *Pauṣkara*, an effect is nothing but the manifested form of its cause. See *Pauṣkara V*, p. 869.

³ The subject of the inference (*pakṣa*) includes all effects and a *sapakṣa*, where the thing to be proved could be observed as positively connected with the reason, cannot be shown. Therefore, this reason is only-negative.

⁴ Since a single inference cannot illustrate both *sāmānyatodrṣṭa* and *viśeṣatodrṣṭa* reasons, the reference is perhaps to the inferences mentioned in verses 47^b-49. The positive-negative inference clearly contains a *sāmānyatodrṣṭa* reason because it leads to the inference of fire which is perceptible. The other two reasons may be held to produce inferences of imperceptible entities. Positive-negative reason is sometimes identified with *sāmānyatodrṣṭa*, and only-positive and

[88] Having thus discussed reason, since (inferential) cognition depends on the cognition of the (reason), [the author] examines fallacious reasons, each characterized by the absence of one of the five features (of reason) described above.¹

Fallacies of reason are held to be five here in the Śaiva doctrine (*śivāgama*). Unestablishedness (*asiddhi*) is the first; it arises from the uncertainty of the presence of the reason in the subject. Unestablishedness in (the inference) "Atoms are the (material) cause (of the universe); because they are eternal" is due to the nature (of the reason). Due to the unestablishedness of the attribute, substantive, etc., arise the corresponding (fallacies of unestablishedness). (50-51)

Hetūnām dūṣaṇāni, fallacies of reason, causes which impede inferential cognition; atra śivāgāme pañca, are five here in the Śaiva doctrine. They (namely reasons vitiated by these fallacies also) are classified into five as, the unestablished (*asiddha*), contradictory (*viruddha*), deviating (*anaikāntika*), counterbalanced (*prakaraṇasama*) and untime-

only-negative respectively with *pūrvavat* and *śeṣavat* which are also known as *viśeṣatodrṣṭa*. See *Nyāyabhūṣana* on *Nyāyasāra*, p. 190. Jñānaprakāśa's commentary (*Pauṣkara* V, p. 863), which is not explicit, seems to suggest that each of the three reasons can be *drṣṭa* and *sāmānyatodrṣṭa* depending on their specific and general nature: *drṣṭam sāmānyataḥ drṣṭam vaksyamāṇahetutrayasya viśeṣeṇa sādharanena ca*.

¹ Thus, the reason which is not the attribute of the *pakṣa* is *asiddha*, that which is absent from a *sapakṣa* is *viruddha*, that which is present in a *vipakṣa* is *savyabhicāra*, that which is contradicted is *bādhita* and that which has a counterbalancing reason is *prakaraṇasama*. While this is true with regard to the fallacies recognized by Umāpati in the commentary, and as defined by him, it should be noted that the fallacies and their definitions in the *Pauṣkara* concern only the first three features of reason, not five.

ly (*kālātyayāpadiṣṭa*);¹ (these are five) because (the fallacy named) 'unestablishedness due to the absence of cognition' (*ajñānāsiddhi*) is subsumed in unestablishedness (*asiddhi*) and (the fallacy named) inconclusive (*anadhyavasita*) in deviating (*savyabhicāra*, that is, *anaikāntika*). But then, as *viruddha* and *savyabhicāra* (which vitiate inference by unsettling the pervasion) could be subsumed in 'unestablished due to pervasion' (*vyāpyatvāsiddha*) (which also vitiates inference by unsettling the pervasion), why is it said that they (that is, fallacious reasons) are fivefold? This objection is replied: although there is commingling within an entity (having multiple attributes) (here the reason), since the attributes which constitute vitiating fallacies (in this case) are clearly specified (to be five), it (namely reason also) is said to be fivefold.²

[89] Of these, [the author] defines the (fallacy named) unestablished (*asiddhi*). *Hetoḥ, of the reason, of the mark (linga), the pervaded; pakṣavrtteḥ anīscaye, when there is uncertainty of the presence in the subject, uncertainty of its being the attribute of the pakṣa; and here, uncertainty is the absence of certainty (and not doubt); prathamah, the first, fallacy named asiddhi arises. Asiddhi is the absence of the certitude of the pervasion of the mark and (the absence of the certitude) of its being the attribute of the pakṣa (pakṣadharmaṭā). But this definition is according to others' doctrine (matāntara).³ According to our own doctrine (svamata), however, asiddhi is mere non-presence of*

¹ While *anadhyavasāyika* is a distinct fallacy according to the *Pauṣkara*, Umāpati subsumes it in *savyabhicāra-anaikāntika* and introduces *prakaraṇasama* which is not recognized as a fallacy by the *Pauṣkara*. The definitions of *viruddha*, *anaikāntika* (named *savyabhicāra* by Umāpati) and *kālāntika* (named *kālātyayāpadiṣṭa* and *bādhita* by Umāpati) proposed by Umāpati differ from those of the *Pauṣkara*. Umāpati also introduces varieties of *asiddhi* and *anaikāntika* which are not mentioned by the *Pauṣkara*.

² That is to say, when a reason is affected by several fallacies, the same reason is considered to consist of as many fallacious reasons as the fallacies affecting it, because the fallacies affecting it are distinct.

³ For example, that of the Vaiśeṣikas. See *Kaṇādarahasya*, p. 101.

the pervaded, namely the *hetu*, in the *pakṣa*. And this *asiddhi* is of four kinds: *svārūpāsiddhi*, *vyāpyatvāsiddhi*, *āśrayāsiddhi* and *jñānāsiddhi*. [The author] first explains *svārūpāsiddhi* with illustration, *nityatvāt*, etc. *Aṇavaḥ*, atoms; *hetuḥ*, are the cause, the material cause of the universe; *nityatvāt*, because they are eternal. Here the unestablishedness of the reason 'eternity'; *svārūpataḥ asiddhiḥ*, is due to the nature; as atoms are numerous and inert, they are not eternal.¹ Such is the meaning.

[The author] defines other kinds of *asiddhis*, *viśeṣaṇa*, etc. Of the attribute, namely pervasion, which is the attribute of consideration (*liṅgaviśeṣaṇa*)²; of the substantive, namely substrate, hill, etc., which is the substantive of consideration (*liṅgaviśeṣya*); the expression 'etc.' (in the verse) refers to the cognition of the pervasion and of the reason's being the attribute of the subject (*pakṣadharmatā*). From the unestablishedness of these (three) occur; *tattadātmikā*, the corresponding, unestablishedness, namely 'unestablishedness due to the pervasion' (*vyāpyatvāsiddhi*), 'unestablishedness due to the subject' (*āśrayāsiddhi*) and 'unestablishedness due to the (absence of the) cognition (of the *vyāpti*, *hetu* and *pakṣa* which constitute consideration)' (*jñānāsiddhi*). Of these, *vyāpyatvāsiddhi* is of two kinds: caused by the absence of the means of apprehending the pervasion and caused by the presence of a vitiating condition (*upādhi*). The first is illus-

¹ According to the *Pauṣkara*, the inference "That which is numerous and inert, is non-eternal; like pot, etc." proves that atoms are non-eternal. See *Pauṣkara* 6.277^a: *anekaṃ yaj jaḍaṃ vastu vastv asat tad ghaṭādivat*.

² The *Pauṣkara* refers to the attribute and substantive of reason (*hetu*). But Umāpati interprets them as the attribute and substantive of consideration (*parāmarśa*) in order to introduce four varieties of *asiddhi*. Thus, the expression *liṅga* in the commentary refers not to *hetu*, but to *liṅgaparāmarśa*, namely the cognition that the *hetu* qualified by the *vyāpti* is the attribute of the *pakṣa*; for example, the cognition that the hill possesses smoke which is invariably connected with fire. As it will be seen shortly, Umāpati subsumes *asiddhi* due to the attribute and substantive of reason, in *svārūpāsiddhi*.

trated by (the inference) "The earth is scratchable with a hare's horn; because it is earthen";¹ the second, by "Injury caused during the *agniṣṭoma* sacrifice leads to demerit; because it is an injury; like any other injury", in which 'unprescribedness' is the vitiating condition.² Reason qualified by irrelevant attribute, such as 'blue smoke', also is subsumed in the same (*vyāpyatvāsiddhi*).³

Āśrayāsiddhi is illustrated by (the inference) "The sky-lotus is fragrant; because it is a lotus; like the terrestrial-lotus".⁴ 'Proving that which is already proved' (*siddhasādhana*) also is subsumed in *āśrayāsiddhi*.⁵ *Jñānāsiddhi* is unestablishedness due to (the absence of) the cognition of (reasons such as) smoke; for example, when smoke, etc. are not known to have a *vyāpti* and to be the attribute of the *pakṣa*. Unestablishedness due to the attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*) and substantive (*viśeṣya*) of *hetu* should be considered *svārūpāsiddhi*, while the unestablishedness due to the attribute, etc. of *pakṣa* is to be subsumed in *āśrayāsiddhi*. Thus, the *hetu* is 'unestablished due to the attribute (of the *hetu*)' (*viśeṣaṇa*-

¹ The *hetu* is unestablished because a *vyāpti* involving a hare's horn, which does not exist, cannot be known.

² As only that injury which is not prescribed by the scripture is said to lead to demerit, this *hetu*, whose connection with the *sādhya* depends on a condition, is fallacious. Unprescribedness (*avihitatva*) is the *upādhi* in this inference because it co-exists with the *sādhya* (wherever there is unprescribedness, there is demerit) but it does not always exist with the *hetu* (injury) because unprescribedness is absent in the case of sacrificial injury (which is prescribed).

³ The *hetu* in the inference "The hill is fiery; because it has blue smoke" is *vyāpyatvāsiddhi* because the pervasion is 'between' smoke and fire and not between blue smoke and fire; blueness is irrelevant to the inference.

⁴ The *hetu* ('being a lotus') does not occur in the *pakṣa* (sky-lotus) of this inference because sky-lotus does not exist.

⁵ Since the *pakṣa* is already proved to have the *sādhya*, the two conditions which induce inference, namely the doubt about the presence of the *sādhya* in the *pakṣa* (*sādhyaśaṅka*) and the desire to infer (*śiṣādhayaṣā*), are absent in *siddhasādhana*. In the absence of an entity which could serve as a *pakṣa*, the *hetu* is devoid of a substrate and is unestablished.

siddha) in the inference "Sound is non-eternal; because it is a quality while being visible"; 'unestablishedness due to the substantive (of the *hetu*)' (*viśeṣyāsiddhi*) arises when the same (reason) is inverted ('because it is visible while being a quality').¹ It should be understood that inferences such as "The golden hill has fire (because it has smoke)" illustrate 'unestablishedness due to the attribute of the *pakṣa* (*āśraya-viśeṣaṇāsiddhi*)'.² All these (varieties of *asiddhi*) are indicated by the expression 'of the respective nature' (in the verse).³

[90] [The author] defines contradictory reason (*viruddha*).

The reason which is present in the subject and in a dissimilar instance is contradictory (*viruddha*).
"The pervading is not all-pervasive; because it is not limited by space". (52)

The (word) connection is *pakṣavipakṣayor vartamāno hetuḥ viruddhas syāt*: the *hetu* which is present in the subject and in a dissimilar instance is contradictory. Here, the definition of *viruddha* is, 'presence only in a dissimilar instance'; the word 'subject' (in the verse), however, is to indicate that the *hetu* is also present in the subject in certain cases of *viruddha*.⁴ It should be noted that the word 'only' (*mātra*) prevents the overpervasion (of this definition) in deviating reason which is too general (*sādhāraṇānaikāntika*).⁵ [The author] illustrates, *vyāpaka*, etc.; *vyāpakāḥ avyāpakāḥ*, the

¹ The feature 'being visible', which is the attribute of the *hetu* in the first inference and the substantive of the *hetu* in the second inference, is absent in the *pakṣa* (because sound is invisible); thus, the *hetu* is unestablished.

² The *hetu* (smoke) is not present in the *pakṣa* (golden hill) because a golden hill does not exist; the unestablishedness is due to the attribute of the *pakṣa*.

³ The *Pauṣkara* only refers to *svārūpāsiddhi*, *viśeṣaṇāsiddhi* and *viśeṣyāsiddhi*; Umāpati introduces *vyāpyatvāsiddhi*, *āśrayāsiddhi* and *jñānāsiddhi* through this commentatorial device.

⁴ The *Pauṣkara* definition of *viruddha* is thus modified in the commentary.

⁵ While *sādhāraṇānaikāntika hetu* occurs in similar as well as dissimilar instances, *viruddha* occurs only in dissimilar instances. This explanation only concerns Umāpati's definition of *viruddha*.

pervading is not all-pervasive, "The pervading, self, etc. is not omnipresent; because it is not limited by space". This *hetu* ('because it is not limited by space') is contradictory because, while striving to prove the absence of omnipresence, it exists only in dissimilar instances (that is, omnipresent entities). Likewise, the fallacy is *viruddha* when the attributes of the *sādhya* and those of the *hetu* contradict mutually as (in the inference) "The sandal-wood hill has fire; because it has non-fragrant smoke".¹

[91] Deviating (*savyabhicāra*) is of three kinds:² too general (*sādhāraṇa*), too specific (*asādhāraṇa*) and inconclusive (*anadhyavasita*). Of these, [the author] defines and illustrates *sādhāraṇa*.

Anaikāntika is that which is present in the three, the subject, etc. O twice-born! it is illustrated by (the inference) "The self is eternal; because it is knowable". (53)

Pakṣāditritaye, in the three, the subject, etc., among these; *vartamānaḥ*, that which is present, present in a similar instance and a dissimilar instance, is the *anaikāntika* which is too general (*sādhāraṇa*). It should be noted that the definition (of *sādhāraṇa*) is, 'being present in a dissimilar instance while being present in a similar instance'; the clause 'while (being present in a similar instance)' is to prevent overpervasion in a *viruddha* reason,³ and the substantive (of the definition, namely 'being present in a dissimilar in-

¹ The attribute 'non-fragrant' of the *hetu* is contradictory to 'fragrant' which would be the attribute of the *sādhya*, sandalwood fire.

² The classification of *savyabhicāra* into three kinds is introduced by Umāpati, who also defines them. He interprets verse 53 to be the definition and example of *sādhāraṇa-anaikāntika* which he considers to be the first variety of *savyabhicāra*. This verse of the *Pauṣkara*, however, defines and illustrates the fallacy of deviation (*anaikāntika*).

³ Which is present in a dissimilar instance but not in a similar instance.

stance') is to prevent overpervasion in a valid reason.¹ [The author] illustrates, "The self is eternal". The reason 'being knowable' is *sādhāraṇānaikāntika* because it is present both in a similar and dissimilar instances.²

[92] [The author] defines *asādhāraṇa* and *anadhyavasita*.³

Anadhyavasāyika is that which does not lead to the thing to be proved, (that which is present) only in the subject. (54^a)

*Sādhya*prayojakaḥ, that which does not lead to the thing to be proved, (because it) is not pervaded by the *sādhya*, that is to say it does not co-exist with it. By this, it should be understood that the definition of inconclusive (*anadhyavasita*) is, 'that whose co-existence (with the *sādhya*), which gives rise to the cognition of pervasion, is not known'. This same (fallacy) is also known as *anupasaṃhārin*. *Pakṣa eva*, only in the subject, that which is present (only in the *pakṣa*); 'in spite of having a similar instance' is to be added to the verse; thus, the definition of too specific (*asādhāraṇa*) is, 'that which is present only in the *pakṣa* while having a similar instance'. The phrase 'while (having a similar instance)' is to prevent overpervasion in only-negative reason⁴ and the word 'only' is to prevent overpervasion in a valid reason.⁵

[93] [The author] illustrates *anadhyavasita*.

¹ A valid reason is found in a similar instance but not in a dissimilar instance.

² Because all eternal entities (which are similar instances) and non-eternal entities (which are dissimilar instances), are knowable.

³ *Anadhyavasāyika* is the third variety of fallacy according to the *Pauṣkara*. It is defined in verse 54^a and illustrated in 54^b. But Umāpati, who names it *anadhyavasita*, considers it a variety of *sa-vyabhicāra*. He makes verse 54^a yield the definitions of *anadhyavasita* and *asādhāraṇa* and interprets 54^b as an example of *anadhyavasita*.

⁴ An only-negative reason is not present in a similar instance because it has none; *asādhāraṇa* has a similar instance but is not present in it.

⁵ A positive-negative reason exists in the subject and a similar instance.

It is illustrated by (the inference) "Universe exists constantly; because it is a product". (54^b)

Viśvaṃ, universe, everything; *santatyā* vārtate, exists constantly, in succession, in the form of a manifold continuous flow; *vastutvāt*, because it is a product. Since everything is included in the subject (of this inference), the co-existence (of the *hetu* and *sādhya*) in presence and in absence, which produces the cognition of pervasion, cannot be known.¹ Hence it (that is, the reason) is inconclusive. The example of *asādhāraṇānaikāntika* "The earth is eternal; because it has smell"² is not given (in the verse) because it is well known. But then, it may be objected that the definition of *asādhāraṇa* is overpervasive in the valid (only-positive) reason of the inference "Sound is eternal; because it has soundness".³ This objection is answered: in case of favourable reasoning (*anukūlatarka*), where the *sādhya* is certain (to be present in the *pakṣa*), the *pakṣa* also serves as the *sapakṣa*⁴ and the feature 'presence only in the *pakṣa*' does not apply;⁵ but, where that certainty is absent, it (namely the reason) comes within the range of the definition (of *asādhāraṇa*). Thus, the definition is not overpervasive.

[94] [The author] defines the fallacy named *bādha*.⁶

¹ Since the *pakṣa* of the inference includes the entire universe, the reason ('being a product') does not have similar and dissimilar instances where its positive and negative connection with the *sādhya* ('constant existence') could be observed.

² Smell exists neither in an eternal entity, which could be a similar instance, nor in a non-eternal entity, which could be a dissimilar instance; as the *hetu* exists only in the *pakṣa* (the earth), its relation with the *sādhya* cannot be known.

³ Soundness exists neither in eternal entities, nor in non-eternal entities; it exists only in sound.

⁴ See *Vādivinoda*, p. 16.

⁵ Here the *hetu* has a similar instance (*sapakṣa*) although it is not different from the subject (*pakṣa*).

⁶ Umāpati differs from the *Pauṣkara* in interpreting the fallacy of *kālātīta* as *bādha*. Though *kālātīta* (or *kālātyayāpadiṣṭa*) is often identified with *bādha* (see *Nyāyakośa*, p. 233), these two are distinct fallacies (see, for example, *Nyāyasāra*, p. 310). Umāpati's explan-

Whereas *kālātīta* occurs due to the contradiction of the subject (*pakṣasya*)¹ in the subject (*pakṣe*) by a *pramāṇa*. "All effect is devoid of a material cause; because it is adventitious".² (55)

Pakṣasya, of the subject, of the thing to be proved found in the subject (*pakṣasthasādhyā*), absence of heat, etc.;³ *pakṣe*, in the subject, fire, etc.; *mānavirodhataḥ*, due to contradiction by a *pramāṇa*, perception, etc., which reveal that heat is its nature; *kālātītaḥ*, (the fallacy named) *kālātīta* occurs, that is to say the reason 'because it is a substance' becomes a fallacious reason known as '(that which has a) contradicted content' (*bādhitaviṣaya*). It should be noted that the definition of *bādha* is, 'having a *pakṣa* which has the ascertained absence of the *sādhyā*'.⁴ If the definition,

ation of *bādha* (illustrated by the inference "Fire is not hot; because it is a substance") bears upon the contradiction to the thing to be proved (perception reveals that fire is hot). The definition and example of *kālātīta* in the *Pauṣkara*, however, concern contradiction within the subject. The *pakṣa* ('The universe which is devoid of a material cause') is contradicted by verbal testimony and perception which prove that the universe has a material cause. This fallacy is named 'untimely' (*kālātīta*) because the very declaration of a fallacious *pakṣa* renders the statement of *hetu* inopportune.

¹ Both Jñānaprakāśa's commentary (*Pauṣkara*V, p. 874) and the citation of the same verse in the *Śaivaparibhāṣā* (Madras edn, p. 33) read *sādhyasya* for *pakṣasya*. But Umāpati's commentary confirms the reading *pakṣasya* although he interprets *pakṣasya* as *pakṣasthasādhyasya* to suit the standard definition of *bādha*.

² This translation follows Umāpati who not only reinterprets the *Pauṣkara* definition of *kālātīta* but also modifies the example presented in the *Pauṣkara* to suit his interpretation. The inference according to him is, 'All effect' (the *pakṣa* of the inference) 'is devoid of a material cause' (the *sādhyā*) 'because it is adventitious' (the *hetu*). The inference intended by the *Pauṣkara* is, 'Universe which is devoid of a material cause' (the *pakṣa*) 'is an effect' (the *sādhyā*) 'because it is adventitious' (the *hetu*). According to the *Pauṣkara*, *kālātīta* arises when a reason (*hetu*) is found in a subject (*pakṣa*) which is contradicted, that is to say proved to be unsound, by a *pramāṇa*.

³ In the inference "Fire is not hot; because it is a substance" chosen by Umāpati to illustrate the fallacy. He explains the *Pauṣkara* inference of *kālātīta*, but according to his own definition of *bādha*, in the following part of the commentary.

⁴ This is Umāpati's definition.

were merely, 'which has the ascertained absence of the *sādhyā*', there would be overpervasion with regard to a valid (only-negative) reason;¹ it is prevented by the clause 'having a *pakṣa*'. It should not be said that this definition is overpervasive with regard to (the fallacy) *viruddha* (which exists in a *vipakṣa* which has the absence of *sādhyā*), for (in *bādha*) the ascertained absence in the *pakṣa* is that of a *sādhyā* which is not opposed to it (namely the reason), while in *viruddha*, the *sādhyā* (which is absent) is opposed to the reason.

[The author] illustrates, *nirupādānakam*, etc. *viśvaṃ kār-yaṃ*, all effect; *nirupādānakam*, is devoid of a material cause; *āgantukatvāt*, because it is adventitious. This is contradicted by verbal testimony which declares, "The supreme bindu is the material cause";² "Māyā tattva is the source of the universe; indestructible, insentient, omnipresent, unique, pure, subtle, beginningless, changeless, supreme";³ and also contradicted by perception with regard to objects such as pot.⁴ The definition of the fallacy *prakaraṇasama* was stated earlier as 'by the two (reasons) with regard to the (respective) thing to be proved'.⁵ Although the definition of *bādha* was also discussed earlier by the statement 'contradiction is that which is caused by another means of knowledge',⁶ it should be understood that it is restated here to discuss the varieties of contradictions arising from verbal testimony, perception, etc.

¹ Because an only-negative reason is connected to the absence of the *sādhyā* by co-existence in absence.

² *Pauṣkara* 8.18^b.

³ Compare *Svāyaṃbhuvāsūtrasaṃgraha*, *vidyāpāda*, 2.8.

⁴ Perception proves that effects such as pot are not devoid of a material cause; they are produced out of clay, etc.

⁵ *Pauṣkara* 7.46^b. But this half-verse concerns one of the five attributes of a valid reason and not a fallacy. In fact, *prakaraṇasama* and *bādha* are not discussed in the present context because the *Pauṣkara* does not consider them to be fallacies of reason. Umāpati includes them among the fallacies because he believes that the absence of each of the five features of a valid reason lead to a fallacy.

⁶ *Pauṣkara* 7.46^a.

[95] Now, there could be impediment (to inference) by contradiction (*bādhā*) and counterbalancing reason (*satpratipakṣa*) because they constitute respectively, the cognition of the absence of the thing to be proved (in the subject) and the causal aggregate which produces that cognition;¹ but how do other fallacious reasons obstruct inference? [The author] explains.

Reason, known as such, is capable of establishing a thing to be proved through a pervasion; the breakdown of the pervasion in some way or other, due to a fallacious reason, is held to be the main impediment to inference. (56-57^a)

Yathāvadviññātāṃ sādhanam, reason known as such, cognized as pervaded (by the thing to be proved) and as being the attribute of the subject; *sādhyasiddhaye*, establishing a thing to be proved, to prove (for example) the presence of fire on a hill; *vyāpteh*, through a pervasion, by means of the cognition of pervasion (*vyāpti*); this also implies the cognition of (the reason) being the attribute of the subject (*pakṣadharmatā*);² *paryāptam*, is capable, means, is fit. Such is the fact. *Asato hetoḥ*, through a fallacious reason, such as unestablished reason (*asiddha*); *yena kenāpi vartmanā*, in some way or other, through the disruption of one of the constituents of *parāmarśa*; *vyāptibhaṅgaḥ*, the breakdown of the pervasion, which disrupts *parāmarśa*; *anumānasya prathamam dūṣaṇam matam*, is held to be the main impediment to inference. *

¹ Because in *satpratipakṣa*, besides the *hetu* which aims to prove the presence of the *sādhyā* in the *pakṣa*, there exists another *hetu* which aims to prove the absence of the same *sādhyā* in the same *pakṣa*.

² While the *Pauṣkara* holds that the cognition of the *vyāpti* produces inference and that the breakdown of *vyāpti* impedes inference, Umāpati seems to believe that inference is produced by *parāmarśa*, namely the cognition that the *hetu*, which is invariably connected with the *sādhyā*, is the attribute of the *pakṣa*. The breakdown of *parāmarśa* impedes inference.

[96] [The author] briefly describes other grounds of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*)¹ in the context of the discussion of fallacious reasons.

When it is declared, "Not hot, (is) fire", etc. accompanied by the reason, the transposition (*vaiparītya*)² of the first two of the five members of the inference is ill-enunciated (*sadurdiṣṭa*).³ Those pertaining to example (*drṣṭānta*) are now stated. The example is deficient of the thing to be proved when it is stated, "The self is eternal; because it is all-pervasive; like the sky", and the same is also with regard to the thing which proves. (57^b-59)

Anuṣṇo vahnir iti, "Not hot, (is) fire", etc.; 'etc.' refers to statements such as "Has fire, this hill"; *pratijñāte sahetukam*, when stated together with the reason, declared preceded by the reason, for example, "Because it is a substance, fire is not hot", "Because it has smoke, the hill has fire", etc.; *anumānasya pañcānām avayavānām*, of the five members of the inference, among the sentences like proposition (*pratijñā*), etc., which constitute the inference; *pūrvayoh*, of the first two, of proposition (*pratijñā*) and reason (*hetu*); and this also implies part of the proposition; *vaiparītyam*, the transposition, statement in an inverse

¹ According to the Nyāya school, faults which lead to defeat in reasoning (*nigrahasthāna*) are twenty-two. They include some defects of proposition, but do not seem to include those of example. The following verses of the *Pauṣkara* clearly deal with fallacies of proposition (*pratijñābhāsa*) and example (*udāharaṇābhāsa*). Umāpati seems to employ the term *nigrahasthāna* to signify all kinds of defects, for he not only discusses *udāharaṇābhāsas* in detail, but also refers to *nigrahasthāna*, *chala* and *jāti*.

² The translation follows Umāpati's interpretation. The illustration of the *Pauṣkara* rather suggests a fallacious proposition (*pratijñābhāsa*) produced by the contrariety (*vaiparītya*) between its two constituents, for example, the subject (fire) and the thing to be proved (absence of heat). Thus, the error is also due to the meaning, and not merely due to the order of utterance as stated in the commentary.

³ It is not clear if *sadurdiṣṭa* is the description or name of the fallacy.

order, is the ground of defeat named *aprāptakāla*; [and] *sa-durdiṣṭam*, ill-enunciated, possessing ill-enunciation, that is, endowed with a fallacy of proposition (*pratijñābhāsa*). The meaning is that the ground of defeat (*nigrahassthāna*) named *aprāptakāla* arises when the members (of an inference) are transposed, whereas the fallacy of proposition (*pratijñābhāsa*) arises when a part of the proposition is inverted. It is said by the followers of Gautama, "Statement of the members of an inference in an inverted order is (the *nigrahassthāna* named) *aprāptakāla*".¹ These two are errors due to the speaker, etc. (*puruṣādidoṣa*) and not due to meaning (*arthadoṣa*).

Adhunā, now; *drṣṭāntasya ucyate*, of example are stated, fallacies of example are illustrated. (In the inference) "The self is eternal; because it is all-pervasive; that which is so (all-pervasive), is so (namely eternal); like the sky", *drṣṭāntaḥ sādhyavikalah*, the example 'sky' is 'deficient of the thing to be proved' because the sky, which is a product of the subtle element sound (*śabdātmanmātra*), is not eternal.² [The author] states that the same is an example of (the fallacy named) 'deficient of the thing which proves' (*sādhana-vikala*), *sādhane ca*, and with regard to the thing which proves. Since it (namely the sky) is created (in the lower realm), it does not pervade the upper realm, and the reason, namely 'being all-pervasive', does not apply to it. The word 'and' (*ca*) (in the verse)³ indicates that the same is also an example of 'deficient of both (the *sādhyā* and *sādhana*)' (*ubhayavikala*). It should be understood that the same word ('and' in the verse) also indicates (the fallacy of example named) 'deficient due to (its) nature' (*svarūpavikala*)

¹ *Nyāyasūtra* 5.2.11.

² See *Pauṣkara* 6.279^b-280^a and 6.355^{b(bis)}.

³ Umapati justifies, through this commentatorial device, the introduction of various fallacies of example, as well as grounds of defeat (*nigrahassthāna*), quibble (*chala*) and false rejoinder (*jāti*) which are not mentioned in the *Pauṣkara*.

which is found in the inference "The pond-lotus is fragrant; because it is a lotus, like the sky-lotus".¹ And these are fallacies of example as well as errors due to meaning.

The word 'also' in the expression 'also arise' (*tathā bhavet*) (in the verse) indicates other grounds of defeat, as well as quibble (*chala*) and false rejoinder (*jāti*). Of these, fallacies of example of the form of erroneous utterance are as follows. The fallacy of example named 'unexplained positive pervasion' (*anupadarśitānvayodāharaṇābhāsa*) arises when, instead of "The hill has fire; because it has smoke", it is only stated, "like a kitchen". The fallacious example named 'unexplained negative pervasion' (*anupadarśitavyatirekodāharaṇābhāsa*) occurs when only "like a lake" is stated under the same circumstances.² "Wherever there is fire, there is smoke; as in a kitchen" illustrates (the fallacy of) 'inversely explained positive pervasion' (*viparītadarśitānvaya*), and "Wherever there is absence of smoke, there is absence of fire; as in a lake" is an example of 'inversely explained negative pervasion' (*viparītadarśitavyatireka*).³ Grounds of defeat (*nigrahassthāna*)⁴ are twenty-two; the *nigrahassthānasūtra*⁵ enumerates them: weakening the proposition by referring to counter examples (*pratijñāhāni*), changing the proposition (*pratijñāntara*), contradicting the

¹ Sky-lotus, which is non-existent, cannot illustrate the relation between lotus and fragrance nor can it lead to the conclusion intended by the inference. Hence, this example is fallacious due to its nature.

² These fallacies arise because the positive and negative examples are stated without a prior declaration of the positive and negative reason which they are supposed to illustrate.

³ Since fire is found in hot iron, etc. where smoke is absent, being of greater extension, fire pervades smoke; it is not pervaded by smoke. Thus, the declaration of positive and negative examples, which demonstrate an inverted *vyāpti*, is erroneous.

⁴ Grounds of defeat (*nigrahassthāna*), quibble (*chala*) and false rejoinder (*jāti*) arise due to the procedure of the debate, the conduct of the debaters and the significance of words respectively. They do not directly affect pervasion or consideration but, nonetheless, impede inference.

⁵ *Nyāyasūtra* 5.2.1.

proposition (*pratijñāvirodha*), giving up the proposition (*pratijñāsamnyāsa*), changing the reason (*hetvantara*), changing the subject (*arthāntara*), meaningless statement (*anarthaka*), incoherent statement (*apārthaka*), unintelligible statement (*avijñātārthaka*), inversion of the order of the members of the inference (*apṛāptakāla*), omission of a member of the inference (*nyūna*), addition to the members to the inference (*adhika*), repetition (*punarukta*), refusal to answer (*ananubhāṣaṇa*), ignorance (*ajñāna*), inability to reply (*apratibhā*), evasion (*vikṣepa*), admission of error in one's own reasoning (*matānujñā*), passing by the opportunity to criticise (*paryanujoyopekṣaṇa*), criticising the faultless (*niranujoyānu-yoga*), adopting principles contrary to one's own doctrine (*apasiddhānta*) and citing a fallacious reason (*hetvābhāsa*).

False rejoinder (*jāti*) based on similarity (*sādharmya*), dissimilarity (*vaidharmya*), addition (*utkarṣa*), omission (*apakarṣa*), certainty (*varṇya*), uncertainty (*avarṇya*), etc. are twenty-four (fallacies known as) false rejoinder.¹ Quibble (*chala*)² is of three kinds: based on the particular and the universal evoked by a word (*sāmānyachala*), on the metaphorical and literal sense of a word (*upacārachala*) and on the different meanings of a word (*vākchala*).

¹ These are counter-arguments which have the appearance of an inference but are devoid of all validity and connection with the subject under discussion. For example, when a debater states, "Sound is not eternal; because it is a product; like pot, etc.", the opponent counter-argues, "Sound has to be visible; because (as admitted by the debater) it is similar to a visible product such as a pot" and concludes that, since sound is not visible, the debater's reasoning, based on sound's similarity with a pot, is invalid. This is an example of the false rejoinder 'based on an addition' (*utkarṣa*) because the opponent adds visibility (as a characteristic of sound) which is not intended to be proved by the inference of the debater.

² These are strategies employed by the opponent to outwit the debater by resorting to one of the multiple senses of the word uttered by him; for example, when the debater's expression *navakambalah* ('having a new blanket') is interpreted by the opponent to mean 'having nine blankets' because the word *nava* means 'new' as well as 'nine'. This illustrates *vākchala*.

[97] [The author] explains the *pramāṇa* (named) verbal testimony (*śabda*), which follows in the order of succession.

Verbal testimony (*āgama*) is the utterance of a trustworthy person; and¹ (*api*) it is the ultimate means to the cognition of mediate objects. (60^a)

Āptoktiḥ, the utterance of a trustworthy person, the sentence of a trustworthy person is; verbal testimony, the *pramāṇa* named verbal testimony (*śabda*). A trustworthy person is the one who speaks truth while having the true cognition of the sense of the uttered sentence. Here the word 'sentence' signifies a group of words possessing expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*) and juxtaposition (*āsatti*); it does not include compatibility (*yogyatā*) because it is implied by the very expression 'trustworthy person'.² If compatibility were included, it should be known to be of the form of 'the absence of ascertained lack of connection (between word-meanings)' (*ananvayaniṣṭayaviraha*); and this compatibility is the cause (of the cognition of meaning) by its mere presence.³

Expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*) is the non-completion of meaning. It is explained as follows: the word without which a given word fails to reveal the connection between meanings, which (connection) is the content of the intention of the speaker, that word is said to be expectant with the given word in regard to that connection (between meanings).⁴ This (defini-

¹ The word *api* is employed here in the sense of 'and', and not of 'also', because *śabda* would be redundant from the point of view of logic if it served the same purpose as *anumāna*. So the distinction is that *anumāna* is the means to the cognition of mediate objects (see *Pauṣkara* 7.36^b: *parokṣārthābodbhakam*) while *śabda* is the ultimate means to the cognition of mediate objects (*parokṣārthaikaśādhānam*).

² Because the sentence of a trustworthy person would not contain incompatible words.

³ If compatibility were considered necessary, its presence in the sentence is adequate; it is not required that the speaker and hearer be aware of this presence.

⁴ For example, the word 'pot' in the sentence 'Bring the pot' is expectant with the word 'bring' because the word 'pot' cannot convey the meaning intended by the speaker without the word 'bring'. It

tion) wards off the criticism that if the sentence, "Pot (*ghaṭaḥ*) being the object of action (*karmatvaṃ*) bringing (*ānayanam*) act (*kṛtiḥ*)" had expectancy, it would produce the comprehension of these (words) being connected as an act and (its) object (but it does not); and if it lacked expectancy, it would not give rise to the comprehension of these (words) being connected by non-difference (*abhedānvaya-bodha*) (but it does).¹ For here, the absence of the comprehension of these (words) being connected as an act and (its) object (that is to say, the non-comprehension of meaning) is caused not by the absence of another word (since all the words which make up the sentence are present), but by the absence of their capacity (to make them expectant towards each other).² The clause 'the content of the intention of the speaker' (in the definition of expectancy) is to prevent (for example) that the word *nadī*, uttered with the intention of being connected with the word *jalam* in the sentence *aho vimalam jalam nadyāḥ kacche mahiṣaś carati*,³ be construed with the word *kaccha*.

should be noted that verbal roots have expectancy with case-endings, stems with suffixes, etc., because they are considered to be full-fledged words.

¹ Connection between the word-meanings in a sentence is of two kinds: connection based on difference (*bhedānvaya*) and based on non-difference (*abhedānvaya*). The first exists between the stem and suffix, between verb and case-ending, between words possessing different case-endings, etc., where the words come together to give rise to the meaning of the sentence, as in the sentence *ghaṭam ānaya* ('bring the pot'). The second is found between the words possessing the same case-ending, number, etc. which retain their own status and meaning, as for example, in the sentence *ghaṭaḥ karmatvaṃ ānayanam kṛtiḥ* ('pot, being the object of action, bringing; act'). The first sentence has the expectancy as defined above, but not the second sentence though its words are connected by *abhedānvaya*.

² In this case, capacity consists of possessing the appropriate case-endings. Thus, the non-completion of meaning (namely expectancy) depends not on the presence or absence of a word in a sentence, but on the presence or absence of the capacity of words to come together to convey an intended meaning.

³ This sentence could give rise to two different meanings depending on whether the word *nadyāḥ* is construed with the word *kacche* or

Juxtaposition (*āsatti*) is the uninterrupted presence of the connected words (in a sentence).¹ Thus, an authoritative sentence is a group of words possessing expectancy and juxtaposition, uttered by the one who speaks truth while having the true cognition of the sense of the uttered sentence. If it were merely said, 'an authoritative sentence is a group of words', there would be overpervasion in ill-juxtaposed (words), such as "Hill, eaten, has fire, by Devadatta"; therefore it is said 'possessing juxtaposition.' If this much were said (to be the definition), there would be overpervasion in sentences such as "pot, being the object of action", which lack expectancy; therefore, 'possessing expectancy' is supplied. If this much were stated, there would be overpervasion in the statement of a liar; hence, it is said, 'uttered by the one who speaks truth'. Yet, there would be overpervasion with regard to erroneous statements; thus, it is specified 'while possessing the true cognition'. Since this (definition) could apply to the true cognition of (any) group of words, such overpervasion is warded off by the clause 'the sense of the uttered sentence'.

[98] But then, (it may be said that) verbal testimony could be subsumed in *anumāna* *pramāṇa*² (and that it is not an independent *pramāṇa*). It is as follows: "These words are preceded by the true cognition of the connection which

with the word *jalam* which are found on its either side; 'O the purity of the water! the buffalo wanders in the marshy area of the river' in the former case and 'O the purity of the water of the river! the buffalo wanders in the marshy area' in the latter case. The intention of the speaker, which is to point out the stupidity of the buffalo which prefers the dirty marsh to clean water, indicates that the word *nadyāḥ* is connected with the word *jalam* and not with the word *kacche*.

¹ For example, "The hill has fire", "(Food is) eaten by Devadatta", etc.

² This objection may be attributed to some Vaiśeṣikas. They hold that since the comprehension of the meaning of a sentence is the mere cognition of the word-connection which is intended by the speaker, it could be inferred, that is, known through *anumāna* *pramāṇa*; and consequently, an independent *pramāṇa* called *śabda* need not be admitted. See *Kaṇādarahasya*, pp. 104-105.

(connection) is recalled by these particular words and is the content of the intention of the speaker; because they are a group of words possessing expectancy, compatibility and juxtaposition; like the group of words 'bring the cow with (the help of) a stick' ". The clause 'recalled by these particular words' is to prevent overpervasion (of this inference) with regard to the statement "There is smoke"¹ which is preceded by the true cognition of the connection (of smoke) with fire.² The clause 'the content of the intention of the speaker' is to prevent application (of this inference) to (the statement) "knowability", which presupposes the true cognition of the connection of inseparability (*abheda-saṃsarga*).³ The word 'true' is to prevent the application (of this inference) to (statements preceded by) an erroneous cognition of connection. The word 'expectancy' in the reason (*hetu*) is to prevent deviation with regard to the word-connections which are not intended, for example between the words *nadī* and *kaccha* in the statement *aho vi-malam jalam nadyāḥ kacche mahiṣaś carati*. And expectancy is only that which is intended (by the speaker).⁴ The word 'compatibility' is to prevent deviation with regard to (in-compatible) statements such as "Wets with fire". The word 'juxtaposition' is to prevent deviation with regard to ill-juxtaposed (words), such as "Hill, eaten", etc. Thus, (since

¹ Uttered by a person desirous of inferring the presence of fire from the perception of smoke.

² This statement, though preceded by the cognition of a connection, does not come within the scope of the above inference because the smoke-fire connection is not recalled by the uttered words.

³ The above inference, which attempts to prove the presence of a connection between the words in a sentence, could also prove the presence of connections which are not intended by the speaker; for example, the connection between an object (knowability) and the cognition about it (the cognition of knowability) in the sentence "knowability". Thus, it is specified that the connection to be proved is that which is intended by the speaker.

⁴ For words and meanings, which are insentient, do not possess expectancy. They are expectant because a sentient speaker intends them to be so with regard to a meaning which he wishes to convey.

the meaning of the utterance of a trustworthy person could be known through inference,) *śabda* need not be admitted as a distinct *pramāṇa*.

[99] If it is said so, the answer is, no. If the word 'compatibility' included in the (above) reason were to signify compatibility of the form of 'the absence of ascertained lack of connection' (*ananvayaniścayaviraha*), there would be deviation (of the reason) with regard to contradicted statements.¹ And if compatibility were to mean 'having a non-contradicted object' (*abādhitārtha*), the fallacy of 'the reason being unestablished due to the presence of a doubt'² (*saṃdigdhāsiddhi*) would arise (and render the reason invalid). The inference³ "These word-meanings are mutually connected; because they have expectancy, compatibility and proximity" also is to be rejected for the same reason.⁴

[100] But then (some others say),⁵ the inference "These words are preceded by the cognition of the connection

¹ "Wets with fire" is a contradicted sentence because perception proves that the act of wetting cannot be associated with fire. The above reason fails with regard to this sentence because the thing to be proved (namely meaning) is present in the sentence, but the reason ('absence of lack of connection') is not present, for the words of this sentence lack connection.

² Doubt about the connection of the reason with the thing to be proved, for the absence of all contradiction in all cases cannot be known unless the inference is drawn, that is, unless the meaning is known.

³ The first inference (which produces the cognition that, for example, the words 'this' and 'silver' are connected) would not induce action in a person desirous of silver, because only the cognition "This is silver", which directly cognizes an object as characterised by the features of silverness, induces action in that person. Therefore a second inference is proposed which produces the cognition that the word-meanings of the sentence are connected, that is to say the sentence has the meaning 'this is silver' which should induce action.

⁴ Because the word 'compatibility' included in the reason of the inference cannot be defined with certainty.

⁵ This argument may be attributed to the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas, who hold that only the Vedas, which are impersonal (*apauruṣeya*), are *śabda* *pramāṇa*. Secular statements are not *śabda* *pramāṇa* because they reflect the defects of human beings who are imperfect by nature.

which they convey; because they possess a particular intention of the speaker (*sandarbhaviṣeṣa*)” may be accepted; although there is absence of word-connection in (contradicted) statements such as “wets with fire”, the thing to be proved (by the inference), namely ‘being preceded by the cognition of connection’, is present.¹ It should not be said that this (inference) fails with regard to the utterances of a parrot which are devoid of a particular intention of the speaker (but convey a meaning).² Nor should it be said (to overcome the above objection) that the absence there (in the meaningful utterances of a parrot) is only that of the intention of the speaker, and not of the prior cognition of connection; for it would discredit the inference of the knowledge of a speaker (from his speech), which is admitted by all.³ Nor should it be said that since the reason (of the inference), namely ‘possession of a particular intention of the speaker’, is absent (in parrot’s speech), it would be difficult to explain how the cognition of meaning arises here (through inference).

For (those who hold that meaning is inferred through the intention of the speaker and that parrot’s speech is not a counter-example, reply that) here (namely in parrot’s speech) the cognition of meaning is derived (not through inference, but) merely through the order (of words) which

They believe that the meaning of secular statements is inferred through the intention of the speaker who is aware of the meaning of the uttered words and that secular statements are *anumāna* pramāṇa. See *Prakaranapañcikā*, pp. 242-244.

¹ Thus, this inference, which is free from the defect pointed out in the previous inference, proves that meaning is inferred.

² It may be objected that this inference is invalid because the reason (‘intention of the speaker’) is absent where the thing to be proved by it (‘meaning’) is present (in the utterances of a parrot).

³ This commonly accepted principle (which is based on the invariable connection between an utterance and the meaning which the speaker intends to convey through it) would be challenged if it were admitted that there could be an utterance devoid of the intention of conveying a meaning.

is similar to the order (of the words of a human being), which (order) has an intention that presupposes the cognition of the meaning (of the uttered words). It is comparable to the gesture (*ceṣṭā*) of a mad person that is similar to the gesture (of a sane person) which presupposes the desire to convey a meaning. Although it (that is, the meaning) is not inferred here (in the gesture of a mad person) since it is not a gesture which is invariably preceded by the desire to convey a meaning, it (that is, the meaning) is remembered from the perception of similarity with it (that is to say with the gesture of a sane person). Thus, the above inference is not defective.

It should not be said that since the word-connection (that is to say the meaning) is not cognized directly, it would not induce any action; for, as in the case of gesture, etc.,¹ where meaning induces action in spite of being the content of an intention (*abhiprāyaviṣaya*), here (in the inference of meaning) also meaning could induce action in spite of being the content of a cognition (*jñānaviṣaya*). If not (that is, if it were not accepted that gesture, etc. convey a meaning through intention), gesture also would have to be considered an independent pramāṇa.

[101] It is replied (to those who hold that meaning is inferred): The cognition of meaning which is independent² is inducer to action, not any cognition of meaning, for if it were the case, the cognition “I wonder if there is a pot in the house” also would induce action.³ Therefore, only the cognition of meaning which is independent of being the content of (another) cognition induces action. And such

¹ The word ‘etc.’ should refer to writing and other symbols.

² That is, understood directly from words and not derived through another cognition like inference, doubt, etc.

³ But this does not induce the person desirous of a pot to act because the pot is known not directly as the content of a valid cognition, but indirectly as the content of a doubt, which also annihilates the validity of the cognition.

(cognition of meaning) can be obtained in two ways. The meaning is either cognized directly (from the utterances of a trustworthy person) [or]¹ it is inferred. But such inference cannot be drawn because, as noted earlier, if the reason (of the inference) did not include compatibility of the nature of 'having a non-contradicted object', the inference would fail (with regard to contradicted statements) and if it included compatibility of that nature, the fallacy of 'the reason being unestablished due to the absence of the cognition of pervasion' (*ajñānāsiddhi*) would arise.

[102] Now, it may be objected that the inferential cognition produced by a gesture also would not induce action, for that (cognition) has a meaning, which is the content of an intention, as its content;² since it (namely gesture) is also found where meaning is absent (for example, in the gesture of a mad person), it is not invariably accompanied by a meaning and thus, it does not have a direct meaning as its content. This objection is replied (by those who believe that gesture induces action) that it is not claimed that it (namely gesture) gives rise to the inference of intention through an invariable concomitance (between the gesture and the meaning); it is only said that it makes the meaning (which is the content of the intention) known directly.³ And this (admission that gesture reveals meaning directly) does not render gesture, which cannot be subsumed in any other recognized

¹ Since meaning is said to be known in two ways, the text should give the two alternatives. As it does not, the word 'or' should perhaps be supplied. This passage could also be amended following a parallel passage in the *Śivajñānabodhaviṣṭarabhāṣya* (p. 121: *yadi sāṅśād-artha evānumīyate yadi vā pramānumīyate ... na ca tathānumānam*, etc.; but this aims to prove that neither the meaning of a sentence nor the cognition of the validity of that sentence, which induce action, can be inferred).

² Because the meaning of a gesture is inferred through the intention of the person who gesticulates.

³ In other words, the meaning of a gesture is known directly from the intention of the person and not through inference.

pramāṇas, an independent pramāṇa.¹ Since everything that conveys a meaning through convention (*saṃketa*) is of the nature of *śabda* pramāṇa and since gesture is such, it is subsumed in *śabda* pramāṇa. It should not also be objected that since words (of parrot) and gestures (of a mad person) are present where meaning is absent, they cannot be considered direct denoters of meaning; for inconsistency is an impediment only to an invariable concomitance and not to the denotation of meaning through convention. Tradition (*aitihya*)² whose subject is not contradicted is subsumed in *śabda* pramāṇa, while that whose subject is contradicted is but unauthoritative. Thus, everything is sound.

[103] But then, the definition (of *śabda* pramāṇa) is underpervasive because the Veda, Āgama, etc., which are the ultimate means to the knowledge of mediate objects such as liberation, could not have been composed by ordinary (trustworthy) persons. [The author] answers *so'pi*, etc.; *so'pi*, that also, means, as the Veda, Āgama, etc. also³ are uttered by trustworthy person, the definition is not underpervasive. The manner in which the Veda and Āgama could be considered to be uttered by someone, was described earlier.⁴

[104] Now, what is the definition of a trustworthy person and who, then, is the trustworthy person? [The author] explains.

The one who utters the sense well ascertained by perception or inference, that very person is a

¹ As believed by the Tāntrikas. See *Nyāyakośa*, p. 282.

² The Paurāṇikas hold that, since the origin of a tradition (for example, the belief that Vaiśvānara resides in every fig tree) cannot be traced to any authoritative person, it cannot be considered verbal testimony, and that it is an independent pramāṇa. See *Kaṇādasūtra-ṛtti*, p. 406.

³ The interpretation of *so'pi* here in the commentary, seems to be problematic, for it not only forces the word-order of the verse, but also differs from the idea expressed in it.

⁴ In *PauṣkaraBh* on 1.94^b, pp. 66-67.

trustworthy person; Śiva is more trustworthy than that person. (60^b-61^a)

Pratyakṣeṇa, by perception, through the sense of sight, etc.; *yadvā anumāneṇa*, or by inference; *sunīcitam arthaṃ*, well ascertained sense; *yo, who*, utters as it is known; *so'yaṃ āptaḥ syāt*, that very person is a trustworthy person. The nature of a trustworthy person was clearly defined earlier.¹ Who, then, is such trustworthy person with regard to the Veda and Āgama (which are the ultimate means to mediate objects)? [The author] answers, *tasmāt*, than that person, than the person recognized as a trustworthy person; *śivaḥ āptataraḥ*, Śiva is more trustworthy. The significance of the comparative affix (*tarap*) is that there is possibility of defect in (trustworthy) human beings and others (like divine beings) at some time or other, but never in Śiva.

[105] But then, since it is said, "Defilement (caused) by affection, hatred, etc. is found in (all) beings",² how can Īśvara be proclaimed to be defectless? [The author] answers.

Possessor of intensely pure senses, omniscient, holding everything within the range of His awareness, free from partiality, eternal perceiver of truth, He is changeless, perfect, independent, destroyer of the bonds of the bound selves; His utterance is the ultimate authority, true, repository of welfare for ever. (61^b-63^a)

Suprasannendriyagrāmaḥ, possessor of intensely pure senses, He is said to be the one whose totality of the senses is extremely pure; this indicates the absence of defects such as inefficient senses in Śiva; *sarvagocaraḥ*, holding everything within the range of His awareness, His

¹ In *PauṣkaraBh* on 7.60^a.

² Not traced. Also cited in the *Tarkabhāṣāprakāśikā* (p. 173) where the second half of the verse is, *ataḥ prāmāṇyaśaṅkāpi niṣkalaṅke prasaṅgate*.

omniscience is never concealed by mala as it is in the case of ordinary human beings and others.¹ The expressions *sarvajñaḥ* and *sarvagocaraḥ* imply the absence of error and inattention (in Śiva). *Pakṣapātavinirmuktaḥ*, free from partiality, signifies the absence of injustice. *Yathārthagrāhakaḥ*, (eternal) perceiver of truth, signifies the absence of the likelihood of deluding others; the word 'eternal' is a qualifier which differentiates Śiva from ordinary (trustworthy) human beings and other (released selves). *Avyayaḥ*, changeless, eternal, refers to (His) function of uttering scripture at the beginning of every cyclic creation (of the universe). *Paripūrṇaḥ*, perfect, means, He is the one whose wishes are fulfilled; the possibility of uttering untruth prompted by any desire whatsoever is thus rejected. *Svatantraḥ*, independent; excludes the likelihood of the utterance of untruth under duress. *Paśupāśahā*, destroyer of the bonds of the bound selves; this indicates compassion. The one who is compassionate would not utter untruth. Such is the meaning. *Tadvākyaṃ*, His utterance, the utterance of Śiva described above, that is to say the (Śaiva) scripture, etc.;² *tathyam*, true, unrefuted; *śreyonidhiḥ*, repository of welfare, conducive to welfare such as release; *ekaṃ pramāṇam*, ultimate authority, is only authoritative and never, nowhere and in no degree could also become unauthoritative like the words of ordinary human beings and others.

But then, how can Śiva, who does not possess a body, be attributed with pure senses? It is answered that although He does not have a body made up of bindu, etc.,³ (it is said that

¹ Such as the *viññānakevala* selves in the pure path, which are free from the bondage caused by karma and māyā, but whose omniscience remains slightly concealed by mala.

² 'Etc.' should refer to the Veda and other scriptural texts recognized as the word of Śiva, and therefore, authoritative.

³ Bindu is the material cause of the bodies of the selves which reside in the pure path, while the bodies of those in the impure path are produced from māyā. See *Pauṣkara* 2.13^b-14: *kiṃ ca māyādyupā-*

He has pure senses) because it is admitted that He has a body constituted of His capacities and because the scripture declares "His body is said to be composed of śakti".¹ This same notion will be made clear, by way of objection and reply, by the statement "(Śiva) described earlier (as formless and devoid of the sense of speech)",² in the chapter which describes the descent of scriptures (*tantrāvatārapaṭala*).

[106] Now although the scripture (*āgama*) uttered by Śiva (in the higher region) is authoritative for the reasons explained above, how are those (texts) which are heard here (in this lower region) beginning with *Kāmika* and ending with *Vātula*,³ authoritative? [The author] answers (that they also are authoritative because they are composed by Śiva).

After the creation, Īśa, having exalted the selves which belong to the pure path, with regard to their cognition and action by a mere touch of His rays, the compassionate lord as Sadāśiva, taught them the knowledge about the six categories which arose in the form of nāda; (having composed) it (namely the scripture) in many meters, (He taught) first the tenfold śiva variety and then the other, eighteenfold rudra variety. (That) ocean of scripture (*tantra*) descended to the Meru through successive regions. (63^b-66)

dānam dehendriyavatām nṛṇām // kṣubdham kāryakaram tasya kartur dehendriyādikam / yad upādānato jātam sa bindur iti gamyatām.

¹ Not traced. The capacities or powers (śaktis) of Śiva, which are also said to be His *mantras*, are considered to form His body because they perform the functions which limbs perform in a body. See *Pauṣkara* 1.63^{b(bis)}-64^a: *evam mantrās tu pañcaite yair nibaddhā tanuś śivā / vastutas tu na bhinnās te yato nānye svaśaktitah*, 1.58-63 and 8.29-30^a.

² *Pauṣkara* 8.26^b.

³ *Kāmika* is said to be the first of the ten texts named *Śaiva* and *Vātula* is the last of the eighteen texts named *Raudra*. See *Mṛgendra*, *caryāpāda* 1.43^b-47^a.

Īśaḥ, Śiva, at the beginning of the creation; *srṣṭy-anantaram*, after the creation, of the scripture in the form of nāda which is a transformation of *kuṇḍalinī* agitated by Śiva's power.¹ This will be described later (in the *tantrāvatārapaṭala*) by the verses beginning with "Then, at the time of the creation" and ending with "scripture in the form of nāda (came into existence)".² The (selves) which belong to the pure path are those for which the pure path is the sphere of activity, in other words, those which dwell in the pure path;³ *svāmśusamsparśanād eva*, by a mere touch of His rays, by contact through His power; *ḍṛkkriyayā¹ utkaṭān kṛtvā*, having exalted them with regard to ((their) cognition and action, that is, having unveiled their capacities to know and act, which explains their competence to acquire, retain and transmit (knowledge); *bhagavān*, lord Śiva; *sadāśivo'pi*, as Sadāśiva, remaining in the form of Sadāśiva;⁴ *nādarūpatayā āgatam*, which arose in the

¹ Bindu (also named *kuṇḍalinī*), impelled by Śiva's power, evolves not only into the pure material world but also into the universe of speech, nāda being its first evolute in this domain. See *Pauṣkara* 2.33^b-34^a: *vasturūpāḥ kalā jñeyāḥ śabdarūpāḥ puroditāḥ / śabdava-stūbhayātmāsau bindur nānyatarātmakāḥ*. Nāda is the most subtle of all forms of speech. For speech exists in a subtle form in the pure realm, in a gross form in the mixed realm, and in the grossest form in the impure realm. See *Pauṣkara* 2.30^b-31^a: *sūksmās śuddhādhvani girah sthūlā mīśrādhvani sthitāḥ // aśuddhādhvani tā vācaḥ sthitā sthūlatarās sadā*. The instruction of Śiva, namely the scripture, is expressed through nāda at the time of creation, but it is taught by means of subtle speech by Sadāśiva in the pure realm.

² *Pauṣkara* 8.4^b-6^a.

³ The dwellers of the pure path are the *vijñānakevala* selves; they are selected by Śiva out of grace or according to the maturity of their mala and appointed to perform different duties in the pure path or to enjoy. See *Pauṣkara* 4.49-50^a: *icchayaivānugrhyādau śivo vijñānakevalān / malapākam apeksyaiva kāmścic chuddhādhvagocare // yojayaty adhikāreṣu kṛtvā ḍṛkkriyayotkaṭān*; 4.10: *vijñānakevalās sākṣāt tā eva munipuṃgavāḥ / śuddhādhvavartināḥ paścāt bhaviṣyanti śivocchayā*.

⁴ Sadāśiva is the appellation by which Śiva is referred to, when bindu sets about to create the pure realm. See *Pauṣkara* 1.23: *udyuktas tu*

form of *nāda*, which instructs the six categories beginning with the Lord (*pati*); that very *jñānam*, **knowledge**, which is Śaiva scripture (*śivaśāstra*); *anekacchandaḥ*, in many metres, having composed in various metres; *pūrvataḥ daśa-saṁkhyātam śivabhedaṁ*, first, the tenfold śiva variety, the scripture named Śiva (because it is taught to the ten Śivas); *tathā aṣṭādaśavidham aparaṁ*, subsequently the other, the eighteenfold *raudra* (variety); *tebhyah avādīt*, taught them, out of compassion, to the ten Śivas headed by Praṇava and the eighteen Rudras led by Ananta.¹ The disappearance of the affix signifying the agent is archaistic.²

[The author] explains how it descended to the earth, *tat-tat*, etc. Gradually, from the higher to the lower tattvas; *merau*, to Meru, through those (preceptors) who are free from *kalā*;³ *āgataṁ tantrasāgaram*, the ocean of scripture came down, Śaiva scripture (*śivaśāstra*) descended. Scripture (*tantra*) is considered an ocean because it is immense and profound.

[107] Since the purport of the whole scripture (*āgama*) could be learned from those well-known (texts) *Kāmika*, etc., of what purpose is the composition of this (text named *Pauṣkara*)? Having raised the objection, [the author] replies that because they are very extensive, inaccessible and profound (in sense), this is composed to favour everybody.

yadā kārye bindur bhogāhvayaṁ tadā / labhate śiva udyuktas sa eva ca sadāśivah.

¹ See *Kiraṇa*, *vidyāpāda*, *tantrāvatārapaṭala* (Devakottai edn), pp. 32-33 for the names of the ten Śivas and eighteen Rudras, and of the texts received by them.

² It is not clear to which word this remark applies.

³ Just as the selves in the impure path have *kalā*, etc. which form their bondage produced by *māyā*, the selves in the pure path also possess *kalā*, etc. produced by bindu, which confers enjoyment, governance, etc. on them without constituting their bondage. See *Pauṣkara* 2.58-60. The preceptors who receive the scripture are said to be *vikalas* because they are free from the impure *māyā kalās* as well as pure bindu *kalās*.

O sages! having selected this *Pauṣkaratantra* from there with skill, setting aside eulogical statements, etc., (I) transmitted it to you. Promote this on the earth among the qualified who are devoted to the preceptors. (67-68^a)

Tatra, there, means 'from there' (*tasmin*), that is, from the ocean of scripture (*āgama*); (since the *Pauṣkara* is selected from there) the locative case (of the word *tatra*, which refers to the scripture) signifies specification; *arthavādādilopataḥ*, setting aside eulogical statements, having eliminated eulogical passages such as the description of worlds found therein; *bahuyuktibhiḥ uddhṛtya*, having selected with skill, having collected the essence, like ambrosia (from the milky ocean), honey from lotuses; the text (*tantra*) named *Pauṣkara* on account of its similarity with *pauṣkara* (that is, the honey of the *puṣkara* lotus); *viprāḥ yuṣ-mabhyam*, O sages, to you, who are endowed with the abilities of deep faith, devotion, knowledge and retention; *kathitam*, (I) transmitted. The declaration of completion by the expression 'transmitted', in spite of the topics which remain to be discussed,¹ is to indicate the small quantity of subjects which remain to be instructed.

[The author] states that this (*Pauṣkara*) is to be instructed only to the qualified and not, out of greed, etc., to the unqualified, *sthāpayadhvaṁ*, etc.; *idaṁ*, this, *Pauṣkaratantra*; *bhūmau*, on the earth, also; *guruvarṭmasu*, among those for whom the preceptors are the path, means, those who are devoted to preceptors; preceptors are considered a path because they indicate the way to welfare; *yogyeṣu*, among the qualified, those who are disposed to devotion, etc. (towards the preceptors) and faith, etc. (in their teaching); *sthāpayadhvaṁ*, promote, means, diffuse it for the continuity of the tradition. It is said in the *Niśvāsa*, "O

¹ In this *paṭala* and in the *tantrāvatārapaṭala*, which is the last chapter of the *vidyāpāda* of the *Pauṣkara*.

beautiful one! reveal this knowledge to my devotees; it should be diligently guarded (from the unqualified) as wealth (is guarded) from a thief".¹ And (it is said) in another text (*āgama*), "This text (*tantra*), which belongs to the pure Śaiva (*śuddhaśaiva*) (tradition), should neither be given nor revealed. It should be instructed to the initiated, the composed and to the one devoted to Śiva. Its teaching elsewhere is not approved".² The expression 'it should neither be given nor revealed' should be supplied with the words 'to the unqualified'; 'elsewhere' means, 'to the unqualified', (its teaching) is not approved. Scriptural statements which express the same opinion are also found in the chapter on the *madhuvīdyā* in the *Chāndogya*³ and in the sixth chapter of the *Śvetāśvatara*.⁴

[108] But then, while the scriptures (*āgama*) taught by Brahmā, Viṣṇu and others exist and instruct, of what purpose is the instruction of the Śaiva scripture (*āgama*)? [The author] replies:

Although (they form) another path, the initial part of the Veda⁵ and those (scriptures) composed by Brahmā, Viṣṇu and others propose the goals which constitute the bondage of the individual self, for they have prevalence (only) up to the realities (*tattva*) admitted therein. The path to release (however) lies beyond the enjoyment of heaven, etc. (68^b-69)

¹ Not traced. Also cited in the *Śataratnasamgraha* (Delhi edn) and attributed to the *Niśvāsa* by the *Śataratnollekhanī*, p. 93.

² *Suprabheda, kriyāpāda*, 1.25-26^a.

³ See *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 3.11.5-6.

⁴ See *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, 6.22.

⁵ The translation follows Umāpati's interpretation. It appears that Umāpati rejects the ritualistic part of the Veda as the means to the knowledge about liberation, but he accepts the Upaniṣads, the doctrinal parts of the Veda. Perhaps this is not meant by the *Pauṣkara* because the expression *vedādi* seems to refer to the Veda and connected Vedic texts.

Brahmaviṣṇvādikarṭṛkaḥ, (the scriptures) composed by Brahmā, Viṣṇu and others; the word 'others' refers to Bṛhaspati and others. *Vedādiḥ*, the initial part of the Veda, a part of the Veda, the section which instructs ritual practices. Although (they are) a path different from the Śaiva scripture (*āgama*), scriptures (*āgama*) such as Pāñcarātra composed by Brahmā and Viṣṇu; *paśupāsārthadarśakaḥ*, propose goals which constitute the bondage of the individual self, and not the final release.¹ [The author] explains why this is so, *sva*, etc. They (that is, scriptures composed by others) are said to be those, whose prevalence extends up to the realities recognized in the respective scriptures. As reported by the statement, "The elements (*bhūta*), the subtle elements (*tanmātra*), the senses (*indriya*), mind (*manas*), egoity (*ahaṃkāra*), intellect (*buddhi*), the constituents of transformation (*guṇa*), the unmanifest (*avyakta*) and (the two) selves (*nara*) are (said to be) the states (of release) to be attained by the beings",² the scriptures

¹ While the *Pauṣkara* seems to distinguish between the Veda (whose instruction leads its followers to bondage) and the scriptures composed by Brahmā and others (which are authoritative only with regard to the realities recognized by them), the explanation of Umāpati does not seem to differentiate between them.

² *Pauṣkara* 6.68. Since these states are considered by the respective doctrines to be the true nature of the self, attaining them constitutes liberation for the followers of those doctrines. According to the *Pauṣkara*, the Cārvākas, Jyotiṣas and Kaulas (*bhūta*), the Smārtas (*tanmātras*), the munis who believe that the senses constitute consciousness (*indriya*), the Bauddhas and Naiyāyikas (*buddhi*), the Syādvādins (*guṇas*), the Pāñcarātrins (*avyakta*), the Vedāntajñas (*nara*, that is *puruṣa-tattva*) and the Sāṃkhyas (*nara*, that is *puruṣa-tattva*) believe that these states are the ultimate reality. See *Pauṣkara* 6.69-76 and Umāpati's commentary on these verses. The attainment of *ahaṃkāra* is proclaimed as the state of release by the Vaiśeṣikas, that of *manas* by the Naiyāyikas and that of *buddhi* by the Bauddhas according to four verses attributed to the *Pauṣkara* in the *Nānāvāraṇavilakkamāpāṭiyam* (p. 508): *cārvākā ... pare* (= *Pauṣkara* 6.69^a-71 with variants) // *vaiśeṣikās tv ahaṃkāre manasthāḥ nyāyavādinah* // *buddhi-tattve sthitā bauddhā guṇeshv evārhatāḥ sthitāḥ* // *prākṛtāḥ ... harim* (= *Pauṣkara* 6.74^b with variants) // *vedāntajñās ca sāmkyās ca yoginah puruṣe sthitāḥ*. Of these verses, the three half-verses, which are not

revealed by Brahmā, Viṣṇu and others teach the welfare which consists of the attainment of (these) different states and not the release which constitutes the supreme welfare. Therefore, they only instruct the bondage of the selves. It is also said in another text (*āgama*),¹ "Authoritative statement (*āptokti*) is the (Śaiva) scripture (*siddhānta*)² because only Śiva is authoritative (*āpta*); no preceptor of welfare is comparable to them (namely to Śiva and the scripture uttered by Him). Only the (Śaiva) scripture (*siddhānta*) is the accepted doctrine (*siddhānta*), all other scriptures (*āgama*) are *prima facie* views (*pūrvapakṣa*); (because) Śiva alone is *śiva* (that is, omniscient and omnipotent), (every) other (preceptor) is non-*śiva* (that is, possessor of limited knowledge and action)". And it was said earlier, "Those who are recognized in other scriptures (as the creators of the universe) are only bound souls because they lack presence (in the pure regions); they (also) are to be purified and enlightened (by Śiva) because bondage persists in them".³

But then, why cannot the very attainment of different tattvas be considered as release? [The author] replies, *parastāt*, **beyond the enjoyment**, in the heaven, etc.; 'etc.' refers to enjoyment in the worlds up to *śiva* tattva;⁴ *mokṣamārgasya*

found in the *jñānapāda* of the *Pauṣkara* (numbered 556^b, 557^a and 558^a in the *Nānāvarāṇavilakkamāpāṭiyam*), are attributed to the *Siddhāntarahasya* in another passage of the *Nānāvarāṇavilakkamāpāṭiyam* (p. 1130) and are found in the *Siddhāntarahasyasāra* (p. 225 of GOML ms n° R.7710, "restored from n° R.6635"). This second passage of the *Nānāvarāṇavilakkamāpāṭiyam* rightly attributes several verses to the *Pauṣkara* (6.71^b-73^a in the edition).

¹ Compare *Ratnatrayaparikṣā* 10-11.

² As explained by Aghoraśiva in his commentary (*Ratnatrayollekhinī*, p. 149), the word *siddhānta* came to signify 'the twenty-eight texts composed by Śiva' through derivative conventional usage (*yoga-rūḍhi*). In other words, the true meaning of *siddhānta*, namely 'the accepted doctrine', got restricted by popular usage to 'the texts which discuss the accepted doctrine'.

³ *Pauṣkara* 1.95.

⁴ *Śiva* tattva and *sadāśiva* tattva are created out of bindu in the pure path for the enjoyment of those selves whose faculties of enjoyment

sthitiḥ, lies the path to release. It was said earlier, "Those who are joined to the *laya* tattva are liberated and not (those joined) to the other (states of *bhoga* tattva and *adhikāra* tattva)",¹ 'to *laya* tattva' means 'to *śiva* named *laya*'.² Since the purpose of the instruction of the Śaiva scripture (*śaivāgama*) is thus to teach the ultimate release, they are not futile. Such is the meaning.

[109] But then, what is the purpose of the Upaniṣadic teaching? It is replied that (they also are authoritative, for) as proved by the teachings of different treatises such as *Kāmika*, a means does not vitiate another means. The special

(*bhoga*) and governorship (*adhikāra*) are freed by initiation. These two tattvas consist of numerous divine cities filled with infinite objects of pleasure. See *Pauṣkara* 2.37^b-38: *bhogādhikārayoḥ śaktir abhivyaakteha dīkṣayā / yeṣāṃ teṣāṃ tu bhogārthaṃ śivena parikalpitam / tattvaṃ sadāśivaṃ tadvat śivatattvaṃ ca nirmītam*.

¹ *Pauṣkara* 1.51^a. *Laya* tattva is one of the three states (*avasthā*) of bindu to which the selves are initiated in the pure path: those which have some traces of mala are allotted to *bhoga* tattva (or *adhikāra* tattvas) where they exhaust mala through enjoyment and governance, from which they are initiated into *laya* tattva; those which are free from all mala are directly assigned to *laya* tattva from which they do not transmigrate; it constitutes liberation. See *Pauṣkara* 1.50^{b(bis)}-51: *tāni prāpyāni sarvais tu dīkṣayā yojitair nrbhiḥ // yojitā layatattve ye te muktā nāparatra ca / bhogādhikāratattvasthā vyaktacinmātraśaktayaḥ*.

² The word *laya* could refer to Śiva, the superintending gods as well as the selves in the pure path because they all are designated by the names of the states (*avasthā*) and transformations (*pariṇāma*) of bindu with which they are associated. For example, Śiva is named *laya* (also *laya* tattva and *śiva* tattva) when bindu is in the state of repose (*laya*). See *Pauṣkara* 1.18^b-19^a. But union with Śiva cannot be said to be the goal to be reached by the selves because firstly, the self is distinct from, and as eternal as, Śiva; secondly, release signifies the recovery of omniscience and omnipotence by the self (which state is described as *śivatva*) and not becoming one with Śiva. As regards the word *śiva*, it is applied to everything connected with the pure path including the insentient bindu and its evolutes, the selves, superintending gods and Śiva. It is not clear whether the above words *laya* and *śiva* refer to a place or state to be reached. *Jñānaprakāśa* refers to a state named *paraśiva* (in the *laya* tattva) in which the released self attains similarity with Śiva. See *Pauṣkara* V, p. 72. *Rāmakanṭha* lists *paramaśiva* as one of the seven places of release (*vimokṣasthāna*). See *Matangapārameśvaravṛtti, vidyāpāda*, p. 69.

significance is as follows: both the Vedic scripture (*vedā-gama*) and Śaiva scripture (*śaivāgama*) are authoritative with regard to (the practice of) their teachings for those who belong to the (first) three social classes in accordance with the maxim 'all branches' (*sarvaśākhānyāya*),¹ but only Śaiva scripture is authoritative (with regard to the practice of their teachings) for others. The commentary on the verse "(Initiation to) the one who is not devoted, not twice-born, not kind (destroys both the initiated and the initiator)"² explains the manner in which those who belong to the fourth class (*caturthavarṇa*) also are eligible to study the (Śaiva) scripture (*āgama-mādhyāyana*) and to undergo the consecration that authorizes them to initiate others (*ācāryābhīṣeka*).

[110] But it may be objected that, since scriptures (*āgama*), which are made up of words, require to be produced through the sense of speech, as well as the function of the organs of speech like palate, lips, etc., and since these are absent in the one (namely Śiva) who transcends all tattvas³ and is free from *kalas* (*niṣkala*), how could He be considered as the instructor of scripture? Such is the question of the sages:

It was said that knowledge-path (that is, scripture) in the form of nāda comes forth from the one who is free from *kalas*.⁴ This does not seem

¹ The generally accepted rule that all the branches (*śākhā*) of the Veda enjoin the same ritual and that they are equally authoritative. But a person practises only the ritual for which he is eligible, that is to say the ritual prescribed in his own branch. Similarly, both the Vedic and Śaiva scriptures are authoritative for all classes, but the rituals prescribed by them are practised according to the eligibility of the practitioner.

² *Pauṣkara* 4.46^b.

³ The evolutes (*kala*) of māyā and bindu provide respectively, the bodies of those in the impure and pure realm. But Śiva, who transcends māyā and bindu, cannot be said to have a body made up of these evolutes.

⁴ Śiva is the material cause neither of the scripture nor of nāda, because if they were to arise from Śiva, He would cease to be unchanging. He is the origin only figuratively, for His powers induce

appropriate, due to the absence of the sense of speech. (70)

It was declared by the statement "The Lord, after the creation, etc."¹ that, *jñānamārgaḥ pravartate, knowledge-path issues forth*, (that is, scripture arises) in the form of nāda. But this may not seem appropriate. [The author] explains (the objection) *vāgindriya*, etc., due to the absence of the sense which produces speech; in other words, the act of speaking is found only in those who possess it (namely the sense of speech).

[111] Īśvara replies that, because the faculty of action of ordinary human beings is concealed by mala, *kalā* is required to manifest it (namely the faculty of action) and the sense of speech also is required to speak. As Śiva's faculty is never obstructed,² He is not dependent on them and instructs the scripture without the sense of speech, through His ever manifest faculty of action.

His power being absolutely pure, is operative everywhere and is not dependent on the sense of

bindu to produce nāda, the subtle speech which conveys Śiva's knowledge.

According to Umāpati, the verse 70 refers to verses 63-64 of the *pramāṇapāṭala*. But they describe the transmission and not the origination of the scripture. The reference here could be to a verse which is cited and attributed to the *Pauṣkara* by Rāmakaṇṭha in his commentary on the *Mataṅgapārameśvara*, *vidyāpāda* 1.33^a (p. 19), but not found in the *vidyāpāda* of the *Pauṣkara*: *adrṣṭavīgrahāc chāntāc chivāt paramakāraṇāt / nādarūpaṃ viṇiṣkrāntaṃ śāstraṃ sarvaṃ*. It states that scripture in the form of nāda emerged from the formless, undisturbed, pure, ultimate cause, namely bindu. *Jñāna-prakāśa* cites the second half of this verse (*Pauṣkara*V, p. 896) but does not seem to recognize it as a verse from the *Pauṣkara* though he refers to it as *śruti*.

¹ *Pauṣkara* 7.63^b-64^b.

² The omniscience and omnipotence of Śiva, which are considered to be His powers, are real and eternally operative because they are never affected by mala which obstructs the omniscience and omnipotence of the bound self. See *Pauṣkara* 1.39: *jñānakriyātmikā sāpi satyā nityo-ditaprabhā / sā parābhimukhī sarvabandhaśavivarjitā*.

speech. What wonder if He pronounces through it. (71)

Asya śaktiḥ, His power, Śiva's faculty of action; *vimala-ivena*, being (absolutely) pure, because it is free from all association with mala in the three times, the past, present and future; *sarvatra*, everywhere, with regard to each and every object; *niḥsṛtā*, is operative, is manifest; *vāgindriyā-napekṣā*, is not dependent on the sense of speech, because it does not require it. The meaning is, since it (namely Śiva's faculty) is naturally free from mala, it does not require those (entities) which originate in it (that is to say in mala) (and) which remove mala.¹ If He utters scripture (*āgama*) without depending on the sense of speech; *tayā*, through it, through the faculty described above; *kim adbhutam*, what wonder, means, it is not surprising.

[112] The faculty of action (of Śiva) could be operative (as explained above); yet, Śiva, who is free from kalas, cannot be considered a speaker because the function of a speaker consists of the function of the (organs of speech such as) palate and lips. [The author] answers the objection.

The function of being a speaker consists of the streaming forth of the bindu of nāda according to the inclination of His cit-śakti, and of the emergence of words from it. (72)

Pravakṛtvam, the function of being a speaker is; *svacicchaktipravṛtṭyanugūṇasya*, according to the inclin-

¹ Although the senses, *kalā*, etc. are produced from *māyā* (see *Pauṣkara* 3.60^b-62^a: *māyāto dvividhā sṛṣṭiḥ sthūlā sūkṣmātmikety api // dr̥kchaktivyāñjikā sūkṣmā sthitā tattvātmanātmani / sthūlā bhuvana-rūpeṇa śarīrādyātmanā sthitā // sūkṣmā kalādayaḥ pūrvam sthūlā badhnanty aṇuṃ tataḥ*, and 3.3: *pralaye līnadehasya karmino 'nor aharmukhe / dehādeḥ kāraṇam māyā sūkṣmasthūlātmakasya tu*), it is said that they originate in mala because the cognitive and conative apparatus, which is produced from *māyā* and which removes mala, occurs only in the self affected by mala. See *Pauṣkara* 4.147^a: *male sati kalādinām yathā sambandha īsyate*, and 4.3^b: *maloparuddhadṛk-śaktis tatprasṛtyai kalādimān*.

ation of His cit-śakti¹; *nādasya niḥsṛtiḥ*, the streaming forth of nāda, the subtle *paśyantī* speech and not the operation of the palate, lips, etc. But then, since the scripture (*āgama*), uttered by Īśvara and couched in nāda, is inaudible to ordinary human beings like us, why is it said that the composition of the scripture is to instruct the ultimate human goal? [The author] replies, *bindoḥ*, etc., from the bindu, sent forth from nāda²; *prasṛtiḥ*, the emergence, of *madhyamā*; *tataḥ*, from it, from *madhyamā*; *śabdānām*, of words, in the form of *vaikharī* (that is, the audible words), *niḥsṛtiḥ*, come into being.³ Thus, the utility (of the utterance

¹ It should be noted that the agency of Śiva and of His powers is not connected with activity, for any action would set aside their immutability. They are said to be active only because they bring about changes in bindu. See *Pauṣkara* 1.30: *śivas saṃkalpamātreṇa bindu-kṣobhakaras sadā / na vyāpāraviśeṣeṇa yenāyam vikṛto bhavet*. According to the descent of scripture described in the *tantrāvatārapaṭala* of the *Pauṣkara*, when Śiva's power sets bindu (called *viśva-kāraṇa*, the material cause of the pure path) into action, nāda emerges first, and from nāda, arises an entity also named bindu. The second bindu, further impelled by Śiva's power, produces twenty *śaktis* beginning with *ambikā* which are the source of the fifty *varṇas*. The evolution described in the *tantrāvatārapaṭala* is as follows: bindu > nāda > bindu > 4 *śaktis*, *ambikā*, etc. > 16 *śaktis*, *jayā*, etc. > 50 *varṇas*. See *Pauṣkara* 8.5-13 and 25. According to Umāpati, the bindu which is produced from nāda is known as *aparabindu* (*akṣara-bindu* according to Jñānaprakāśa, see *PauṣkaraV*, p. 920), while the bindu which produces nāda is named *parabindu*. See *PauṣkaraBh* on 8.7^a, p. 571.

² The *Pauṣkara* verse describes the function of speech in Śiva (which is, causing nāda to appear from bindu at the beginning of the creation), and not the evolution of speech. Thus, the word *bindu* here should refer to the bindu which produces nāda, and not, as explained in this part of the commentary, to the bindu which is produced from nāda. The translation of the verse follows the commentary.

³ This explanation interweaves the notion of speech comprising of nāda, bindu and śabda with that of the three stages of speech, that is, *paśyantī*, *madhyamā* and *vaikharī*, which is not attested by the *Pauṣkara* verse. It identifies nāda with *paśyantī* and śabda with *vaikharī*; śabda is said to arise from *madhyamā* produced by bindu. This explanation seems to suggest the following scheme: nāda (= *paśyantī*) > bindu > *madhyamā* > śabda (= *vaikharī*).

of Śiva) towards the ultimate human goal is indirect. Such is the meaning.

[113] And yet, the scripture (*āgama*) (constituted of audible words) cannot be the means to infer Śiva's knowledge (*śivajñāna*) as stated earlier,¹ because the audible word does not originate from it (that is, from Śiva's knowledge). Having raised the objection, [the author] answers it.

Words are the means to infer Śiva's knowledge, only indirectly. (73^a)

Pāramparyeṇa, indirectly, through the inference of (the existence of) *madhyamā*, etc.; *śivajñānānumāpakāḥ*, are the means to infer Śiva's knowledge, not directly.² It is said in the *Ratnatraya*, "That from which the pure path arises, where it subsists and into which it merges, is the bindu (also) named supreme *nāda* (*paranāda*), the source of *nāda*, bindu and *arṇa*";³ *vaikhari* (referred to here by the word *arṇa*) is the audible syllable (*varṇa*).⁴ But then, the designation of Śaiva scripture (*śivāgama*) would not apply to these (audible words). Having raised the objection, [the author] answers, *śabdāḥ*, words, audible words composed of syllables; *pāramparyeṇa*, indirectly, through the inference of their (own) cause, namely bindu; *śivajñānānumāpakāḥ*, are the means to infer Śiva's knowledge. They lead to Śiva's knowledge which, as declared by the statement

¹ In *Pauṣkara* 1.7^b: *śābdam tadānumāpakam*. Umāpati explains that, just as the knowledge of a speaker is inferred through the meaning of his speech which conveys his knowledge, Śiva's knowledge is inferred through the meaning of the texts which He utters.

² Since the gross speech comes into being from the successively subtler speech, gross audible words could be traced, through the inference of the existence of the intermediate states of speech, to the most subtle speech which conveys Śiva's knowledge.

³ *Ratnatrayaparīkṣā* 22.

⁴ This explanation traces the origin of audible speech (*vaikhari*) to *śivajñāna* (which appears in the form of *nāda*) through *madhyamā*, and is in keeping with the commentary on the previous verse. The immediately following passage of the commentary explains the production of *varṇas* through the bindu which arises from *nāda*; it matches the process described in *Pauṣkara* 7.72.

"Knowledge of the six categories which arose in the form of *nāda*",¹ is in the form of *nāda*, and is the origin of bindu. Since they (namely audible words) originate in the bindu which arises from *nāda*, their designation (as scripture) is figurative, supported by usage (*nirūḍhalakṣaṇa*).²

[114] But then, while the Śaiva scripture (*śivāgama*) that enjoin the ultimate welfare exists, why did Brahmā, Viṣṇu and others, though conversant with it, instruct different paths? [The author] explains.

And those (Śaiva texts) which discuss pure entities were not received with faith by the sages; those which came from the wise deal with (the entities of) the lower realms such as prakṛti (73^b-74^a)

Vā is here employed to mean 'and'; thus (*atha vā* means) *atha ca*, nevertheless, that is to say, although Śaiva texts (*āgama*) existed; *śivagocarāḥ*, those which discuss pure entities, the texts whose subject matter deals with the pure entities (which exist beyond prakṛti); *sadbhiḥ*, by the sages, by the authors of other scriptures (*śāstra*); *śraddhayā aprāptāḥ*, were not received with faith, were not studied with attention. Therefore, *prakṛtyādyavagocarāḥ*, deal with the entities of the lower realms such as prakṛti, they (namely the other scriptures) describe the realities (*tattvas*) which belong to the realm of prakṛti and other inferior regions; *anye*, those, texts (*āgama*) such as Pāñcārātra; *sajjanāyātāḥ*, came from the wise, also come from

¹ *Pauṣkara* 7.65.

² In a *nirūḍhalakṣaṇa* or faded metaphor, the primary sense of a word is forgotten and its metaphorical meaning becomes prevalent due to popular usage. The primary sense of the word *āgama* is the knowledge which was uttered in inaudible speech when the pure realm was created, but it commonly signifies the texts, composed of audible words, which convey that knowledge.

the same wise, Viṣṇu and others who are the authors of scriptures (*śāstra*).¹

[115] Since other scriptures (*śāstra*) are thus composed at variance (with the Śaiva scripture), [the author] puts forward the rule which fixes the state of being the overruled and the overruler (*bādhyabādhakabhāva*) in case of conflict between the Śaiva and other scriptures.

Therefore the knowledge contained in the utterance of Śiva is not contradicted by others' words. The words of the sages cannot be set aside by those of ordinary human beings; nor the words of the divine beings by those of the sages; nor those of Brahmā by those of the divine beings; nor those of Viṣṇu by those of Brahmā; nor those of Rudra by those of Viṣṇu; nor those of Śiva by those of Rudra, due to the excellence of the successively superior. The successively inferior is set aside by the (successively) superior. (74^b-76)

Tataḥ, therefore, since the other scriptures (*āgama*) deal only with the tattvas which belong to prakṛti and lower realms; *śivagīrām bodhaḥ*, the knowledge contained in the utterance of Śiva, which deals with all tattvas; *anyayā girā*, by others' words, by scriptures (*śāstra*) such as Pāñcarātra; *vibodhaḥ na*, is not contradicted, for *vibodhaḥ* means, 'that whose thought is contrary'.²

¹ The commentary does not make the distinction which the *Paṇḍikā* seems to make between the sages who did not acquire the instruction of Śiva with attention (and propagated doctrines different from that taught by Śiva) and the sages who composed the scriptures which deal only with lower realms (and consequently, contain limited knowledge). On the other hand, the commentary seems to distinguish between the scriptures (*śāstra*) composed by Viṣṇu and others, and the texts (*āgama*) also composed by the same authors.

² In other words, the Śaiva scripture, which contains more knowledge, cannot be contradicted, that is to say proved to be wrong, by another scripture which contains lesser knowledge.

[116] Or, the following is another interpretation of *atha vā*, etc.:¹ The statement "The ocean of scripture (*tantra*) descended to Meru through successive regions"² declared that the very words uttered by Śiva came down to Meru through the lineage of preceptors. Another thesis is proposed now, *athavā*, or; *śivagocarāḥ*, those which discuss pure entities, are words constituted of pure syllables; *sadbhiḥ*, by the wise, by those (Śaiva preceptors) who are free from *kalā*, etc.; *aprāptāḥ*, were not acquired, in the regions below *māyā* (but were acquired in the pure path); whereas, *sajjanāyātāḥ*, those which came from the wise, the words mentioned above (namely those of Viṣṇu and others) are indeed different (from the words composed of pure syllables). The reason is, *prakṛtyādyavagocarāḥ*, they belong to the lower realms such as prakṛti; prakṛti means *māyā*, therefore, they are produced from *māyā*, etc.³

But then, how can they (that is, the pure syllables) be said to convey a meaning, for they are inaudible, and of what utility are the *prākṛta* syllables? (The present verse explains). *Tataḥ*, through them, through the *prākṛta* syllables; *śivagīrām bodho*, the knowledge of the pure speech, arises because they (namely the *prākṛta* syllables) manifest them (namely the pure syllables). But, does the cognition of the meaning (of the pure speech) occur through the *prākṛta* speech? [The author] answers, *anyayā girā*, through the other speech, through the *prākṛta* (speech); *vibodhaḥ na*, perfect cognition does not arise. The meaning is that the cognition of Śiva and other pure entities (of the higher

¹ Verses 73^b-74.

² *Paṇḍikā* 7.66^b.

³ Speech is said to be subtle in the pure realm, gross in the mixed realm and grosser in the impure realm. See *Paṇḍikā* 2.30^b-31^a. While the subtle speech in the pure realm is composed of syllables produced from bindu, the gross and grosser speech in the mixed and impure realm is composed of syllables produced from prakṛti, namely *māyā*.

realm, which are the subject of the pure speech) cannot arise through the impure (speech).¹

[117] [The author] (further) explains that the statement of a more learned person cannot be overruled by that of a less learned. On the contrary, it overrules the latter, *na cārṣaṃ*, etc.; *ārṣaṃ*, that of the sages, the śāstra composed by the sages, Manuśāstra, etc., cannot be set aside; *pauruṣaiḥ*, by those of ordinary human beings, by the statements of ordinary human beings. The phrase 'cannot be set aside' is to be supplied to all (the following sentences). *Ṛṣibhiḥ*, by those of the sages, by the statements of the sages; *daivikam*, those of the divine beings, those uttered by Indra and others; *devaiḥ*, by those of the divine beings, by the utterances of the divine beings; *brahmaṇo vākyaṃ*, the utterances of Brahmā, those uttered by Brahmā; *padma-janmanā*, by utterances of the lotus-born, by the statements of Brahmā; *vaiṣṇavaṃ*, those of Viṣṇu, (scriptures) such as the Pāñcarātra; *tathā*, so also; *hariṇā*, by those of Hari, by the utterances of Viṣṇu; *raudraṃ*, those of Rudra, those uttered by Rudra; *rudreṇa*, by the words of Rudra; *śivātmakam*, that of Śiva, the scripture uttered by Śiva cannot be set aside. [The author] explains, *ūrdhvordhva-vaiśiṣṭyāt*, since they are successively superior, due to their excellence. It is well known that the words of the sages, compared to those of human beings, and those of the divine beings, compared to those of the sages, and so on, are successively superior.

The excellence (of the words) of Śiva with regard to all, is proved by us in the *patipāṭala*² supported by evidence from śruti, smṛti, itihāsa and purāṇa. *Ūrdhvataḥ*, by the superior, by the successively superior, that is, the scripture

(*āgama*) of Rudra by that of Śiva, the scripture of Viṣṇu by that of Rudra, and so on; *adho'dhaḥ*, the successively inferior; *bādhyam*, is set aside; due to the absence of excellence, deficiency of knowledge, etc. It is said in the *Sarvajñānottara*, "The utterance of the sages cannot be overruled by that of the human beings, nor the utterance of the divine beings by that of the sages, nor that of Brahmā by that of the divine beings, nor that of Viṣṇu by that of Brahmā, nor that of Śiva by that of Viṣṇu".¹ The *Mataṅga* also declares the same in the passage beginning with "The Lord, who has the five mantras as His body, is said to be *sakala*" and concluding with "His utterance cannot be contradicted by the gross means of knowledge of the human beings".² The expression 'of the human beings' (in this statement) also implies those of the sages and others (such as Gods).

[118] In fact, the inquiry into the states of being the overruler and overruled does not arise because, as declared by the *Vāyavyasamhitā*, which is based on the scripture (*śruti*), "The scripture (*śruti*) states that the trident-bearer Śiva Himself is the creator of these eighteen sciences which teach different paths",³ Śiva Himself is the redactor of all doctrines. It is clear that the subject under discussion concerns the scriptures (*śāstra*) composed by Viṣṇu and others who are the secondary authors of different scriptures (composed by Śiva Himself). But then, it may be objected that since it is said, "Purāṇa is set aside by the Vedas, the teaching of which is overruled by the Āgamas",⁴ how can the Veda, which is composed by Śiva Himself and not by a secondary author, be set aside by the (Śaiva) scripture (*āgama*)? It is answered that the purport of this statement is

¹ In other words, the impure syllables manifest the pure syllables, but they cannot convey the meaning of the words constituted of the pure syllables.

² *PauṣkaraBh* on 1.6^a, pp. 5-11.

¹ Not found in the Devakottai and Adyar editions.

² *Mataṅgapārāmeśvara*, *vidyāpāda*, 3.18-19.

³ Compare *Śivamahāpurāṇa*, *Vāyavyasamhitā*, *pūrvabhāga*, 1. 24.

⁴ Attributed to the *Mohaśūroottara* in the *Madhyārjunasiddhānta-dīpikā*, GOML ms n° R.7710, "restored from n° R.6635", p. 114.

as follows: with regard to subjects like the creation of *kalā*, etc. which are not discussed in the Veda, (the teachings of) the Veda and the Śaiva scripture (*śivāgama*) should be rendered non-conflicting from the point of view of the (Śaiva) scripture (by supplementing the teaching of the Veda with that of the Śaiva scripture) following the maxim 'the chapter on ether' (*viyadadhikaraṇanyāya*).¹ If not,² the importance given to the Vedic duty in certain treatises, attested by statements such as "Having first performed the Vedic (duty), one should then perform the Śaiva (duty)",³ and the declaration of the eminence of the teaching of the (Śaiva) scripture on account of its being the essence of Vedic teaching, by statements such as "Having taken the essence of the Veda",⁴ would be contradicted.

[119] Even if the Śaiva scripture (*śivāgama*) cannot be overruled by the Raudra scripture (*rudrāgama*) for the reasons explained above, why is it not overruled by other scriptures? Having raised the objection, [the author] replies that, in case of conflict with a scripture which is superior because it pervades, it is proper that the scripture which is pervaded (by it) and which is (as a consequence) inferior

¹ The maxim demonstrated in the chapter on ether (*viyadadhikaraṇa*) in the *Brahmasūtras* that the notion of the creation of ether, though not mentioned in certain texts, is to be admitted because it is mentioned in some other texts. So also, *kalā* and other Śaiva concepts, even though not mentioned in the Veda, are to be accepted because they are recognized in the Śaiva texts. This is the meaning of the setting aside of the Veda by the Śaiva scripture.

² That is to say, if the Veda was overruled by the Śaiva scripture, as declared in the statement, and if the Veda was not admitted as authoritative by the Śaiva scripture.

³ Cited by Umāpati also in the *patipāṭala* (*PauṣkaraBh* on 1.6^a, p. 10) without attribution: *vaidikīm tu puraskṛtya paścāc chaivīm samācāret / iti varṇāśramācārāṇ manasāpi na lamghayet / yasmin varṇe sthito dehi prāpto dīkṣām śivātmikām / tasminn eva sthito nityam śivadharmā ca pālayet*. The last three lines are cited with variants by Aghoraśiva in the *Mrgendravṛttidīpikā* (p. 11) and attributed to the *Bhārgava*.

⁴ Not traced.

should be interpreted in a different manner, and not the inverse.

All scripture (*śāstra*) is constituted unopposed to the Śaiva scripture (*śivāgama*); the Śaiva scripture (*śivaśāstra*) should not be determined (that is to say declared to be authoritative) as unopposed to another scripture, or in conformity with it; for it (namely the other scripture) is the pervaded and it (namely the Śaiva scripture) is the pervader. (77-78^a)

In case of conflict with the Śaiva scripture, *sarvām śāstram*, all scripture, Sāṃkhya, etc.; *vyavasthitam*, is constituted, means, should be constituted, as having a doctrine unopposed to it (namely the Śaiva scripture).¹ *Śivaśāstram*, the Śaiva scripture, on the other hand, when in conflict with another scripture; *na vyavasthāpyam*, should not be determined; *anyaśāstrāvirodhena*, as unopposed to another scripture, as unopposed to the Sāṃkhya and other scriptures, that is to say as having a purport different from its own; *athavā*, nor, even in case of agreement; *na vyavasthāpyam*, should not be determined; *tatsamvādatayā*, in conformity with it, Śaiva scripture should not be declared as authoritative because it has the same purport as the other scripture. [The author] explains why it is so, *tad*, etc.; *yataḥ*, for, the reason is that; *tat vyāptam*, it is pervaded, scripture like Sāṃkhya is pervaded by the Śaiva scripture because it (namely Śaiva scripture) discusses the tattvas up to prakṛti which are described there (in Sāṃkhya). Śaiva scripture on the other hand; *vyāpakam*, is the pervader, of all scriptures because it also discusses the tattvas which are not mentioned in other scriptures. It is superior to those (scrip-

¹ By interpreting 'is constituted' (*vyavasthitam*) as 'should be constituted' (*vyavasthāpanīyam*), Umāpati seems to differ from the *Pauṣkara* which states that all scriptures are unopposed to Śaiva scripture and that each scripture is authoritative with regard to its own sphere of application.

tures) since it is composed by someone who has the knowledge of greater subjects. Such is the meaning.

[120] But then, if scriptures like Sāṃkhya conflict with the Śaiva scripture, which is the ultimate authority? [The author] answers:

The authority of each scripture (*śāstra*) is only as great, O sages, as the pervasion proclaimed by the respective scripture. (78^b-79^a)

Yasya yasya hi śāstrasya, (proclaimed) by the respective scripture, composed by Cārvāka and others; yāvati vyāptih, as the pervasion, extension (vyāpana), that is, relevance (tātparya) with regard to the elements (bhūta), etc., (which are declared as the ultimate reality in the respective scripture); iṣyate, is proclaimed; tāvaty eva, only as great, only with regard to those, elements, etc.; tasya tasya, of each śāstra, Cārvāka, etc.; pramāṇam bhavet, is the authority.

But then (it may be objected that), this seems contradictory because Lokāyata and other doctrines were rejected earlier by the statement "The inferior is overruled by the successively superior",¹ whereas their authority is maintained here. It is replied that the earlier and later statements are not contradictory because the intention is as follows: when there is conflict with regard to doctrine (*vastvaṃśa*), about topics such as the origin of the universe, the nature of the individual self, of Īśvara, etc., about which an alternative stand (*vikalpa*) cannot be taken, they (namely the non-Śaiva scriptures) are overruled with regard to those aspects. But they are authoritative with regard to practice (*kriyāṃśa*) because, following the maxim 'Sacrifice (which could be performed) before or after the sunrise (according to the religious status of the performer)', an alternative to a fixed rule can be adopted according to the qualification of the agent. And this

¹ *Pauṣkara* 7.76^b.

validity of all doctrines is clearly stated in the *Sūtasamhitā*¹ and discussed by us while dealing with the validity of the (Śaiva) scripture.²

[121] [The author] introduces the next (subject) with a recapitulation of that which has been discussed so far.

Having thus explained the means of knowledge (named) verbal testimony (*āgama*), [the author] discusses the remaining (pramāṇa). (79^b)

Evam, thus, in the above manner, having explained; āgamamāne, the means of knowledge (named) verbal testimony (āgama); śiṣṭam, the remaining, [the author] discusses the pramāṇa named presumption (arthāpatti), which is the remaining of the four pramāṇas.

[122] [The author] illustrates the same.³

And it is (as follows): the description of the state of release found in other scriptures (*anyaśāstra*) leads to (the knowledge of) these (scriptures) having certainly been composed by someone who is not omniscient, for something superior to that (state of release) is taught by the Śaiva scripture (*śivaśāstra*). (80-81^a)

Tat, it, the pramāṇa named presumption (is as follows): (anyaśāstrasamsiddhamokṣatattvopadarśanam) means, the description of the state of release found in other scriptures, in Lokāyata, etc. The fact, that these groups of sentences are unaccountable without their having been composed by someone who is conversant with their meaning, leads to the presumption of an author who is conversant with their meaning. Since, śivaśāstreṇa, by the Śaiva scripture; tasmāt param kimcit bodhitam, something superior to that is instructed, the existence of a (higher) state of re-

¹ See *Sūtasamhitā*, vol. 2, 4.22.1-29.

² In *PauṣkaraBh* on 1.6^a, pp. 5-11.

³ The *Pauṣkara* does not define *arthāpatti* pramāṇa, it only gives two examples in verses 80-82.

lease is revealed by the Śaiva scripture (*tantra*); through the presumption of the definite absence of omniscience of the composers of those respective scriptures; *asarvajñāpranītatvaṃ*, (their) having been composed by someone who is not omniscient, is presumed. Such is the meaning.¹

Or (it could be explained as follows): the statement, which describes the state of release such as the attainment of the elements, etc., found in the Bauddha and other scriptures; *tasmāt param*, superior to that (state of release), such as the similarity with Śiva (*śivasāmya*), which is higher than the states of release described in the Bauddha and other scriptures; *bodhitam*, is instructed, vehemently proclaimed as the ultimate release by the Śaiva scripture; *tat*, that, the same (statement about the superior states of release in the Śaiva scripture), is inexplicable without the above mentioned scriptures' being composed by authors who are not omniscient. Therefore, *asarvajñāpranītatvaṃ*, (their) having been composed by someone who is not omniscient, is presumed; and that is the pramāṇa named presumption (*arthāpatti*). This (second) explanation brings out the relevance of the (seemingly) redundant expressions *tasmād iti param kiṃcit* and *anyaśāstrasamsiddham* of the verse.

[123] Having thus illustrated presumption from words (*śrutārthāpatti*), [the author] illustrates presumption from ex-

¹ According to this explanation, it is first presumed that śāstras are composed by authors who are conversant with their meaning (*svārthābhijñāpranītrva*), then, through the presumption of the absence of the omniscience (*asarvajñatva*) of these authors (proved by the fact that the Śaiva scripture proclaims a higher state of release), it is further presumed that these śāstras are composed by those who are not omniscient (*asarvajñāpranītatva*). This explanation could be attributed to the actual reading *tac ca* in verse 80^a. The second explanation in the commentary, which is perhaps based on the reading *yac ca*, is simpler and more direct.

perience (*drṣṭārthāpatti*), preceded by the declaration (of the subject).¹

And the means of knowledge, named presumption is illustrated in another manner. As omniscience is known from the scripture, the absence of omniscience which is experienced implies (the existence), only in the (bound) selves, of something named *paśutva* which produces that (absence of omniscience). (81^b-82)

Anyathā ca nigadyate, and is illustrated in another manner, means '*drṣṭārthāpatti* is proposed'; *drṣyamāṇam asārvajñyam*, the absence of omniscience which is experienced, the limited knowledge experienced by the (bound) self, which is omniscient by nature, is inexplicable without (the presence of) some obstructing factor; *kalpayet*, implies, some obstruction; *svopapādakam*, which produces it. *Sārvajñye sthite*, as the omniscience is known, since the omniscience of Śiva, which is never obstructed, is known; *śāstrataḥ*, from the scripture, which declares the absence of mala, etc. (in Him). Supported by the (scriptural) evidence which proclaims His omniscience, an obstruction; *paśutvākhyam*, which is named *paśutva*, is presumed to exist; *paśuḥ eva*, only in the (bound) selves.

Or (the meaning of the second half of the verse 82 is as follows): it is said that *paśutva* is presumed. But the very fact that other categories (like buddhi, elements, etc.) lack consciousness, proves that the absence of omniscience exists in the (conscious) selves;² why is an obstructing factor named

¹ The classification of *arthāpatti* into *śrutārthāpatti* and *drṣṭārthāpatti* is introduced by Umāpati, who also supplies the definition of *arthāpatti*. Jñānaprakāśa does not make this distinction, for according to him, verses 81^b-82 merely give another example of *arthāpatti* (*PauṣkaraV*, p. 907). He does not give any definition of *arthāpatti*.

² In other words, since omniscience belongs to the selves (which are sentient, and not to buddhi, etc. which are insentient), the absence of omniscience also belongs to the selves. The presumption of an entity

paśutva presumed? This is explained, *paśuṣv eva śāstrataḥ sārvaññye sthite*, since omniscience indeed exists in the selves according to the scripture; *asārvaññyam*, the absence of omniscience, which is perceived, implies in the selves (*paśutva* which obstructs their omniscience).¹ Thus, it should be understood that the definition of presumption, 'Arthāpatti is the presumption, from the cognition of something which is inexplicable, of something which explains it', is implicitly stated.

[124] But then, (it may be objected that *arthāpatti* is not an independent pramāṇa because) the inference "The scripture (*śāstra*) which describes the state of release recognized by it, is composed by someone who is acquainted with its meaning; because it is a scripture; like any other scripture", supported by contradiction from the scriptural statements which instruct another doctrine, namely that there is a superior state (of release), also proves the absence of the omniscience of its author (although it is not the thing to be proved by that inference);² just as the inference "The earth, etc. have a creator; because they are created" proves the oneness of the creator although it (namely oneness) does not form part of the delimitor of 'the state of being the thing to be proved' (*sādhyatā*) by that inference. Thus, since the cognition pro-

named *paśutva*, which is said to produce that absence of omniscience, is redundant.

¹ According to both the explanations, the absence of omniscience of the selves, which is inexplicable, leads to the presumption of *paśutva* which explains that absence. According to the first interpretation, the presumed obstructing factor exists only in the selves because the scripture declares that Śiva's omniscience is never obstructed. According to the second interpretation, the obstructing factor is presumed to exist in the selves because the selves, though omniscient as proclaimed by the scripture, experience limited knowledge.

² In other words, the inference which proves that a scripture has an author who is conversant with its meaning, also proves (supported by the presence of another scripture containing greater knowledge) that the same author (whose scripture contains lesser knowledge) is not omniscient. Hence *arthāpatti* need not be accepted as a distinct pramāṇa.

duced from presumption could be derived through inference, it (namely presumption) need not be admitted as an independent pramāṇa. [The author] wards off the above objection:

And it is different from (the pramāṇa named) inference because the subject of the two is different. (83")

Dvayoh, of the two, of *anumāna* and *arthāpatti*; because the subject of the two is different, that is, since the results arising from the two pramāṇas are distinct; *tat bhinnam*, it is different, *arthāpatti* pramāṇa is different from *anumāna* pramāṇa. The results obtained from it (that is, the above *arthāpatti*) cannot be obtained through the proposed inference because a feature which is not delimited by 'the state of being the thing to be proved' of an inference cannot become the subject (*viśaya*) of that inference;¹ because the cognition of an entity through its previous cognition (*upanītabhāna*) is not admitted with regard to inference;² and because that which is to be explained (*upapādyā*) and that which explains (*upapādaka*) are inverted in the analysis of the two (processes).³ It should be understood that the cognition of one-

¹ The thing to be proved of the above inference is 'being an author who is conversant with its meaning' (*svārthābhijñāpranētrtva*). The proposed *arthāpatti* is the means to the cognition of 'being composed by an author who is not omniscient' (*asarvaññāpranētatva*). This cannot be proved by the above inference because it is not specified as the thing to be proved by that inference.

² According to some Naiyāyikas, *upanītabhāna* is the awareness of an object as it was previously experienced, like the olfactory perception of fragrance in the visual perception of a piece of sandalwood as 'I see fragrant sandalwood'. See *Nyāyakośa*, p. 163. This awareness is admitted in the case of perception because an object, which is not present in front of the senses, could be said to be perceived through extraordinary perception. But it is not admitted in inference because something, which is not the thing to be proved by an inference, cannot be proved by that inference. Therefore, the absence of omniscience (*asarvaññāpranētatva*) cannot be brought within the range of the above inference through *upanītabhāna*.

³ While *anumāna* proceeds from that which proves (for example, smoke) to that which is to be proved (fire), *arthāpatti* progresses from

ness (of the creator in the above inference) also is known (not through inference, but) through another pramāṇa.¹

[125] Thus having discussed in detail the tattvas, which form part of the six categories, and pramāṇas (the means to know these categories),² (the author) explains the nature and order of the dissolution of the creation.

The withdrawal of the objects, thus known through the means of knowledge, should be admitted to be in the inverse order due to the relation of cause and effect. The dissolution of the cause cannot take place prior to that of the effect; therefore (dissolution) beginning with the last effect is appropriate; (and) the earth (element) is the first to undergo dissolution. (83^b-85^a)

Evam, thus, in the manner explained above; *pramāṇa-siddhānām*, known through the means of knowledge, such as verbal testimony; *arthānām*, of objects, realities and their evolutes from *śiva* tattva to the earth element³; *upa-samhārah eṣṭavyaḥ*, withdrawal should be admitted, dissolution should be accepted (to be in the inverse order).

[126] But then (it may be said that), there is no evidence whatsoever to prove the withdrawal of the entire creation; on the contrary, there is proof for a beginningless continuous succession of the created entities. It is proved by inferences such as "Day and night are preceded by day and night; be-

that which is to be explained (for example, the absence of omniscience) to that which explains (*paśutva*).

¹ Through *śabda* according to Umāpati. See *PauṣkaraBh* on 1.93^a, pp. 62-63.

² Tattvas were described in the previous six chapters and pramāṇas in the present chapter.

³ While *śiva* tattva is the first and the most subtle substance produced from bindu in the pure realm, the earth element is the last and the grossest element (*bhūta*) produced from *māyā* in the impure realm. See *Pauṣkara* 2.34^b-35^a and 6.279^b-280^a.

cause they are day and night; as recognized (by all)",¹ and "Brāhmaṇa and other classes (*varṇa*) are preceded by brāhmaṇa and other classes; because they are brāhmaṇa and other classes; as recognized (by all)".² Moreover, pitilessness would befall the highly compassionate Śiva if He were to dissolve the entire universe created by Him (for the benefit of the bound selves).

[127] This (objection) is answered. Evidence which proves the dissolution of the universe is not lacking, for the inference "The continuous series of effects (consisting of objects) like pot, which is the subject of discussion, ceases to exist completely at some time or other; because it is a continuous series; like the continuous series of a flame" and the inference "The two *māyās*³ existing simultaneously, are subject to the cessation of the succession of their effects at some time or other; because they are material cause; like threads" prove it. This (second) inference does not apply to the successive destruction of effects (which takes place in the pure and impure realms) because the adjective 'simultaneously' that qualifies the subject ('two *māyās*') also qualifies the thing to be proved ('subject to the cessation of the succession of their effects').⁴ The invariable connection

¹ As day and night are uninterruptedly preceded by day and night, there cannot be a period during which day and night did not exist; this proves that the universe exists continuously.

² Since only the person who is born of brāhmaṇa parents can be a brāhmaṇa and since there is continuity of brāhmaṇa-hood in the world, it is proved that there was never a period during which brāhmaṇa parents did not exist; this also proves that the world exists continuously.

³ Since *māyā*, which is the material cause of the impure realm, is one and eternal (*nityaikā*, *Pauṣkara* 3.2^a), the reference here to a second *māyā* should be to bindu, the material cause of the pure realm, which is sometimes named *mahāmāyā*. See, for example, *Siddhāntasārāvalivyākhyā* on 27^b: *māyādvayam māyeti bindur iti aśuddhaśuddha-jagadupādānavayam*; *Raurava*, *vidyāpāda*, 3.28^b: *māyopari mahāmāyā sarvakāraṇakāraṇam*, etc.

⁴ The above inference would be said to be defective if it were to prove the successive destruction of the creation of *māyā* and bindu, which is

between day and night and the precedence of day and night by day and night (mentioned above) does not obstruct (these inferences) (because the inference comprising of that invariable connection is defective). For, if the subject (*pakṣa*) of that inference were the day and night of the present time, the defect of 'proving that which is already proved' (*siddhasādhana*) would arise;¹ and if the subject were the day and night prior to the creation, the defect of 'the non-establishment of the reason due to (the non-existence of) the substrate (in which the reason could exist)' (*āśrayāsiddhi*) would result.² Moreover, it (namely the reason 'precedence of day and night') is contradicted by verbal testimony.³

It should not be said (by those who do not admit dissolution) that brāhmaṇa-hood, etc.⁴ would not be assured if brāhmaṇa and other classes at the time of the creation were not preceded by brāhmaṇa and other classes; for it is accomplished by a particular unseen potency (*adrṣṭa*), as proved in the case of Viśvāmitra and others.⁵ And this does not lead to the defect of '(an effect) not following (its cause)' (*ananu-*

admitted by all. It is therefore specified that the inference intends to prove not the common destruction of objects, but the simultaneous destruction of everything in the pure and impure realms, namely the great dissolution of all creation.

¹ Because everyone perceives that day and night precede day and night.

² As the day and night, which constitute the subject (*pakṣa*) of the inference, do not exist prior to the creation, the reason ('because they are day and night') is devoid of a substrate (the subject) in which it could exist and in which it could prove the presence of the thing to be proved (*sādhya*).

³ Since scriptures declare that day and night are interrupted during the great dissolution.

⁴ 'Etc.' should refer to scorpion-hood, etc.

⁵ It is said that Viśvāmitra, who was a ksatriya because he was born of ksatriya parents, obtained brāhmaṇa-hood through the performance of austerities. It is also believed that although all scorpions are born of parent-scorpions, the very first scorpion came into existence out of a heap of cow-dung due to a particular *adrṣṭa*.

gama)¹ because unseen potency is the cause everywhere; and the (causal) following exists between a particular unseen potency and brāhmaṇa, for as in the case of cow-dung and scorpion, the potency is the same.²

[128] It should not be said that the simultaneous dissolution of the universe would prove the pitilessness (of Śiva); it is intended to give respite to the selves exhausted by transmigration in cycles of existence,³ to restore the inclination to create to the two māyās whose powers are rendered faint due to repeated production of effects, and to allow the karma (of the selves) to ripen. It is said in the *Mrgendra*, "Having withdrawn the apparatus of experience, having merged (it) into (its) cause and having seized the same (cause) along with the selves (which reside in it), (Śiva) remains for the repose of the selves wearied of transmigration, because He is the benefactor of all beings".⁴ The meaning is, having dissolved the apparatus of experience comprising of bodies, the means (of experience), worlds (filled with objects of experience), etc. into the cause which is māyā; and having seized, that is to say having dominated it together with the selves whose presence therein is declared by the statement, "(The abode of the *sakala*, *pralayākala* and *vijñānakevala* selves is respectively) at the beginning, in the

¹ If brāhmaṇa-hood were produced by an *adrṣṭa* at the time of the creation and subsequently by birth from brāhmaṇa parents, the causal relation between birth from brāhmaṇa parents and brāhmaṇa-hood would be variable, for the effect (namely brāhmaṇa-hood) does not invariably follow its cause (which is birth from brāhmaṇa parents).

² In other words, the birth of a brāhmaṇa from brāhmaṇa parents at present is caused by the same *adrṣṭa* which gave rise to the first brāhmaṇa at the time of the creation; just as the birth of a scorpion from parent-scorpions at present is due to the same *adrṣṭa* which caused the very first scorpion to appear from cow-dung. Thus, the causal relation is not disturbed.

³ See Pauṣkara 5.69^b-70^a: *kiṃ tu bhogeṣu khinnānām viśrāntyarthaṃ maheśvaraḥ // svecchayaivopasamhāre niyamaṃ vidadhāti sah*.

⁴ *Mrgendra*, *vidyāpāda*, 4.13-14^a.

interior and at the end of māyā",¹ the Lord remains (without inducing further activity) for the respite of the individual selves. It is said by Trilocanaśivācārya in the *Siddhāntasārāvali*, "Śambhu brings about the great dissolution for the repose of the selves weary (of transmigration), to allow the totality of karma to ripen, and to restore the power of māyā".² Bhoja too said, "The Lord undertakes the great dissolution out of compassion for the sake of all beings tired of cycles of existence, for their own repose, (and) for the ripening of (their) karma".³

[129] And that dissolution is to be admitted, *vyatyayena*, in the inverse order, in an order contrary to that of the creation, that is, in the reverse order. [The author] explains why it is so, *kāryakāraṇabhāvataḥ*, due to the relation of effect and cause, since they constitute that which inheres (namely the effect) (*upādeya*) and (its) material cause (*upādāna*).⁴ But then, why is dissolution in the regular order not admitted between those which are connected as the material cause and as that which inheres in it (namely the effect) ?

¹ *Pauṣkara* 4.6^b. The location of the selves in different regions, however, is metaphorical because they are all-pervasive. They are said to be confined to a particular realm according to the type of bondage which exists in them. See *Pauṣkara* 4.7^a: *avasthānaṃ ca bandhena lakṣyate 'nor vibhutvataḥ*. Umāpati explains that the beginning of māyā means the sphere of tattvas between the earth element and *kalā*, the interior of māyā signifies the māyā which has withdrawn its creation, and the end of māyā is its upper part. The *Pauṣkara* specifies that the *vijñānakevala* selves (which are free from karma and māyā), cannot be said to be situated at the end of māyā. It only means that they remain between the impure realm, which they have transcended, and the pure realm which they will join when initiated. See *Pauṣkara* 4.9: *bhokṣyamāṇatayā tasya bhuktatvenetarasya ca / arthād eva sthitā madhye proktā vijñānakevalāḥ*.

² Compare *Siddhāntasārāvali* 27^a.

³ *Tattvapraśāsa* 70-71^a.

⁴ *Upādeya* is that which exists in a substance by inherence; a piece of cloth is an *upādeya* because it inheres in the threads which are its cause. *Upādāna* is that in which an effect is produced while being connected to it by inherence; threads are *upādāna* because the cloth, which is produced by them, exists in them by inherence. *Upādāna* is also known as the *samavāyikāraṇa* (intimate cause).

[The author] answers, *na hi*, etc., *kāryopasaṃhārād ādau*, prior to the withdrawal of the effects, before the dissolution of that which inheres; *kāraṇasaṃhrtiḥ*, the withdrawal of the cause, the dissolution of the material cause is not proper; for, prior to the dissolution of effect which consists of its (namely the effect's) remaining as a potency in its material cause, the dissolution of the material cause cannot take place; moreover, it would render the effect baseless. Others also admit that the destruction of effect, brought about (in certain cases) by the destruction of the non-intimate cause (*asamavāyikāraṇa*),¹ exists in the material cause; since the destruction of effect in every case could be explained by the destruction of the non-intimate cause, there is no evidence to prove the destruction of effect through the destruction of the intimate cause (*samavāyikāraṇa*). It should be noted that this (notion), namely that a material cause is that from which the effect is produced, where it exists and into which it merges (on dissolution), also agrees with the nature of material cause described in the Vedic scripture (*śrutyāgama*). *Tad antimāt kāryāt*, therefore from the final effect, the withdrawal of the creation, beginning with the ultimate effect, is appropriate for the reasons discussed above. [The author] explains that very process of dissolution beginning with the last effect, *prthivyādi*, etc.; the

¹ Non-intimate cause (*asamavāyikāraṇa*) is that which connects an effect and its intimate cause (*samavāyikāraṇa*) while inhering in one of them; for example, conjunction between threads (*tantusamyoga*) is a non-intimate cause because, while existing in the threads (*samavāyikāraṇa*, the material cause), it connects them to the cloth (*kārya*, the effect). Some Naiyāyikas hold that the destruction of an effect is brought about by the destruction of its material cause (*samavāyikāraṇa*), except in the case of the binary (which is an effect because it is produced by the conjunction of two atoms). The destruction of the binary is caused not by the destruction of the atoms (which are eternal according to them) but by the destruction of conjunction between them (*asamavāyikāraṇanāśa*). Some other Naiyāyikas hold that it is simpler to admit that the destruction of every effect is brought about by the destruction of the non-intimate cause. See *Tarkadīpikā*, p. 10.

earth (element) is that whose destruction takes place first, in other words, it is the foremost to dissolve.

[130] [The author] gradually explains the process of dissolution in the inverse order, with illustrations:

The elements merge into the subtle elements; the subtle elements and the senses, together with mind, into egoity; that (egoity) into intellect; that (intellect) into *guṇas*; those *guṇas* into prakṛti; that (prakṛti), as well as the group of five tattvas beginning with *rāga* (merge) into *māyā*; it (that is, *māyā*), however, is declared to be eternal. (85^b-87^a)

Tanmātreṣu, etc.; *bhūtāni*, the elements, earth, etc. merge respectively into the subtle elements, smell, etc.¹ It should be noted that all (the sentences) are connected with the above verb (namely 'merge'). *Tanmātrāṇy api*, the subtle elements also, smell, etc.; *indriyāṇi*, the senses, the five senses of action beginning with the sense of speech,² the five senses of cognition beginning with the sense of smell;³ *manas cāpi*, and mind, merge into *ahamkṛtau*, egoity. And here the disposition is that the subtle elements merge into the egoity predominated by *tamas*, the senses of action into the egoity predominated by *rajas*, and the senses of cognition and mind into the egoity predominated by *sattva*; *sā*, that,

¹ The five elements, ether, air, fire, water and earth, merge into the five subtle elements, sound, contact, form, taste and smell, from which they are produced. See Pauṣkara 6.279^b-280^a: *mahābhūtāni jāyante kramāt tanmātrapañcakāt // ākāśaṃ pavanas tejas toyam bhūr itī saṃjñayā*.

² The senses of speaking, walking, holding, excreting and procreating. See Pauṣkara 6.195^a: *karmendriyāṇi vākpādapaniguhayagudāni ca*.

³ The senses of smelling, tasting, seeing, touching and hearing. See Pauṣkara 6.158: *buddhindriyāṇi kathyante śrotraṃ tvak cakṣur eva ca / jihvā ghrāṇaṃ ca pañceti suprasiddhāni tāni ca*.

egoity; *matau*, in intellect, that is, in the *buddhi* tattva;¹ *sā*, that, intellect; *guṇeṣu*, in *guṇas*, in *guṇa* tattva; the plural number here (in the word *guṇeṣu*) only signifies that *guṇas* are divided (into three) and not that they are multiple tattvas since the oneness of the (*guṇa*) tattva was proved by the text "Since they produce effects conjointly".² *Te guṇāḥ*, the *guṇas*, the *guṇa* tattva (merges into prakṛti); *sā*, that, prakṛti and, *rāgādyam tattvapañcakam*, the group of five tattvas beginning with *rāga*, (the group) consisting of *kāla*, *niyati*, *kalā*, *vidyā* and *rāga*;³ *māyāyam layam āyānti*, merge into *māyā*. The dissolution of prakṛti and the group of *rā-*

¹ *Buddhi* tattva is that state of *guṇa* tattva in which the *sattvagūṇa* is predominant. See Pauṣkara 6.42^b-43^a: *rajastamobhyām nyagbhūtā vṛttis tattvena cotkāṭā // sā buddhir uditā tanre viṣayādhyavasāyini*.

² Not traced, but the expression in the commentary seems to suggest that it is from the Pauṣkara. *Guṇa* tattva is the state of equilibrium of the *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* *guṇas*. See Pauṣkara 6.29^a: *sattvādayas samāvasthām prāptās tattvaṃ guṇātmacam*. The difference between the prakṛti, *guṇa* and *buddhi* tattvas is as follows: when the three *guṇas* are in a state of equilibrium but merged indistinctly, prakṛti is known as *pradhāna*, *avyakta* or *prakṛti* tattva. When they are separated from each other in that state of equilibrium, it is called *guṇa* tattva and finally, when the equilibrium is disturbed by the predominance of the *sattvagūṇa*, it is known as *buddhi* tattva. See Pauṣkara 6.35^b-36: *avyaktaḥ guṇasāmyam tu pradhānam paripatthyate // vibhaktaguṇasāmyam tu guṇatattvam ihoditam / vibhaktaguṇavaiśāmyam tattvaṃ buddhyādikam dvijāḥ*.

³ Since this is the order in which they were created, their dissolution in the inverse order begins with *rāga*. For an order different from these two, see Pauṣkara 5.1^b: *kalā vidyā ca rāgaś ca kālo niyatir eva ca*, in which order these tattvas help the self to regain, though partially, its capacities to know and act. Of these, *kalā* first appears from *māyā* and *vidyā* emerges from *kalā* (Pauṣkara 5.8); subsequently *rāga* emerges from *kalā*. (Pauṣkara 5.26). Umāpati explains (Pauṣkara Bh on 5.1^b-2^a, p. 305) that *kāla* is mentioned first when the creation of the universe is examined because creation takes place in time. But it is mentioned after *kalā*, etc., when bondage is discussed, because *kāla* and *niyati* can direct the experience of the self only when its faculties to act, know and desire are activated respectively by *kalā*, *vidyā* and *rāga*. See Pauṣkara 5.47 and 5.23^b-24^a.

ga, etc.¹ also take place in an order inverse to that of the creation described earlier.² Māyā, however, does not disappear because it is eternal. [The author] explains, *sā tu*, etc. It is proved to be eternal on the basis of reasons such as, its being the substrate of karma during dissolution, etc.³

[131] So also, the pure path⁴ merges into *kuṇḍalinī* (that is, bindu)⁵ in the inverse order. [The author] explains, *māyopari*, etc.:

The pure path, which exists beyond māyā, merges into bindu. Bindu, which is the (material) cause of *kalā*, etc., being (the domain) governed by Śiva, remains forever in the presence of Śiva as the sphere of (His) activity. The entire universe comes into existence again, beginning with bindu. (87^b-89^a)

Māyopari viśuddhādhvā, the pure path, which exists beyond māyā, consisting of tattvas such as *vidyā* tattva and their evolutes; *bindau pralayaṃ rccanti*, merge into bindu, dissolve in the reversed order. Bindu, which is eternal

¹ While *kalā*, etc. are the subtle creation of māyā, prakṛti is its gross creation. The self is first bound by the subtle creation and subsequently by the gross creation. See *Pauṣkara* 3.60^b-62^a.

² In the *pumstvapāṭala*, the sixth chapter of the *Pauṣkara*.

³ It is presumed that only māyā can be the substrate of the karma of the selves when the creation is withdrawn. Bindu cannot receive karma because it is beyond the realm of karma; nor the self, for the conscious self would become inert if it were to own an inert substance like karma. The inference, "Māyā is eternal; because it is the material cause of infinite effects; that which does not produce infinite effects, is also not eternal; like threads (which produce finite effects like cloth)", also proves that māyā is eternal. See *Pauṣkara* 3.27-29^a.

⁴ Umāpati explains that *varṇas*, *padas*, *mantras*, *kalās* and bindu-tattvas (from *śiva* tattva to *vidyā* tattva) including the worlds contained in them, are known as the pure path. It is considered pure because it produces happiness untainted with sorrow. See *Pauṣkara* on 1.10, p. 15: *kuṇḍalinyā upādānabhūtāyāḥ varṇapadamantrakalāḥ śivatattvādīni vidyātattvāntāni tadgatabhuvanāni ca śuddhādhvapadenocyante śuddhatvaṃ ca duḥkhāsambhinnasukhaheturtena*.

⁵ According to the *Pauṣkara* 2.1^b, bindu, the material cause of the pure path, is also named *kuṇḍalinī*: *sa bindur iti mantavyaḥ saiva kuṇḍalinī matā*.

like māyā, does not disappear but exists as a power seized (*parigrahaśakti*) by Śiva.¹ [The author] explains, *bindu*, etc. *Kalādisaktyātmā*, the (material) cause of *kalā*, etc., the subtle form of these; *kalā* here refers to *nivṛtti* and other *kalās*, and 'etc.' refers to the tattvas and their evolutes;² *śivādhiṣṭhitavigrahaḥ*, being (the domain) governed by Śiva, it is governed by Śiva because the authority of Ananteśa is limited to (the region of) māyā;³ *śivasya agrataḥ*, in the presence of Śiva, who is its governor; *viśayātmatayā*, as the sphere of (His) activity, as that which is seized (by Him); *nityam āste*, remains forever. But then, does not creation again take place after the great dissolution? [The author] answers, *punaḥ*, etc.; *punaḥ*, again, after the dissolution, in accordance with the maturity of the karma of

¹ Although bindu is said to be a power of Śiva, it is different from His own powers which are his faculties of cognition and action that inhere in Him. They are considered to form His limbs because they perform the task which the organs of a body perform, and they are said to be His mantras because they represent His different aspects. See *Pauṣkara* 1.63 and 1.39. Bindu on the other hand, being insentient, does not inhere in Śiva. It is considered to be seized (*parigrahyā*) by Him because it is the material cause of the pure path in which Śiva's powers provoke activity. It is said to be pure since its creation is free from māyā and karma. See *Pauṣkara* 2.10-12 and 1.10^b. Mantras produced from bindu under the impulsion of Śiva's powers too do not inhere in Śiva because they are as insentient as their material cause. Moreover, they are non-eternal because they lapse into bindu when it withdraws its creation.

² The reference here is not to the *kalā*, *vidyā*, etc. which arise from māyā and constitute the bondage of the selves in the impure path. These are the five *kalās* (*nivṛtti*, *pratiṣṭhā*, *vidyā*, *śānti* and *śāntyaṭīta* which are cities in the pure path and the supports of tattvas in the mixed and impure paths) and the four tattvas (*śiva*, *sadāśiva*, *īśvara* and *vidyā*) which are created out of bindu as the spheres of pleasure and governance for the selves in the pure path (*rudrānu*). They constitute the realms in which the selves exhaust their mala to obtain liberation. See *Pauṣkara* 2.31^b-35 and 2.2^b-3^a. Besides this material creation, bindu also brings forth speech which permeates the pure and impure paths. See *Pauṣkara* 2.15-16, 8.5-6^b and 7.72^b.

³ Umāpati explains that Śiva is said to be the overseer in the pure path, Ananta in the mixed path and Śrikanṭha in the impure path. See *Pauṣkara* 6.18 and 6.30^a, and Umāpati's commentary on them.

the selves; *pravartate*, comes into existence, the entire universe comes into existence in the regular order, beginning with bindu.

Thus ends the *pramāṇapaṭala*, the seventh (chapter) of the jñānapāda of Umāpatiśivācārya's¹ commentary on the *Pauṣkarasaṃhitā*.

TEXT

¹ See the introduction for a discussion on the identification of the author of the *Pauṣkarabhāṣya*.

पौष्करप्रमाणपटलभाष्यम्

[1] अथ प्रमाणपटलः प्रारभ्यते । अथेदानीं षट्स्वपि पदार्थेषु प्रमाणेद्देशलक्षणपरीक्षादिभिर्निरूपितेषु, तत्र प्रमाणस्वरूपे वादिविप्रतिपत्तिदर्शनात्, तदनिर्णये च प्रमाणतदाभासविवेकाभावेन प्रमेयनिरूपणस्याप्यकृतप्रायत्वात्, तज्जिज्ञासवः वृत्तानुवादपुरःसरं प्रमाणस्वरूपं पृच्छन्ति ऋषयः ।

भगवन् देवदेवेश भक्तानुग्रहतत्पर ।

पदार्थाषट् समुद्दिष्टाः कृपयानेकयुक्तिभिः ॥ १ ॥

अधुना श्रोतुमिच्छामः प्रमाणानि कृपानिधे ।

यत्स्वरूपमविज्ञाय प्रमेयो व्यर्थ इष्यते ॥ २ ॥

तस्मादस्माकमीशान तानि वक्तुमिहार्हसि ।

भगवन् ! षाड्गुण्यपरिपूर्ण ! देवदेवाः ब्रह्मविष्णवादयः तेषामपि ईश नियामक । भक्तानुग्रहतत्पर ! यद्यपि सृष्ट्यादिष्वपि तात्पर्यं तथापि तेषामप्यनुग्रहार्थत्वादनुग्रह एव परं तात्पर्यमिति भावः । अथवा भक्तेषु परिपालनज्ञानोपदेशादिरूपोऽनुग्रहविशेषः तत्तात्पर्यकेत्यर्थः । पदार्थाः पत्यादिकारकान्ताः षट्पदार्थाः समुद्दिष्टाः सम्यक् निरूपिता इत्यर्थः । यद्यपि कारकपदार्थाः पृथक् न निरूपिताः, तथापि क्रियापादे दीक्षायाः सप्रपञ्चं कारकपदार्थरूपाया निरूपितत्वात्, अत्र च पतिपदार्थनिरूपणे पशुपदार्थनिरूपणे च “भुक्तिमुक्तिरूपिणः फला” इत्यनेन “दीक्षैव मोचयेत्पाशान्” इत्यनेन च तत्तत्

व्याप्तेः; तत्र रक्तरूपस्योत्पत्त्यमानतया तदत्यन्ताभावस्य तत्रानङ्गीकारेण तादृशधर्मप्रकारकत्वात् ।

[6] नापि विशेष्यनिष्ठसंसर्गाभावाप्रतियोगिधर्मप्रकारकत्वम् । रक्तं बदरफलमित्यादिप्रमायामव्याप्तेः; तस्याः प्रमायाः बदरफलनिष्ठप्रागभावप्रतियोगिरक्तिमरूपधर्मप्रकारकत्वात् । घटपटावितिसमूहालंबनप्रमायाः घटपटनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगिपटत्वघटत्वप्रकारकतया तत्राव्याप्तेः । संयोगप्रमायामव्याप्तेः ।

[7] नाप्यर्थाव्यभिचारित्वम् । तत्राव्यभिचारित्वपदस्यार्थानधिकरणावृत्तित्वार्थकत्वे घटाद्यनधिकरणबुद्धौ तदवृत्तेर्वर्तमानत्वात् अव्याप्तिः; अर्थसंबन्धानधिकरणावृत्तित्वार्थकत्वे संशयविपर्ययादेरप्यर्थसंबन्धाधिकरणबुद्धिवृत्तित्वात् तदनधिकरणावृत्तित्वात् अतिव्याप्तिः ।

[8] नापि विशेष्यवृत्तिधर्मप्रकारकत्वम् । वह्निगुञ्जापुञ्जयोः इमौ वह्नी इति भ्रमे इमौ गुञ्जापुञ्जवह्नी इति व्यत्यस्तभ्रमे चातिव्याप्तेः ।

[9] नापि प्रकारानाश्रयाविशेष्यकत्वम् । समूहालंबनप्रमायामव्याप्तेः ।

[10] नापि तद्विशेष्यकत्वे सति तत्प्रकारकत्वम् । अत्र घटत्वमिति प्रमायामव्याप्तेः; तत्र घटवद्विशेष्यकत्वाभावात् । घटत्वे घट इति भ्रमे अतिव्याप्तेः । तस्माद्यथार्थकत्वं निर्वक्तुमशक्यमिति चेत्,

[11] अत्रोच्यते । स्वविरोधिधर्मानवच्छेदेनोल्लिख्यमानतत्तत्प्रकारतत्तत्संबन्धवद्विशेष्यकत्वावच्छेदेन तत्तत्प्रकारकत्वं यथार्थत्वम् ।

[12] स्वविरोधिधर्मानवच्छेदेनेति विशेषणप्रयोजनं त्यग्रावच्छेदेन कपिसंयोगवद्विशेष्यके मूले कपिसंयोग इति ज्ञाने अतिव्याप्तिनिवारणम् । न चैतदतिव्याप्तिनिवारणार्थं स्ववृत्त्यवच्छेदकधर्मावच्छेदेनेत्येवास्तु विरोधिपदसहितं नञ्पदं व्यर्थमिति वाच्यम् । वृक्षः कपिसंयोगीति अवच्छेदकमात्राविषयके ज्ञाने अव्याप्तिनिरासार्थत्वात् । उल्लिख्यमानेति विशेषणदानाच्च साक्षात्संबन्धविषयके लोहितः स्फटिकः इति भ्रमे परंपरासंबन्धवद्विशेष्यकत्वप्रयुक्ता अतिव्याप्तिर्निरस्ता ।

[13] संबन्धवद्विशेष्यकत्वावच्छेदेन तत्तत्प्रकारकत्वमित्युक्त्या च अत्र घटत्वमिति ज्ञाने अव्याप्तिर्निरस्ता । घटानाश्रयघटत्वविशेष्यकत्वेन घटरूपप्रकारवद्विशेष्यकत्वाभावेऽपि घटसंबन्धवद्विशेष्यकत्वस्य तत्र विद्यमानत्वात् । न चेदं रजतमिति भ्रमे अतिव्याप्तिः; रजतत्वसंबन्धवद्रजतविशेष्यकत्वाभावात् शुक्तेरेव तत्र विशेष्यत्वात् ।

[14] अवच्छेदेन तत्प्रकारकत्वमित्युक्त्या व्यत्यासभ्रमे अतिव्याप्तिः प्रक्षिप्ता । तस्मिन् गुञ्जापुञ्जविशेष्यकत्वावच्छेदेन वह्नित्वप्रकारकत्वं, वह्निविशेष्यकत्वावच्छेदेन च गुञ्जापुञ्जत्वप्रकारकत्वं, न तु तत्तत्संबन्धवद्विशेष्यकत्वावच्छेदेन तत्तत्प्रकारकत्वम् । एतद्विज्ञानत्वमेव भ्रमलक्षणमिति द्रष्टव्यम् ।

[15] इदं च बुद्धिवृत्तिगतं यथार्थत्वरूपप्रामाण्यं तु स्वतः एव मनसा गृह्यते न तु परतः। विषयावच्छेदलक्षणं संविद्वत् प्रामाण्यं स्वप्रकाशरूपया संविदा गृह्यते।

[16] तस्य बुद्धिवृत्तिगतयथार्थत्वरूपप्रामाण्यस्य स्वतो-
ग्राह्यत्वन्नाम बाधानवतारकालीनस्वाश्रयगोचरयावल्लौकि-
कप्रत्यक्षग्राह्यत्वम्।

[17] इदं च परतस्त्ववादिनः प्रति साधनीयम्। बाधानव-
तारकालीनेतिविशेषणेन यत्र रजते नेदं रजतमिति बाधाव-
तारस्तत्र रजतज्ञानगोचरप्रत्यक्षेण प्रामाण्याग्रहणात् बाध
इति दूषणं निरस्तम्। स्वाश्रयगोचरेत्यनेन घटज्ञानगतप्रामा-
ण्यस्य पटज्ञानगोचरप्रत्यक्षेणाग्रहणात् बाधो निरस्तः। याव-
दितिविशेषणाभावे च ज्ञानान्तरोपनीतस्थले नैयायिकेनापि
मनसा प्रामाण्यग्रहस्वीकारात् सिद्धसाधनं स्यात्। तन्निवृत्त्य-
र्थं यावदिति। प्रमेतिसामान्यलक्षणादिजन्यज्ञानविषयत्वमा-
दाय सिद्धसाधनव्यावृत्त्यर्थं लौकिकप्रत्यक्षेति।

[18] प्रामाण्यस्य स्वतस्त्वे प्रमाणमनुव्यवसायसामग्र्येव।
तथा हि स्ववृत्तिवर्तमानज्ञानगोचरत्वमेव तद्गोचरज्ञानस्य
लौकिकप्रत्यक्षस्य। तादृशं च यदा उत्पद्यते तदा स्वविषयी-
भूतज्ञानोपनीतं विशेषणं विशेष्यमिव च तत्संबन्धमप्यवगाह-
मानमेवोत्पद्यते। अन्यथा इदं रजततया जानामीति पुरोव-
र्तिनि रजतत्वस्य प्रकारतया भानं न स्यात्; भासमानवैशि-
ष्ट्यप्रतियोगित्वस्यैव प्रकारत्वरूपत्वात्।

[19] ज्ञानविषयतया तद्वत्त्वस्य ग्रहेऽपि स्वातन्त्र्येण न ग्रह
इति चेत्, तर्हि अनुमितौ प्रामाण्यावगमोऽपि नैयायिकस्य

विरुद्ध्येत; जलज्ञानं प्रमा समर्थप्रवृत्तिजनकत्वादित्यत्रापि
ज्ञानविषयतया तस्य गृह्यमाणत्वात् स्वातन्त्र्येण ग्रहणं न
स्यात्।

[20] ननु प्रामाण्यस्य स्वतः एव गृह्यमाणत्वे ज्ञाने प्रामाण्य-
स्य संदेहो न स्यात्; धर्मिज्ञानेन तद्वत्प्रामाण्यस्यापि गृहीत-
त्वात्, धर्मिज्ञानानुदये च कारणाभावेन संशयस्यैवानुदयप्रसं-
गात्, धर्मिज्ञानेन प्रामाण्यस्याग्रहे च स्वतस्त्वभंगापत्तेः इति
चेत्,

[21] न। ज्ञाने दोषजन्यत्वसंशयादेव संशयोपपत्तेः। अन्य-
था तवापि मते अप्रामाण्यसंदेहो न स्यात्; अप्रामाण्यसंदेहस्य
तद्वत्त्वाभावसंशयपर्यवसन्नतया तद्वत्त्वग्राहिणा अध्यवसायेन
प्रतिबन्धात्। न च वाच्यं संदेहात् पूर्वं व्यवसायनाशात्
प्रतिबन्धकाभावेन संशय उत्पद्यत इति; विरोधिनिश्चयस्येव
तज्जनिताप्रमुष्टसंस्कारस्यापि संशयप्रतिबन्धकत्वात्। अन्य-
था निश्चितेऽर्थे तृतीयक्षणे संशयापत्तेः। किंच दोषजन्यत्वस्य
संशयाप्रयोजकत्वे दूरस्थजलादिज्ञान इव करतलामलकादि-
ज्ञानेऽपि प्रामाण्यसंदेहस्य तदाहितार्थसंदेहस्य चापत्तेश्च।

[22] किंच धर्मिज्ञानस्य संशयजनकत्वमेव न स्वीक्रियते
येन प्रामाण्यसंदेहो न स्यात्। न च वाच्यं धर्मिज्ञानस्य संश-
याजनकत्वे पथिगच्छतो नानावृक्षेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षेऽपि वृक्ष-
विशेषनियतसंशयानुपपत्तिरिति। धर्मिज्ञानहेतुत्ववादिमते-
ऽपि अस्य दोषस्य तुल्यत्वात्; तद्धेतुभूतधर्मिज्ञानमपि सर्व-
विषयकं किमिति नोत्पद्यत इति वक्तुं शक्यत्वात्। विषयमा-

हात्स्यादेर्नियतविषयधर्मिज्ञानप्रयोजकत्वे नियतविषयकसंश-
यजननेऽपि तस्यैव हेतुत्वात् ।

[23] न च विषयमाहात्म्यादीनामननुगतत्वादनुगतं धर्मि-
ज्ञानमेव हेतुरिति वाच्यम् । अननुगतत्वेऽपि तेषां क्लृप्तत्वात्
धर्मिज्ञानस्य कल्प्यमानत्वात् । किंच धर्मिज्ञानं प्रति विषय-
माहात्म्यादीनां हेतुत्वेऽपि जन्यतावच्छेदकं धर्मिज्ञानत्वमेव
न तु संशयान्यधर्मिज्ञानत्वं गौरवात् । तथा च धर्मिज्ञानत्वस्य
संशयेऽपि विद्यमानत्वात् तेषां संशयहेतुत्वं क्लृप्तमेव ।

[24] नन्वेवमपि संशयकारणीभूतधर्मिज्ञानगोचरत्वनि-
बन्धनानुपपत्तिपरिहारेऽपि, संशयेनैव स्वाश्रयगोचरबाधा-
नवतारकालीनलौकिकप्रत्यक्षात्मकेन प्रामाण्यस्याग्रहणात्,
बाधः । न च तत्र प्रामाण्यस्यापि कोटित्वात् ग्रहणमस्तीति
वाच्यम्; एवमप्यप्रामाण्यतदभावसंशयेन प्रामाण्यस्य कोटि-
त्वेनाप्यग्रहणात् बाधस्य तदवस्थत्वात् इति चेत्, न । बाधा-
नवतारकालीनत्वे सति तद्वत्त्वाभावोपस्थितिसामग्र्यनुत्तर-
कालीनत्वस्य विवक्षितत्वात् । संशयस्य च तद्वत्त्वाभावविष-
यकतया तदुपस्थितिसामग्र्युत्तरकालीनत्वात् । तस्मात् स्वत-
स्त्वे बाधकाभावादुक्तं स्वतस्त्वम् ।

[25] परतस्त्वं तु नोपपद्यते । प्राथमिकप्रामाण्यानुमितेरन्व-
यिना वा व्यतिरेकिणा वा असंभवात् । प्रामाण्यरूपसाध्यस्य
पूर्वम् अप्रसिद्धत्वेन व्याप्तिग्रहासंभवेन कारणीभूतसाध्यज्ञान-
स्याभावेन च तदुभयानवतारात् ।

[26] न चाप्रामाण्याभावरूपं प्रामाण्यं साध्यप्रसिद्धिं विना-
पि अप्रामाण्यरूपप्रतियोगिप्रसिद्ध्या साधयितुं शक्यते यद्-

व्यापकतया हेत्वभावो गृहीतः तदभावेन तदभावः सिद्धय-
तीति वाच्यम् । अप्रामाण्यस्यापि परतस्त्वेन तत्प्रसिद्धेरप्य-
भावात् । किंच अप्रामाण्याभावानुमितावपि प्रामाण्यानुमितेः
अनुपपादाच्च ।

[27] न च तद्वत्त्वादेर्ज्ञानान्तरेणोपनये मनसा प्रामाण्यग्रहेण
साध्यप्रसिद्धिर्वक्तुं शक्यत इति वाच्यम् । तथात्वे तन्न्यायेन
व्यवसायस्याप्युपनायकत्वाविशेषेण अनुव्यवसायेनापि प्रामा-
ण्यग्रहापत्त्या प्रामाण्यस्वतस्त्वस्य निवारयितुमशक्यत्वात् ।
एवं प्रामाण्यानुमितिहेतुभूतदाहसामर्थ्यवद्विशेष्यकत्वादिरपि
दुर्ग्रह इत्यनुपपन्नं परतस्त्वम् ।

[28] अप्रामाण्यं तु परतो जायते । न च अप्रामाण्यस्याप्र-
सिद्धत्वादुक्तन्यायेन कथं तद्विषयकानुमिति इति वाच्यम् ।
बाधोपनीते तदभाववत्त्वे मनसा तदग्रहणसंभवात् । न चैवम-
प्रामाण्यस्य स्वतस्त्वापत्तिः अनुव्यवसायेनापि तदग्रहसंभवा-
दिति वाच्यम् । तदभाववत्त्वस्य व्यवसायानुपनीतत्वेनानु-
व्यवसायस्य तत्रासामर्थ्यात् ।

[29] उत्पत्तौ तु प्रामाण्यस्य परतस्त्वमेव । ज्ञानसामान्य-
सामग्र्यतिरिक्तकारणजन्यतावच्छेदकत्वं प्रमात्वस्य परत-
स्त्वमिति यावत् ।

[30] यद्यपि प्रमात्वस्य कार्यमात्रवृत्तिधर्मत्वाद्धेतोरवच्छेद-
कत्वं साधयितुं न शक्यते नीलघटत्वानित्यज्ञानत्वादौ व्य-
भिचारात्, तथापि बाधकाभावे सति कार्यमात्रवृत्तिधर्मत्वादि-
त्यनेन तत् साधनीयम् । बाधकाभावपदेन बाधकसामान्या-
भावो न विवक्षितः सन्दिग्धासिद्धिप्रसंगात्, विशेष्यवैयर्थ्या-

च्च । किंतु अवच्छेदकान्तरोपपन्नकार्यत्वाधिकरणवृत्तित्वरूप-
बाधकस्वावच्छिन्नयावत्कार्यवृत्तिकार्यत्वप्रतियोगिकैकारण-
त्वासंभवरूपबाधकद्वयाभावो विवक्षितः । तत्राद्यविशेषेण नी-
लघटत्वे अनित्यज्ञानत्वे च द्वितीयेन द्रव्यत्वे च व्यभिचारो
निरस्तः । न च वाच्यम् प्रमात्वस्य नित्यवृत्तित्वात् कार्यमा-
त्रवृत्तित्वमसिद्धमिति; तद्वद्विशेष्यकत्वे सति तत्प्रकारकत्वरू-
पबुद्धिवृत्तिगतयथार्थत्वस्य पक्षीकृतत्वात् ।

[31] यद्यपि प्रमात्वावच्छेदेन नानुगतं किञ्चित् कारणम-
स्ति तथापि प्रत्यक्षप्रमात्वादवच्छिन्नानामेव पक्षीकृतत्वात्,
तत्र चानुगतकारणस्य संभवात् न दोषः । तथा हि प्रत्यक्ष-
प्रमायां भूयोवयवेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षो गुणः ।

[32] अनुमितिप्रमायां यद्यपि यथार्थलिङ्गपरामर्शस्य गुणत्वं
न संभवति; वह्निमति पर्वते बाष्पे धूमभ्रमात् जायमानवह्न्य-
नुमितेः प्रमात्वात्, गन्धप्रागभावावच्छिन्नपक्षकानुमितेः
सत्यपि यथार्थलिङ्गपरामर्शे भ्रमत्वाच्च; तथाप्यबाधितत्व-
प्रमा, साध्यवद्विशेष्यकत्वावच्छेदेन हेतुप्रकारकं ज्ञानं वा
गुणः । साध्यसंदेहस्थलीयानुमितावपि संदेहस्य साध्यांशे
प्रमात्वेनाबाधितत्वप्रमायां न व्यभिचारः । घनगर्जितस्थले
साध्यप्रमित्यभावेऽपीश्वरीयसाध्यप्रमामादाय व्यभिचारो नि-
राकर्तव्यः । साध्यवद्विशेष्यकत्वावच्छेदेनेत्युक्त्या यत्र वह्नि-
मति अवह्निमति च इमौ वह्निमन्ताविति समूहालंबना-
नुमितिर्जायते तत्रैकांशे प्रमात्वमपरांशे च भ्रमत्वमुपपन्नम् ।

[33] शब्दप्रमायां च वक्तृवाक्यार्थयथार्थज्ञानं गुणः । न चा-
पौरुषेयवेदजन्यप्रमायां बाधः; तत्राप्येतदनुरोधेन सवक्तृक-

त्वकल्पनात् । न च योग्यताया एव तत्र गुणत्वमस्तीति वा-
च्यम् । तस्याः संसर्गरूपत्वे अतीतानागतादिस्थले व्यभिचा-
रात्; अनन्वयनिश्चयविरहरूपत्वे भ्रमसाधारण्येन गुणत्वायो-
गात्; एकपदार्थसंसर्गे अपरपदार्थनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगि-
त्वप्रमाविशेष्यत्वाभावरूपत्वे अन्योन्याभावगर्भयोग्यतास्थले
व्यभिचारात्; तदपेक्षया वक्तृवाक्यार्थयथार्थज्ञानस्य लघु-
त्वाच्च । न च संसर्गरूपयोग्यताविषयकप्रमाया एव गुणत्वम-
स्तीति वाच्यम् । तस्याः नियतपूर्ववर्तित्वस्याकूततया निय-
तपूर्ववर्तितया कूतस्य वक्तृवाक्यार्थयथार्थज्ञानस्यानन्यथा-
सिद्धिमात्रं कल्पनीयं लाघवात् । एवमन्यत्रापि गुणः कल्प-
नीयः ।

[34] अत्र प्रमाणलक्षणप्रविष्टानां संशयादीनां लक्षणमाह ।

द्वयालंबा संशयो बुद्धिः समानाकारदर्शनात् ॥ ५ ॥

विपर्ययोऽन्यथाज्ञानमतद्रूपप्रतिष्ठितम् ।

अनुभूतार्थविषयामतिः स्मृतिरिहोच्यते ॥ ६ ॥

एभिर्विहीना चिच्छक्तिः प्रमाणत्वेन सम्मता ।

द्वयालंबा एकस्मिन् धर्मिणि विरुद्धनानार्थावलंबिनी बु-
द्धिः विकल्परूपं मानसं ज्ञानं बुद्धिवृत्तिः संशयः । कारणमाह
समानेति । समानाकारः स्थाणुपुरुषसाधारणः ऊर्ध्वत्वादि ।
इदं चोपलक्षणं हेत्वन्तरयोः असाधारणधर्मदर्शनविप्रतिपत्ति-
श्रवणयोरपि । तदुक्तं “संशयः कथितो ज्ञानमवधारणवर्जि-
तम् । समानानेकधर्माभ्यां विमतेश्च तदुद्भवः” इति । विमतेः
विप्रतिपत्तिवाक्यादित्यर्थः । विपर्ययं लक्षयति विपर्यय इति ।
अतद्रूपप्रतिष्ठितम् तत् रूपं धर्मो न भवति यस्य तत् अतद्रूपं

तदभाववदित्यर्थः तत्र प्रतिष्ठितम् तद्विशेष्यकमित्यर्थः । अन्यथा प्रकारान्तरेण ज्ञानं तदभाववद्विशेष्यकं तत्प्रकारकं ज्ञानमिति यावत् विपर्ययः । उक्तं चाधस्तात् “अन्यत्रसिद्धधर्माणामन्यत्राध्यास इष्यते” इति ।

[35] नन्विदमनुपपन्नम्; अन्यथाख्यातौ मानाभावात् । न च वाच्यं रजतत्वप्रकारकशुक्तिविशेष्यकप्रवृत्तिरेव स्वसमानप्रकारकज्ञानं साधयति प्रवृत्तिमात्रे समानप्रकारकज्ञानस्य कारणत्वादिति । सत्यप्रवृत्तिस्थले विशिष्टज्ञानस्य कारणत्वेऽप्यन्यत्र भेदाग्रहादेव प्रवृत्तेरुपपत्तेर्वादिनापि विशिष्टज्ञानहेतुत्वेन तस्याङ्गीकरणीयत्वात् । न च भेदाग्रहस्य प्रवर्तकत्वे सुषुप्तिदशायामपि प्रवृत्तिप्रसंगः; उपस्थितेष्टभेदाग्रहस्यैव प्रवर्तकत्वस्वीकारात् । न च रजते नेदं रजतमिति ज्ञानादपि प्रवृत्तिप्रसंगः; इष्टभेदाग्रहे अन्यथाख्यात्यापत्तेरिति वाच्यम्; स्वतन्त्रोपस्थितेष्टभेदाग्रहस्यैव प्रवर्तकत्वात् ।

किंच विशिष्टप्रत्यक्षमात्रे विशेषणज्ञानं, विशेषणविशेष्ययोः सन्निकर्षः, तदुभयोरसंसर्गाग्रह इत्येतावन्ति कारणानि । शुक्तौ रजतत्वप्रत्यक्षे च विशेषणसन्निकर्षरूपकारणाभावेन विशिष्टप्रत्यक्षसामग्र्या अभावेन कथं भ्रमरूपविशिष्टप्रत्यक्षं स्वीकर्तुं शक्यते ? न च प्रमायामेव विशेषणसन्निकर्षस्य कारणत्वम्; लाघवेन विशिष्टप्रत्यक्षत्वावच्छेदेनैव तस्य कारणत्वात् न तु प्रमारूपप्रत्यक्षत्वावच्छेदेन गौरवात् । किंच विशिष्टप्रत्यक्षमात्रे विशेषणसन्निकर्षस्याकारणत्वे पर्वते वह्निविशिष्टप्रत्यक्षापत्तिः । तथा हि पर्वतो वह्निमानित्यनुमितस्थले पर्वतरूपविशेष्ये इन्द्रियसन्निकर्षः, वह्निरूपविशेषणज्ञानं, तदु-

भयोरसंसर्गाग्रह इति विशिष्टप्रत्यक्षसामग्र्या विद्यमानत्वात् । न चैतदनुरोधेन यथार्थविशिष्टप्रत्यक्ष एव तस्य कारणत्वं भवत्विति वाच्यम्; गौरवेण निरस्तत्वात् । तस्मादन्यथाख्यातौ प्रमाणाभावात् अनुपपन्न एवायं ग्रन्थः ।

[36] अत्रोच्यते । न तावत् भेदाग्रहादेव प्रवृत्त्युपपत्तिः । रजतरङ्गयोरिमे रङ्गरजते इति समूहालंबनभ्रमस्थले एकैकत्र युगपत् प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्यापत्तेः । किंच सत्यप्रवृत्तिस्थले विशिष्टज्ञानस्य कारणत्वकल्पनादशायां प्रवृत्तित्वेन विशिष्टविषयकज्ञानत्वेन कार्यकारणभावः कल्प्यते लाघवात् । न तु सत्यप्रवृत्तित्वावच्छेदेन सत्यविशिष्टज्ञानत्वावच्छिन्नस्य कारणत्वम्, असत्यप्रवृत्तित्वावच्छेदेन च भेदाग्रहस्य कारणत्वं, गौरवत्वात् । न चैवमसत्यप्रवृत्तिस्थले विशिष्टज्ञानाङ्गीकारे गौरवम् । कारणत्वकल्पनादशायामेतादृशगौरवस्य अनुपस्थितत्वात् । कारणत्वकल्पनोत्तरकालं च एतादृशगौरवोपस्थितौ सत्यामपि तस्याकिंचित्करत्वात् ।

न च विशेषणसन्निकर्षरूपकारणाभावेन विशिष्टप्रत्यक्षबाधः; ज्ञानलक्षणसन्निकर्षस्य, दोषविशेषरूपसन्निकर्षस्य वा कल्पनात् । न चैवं पर्वतो वह्निमानित्यत्रापि ज्ञानलक्षणसन्निकर्षस्य विद्यमानत्वेन, समाने विषये प्रत्यक्षसामग्र्या बलवत्त्वेन, पर्वते वह्निप्रत्यक्षापत्तिरिति वाच्यम् । ज्ञानलक्षणसन्निकर्षस्य अलौकिकत्वेन समानेविषये अलौकिकप्रत्यक्षसामग्रीतोऽनुमितिसामग्र्या बलवत्त्वात् । यद्वा यथार्थप्रत्यक्षत्वावच्छेदेनैव विशेषणसन्निकर्षस्य कारणत्वम् । न च गौरवम् । विशिष्टज्ञानकारणताग्राहकप्रमाणेन प्रवृत्तिमात्रे विशिष्टज्ञान-

हेतुत्वसिद्धौ गौरवस्य प्रामाणिकत्वात्, प्रामाणिकगौरवस्य चादोषत्वात् । तस्मादन्यथाख्यात्यङ्गीकारे न किञ्चित् बाधकमिति ।

[37] ननु अस्त्वेवं शुक्तौ रजतविशिष्टज्ञानम् । तथापि तत्र प्रतीयमानं रजतमत्यन्तासदेव । असदेव रजतमिति प्रतीतेः, तत्र रजतं नासीत् नास्ति न भविष्यति च इति त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वावगमाच्च । इदमेव ह्यसत्त्वमिति माध्वाः । तदुक्तं न्यायामृते “त्रिकालसर्वदेशीयनिषेधप्रतियोगिता असत्ता प्रोच्यतेऽध्यस्ते तुच्छे तु प्रतियोगिनि” इति । तन्न । असतोऽपरोक्षतया प्रतीत्यनुपपत्तेः । किञ्च असतो विशेषणस्य, सन्निकर्षस्य पूर्वं तज्ज्ञानस्य वा कारणस्याभावेन तद्विशिष्टज्ञानासंभवाच्च ।

ननु तथापि भासमानं रजतं शुक्तौ सदेवास्तु । न च शुक्तौ रजतोत्पत्तौ कारणबाधः । प्रतिनिधिश्रुत्यनुसारेण सदृशद्रव्ये सदृशद्रव्यान्तरानुस्यूतेः सिद्धत्वेन रजतसदृशायां शुक्तौ रजतावयवानां सत्त्वात् इति रामानुजीयाः । तदुक्तं तदीयभाष्ये “यथार्थं सर्वविज्ञानमिति वेदविदां मतम्” इति । तन्न । तथात्वे नेदं रजतमिति बाधानुपपत्तेः । न च अनुदरा कन्येतिवत् अल्पत्वार्थको नञ् इति वाच्यम् । सर्वात्मना सदृशे महति सीसकटाहादौ बहुरजतावयवसंभवेन उक्तबाधानुपपत्तेः, बाधानन्तरमपि रजतार्थिप्रवृत्तिप्रसंगाच्च । यत्र सादृश्यमूलो देहात्मादिभ्रमः, तत्र तदनुस्यूतेरसंभवेन त्रान्यथाख्यातेरवश्याभ्युपगन्तव्यत्वात् । यत्र सादृश्यमूलो मः तत्रापि न तदवयवानुस्यूतौ, तथा तदुत्पत्तौ वा प्रमाण-

मस्ति । प्रतिनिधिश्रुतिस्तु तदवयवातिसदृशावयवतत्परा न तु तदवयवानुस्यूतिपरा । तथात्वे पुत्तिकादावपि सोमलतोत्पत्तिप्रसंगादिति ।

“तदसत् संविदर्थ” इत्यादिना संविदो विषयाकारत्वनिषेधादेव आन्तरमेव ज्ञानाकारं रजतं बहिरिव भासत इति आत्मख्यातिवादिनां मतं निराकृतम् । मायिनस्तु ख्यातिबाधान्यथानुपपत्त्या शुक्तौ प्रतीयमानं रजतं सदसद्विलक्षणमेवेति वदन्ति । तत् यथाधिकारमुपदिशतः शिवस्य हृदयं न । “परस्परविरोधे हि न प्रकारान्तरस्थितिः” इति न्यायेन सत्त्वासत्त्वयोरन्यतरबाधे अन्यतरस्यावश्यकत्वेनोभयवैलक्षण्यासिद्धेः । तस्मादन्यथाख्यातिरेव स्वीकर्तव्या ।

[38] स्मृतिं लक्षयति अनुभूतेति । संस्कारजन्यज्ञानं स्मृतिरित्यत्र तात्पर्यं न तु यथाश्रुते । धारावाहिकज्ञानादावतिव्याप्तेः । संस्कारत्वेन संस्कारजन्यत्वविवक्षणात् तद्ध्वंसादौ च नातिव्याप्तिरिति द्रष्टव्यम् । एवं प्रतियोगिनो निरूप्य तदनवच्छिन्नत्वघटितं लक्षणं सुबोधमित्याह एभिरिति । अत्र तर्कस्याप्याहार्यारोपरूपस्य विपर्ययविशेषत्वात् पृथगनुपदानम् ।

[39] नन्वेवमपि संशयादिविनिर्मुक्तं ज्ञानमित्येव प्रमाणलक्षणमस्तु न च बुद्धिवृत्तावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय चिच्छक्तिपदमिति वाच्यम् ज्ञप्तिर्ज्ञानमिति भावव्युत्पन्नज्ञानपदेनैव तन्निराससंभवादिति चेन्न । तथाप्यात्मन्यतिव्याप्तिः । तद्वारणाय चिच्छक्तिपदम् ।

[40] नन्वेवमपि चिच्छक्तेर्मलावृतत्वदशायामपि मानता-
व्यवहारस्यादित्याशंक्याह ।

चिच्छक्तिश्च परापेक्षो बोध एव न चापरः ॥ ७ ॥

अत्र चिच्छक्तिपदेन परापेक्षः विषयोन्मुखो बोध एव
विवक्षितः न चापरः आवृतचिच्छक्तिप्रकाश इत्यर्थः ।

[41] ननु आत्मनोऽपि चिद्रूपत्वाविशेषात् तस्यापि मान-
त्वेन संग्रहः कुतो न क्रियत इत्यत आह ।

न तस्याभिमुखं ज्ञानं माता मानं परोन्मुखम् ।

माता प्रमतरूपमात्मरूपं ज्ञानं तस्य विषयस्याभिमुखं न
विषयप्रकाशकं नेत्यर्थः । मानं प्रमाणं चेत् परोन्मुखं विषय-
प्रकाशकमेव वक्तव्यम् । ततो नात्मनः प्रमाणत्वेन संग्रह
उचित इति भावः । आत्मनो विषयानुन्मुखत्वं, चिच्छक्ते-
र्विषयोन्मुखत्वं च “तद्धर्मभूतं ज्ञानं च व्यापकं विषयो-
न्मुखम्” इत्यादिभिः पशुपटले निरूपितं तत्रैवानुसंधेयम् ।
एवं च मातृमानव्यवहारसांकर्यमपि नास्तीति द्रष्टव्यम् ।

[42] ननु जप्तेरेव मानत्वाङ्गीकारे च प्रमाणस्य फलवत्त्व-
नियमात् ज्ञानातिरिक्तस्य फलस्याभावात् कथमस्याः प्रमा-
णत्वं कथं वा प्रमाणजन्यफलाभावे तदनाधारस्य विषयस्य
कर्मत्वमित्यत आह ।

परे प्रमेयभावादिव्यापारः फलमिष्यते ॥ ८ ॥

परे परस्मिन्विषये । छांदसत्वात् सर्वनामसंज्ञाभावः । प्रमे-
यभावादिः प्रमेयभावः प्रमेयत्वं विषयत्वमित्यर्थः । विषय-
विषयिभावसंबन्ध इति यावत् । आदिपदेन विषयगतस्फुरत्ता
गृह्यते । स एव व्यापारः कार्यं चिच्छक्तेः फलमिष्यते फल-

त्वेनाङ्गीक्रियते । तदुक्तं पशुपटले “प्रत्यर्थमपि संबन्धस्त-
त्कार्यम्” इति, “तस्मिन्निरुद्धे तत्कार्यं प्रत्यर्थं वेदनात्मकम् ।
न जायते ततः कार्यतिरोधानं मलात् स्थितम्” इति च सं-
बन्धवेदनयोः तत्कार्यत्वम् । क्वचित् परं प्रमेयं भावादि इति
पाठः । तत्रायमर्थः । तत्र परोन्मुखमित्यत्र परशब्दस्य सर्वो-
त्कृष्टशिवमात्रपरत्वभ्रमं वारयति परमिति । परं स्वस्मात्
भिन्नं सर्वमपि पदार्थजातं विवक्षितमित्यर्थः । एवं च विषया-
कारबुद्धिवृत्त्यवच्छिन्नायाः विषयोन्मुखाः चिच्छक्तेः प्रमा-
णत्वं, तादृशशक्तिमत आत्मनः प्रमातृत्वं, घटपटादेर्विषयस्य
प्रमेयत्वं, विषयविषयिभावसंबन्धार्थवेदनयोः चिच्छक्तिर्कार्य-
योः फलत्वमिति विवेकः ।

[43] अत्र लक्षणस्य त्रयो दोषाः अव्याप्तिरतिव्याप्तिर-
संभवश्चेति । ते स्वोक्तलक्षणे न संभवन्तीति प्रतिपादयति ।

अत्राव्याप्त्यादिदोषाणां न कदाचन संभवः ।

प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणेषु व्याप्त्या नाव्याप्तिदूषणम् ॥ ९ ॥

नातिव्याप्तिश्च मेयेषु नानाभावेष्ववर्तनात् ।

नान्यथाव्याप्तिरप्यस्ति प्रमाणं चेत्तदीदृशम् ॥ १० ॥

प्रमाणकथनं तेन समीचीनमुदाहृतम् ।

अत्र लक्षणे अव्याप्त्यादिदोषाणां संभवः संभावनापि
नास्तीत्यर्थः । तत्राव्याप्तिर्लक्ष्यैकदेशे लक्षणस्यावर्तनं । तत्ता-
वन्नास्तीत्याह प्रत्यक्षेति । प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणेषु पूर्वोक्तेषु चतुर्ष्व-
पि व्याप्त्या व्याप्यवर्तनात् अव्याप्तिदूषणम् अव्याप्तिलक्षण-
दूषणं नेत्यर्थः । लक्ष्यविजातीये लक्षणस्य वर्तनमतिव्याप्ति-
र्नामदूषणम् । तदपि नेत्याह नानाभावेषु लक्ष्यविभिन्नेषु मेयेषु

घटपटादिषु अवर्तनादतिव्याप्तिरपि नेत्यर्थः । लक्ष्ये क्वाप्य-
वर्तनं लक्षणस्यासंभवाभिधानं दूषणं । तदपि नेत्याह नेति ।
अन्यथा प्रकारान्तरेण अव्याप्तिः सर्वलक्ष्याव्याप्तिरसंभव
इति यावत् । सापि नास्ति ।

कुत इत्यत आह प्रमाणमिति । यद्यत् सम्यक्प्रमाणत्वेन
लिलक्षयिषितं तत् सर्वमीदृशं पूर्वोक्तलक्षणयुक्तम् । चेत्
नन्वित्यर्थः । उक्तं प्रमाणसामान्यलक्षणमुपसंहरति प्रमाणेति ।
तेन सकलाव्याप्त्यादिदोषरहितत्वेन प्रमाणकथनं कथ्यते
लक्ष्यते अनेनेति कथनं लक्षणमित्यर्थः । समीचीनमदुष्टमुदाह-
रतम् प्रतिपादितमित्यर्थः ।

[44] प्रमाणलक्षणान्तरे जाग्रति कथमस्य समीचीनत्वमि-
त्याशंक्य पूर्वोक्तलक्षणमनूद्य दूषयति ।

ननु न स्यात् कुतो मानं यत्तत् प्रमितिसाधनम् ॥ ११ ॥

सत्त्वदीपदृगादीनां प्रमाणत्वप्रसंगतः ।

यत्प्रमाणन्न तन्मेयं मेयाभावः पुनस्स्थितः ॥ १२ ॥

मित्यानुमीयते तत्र शब्दादि विषयत्वतः ।

यन्मेयन्न हि तन्मानं यतो मानेन मीयते ॥ १३ ॥

ननु यत् प्रमितिसाधनम् प्रमाकरणं तन्मानं मानलक्षणं
कुतो न स्यात् ? केन हेतुना न स्यादित्यर्थः । ननु तस्या इ-
ति पाठे तस्याः चिच्छक्तेः कुतो मानत्वं प्रमितिसाधनस्यैव
मानत्वादित्यर्थः । तदेतदतिव्याप्त्या दूषयति सत्त्वेति । सत्त्व-
मिति सत्त्वगुणप्रधानबुद्धिवृत्तिरुच्यते । दृगादीत्यत्रादिशब्देन
श्रोत्रादयो गृह्यन्ते । तेषामपि प्रमाणत्वं प्रसज्येत । लक्षणं
तेष्वतिव्याप्तमित्यर्थः । ननु दृगादीनां लक्ष्यत्वात्तेषु कथम-

तिव्याप्तिरित्याशंक्य, दृगादीनां लक्ष्यत्वे बाधकमाह यदिति ।
यत् प्रमाणं प्रमाणत्वेनाभिमतं तत् प्रमेयन्न प्रमेयीभवितुं नार्ह-
ति प्रमाणत्वप्रमेयत्वयोः तेजस्तिमिरयोरिव सामानाधि-
करण्यासंभवादित्यर्थः । अतो मानस्य मेयाभावः प्रमेयत्वा-
भावः स्थितो निर्णीत एव ।

मानमेयपदव्युत्पत्त्यापि मानत्वमेयत्वयोर्वैयधिकरण्यमेव
नियतमित्याह मित्येति । तत्र मानमेययोर्मध्ये शब्दादिः विष-
यत्वहेतुना मित्या मानेन अनुमीयते । तथा च येन प्रमीयते
तत् प्रमाणं सिद्धम् । यत् मेयं न हि तन्मानं प्रमाणं न
भवतीत्यर्थः । यतो यस्मात् मानेन मीयते तन्मानं, तच्च मेयं
न भवतीत्यर्थः । तथा च येन प्रमीयते तत् प्रमाणं यच्च प्रमी-
यते तत् प्रमेयमिति मानत्वमेयत्वयोर्वैयधिकरण्यनियमात्,
दृगादीनां मेयत्वेन मानत्वासंभवात्, लक्ष्यत्वासंभवेनाति-
व्याप्तिर्दृढैवेत्यर्थः ।

[45] ननु एवं दृगादीनां मेयत्वेन प्रमाणत्वाभावे चक्षुषा
पश्यामि श्रोत्रेण शृणोमीत्यादिसर्वजनसिद्धलोकव्यवहारो
भज्येत । किंच “प्रमाणमेकं तद्वाक्यं तथ्यमीश्वरभाषितम्”
इति स्ववचनविरोधश्च प्रसज्येतेत्यत आह ।

पश्यामीति दृशा लोके प्रसिद्धिरुपकारतः ।

दृशा पश्यामि साक्षात्करोमीति लोके प्रसिद्धो व्यवहार
उपकारतः आलोचनादिवृत्तिद्वारा उपकारकत्वमात्रेण । तथा
च दृशेत्यादौ हेतौ तृतीयेति भावः । चिदभिव्यक्तिं प्रति तु
करणत्वेन करणेऽपि तृतीया । दीपादिव्यावृत्तविशेषस्यैव
प्रमाणव्यवहारप्रयोजककरणत्वरूपत्वाङ्गीकारात् न तत्र तद-

व्यवहारप्रसंगः। एवं लिङ्गेनानुमिनोमि शब्देन जानामीत्या-
दिव्यवहारोऽप्युपकारकत्वेन समर्थनीयः।

[46] सर्वप्रमाव्यभिचारिण्याः चिच्छक्तेरेव प्रमाणत्वमुचितं
न तु परस्परप्रमाव्यभिचारिणां चक्षुरादीनामित्याह।

न कस्यापि पदार्थस्य यद्विना भवति प्रमा॥ १४॥

तदेव मानमेष्टव्यं चक्षुरादि न तादृशम्।

न चक्षुः शब्दसंविता न श्रोत्रं रूपवेदने॥ १५॥

सर्वत्र ग्राहिणी संवित् सैव मानमतो मतम्।

यत्सिद्धाविदमः सिद्धिर्यदसिद्धौ न किञ्चन॥ १६॥

यद्विना येन प्रमाणत्वेनाभिमतं विना कस्यापि पदार्थस्य
शब्दस्पर्शादेर्विषयस्य प्रमा स्फूर्तिलक्षणा न भवति तदेव
मानमित्येष्टव्यमङ्गीकार्यम्। अस्त्वेवं ततः किमित्यत आह
चक्षुरिति चक्षुरादीन्द्रियाणि। चक्षुरादीत्यादिशब्देन पराभि-
मतप्रमाणमात्रं संगृह्यते। तत् न तादृशं न प्रमां प्रत्यव्यभि-
चारीत्यर्थः। तमेवाव्यभिचारित्वाभावं प्रकटयति न चक्षुरि-
ति। शब्दसंविता शब्दप्रमायां चक्षुर्न कारणं रूपवेदने च श्रोत्रं
न कारणम्। एवं लिङ्गादीनामपि व्यभिचारो द्रष्टव्यः। चि-
च्छक्तिस्तु नैवमित्याह सर्वत्रेति। संविच्छक्तिस्तु सर्वत्र
शब्दादिविषयेषु ग्राहिणी स्फूर्तिजननशीला अतः सैव चि-
च्छक्तिरेव मानं मतम् अभिगन्तुं योग्यमित्यर्थः। चिच्छक्ते-
मानत्वाङ्गीकारबीजमूलं सर्वप्रमां प्रत्यव्यभिचारमाह यदिति।
यस्याः चिच्छक्तेः सिद्धौ अभिव्यक्तौ सत्यामेव इदमः
शब्दादिविषयस्य संसिद्धिः प्रमा भवति। यस्याः चिच्छक्तेर-

सिद्धावनभिव्यक्तौ किञ्चन शब्दादिमध्ये किमपि न स्फुरति।
अतः सैव चिच्छक्तिरेव मानमित्यभिमतमुचितमित्यर्थः।

[47] ननु चिच्छक्तेः सर्वप्रमित्यव्यभिचारेण प्रमाणत्वाङ्गी-
कारे तादृशी बुद्धिवृत्तिरेव प्रमाणं किं न स्यादित्याशङ्क्य
निराकरोति।

बुद्धिः सर्वान्तिमत्त्वेन कस्मान्मानन्न चेष्टते।

प्राकृतत्वाविशेषेण दृगादेरविशेषतः॥ १७॥

असंविदात्मकत्वेन न हि बुद्धेः प्रमाणता।

बुद्धिश्च वेद्यते किंतु सुखदुःखादिरूपतः॥ १८॥

प्रमाणैकान्तता तेन बुद्धेरपि न सम्मता।

बुद्धिः सर्वान्तिमत्त्वेन चक्षुराद्यपेक्षया चरमकारणत्वेन,
चक्षुरादिना आलोचितं मनसा संकल्पितं बुद्धिरध्यवस्यती-
त्यङ्गीकारात्, सर्वाव्यभिचारेण सर्वप्रमित्यव्यभिचारेण मानं
प्रमाणमिति कस्मात् नेष्यत इति शङ्कार्थः। परिहरति प्राकृते-
ति। बुद्धेरपि प्रकृतिकार्यत्वसामान्येन दृगादेः सकाशाद्विशेषा-
भावेन न प्रमाणत्वमुचितमिति भावः। ननु बुद्धिवृत्तेः प्राकृत-
त्वाविशेषेऽपि दृगाद्यपेक्षया प्रकृष्टप्रकाशकत्वादस्तु प्रमाणत्व-
मित्यत आह असंविदिति। जडप्रकाशरूपाया बुद्धेरालोकवन्न
प्रमाणत्वमुचितमित्यर्थः।

किञ्च बुद्धेर्विद्याकारणकस्वप्रमितौ कर्मत्वेन सर्वप्रमित्यव्य-
भिचारोऽपि नास्तीत्याह बुद्धिश्चेति। सुखदुःखादिरूपत्वात्
बुद्धिश्च सुखाकारतया च यदा वेद्यते तदा तादृश संवेदनं
प्रति वेद्यत्वेनाकारणत्वात् बुद्धेः प्रमाणैकान्तता सर्वप्रमित्य-
व्यभिचारे नास्तीत्यर्थः। यद्वा बुद्धेः सुखादिरूपतया प्रमेय-

त्वेन प्रमाणत्वमनुपपन्नमिति पूर्वोक्तव्याप्तिं स्मारयति बुद्धी-
ति । ननु बुद्ध्यादेः प्रमेयत्वेन प्रमाणत्वाभावे चिच्छक्तेरप्यनु-
मानागमादिप्रमाणवेद्यत्वेन प्रमेयतया प्रमाणत्वं न स्यात् । न
च चिच्छक्तिगतव्यापकत्वादिधर्माणामेव प्रमाणगोचरत्वं न
स्वरूपस्येति वाच्यम्; बुद्ध्यादिगतधर्माणामेव प्रमाणविषयत्वं
न स्वरूपस्येत्यपि वक्तुं शक्यत्वादिति चेन्न । बुद्ध्यादिस्वरू-
पाणां प्रमाणगोचरत्वाभावे शशविषाणादिवदसत्त्वप्रसंगात् । न
च प्रकृतेऽपीदं समानमिति वाच्यम् । चिच्छक्तेः स्वयंप्रकाश-
चिद्रूपत्वेन स्वसत्तायां शिववत् प्रमाणान्तरनिरपेक्षत्वात् ।

[48] ननु चक्षुरादीनां प्रत्येकं प्रमाव्यभिचारेणाप्रमाणत्वेऽपि
प्रमासामग्र्याः प्रमित्यव्यभिचारात् प्रमाणत्वं कुतो न स्यादि-
त्याशंक्य निराकरोति ।

ननु प्रमेयसंसिद्धौ सामग्री केन नेष्यते ॥ १९ ॥

प्रमात्रादिघटान्तेषु सत्त्वेव घटनिश्चयात् ।

तत्र प्रमातृमेयादिव्यवहारविलोपतः ॥ २० ॥

मातृमानप्रमेयाणां तदन्तर्भावतस्स्थितेः ।

तेषां तु व्यतिरेकेण सामग्री च न दृश्यते ॥ २१ ॥

यद्यतोऽव्यतिरिक्तं तत् ततोऽभिन्नं स्वरूपवत् ।

संशयादिविभिन्ना तु चिच्छक्तिर्मानमिष्यताम् ॥ २२ ॥

प्रमेयसंसिद्धौ प्रमायां वा सामग्री सकलकारणसम्मेलन-
रूपा सा प्रमाणमिति कुतो नेष्यते ? प्रमात्रादिघटान्तेषु
कारणेषु सत्त्वेव घटनिश्चयदर्शनेन सामग्र्याः प्रमित्यव्यभि-
चारेण प्रमाणत्वौचित्यादित्यर्थः । परिहरति तन्नेति । अयं
प्रमाता, इदं प्रमेयम्, इदं प्रमाणम्, इदं सहकारीत्यादिविवि-

क्तव्यवहारलोपः प्रसज्येत । तत् कुत इत्यत आह मातृमाने-
ति । सर्वेषामपि मात्रादीनां सामग्रीरूपप्रमाणकुक्षिनिक्षिप्तत्वा-
दित्यर्थः । ननु सर्वकारणमेलनस्य सामग्रीत्वेन प्रमाणव्यवहा-
रः, मिलितानां प्रत्येकं प्रमात्रादिव्यवहारः कुतो न इत्यत
आह तेषामिति । तेभ्यो मिलितेभ्यो व्यतिरेकेणातिरिक्ततया
सामग्री काचित् न दृश्यते समस्तव्यतिरेकेण समूहे प्रमाणा-
भावादिति भावः । प्रत्युत अभेद एव प्रमाणमस्तीत्याह यद्यत
इति । यद्यतो यस्मात् सकाशादव्यतिरिक्तं व्यतिरिक्ततया
न दृश्यते तत् तस्मादभिन्नम् । अत्र दृष्टान्तः स्वरूपवदिति ।
यथा वस्तुस्वरूपं स्वापेक्षया व्यतिरिक्तत्वेनादृश्यमानं स्व-
स्मादभिन्नमेव । एवं प्रमात्रादिकारणातिरेकेणादृश्यमाना साम-
ग्री ततोऽभिन्नावेति सर्वेष्वपि मानव्यवहारप्रसंगेन असंकीर्ण-
प्रमात्रादिव्यवहारो न स्यादिति भावः । तस्मादस्मदुक्तमेव
लक्षणं साध्वित्युपसंहरति संशयादीति ।

[49] एतेन अन्यप्रमाणलक्षणानि निरस्तानि वेदितव्यानि ।
तथा हि न तावत् “अनधिगतार्थगन्तुं प्रमाणम्” इति भाट्टा-
नां प्रमाणलक्षणं संगच्छते; धारावाहिकज्ञानादौ अव्याप्तेः ।
नापि “अनुभूतिः प्रमाणम्” इति गुरुणां लक्षणं; भ्रमादावति-
व्याप्तेः । न च भ्रम एव नास्तीति वाच्यम्; साधितत्वात् ।
अनुभूतित्वं च स्मृतिव्यतिरिक्तज्ञानत्वं तथा च स्मृतेरात्म-
स्वात्मांशयोरव्याप्तेः । न चेष्टापत्तिः, अपसिद्धान्तात् । तदु-
क्तं शालिकनाथेन “सर्वविज्ञानहेतूत्वा मितौ मातरि च प्रमा
साक्षात्कारित्वसामान्यात् प्रत्यक्षत्वेन सम्मता” इति ।

अविसंवादिविज्ञानं प्रमाणमिति प्रमाणलक्षणम्, अविसंवाद-
दक्षार्थक्रियास्थितिरिति । तदुक्तं “प्रमाणमविसंवादविज्ञानमर्थ-
क्रियास्थितिः अविसंवादनम्” इति । तदपि न । भूतभविष्य-
द्विषयेषु अनुमानेष्वव्याप्तेः, न सतो भूतभविष्यतोः काचिद-
र्थक्रिया नामास्ति । स्मृतिसविकल्पकयोरतिव्याप्तेः । न
चेष्टापत्तिः, तेषां मते शुद्धवस्तुविषयत्वेन निर्विकल्पकस्यैव
प्रमाणत्वादिति दिक् ।

[50] इयता प्रमाणसामान्यं निरूपितम् । इदानीं प्रथमोद्दिष्टे
प्रत्यक्षे सिद्धान्त्युचितमनुवादसामर्थ्यात् तल्लक्षणं स्वयमेव
ग्रन्थगौरवभयादाक्षेप्तुं कथयन्ति ऋषयः ।

चिच्छक्तेरर्थसंयोगोऽध्यक्षमिन्द्रियमार्गतः ।

चिच्छक्तेरिन्द्रियमार्गतः अर्थसंयोगः प्रत्यक्षमिति सिद्धा-
न्ते वक्तव्यमित्यर्थः ।

[51] ततः किमिति चेत् तत्र चिच्छक्तेः स्वमात्रनिष्ठाया
न प्रत्यक्षत्वमुचितमिति इन्द्रियादिद्वाराविषयोपरक्ताया एव
प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणत्वं वक्तव्यं विषयोपरागश्च कादाचित्क इति
किंचित्करणकृतो वक्तव्यः । तथा च चिच्छक्तेः स्वयमेव
तत्र मलावृतत्वेन कारणत्वासंभवादन्यदव्यभिचारात् प्रमाणं
किं न स्यादित्यभिप्रायेणाहुः ।

स्वयमेव हि चिच्छक्तिः पदार्थाभिमुखी न तु ॥ २३ ॥

कथं पदार्थे संबन्धस्तस्याः कारणमन्तरा ।

चिच्छक्तेर्मलावृतत्वेन स्वत एव पदार्थसंबन्धासंभवात्
स्वाभाव्यक्यर्थं पदार्थसंबन्धातिरिक्तं किंचित् कारणं वक्त-

व्यमिति तदेव कारणं प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणमस्तु आवश्यकत्वात् उप-
जीव्यत्वाच्चेत्यर्थः ।

[52] अत्र कलादीनां, चक्षुरादीनां चान्तर्बहिःकरणानाम-
भाव्यक्तिविषयसंबन्धयोः साधनत्वेऽपि पूर्वोक्तयुक्तिभिर्न
प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणत्वमित्यभिप्रेत्य अर्धांगीकारेण परिहरति
ईश्वरः ।

सत्यं मलावृतत्वेन स्वनिष्ठैव प्रतिष्ठिता ॥ २४ ॥

कलादिकरणव्यक्ता युज्यतेऽर्थैर्यदा तु चित् ।

तदा प्रत्यक्षमित्युक्तमक्षमर्थे प्रवर्तते ॥ २५ ॥

न चेन्द्रियार्थमात्रस्य संयोगोऽध्यक्षमिष्यते ।

चित्संयोगविहीनानामकिंचित्करता यतः ॥ २६ ॥

स्वात्मन्येव विश्रान्तो तिष्ठतीति सत्यं पश्चात् कलादिक-
रणेनाभाव्यक्ता सती सा यदा अर्थैः शब्दादिभिर्विषयैः
युज्यते तदा प्रत्यक्षमित्युक्तम् । चिच्छक्तिर्मलावृतत्वेन हेतु-
ना स्वनिष्ठैव प्रतिष्ठिता पश्चात् कलादेश्चक्षुरादेश्च चिदभि-
व्यक्त्या हेतुत्वेऽपि जडत्वेन न मुख्यप्रमाणत्वमिति भावः ।

ननु चिच्छक्तेः स्वाभाव्यक्तिमात्रेण कथं बहिरर्थसंबन्ध
उपपद्यते ? कथं वा अनुमेयादिसाधारणार्थसंबन्धमात्रेण प्रत्य-
क्षव्यपदेशभाक्त्वमपीत्यत आह अक्षमिति । अक्षं चक्षुरादिक-
मिन्द्रियम् । तथा च तत्प्रवृत्तिद्वारा चिच्छक्तेरपि बहिरर्थ-
संबन्धः सुलभ एव तेनैव चोपाधिना प्रत्यक्षादिव्यपदेश-
भाक्त्वमपि लभते । एवं च अक्षद्वारा अर्थसंबन्धिनी संशया-
दिविनिर्मुक्ता चिच्छक्तिः प्रत्यक्षमित्युक्तं भवति । एवम-
नुमानादिष्वप्यूहम् । एवमिन्द्रियन्यायेनेन्द्रियार्थसंयोगस्या-

पि न प्रमाणत्वमित्याह न चेति । इन्द्रियार्थमात्रस्य केवलेन्द्रियार्थयोः संयोगः सोऽप्यध्यक्षमिति नेष्यते । कुत इत्यत आह चिदिति । स्वतो जडानां चित्संबन्धरहितानां तेषामिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षाणाम् अकिञ्चित्करता अर्थसंवेदनलक्षणप्रयोजनशून्यता यतः अतो न प्रमाणतेति भावः ।

[53] इदं लक्षितं प्रत्यक्षं निर्विकल्पकसविकल्पकभेदेन द्विविधमिति विभज्य निरूपयति ।

विकल्पयोगात् सा शक्तिरेका द्विविधमुच्यते ।

वस्तुस्वरूपमात्रस्य ग्रहणन्निर्विकल्पकम् ॥ २७ ॥

नामजात्यादिसंबन्धसहितं सविकल्पकम् ।

सा चिच्छक्तिरेकापि विकल्पयोगात् नामजात्यादिलक्षणविकल्पयोगात् । एतच्च तदयोगस्याप्युपलक्षणम् । एवं च विकल्पयोगायोगाभ्यां द्विविधं निर्विकल्पकसविकल्पकरूपं यथा भवति तथोच्यते । क्रियाविशेषणमेतद् । तत्र निर्विकल्पकं लक्षयति वस्त्विति । अत्र च मात्रवाचा नामजात्यादि व्यावर्त्यते सविकल्पके अतिव्याप्तिवारणाय ।

[54] तत्सद्भावे च यद्यपि प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणं न संभवति तस्यातीन्द्रियत्वात्, तथापि प्राथमिकदेवदत्तविषयकजन्यविशिष्टज्ञानं जन्यविशेषणज्ञानजन्यं जन्यविशिष्टज्ञानत्वात् अनुमित्यादिवत् इत्यनुमानं मानम् । अत्र च प्राथमिकमिति पक्षविशेषणमहिम्ना जनकस्य निष्प्रकारकत्वसिद्धिः । अत एव न स्मृत्या अर्थान्तरता । देवदत्तत्वादेः प्रागननुभूततया तदा तद्गोचरस्मरणस्य असंभवेन प्राथमिकतत्प्रकारकप्रत्यक्षस्य तज्जन्यत्वायोगात् ।

जन्मान्तरस्मृतिमादायार्थान्तरव्युदासाय देवदत्तेति । एतदध्यक्षतेर्जन्मान्तरे अननुभूतत्वादिति । ईश्वरज्ञाने चिच्छक्तौ च बाधवारणाय जन्येति । साध्ये च जन्यपदमीश्वरज्ञानमादाय अर्थान्तरव्युदासार्थम् । हेतौ च जन्यपदं तत्रैव ज्ञाने व्यभिचारवारणाय । विशिष्टपदं च साध्यमान निर्विकल्पके व्यभिचारवारणाय । पक्षे च विशिष्टपदं तत्रैव बाधवारणाय ।

[55] न चानुमितित्वावच्छेदेन साध्यज्ञानत्वावच्छिन्नस्यैव कारणत्वात्, विशेषणज्ञानत्वावच्छेदेन कारणत्वाभावात्, दृष्टान्ते साध्यवैकल्यमिति वाच्यम् । न हि विशेषणज्ञानत्वावच्छेदेन तज्ज्ञानजन्यत्वं प्रकृते साध्यं किंतु विशेषणज्ञानजन्यत्वमात्रम् । तच्च आकारान्तरेण तज्ज्ञानजन्यत्वमादायापि पर्यवस्यतीति न कोऽपि दोषः । यद्वा विशेषणज्ञानत्वावच्छेदेन तज्ज्ञानजन्यत्वे साध्यमानेऽपि “यद्विशेषयोः कार्यकारणभावः तत्सामान्ययोरपि बाधकं विना” इति न्यायेन अनुमितित्वेन साध्यज्ञानत्वेन च कार्यकारणभावे विशिष्टज्ञानत्वेन विशेषणज्ञानत्वेन च कार्यकारणभावोऽप्यस्तीति न साध्यवैकल्यम् ।

[56] न च तेनैव न्यायेन अनुमितौ पक्षज्ञानस्य कारणत्वात् विशिष्टज्ञानमात्रे विशेष्यज्ञानस्यापि कारणत्वापत्तिरिति वाच्यम् । निर्विकल्पकस्योभयविषयतया सामग्रीबलादुत्पन्नतया विशेष्यज्ञानस्य जनकत्वाङ्गीकारे बाधकाभावात् । यदि च, घटाभाववद्भूतलमिति ज्ञानं नाभावनिर्विकल्पकपूर्वकं अभावज्ञानस्य प्रतियोगिज्ञानजन्यतया विशिष्टज्ञानसामग्रीनियमेन तद्गोचरनिर्विकल्पकासंभवात् अतोऽभावगोचरं स-

विकल्पकमेव जनकमभ्युपेयम्; तदपि यद्यभावविशेषणकं तदा अनवस्था स्यादित्यभाक्विशेष्यकं तदास्थेयम्; तत्रापि यदि विशेष्यज्ञानं जनकं तदा पुनरप्यनवस्थातादवस्थ्यमिति, विशेष्यज्ञानत्वेन जनकत्वं व्यभिचारात् न संभवतीति मन्यसे तदा तस्मादेव बाधकाद्विशेष्यज्ञानत्वेन जनकत्वं न संभवतीति न किञ्चिदनिष्टम्।

[57] अथाभावत्वप्रकारकप्रत्यक्षत्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति प्रतियोगिज्ञानस्य जनकत्वं नाभावप्रत्यक्षत्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति इदंत्वादिकप्रकारकप्रत्यक्षे व्यभिचारादिति, विशिष्टज्ञानसामग्रीनियमाभावेनाभावेऽपि निर्विकल्पकसंभवात्, तदनन्तरं तद्विशेष्यकं तद्विशेषणकं वा प्रत्यक्षमिति न व्यभिचारः, तदा बाधकाभावाद्विशेष्यज्ञानत्वेनापि जनकत्वमस्तु का नो हानिः। युक्तस्याभावेऽपि निर्विकल्पकाभ्युपगमः। अन्यथा तस्यैन्द्रियकत्वानापत्तेः “आलोचनं हि व्यापारमिन्द्रियाणाम्” इत्यादि स्वरसेनैन्द्रियाणां निर्विकल्पकं प्रत्येव जनकत्वस्थितेः।

[58] अथवा “न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादृते अनुविद्धमिव ज्ञानं सर्वं शब्देन गृह्यते” इति न्यायेन सर्वं सविकल्पकं ज्ञानं शब्दोल्लेखि। न च बालमूकादिज्ञानस्य शब्दोल्लेखित्वासंभवः। विभक्तशब्दोल्लेखासंभवेऽप्यविभक्तनादात्मकशब्दोल्लेखस्य तत्रापि संभवात्। शब्दस्यानुपस्थितत्वे तद्विशिष्ट्यग्रहासंभवात् तदुपस्थितिर्वाच्या। उपस्थितिश्च स्मृतिरूपैव अन्यस्यासंभवात्। सा च न संबन्धिदर्शनं विनेति शब्दस्मृतिहेतुसंबन्धिदर्शनत्वेन निर्विकल्पकसिद्धिः।

सविकल्पकं लक्षयति नामेति। आदिपदेन गुणादयो गृह्यन्ते। तेषां संबन्धसहितं संबन्धविषयमित्यर्थः।

[59] प्रत्यक्षस्य प्रकारान्तरेण त्रैविध्यमाह।

एतच्चेन्द्रियसापेक्षन्निरपेक्षं तथैव च॥ २८॥

अन्तःकरणसापेक्षमिति त्रिविधमिष्यते।

निरपेक्षमिति। बहिःकरणान्तःकरणोभयनिरपेक्षत्वात् निरपेक्षमित्युच्यते। तदुक्तं “प्रत्यक्षं त्रिविधं प्रोक्तमक्षमानसचिद्वशात्” इति। तत्र निरपेक्षस्य वक्ष्यमाणानावृत्तचिच्छक्त्यात्मकस्य प्राधान्यात् प्रथमोद्देश्यत्वमभिमतं छंदोभंगभवेन श्लोके मध्ये निगदितम्।

[60] स्वरूपमाह।

तत्रेन्द्रियानपेक्षं तु सर्वथा त्यक्तबन्धया॥ २९॥

चिच्छक्त्यानन्तयोगाच्च योगस्वाभाविको मतः।

तत्र त्रयाणाम्मध्ये इन्द्रियानपेक्षं प्रत्यक्षं नाम सर्वथा सर्वात्मना त्यक्तबन्धया निराकृतमलादिबन्धया चिच्छक्त्या अनन्तयोगात् अनन्तेन अपरिच्छिन्नेन आत्मना शिवेन वा योगात् अत एव इन्द्रियानपेक्षमेतत् प्रत्यक्षस्य। मुक्तसंबन्धिना परिभूतमलसंबन्धशिवशक्त्या वा यः स्वाभाविको योगः स इत्यर्थः। इदमेव च निरपेक्षं ज्ञानमात्मविषयत्वे स्वसंवेदनं शिवविषयत्वे स्वसंवेद्यमिति च द्वैविध्यं लभत इति मन्तव्यम्।

[61] इन्द्रियसापेक्षं निरूपयति।

अन्यच्चेन्द्रियसापेक्षं स्याच्छादननिवृत्तये॥ ३०॥

इन्द्रियापेक्षया शक्त्या तद्द्वारेणार्थवीक्षणम्।

छादननिवृत्तये मलावरणनिवृत्तये मलावरणनिवृत्त्यर्थमिन्द्रियं
चक्षुरादिकमपेक्षमाणया चिच्छक्त्या तद्द्वारेण इन्द्रियवृत्तिद्वारेणार्थवीक्षणं शब्दादिविषयज्ञानमिन्द्रियसापेक्षनामकं प्रत्यक्ष-
मित्यर्थः । तच्चान्यत् स्यात् निरपेक्षान्तःकरणसापेक्षाभ्यां
भिन्नं स्यादित्यर्थः ।

[62] अन्तःकरणसापेक्षं निरूपयति ।

अन्तःकरणसापेक्षं बाह्येन्द्रियजयेन तु ॥ ३१ ॥

अन्तःकरणसापेक्षं चिच्छक्तेर्ध्येयसंगतिः ।

बाह्येन्द्रियजयेन बाह्येन्द्रियाणां चक्षुरादीनां जयेन स्व-
विषयेभ्यो निवर्तनेन अन्तःकरणसापेक्षं यथा भवति तथा
चिच्छक्तेर्ध्येयेन ध्यातुं योग्येन विषयेन संगतिः संबन्धः
अन्तःकरणसापेक्षं नाम प्रत्यक्षम् । इदं च अन्तःकरणसापेक्षं
प्रत्यक्षं द्विविधं योगिप्रत्यक्षं सुखादिप्रत्यक्षं चेति । तत्र सुखा-
दिप्रत्यक्षं स्पष्टत्वात् नोक्तम् ।

[63] अथ इन्द्रियसापेक्षं बाह्यार्थगोचरं प्रत्यक्षम् । तत्र चि-
च्छक्तेरर्थसंबन्धहेतुभूतमक्षार्थसंबन्धं सोदाहरणं निरूपयति ।

अक्षमात्रेण संबन्धः षड्विधोऽध्यक्षसंज्ञितः ॥ ३२ ॥

घटादिद्रव्यविज्ञानं चक्षुःसंयोगमात्रतः ॥

संयुक्तसमवायात्तद्गुणसामान्ययोर्मतिः ॥ ३३ ॥

संयुक्तसमवेतार्थसमवायाद् गुणत्वधीः ।

शब्दस्य ग्रहणं श्रोत्रसमवेततया स्थितम् ॥ ३४ ॥

शब्दत्वं समवेतार्थसमवायात् प्रतीयते ।

विशेषणतयाभावसमवायमतिस्थिता ॥ ३५ ॥

विशेष्यत्वेन वाभावसमवायमतिस्थिता ।

अक्षमात्रेण चक्षुरादीन्द्रियमात्रेण मात्रशब्दः कात्स्न्यवाचि ।
संबन्धः घटादिविषयाणां यथायथं संबन्धः अध्यक्षसंज्ञितः ।
सिद्धान्ते तु सन्निकर्षस्य व्यञ्जकत्वेन मुख्यप्रमाणत्वाभावात्
तदुपकारकत्वादुपचारादध्यक्ष इत्युच्यते । प्रत्यक्षाह्वयसंब-
न्धः सन्निकर्षः षड्विधः । एतच्च परमतेन । सिद्धान्ते तु
श्रोत्रस्याहंकारिकत्वेन तेन साकं शब्दशब्दत्वयोः संबन्धस्य
संयुक्तसमवायसंयुक्तसमवेतसमवायरूपत्वेन चातुर्विधमेव
द्रष्टव्यम् । तानेव सन्निकर्षान् यथाक्रममुदाहृत्य दर्शयति घटा-
दीति । घटादीनां द्रव्यत्वाच्चक्षुषोऽपि द्रव्यत्वात्तयोः संबन्धः
संयोग इति भावः ।

[64] ननु गुणादिग्रहे संयुक्तसमवायस्य कारणत्वेन कृप्त-
त्वात् द्रव्यग्रहेऽपि तस्य संभवात् स एव हेतुरस्त्विति चेन्न ।
आत्मत्रसरेणवादिप्रत्यक्षे संयुक्तसमवायस्यासंभवेन; संयोग-
स्य कारणताग्रहसमये सामान्यतो द्रव्यप्रत्यक्षत्वावच्छेदेन
हेतुत्वकल्पनात् । तद्गुणसामान्ययोरिति घटादिगतगुणसामा-
न्ययोरित्यर्थः । एतच्च कर्मणोऽप्युपलक्षणम् । तथा च चक्षुः-
संयुक्ते घटे गुणकर्मसामान्यानां समवायात् संयुक्तसमवाय-
सन्निकर्ष इत्यर्थः । गुणत्वधीः गुणत्वादिधीः संयुक्तसमवेतस-
मवायात् । चक्षुःसंयुक्ते घटादौ गुणादेः समवायात् तत्र च
गुणत्वादेः समवायात् संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायस्तद्ग्राहक इ-
त्यर्थः । शब्दस्येति श्रोत्रस्याकाशात्मकत्वेन शब्दस्य च तद्गु-
णत्वात् गुणगुणिनोः संबन्धः समवाय इति श्रोत्रेण शब्दग्रहणे
समवाय इत्यर्थः ।

[65] ननु समवाय एव न मानमिति चेत्, स नीलो घट इति प्रत्ययः संबन्धविषयकः संबन्धनिमित्तको वा विशिष्ट-प्रत्ययत्वात् दण्डी पुरुष इति प्रत्ययवत् तत्त्वं च विशेषणत्व-गोचरबुद्धित्वं विशेषणज्ञानजन्यबुद्धित्वं वा अतो न साध्या-विशेष इति अनुमानस्यैव मानत्वात् । न च स्वरूपसंबन्धमा-दायार्थान्तरत्वं, विशेषणविशेष्यातिरिक्ताविषयके चाभाववि-शिष्टबुद्धौ व्यभिचार इति वाच्यम् । लाघवसहकृतोक्तानुमा-नेन गुणकर्मादिसाधारणस्यैकस्य संबन्धस्य सिद्धेः विशेषण-विशेष्यस्वरूपाणामनन्तत्वात् । न चैवमभावविशिष्टबुद्धावप्यु-क्तहेतुना अभावे समवायसिद्धिप्रसंगः । तथात्वे ध्वंसस्यापि कपालादौ समवायप्रसंगेन समवायिकारणनाशात् ध्वंसस्यापि नाशप्रसंगः ।

[66] ननु एवमपि अभावविशिष्टबुद्धिपक्षीकरणे उक्तानुमा-नेन भट्टोक्तरीत्या वैशिष्ट्यमपि संबन्धान्तरमभावे सिद्धयेदि-ति चेत्, तस्य सर्वाभावेषु एकत्वे पूर्वं घटाभाववति पश्चात् घटवति घटाभाववदिति धीप्रसंगः । अत्र हि पूर्वं स्थितस्य घटाभावस्य नित्यत्वेन घटसत्त्वदशायां संबन्धाभावमादायै-वाप्रतीतिर्वाच्या । इदानीं वैशिष्ट्यस्य तत्संबन्धत्वे तस्यैक-त्वाङ्गीकारे पश्चात् घटाभावप्रतीत्यनुसारेण घटाभाववैशि-ष्ट्यस्यापि तत्र सत्त्वात् तद्धीप्रसंगः । अनेकत्वे च वैशिष्ट्यस्य कृप्तानां विशेषणविशेष्यरूपाणामेव संबन्धत्वमस्तु किं वैशि-ष्ट्याख्येनातिरिक्तेनेति । न चैवं समवाये बाधकं किंचिदस्ती-ति समवायसिद्धिः । न चैवं गुणादिषु समवायाङ्गीकारे तत्र

भूतेषु तादात्म्योक्तिः विरुद्धयेतेति वाच्यम्; तादात्म्यसम-वाययोरेकत्वाभिप्रायेण मतान्तराभिप्रायेण वा तदविरोधात् ।

[67] शब्दत्वं तु समवेतसमवायात् । श्रोत्रसमवेते शब्दे शब्दत्वसमवायात् तद्ग्रहणे समवेतसमवायः संबन्ध इत्य-र्थः । अभावसमवाययोर्मतिः घटाभाववत् भूतलं पटसमवाय-वान् तन्तुरित्यादिः विशेषणतया विशेषणतालक्षणसन्निकर्षेण-त्यर्थः । यदा भूतले घटाभावः घटे रूपसमवाय इति प्रतीतिः तदा विशेष्यत्वेन सन्निकर्षेण ।

[68] ननु विशेषणविशेष्यभावसन्निकर्षेणाभावग्रह इत्यनुप-पन्नम्; अनतिप्रसक्ततदधिकरणतज्ज्ञानतत्समयसंबन्धैरेवाभा-वप्रतीतिव्यवहारयोरुपपत्तेः, अतिरिक्ताभावे मानाभावादिति चेत्, सप्रतियोगिकोऽभावोऽनुभूयते न चाधिकरणादीनां स-प्रतियोगिकत्वमस्ति । प्रागभावादीनां चतुर्णां भविष्यतीत्यादि-बुद्धिविषयाणां वैलक्षण्यमनुभूयते न चाधिकरणादिषु तदस्ति । किंच अधिकरणस्याभावत्वे भूतले घटो नास्तीति अबाधि-ताधाराधेयभावानुपपत्तिः । ज्ञानसमयसंबन्धयोरभावत्वे च भूतले घटो नास्तीति चक्षुषानुभवानुपपत्तिश्च । किंच अधि-करणमात्रस्याभावत्वे घटवत्यपि घटाभावप्रसंगः । न च केव-लाधिकरणमेवाधिकरणमिति वाच्यम् । अभावाघटितस्य कैव-ल्यस्य निर्वक्तुमशक्यत्वात् ।

[69] नन्वस्त्वतिरिक्तोऽभावः तथापि विशेषणतायाः प्र-त्यासत्तित्वे मानाभावादभावस्येन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वमनुपपन्नम् । न चेन्द्रियान्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधानमेव मानम् । तस्याधिकरण-ज्ञानमात्रोपक्षीणत्वात् । यथा न्यायमते वायुप्रतीतौ त्वगिन्द्रि-

यान्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधानस्य स्पर्शलिङ्गग्रहणोपक्षीणत्वं तद्व-
त्। चक्षुषा अभावमहं साक्षात्करोमीति तृतीयापि नियतपूर्व-
वर्तित्वमात्रेण गौणतया कल्पनीया त्वचा वायुमहं साक्षा-
त्करोमीतिवत्। किंच अभावस्य ऐन्द्रियकत्वेऽपि योग्यानुप-
लब्धेः कारणत्वं स्वीकर्तव्यमेव। तत्र च योग्यत्वं नाम प्रति-
योगितद्व्याप्येतरयावत्तदुपलंभकसमवधानमेव। तत्र चेन्द्रिय-
स्यापि तदुपलंभककोटिनिविष्टत्वेन योग्यताघटकतया अव-
च्छेदकत्वेनान्यथासिद्धत्वात्, कारणत्वस्य वक्तुमशक्यत्वा-
च्च।

अपि च किं यज्ञवाटिकायां मैत्रो दृष्ट ? इति केनचित्
कश्चित् पृष्ठः सन् क्षणं ध्यात्वा उत्तरमाह तत्र नासीत् मैत्र
इति। अयं च मैत्राभावग्रहः चक्षुरादिव्यापारं विनापि जाय-
मानत्वेनानुपलब्धिजन्य एव। न च प्रतियोग्यस्मरणेनैव सो
ऽनुमीयते; अनुभूतेऽपि संस्कारप्रमोषेणास्मरणसंभवेन तत्र
तद्व्याप्तत्वाभावात्। इति चेत्,

[70] न। यदि चेन्द्रियव्यापारस्याधिकरणज्ञानमात्रोपक्षीण-
ता, तर्हि अन्धस्य त्वगिन्द्रियोपनीते पीतघटे नीलाद्यभावग्र-
हप्रसंगः। न च प्रतियोगिग्राहकेणेन्द्रियेण अधिकरणज्ञानं त-
त्तापेक्षितमिति वाच्यम्; वायौ रूपाभावाग्रहप्रसंगात्। तस्मात्
नन्यथासिद्धेन्द्रियान्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधानात् विशेषणतायाः
त्यासत्तित्वमङ्गीकर्णीयम्। न च योग्यताघटकतया इन्द्रि-
स्यान्यथासिद्धिः। अवच्छेदकत्वेऽप्यालोकगतोद्भूतरूपवत्
गणताया अविरोधात्।

[71] किंच प्रतियोगितद्व्याप्येतरयावत्तदुपलंभकसमवधा-
नस्यैव योग्यतात्वे, स्फीतालोकवति भूतलादौ निमीलिताक्ष-
स्य घटाभावाग्रहणानुपपत्तिप्रसंगः; अनुपलब्धिरूपग्राहकस-
त्त्वात्। अक्षिनिमीलनेन सन्निकर्षच्छेदेऽपि सन्निकर्षस्य प्रति-
योगिव्याप्यतया प्रतियोगितद्व्याप्येतरयावत्तदुपलंभकसमव-
धानरूपयोग्यताया अपि तत्र सत्त्वात्। तस्मात् प्रतियोगि-
सत्त्वप्रसंजनप्रसंजितप्रतियोगिकत्वमेव योग्यत्वम्। इयं च
योग्यता निमीलिताक्षस्य स्फीतालोकवति घटवद्भूतलस्थले
न संभवति सन्निकर्षाभावेन प्रतियोगिसत्त्वेनोपलंभप्रसंजना-
भावात्।

[72] चक्षुरादिव्यापारं विनापि मैत्राभावप्रतीतिस्तु, सा
शाला तदा मैत्राभाववती तदा मैत्रतद्व्याप्येतरयावत्तदुप-
लंभकसमवहितत्वे सति तत्कालीनानुभवजन्यमैत्राविषयक-
मदीयस्मरणविषयकत्वात्, इत्यनुमानात्। अत्र मदीयत्ववि-
शेषणेन यत्र यस्य मैत्रे तथाविधादरप्रत्ययाभावात् तदानुभवे
ऽपि संस्कारानाधानात्, तत्प्रमोषाद्वा तदविषयकं स्मरणं, त-
द्विषयत्वमादाय तत्र मैत्रवति व्यभिचारो निरस्तः।

[73] अपि च इन्द्रियगतदोषेणाभावग्रहणं दुष्यमाणमनुभूय-
ते। तदपीन्द्रियजन्यत्वे मानम्। न ह्यकारणगतदोषेण कार्यं
क्वचिदपि दृश्यते। तस्मादिन्द्रियस्यान्यथासिद्धिशङ्कैव नास्ती-
ति सिद्धमभावस्येन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वम्। तदनुरोधेन विशेषणताया
अपि सिद्धं प्रत्यासत्तित्वम्।

[74] क्रमप्राप्तमनुमानं निरूपयति।

अनुमानं दृढव्याप्त्या परोक्षार्थावबोधकम्॥ ३६॥

अप्रामाण्यशंकानास्कंदितव्याप्तिविशिष्टपक्षधर्मताज्ञानरू-
पानुमितिजनकत्वमनुमानत्वमित्यर्थः । इदं चानुमानोपकार-
कलक्षणम् । मुख्यानुमानलक्षणं तु उक्तबुद्धिवृत्त्यवच्छिन्नचि-
च्छक्तिकत्वमिति द्रष्टव्यम् । अत्र परोक्षार्थावबोधकमित्येता-
वत्युच्यमाने शब्दप्रमाणे अतिव्याप्तिः । अतः उक्तं दृढव्या-
प्त्येति । तावत्युक्ते संशयोत्तरप्रत्यक्षे अतिव्याप्तिः । अतः
परोक्षेति । न च प्रत्यक्षदृष्टेऽप्यर्थे अनुमित्तया अनुमिताव-
व्याप्तिरिति वाच्यम् । सन्निकर्षाजन्यत्वस्यैव बोधविशेषण-
त्वस्य परोक्षशब्देन विवक्षितत्वात् । एतच्च भ्रमप्रमासाधार-
णानुमानलक्षणम् । अनुमानप्रमाणलक्षणं तु यथार्थत्वविशेषितं
बोध्यम् । एतच्चानुमानं द्विविधं स्वार्थं परार्थं चेति । स्वप्रति-
पत्तिहेतुभूतं स्वार्थं । स्वयं बुद्ध्वा पश्चात् परप्रतिपत्तये यत्
पञ्चावयवं वाक्यं प्रयुङ्क्ते तत् परार्थम् । एतस्य वाक्या-
त्मकस्य परकीयमानसपरामर्शजनकत्वेनानुमानत्वमुपचारा-
त् ।

[75] तदेव परार्थानुमानं निरूपयति ।

तच्चेह पञ्चावयवं प्रतिज्ञाहेतुरेव च ।

दृष्टान्तोपनयावेतौ निगमश्चापि पञ्चमः ॥ ३७ ॥

इष्टार्थोक्तिः प्रतिज्ञा तु हेतुस्तद्व्याप्तिमद्वचः ।

दृष्टान्तो द्विविधोद्युक्तो हेतुस्तद्वत्परीक्ष्यते ॥ ३८ ॥

दृष्टान्तापेक्षया व्याप्तप्रस्तारोपनयो भवेत् ।

पुनः प्रतिज्ञानियमो निगमस्स्यात्सहेतुकः ॥ ३९ ॥

तच्च परार्थानुमानं च इह शास्त्रे प्रतिज्ञादि पञ्चावयवा-
त्मकम् । अनेन “त्रीनुदाहरणान्तान्वा यद्वोदाहरणादिकान्

मीमांसकाः सौगतास्तु सोपनीतिमुदाहृतिम्” इत्यवयवत्रया-
वयवद्वयात्मकं न्यायवाक्यमित्यपरेषामभ्युपगमो निरस्तो
वेदितव्यः । तथा हि न तावद् यद्वोदाहरणादिकानिति पक्षो
युक्तः । साध्यहेत्वोरनिर्देशे प्रथमं व्याप्तेरनाकांक्षितत्वेनोदा-
हरणाद्युपन्यासस्यानाकांक्षिताभिधानत्वेन निग्रहापत्तेः । तथा
च बह्वै हि प्रतिज्ञाते, कुत इत्याकांक्षायां हेतावुपन्यस्ते, कथ-
मस्य गमकत्वमित्याकांक्षायां गमकताप्रयोजके व्यप्तिस्वरूपे
जिज्ञासिते, तद्व्याप्तिप्रतिपादकत्वेनोदाहरणवाक्यस्याकांक्षि-
तत्वादभिधानमुचितं भवति । अतः साकांक्षत्वाय प्रतिज्ञादि-
कमप्यङ्गीकरणीयम् ।

नापि त्रीनुदाहरणान्तान्वेति पक्षो युक्तः । उपनयानभिधा-
ने व्यप्तिविशिष्टस्यैव हेतोः पक्षधर्मताया ज्ञापितत्वाभावात्
व्याप्तिविशिष्टपक्षधर्मतावगाहिपरकीयमानसिकपरामर्शानु-
त्पादप्रसंगेनानुमितेरेवानुत्पत्तिप्रसंगात् । सिद्धवत् निर्देशरू-
पस्य निगमनस्य बाधप्रतिपक्षनिवारकतयोपयोगित्वात् ।
उक्तन्यायेन सोपनीतिमुदाहृतिमिति पक्षो निरस्तः । तस्मात्
युक्तं पञ्चावयवत्वम् ।

[76] अवयवसामान्यलक्षणमनुमितिचरमकारणीभूतलिङ्ग-
परामर्शप्रयोजकशब्दज्ञानजनकवाक्यत्वम् । तानवयवान्वि-
भागेनोद्दिशति प्रतिज्ञेत्यादिना । दृष्टान्तः उदाहरणमित्यर्थः
तत्र प्रतिज्ञां लक्षयति इष्टार्थेति । इष्टः सिषाधयिषितोऽर्थो य-
स्मिन् स इष्टार्थः पक्षः, तस्योक्तिः साध्यविशिष्टतया पक्षस्य
निर्देशः प्रतिज्ञेत्यर्थः । यथा पर्वतो वह्निमानित्यादि । न च
प्रतिज्ञासमानार्थके उदासीनवाक्ये अतिव्याप्तिः; अवयवत्वे

सतीति विशेषणात् । एवमुत्तरत्रापि द्रष्टव्यम् । हेतुं लक्षयति हेतुरिति । वस्तुतो व्याप्तिमतो लिङ्गस्य तत् तादृशं गमकत्वप्रतिपादकविभक्त्यन्तं वचः वाक्यं हेतुरित्यर्थः । एतेन विभक्त्यन्तपदेन वाक्यपदेन चा पञ्चम्यन्तवाक्यरूपे उपनये, तस्मात् वह्निमान् इति निगमनवाक्यैकदेशे च नातिव्याप्तिः ।

उदाहरणं लक्षयति दृष्टान्त इति । दृष्टान्तो नाम महानसादौ द्विविधोद्युक्तः द्वाभ्यां विधाभ्यामन्वयव्यतिरेकव्याप्तिभ्यामुद्युक्तः संबद्धो यो प्रतिपाद्यते येन वाक्येन तद्वाक्यमित्यर्थः । दृष्टान्तो हेतोर्व्याप्तिप्रदर्शकं वाक्यमुदाहरणमिति यावत् । यथा यो यो धूमवान् स स वह्निमान् यथा महानस इत्यन्वयेनोदाहरणं; यथा वा यो यो वह्निमान् न भवति स स धूमवान् न भवति यथा महाह्रद इति व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिप्रदर्शनपरमुदाहरणम् । उपनयं लक्षयति दृष्टान्तेति । दृष्टान्तापेक्षया उदाहरणमपेक्ष्य उदाहरणव्याप्तिमपेक्ष्येति यावत् । पक्षे व्याप्तप्रस्तारः व्याप्तत्वेन प्रकारेण लिङ्गस्य प्रतिपादनं उदाहरणोपदर्शितव्याप्तिकस्य हेतोः पक्षे सत्त्वप्रतिपादकं वाक्यमुपनय इत्यर्थः । यथा वह्निव्याप्यधूमवान् चायमिति । निगमनं लक्षयति पुनरिति । पुनः सहेतुकः हेतूपन्यासपूर्वकः प्रतिज्ञानियमः प्रतिज्ञातार्थस्य नियमो निर्धारणं सिद्धवत् निर्देश इति यावत् स एव निगमः निगमनमित्यर्थः । सहेतुतो पक्षे साध्यस्य सिद्धवत् प्रतिपादकं वाक्यं निगमनं यथा तस्माद्वह्निमानित्यादि ।

[77] ननु व्याप्तिगर्भमनुमानलक्षणं दुर्निरूपम् । व्याप्तेरेव दुर्निरूपत्वात् । अतोऽनुमानप्रमाणमित्यत आह ।

साधनस्य स्वतःसाध्येनान्वयो व्याप्तिरुच्यते ।

साधनस्य साधनत्वाभिमतस्य धूमादेः साध्येन साध्यत्वेनाभिमतस्य वह्न्यादिना यः स्वतोऽन्वयः उपाध्यप्रयुक्तः संबन्धः स व्याप्तिरित्युच्यते । अनौपाधिकसंबन्धो व्याप्तिरिति यावत् । ननु अनौपाधिकत्वं नाम उपाध्यभाववत्त्वम् । उपाधिकत्वं च साध्यव्यापकत्वे सति साधनाव्यापकत्वम् । तत्र यत्किञ्चित्साध्यव्यापकसाधनाव्यापकोपाधेर्निषेधस्य व्यभिचारिसाधारण्यात् प्रकृतसाध्यव्यापकप्रकृतसाधनाव्यापकोपाधिनिषेध एव वाच्यः । स चोक्तोपाधेः सिद्धिव्याप्यः स च सिद्ध्यसिद्धिपराहत एवेति चेन्न । अत्रानौपाधिकसंबन्धो नाम साधनस्य यावत्साध्यसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगिप्रतियोगिकात्यन्ताभावासामानाधिकरण्यम् । प्रतियोगित्वं च स्वरूपसंबन्धविशेषः । वस्तुतस्तु यावत्साधनाधिकरणाधिकरणकसाध्यसंबन्ध एव व्याप्तिः । अस्या एव व्याप्तेरुदाहरणवाक्येन प्रदर्श्यमानतया अनुमितिप्रयोजकत्वाल्लाघवाच्च । तथा च स्वतःशब्दस्यैव यावत्साधनाधिकरणकत्वमर्थो विवक्षित इति वेदितव्यः । अत्र यद्यप्येकस्या अपि साध्यव्यक्तेर्यावत्साधनाधिकरणाधिकरणकत्वं नास्ति तथापि साध्यतावच्छेदकस्य वह्नित्वादेरेकत्वेन स्वाश्रयद्वारा तत्त्वं संभवति । तदवच्छिन्नसाध्यकत्वमुक्तलक्षणार्थो बोद्धव्यः ।

[78] नन्वनुमानं न प्रमाणम् । व्याप्तिग्राहकप्रमाणाभावात् । न तावद् व्याप्तिग्राहकं प्रत्यक्षम् । अगृहीतसहचारस्य सन्निकृष्टधूमादौ व्याप्तिप्रत्यक्षस्यानुदयात् । नापि भूयःसहचार-

ज्ञानसहकृतं प्रत्यक्षम् । सत्यपि भूयःसहचारज्ञाने पार्थिवत्व-
लोहलेख्यादौ व्यभिचारसंशयात् ।

नापि तर्कसहकृतम् । तस्यापि व्याप्तिमूलकत्वेनानवस्था-
नात् । व्याप्तिमूलकत्वाभावे च प्रशिथिलमूलत्वेन तर्कस्या-
भासत्वात् । नाप्यनौपाधिकत्वज्ञानसहकृतम् । योग्योपाधि-
व्यतिरेकस्य निश्चेतुं शक्यत्वेऽपि अयोग्योपाधिव्यतिरेकस्या-
निश्चयात् । नापि व्यभिचारज्ञानविरहसहकृतसहचारज्ञान-
सम्प्रीचीनम् । व्यभिचारज्ञानविरहस्य तर्काधीनत्वेऽनवस्थान-
स्योक्तत्वात्, अव्यभिचारनिश्चयाधीनत्वे अन्योन्याश्रयात्,
कोटिद्वयोपस्थितिविरहप्रयुक्तत्वे रासभादावपि कोटिद्वयोप-
स्थितिविरहदशायां वह्निव्याप्तिप्रत्यक्षप्रसंगात् ।

नाप्यनुमानं तद्ग्राहकम् । तत्प्रामाण्यस्यैव दृश्यमाणत्वात् ।
नापि शब्दः तद्ग्राहकः । अनुमानाप्रामाण्ये अनुमानाधीन-
संकेतग्रहमूलकशब्दस्याप्यप्रमाणत्वात् । किंच वह्निव्याप्यधूम-
वानयमिति परामर्शदशायामेव पर्वते वह्नेर्जातत्वात् सिद्धसां-
धनप्रसंगः; पर्वतनिष्ठधूमे वह्निसामानाधिकरण्ये जायमाने
वह्नौ पर्वतवृत्तित्वस्यापि ज्ञातत्वात् । न चानुमानाप्रामाण्ये
वह्न्यर्थिप्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तिः । वह्निविषयकोत्कटसंदेहादपि प्रवृत्ते-
रुपपत्तेः इति चेत्,

[79] अत्रोच्यते । न तावद् व्याप्तिग्राहकप्रमाणाभावः । व्य-
भिचारज्ञानविरहे सति सहचारग्रहसचिवाध्यक्षस्यैव ग्राहक-
त्वात् । व्यभिचारज्ञानविरहश्च क्वचित्तर्कात् क्वचित् स्वतः-
सिद्ध एव कोटिद्वयोपस्थित्याद्यभावात् । न च तर्कस्यापि
व्याप्तिमूलकत्वेनानवस्थापातः । शंकायां तर्कानुसरणात् । न

हि सर्वत्र शंकया भवितव्यमिति नियमः । न च कोटिद्वयोप-
स्थित्यभावेन व्यभिचारसंशयाभावात् प्रत्यक्षस्य व्याप्तिग्राह-
कत्वे रासभेऽपि व्याप्तिप्रत्यक्षप्रसंगः प्रत्यक्षप्रमायां विषय-
स्यापि कारणत्वेन वह्निव्याप्तिरूपविषयाभावात् । भ्रमजनक-
दोषस्याभावेन भ्रमस्याप्यापादयितुमशक्यत्वात्; तज्जनकदो-
षसत्त्वे च भ्रमस्येष्ट्यमाणत्वात् ।

किंच अनुमानाप्रामाण्ये व्याप्तिग्राहकप्रमाणाभावात् तद-
प्रामाण्यसाधने तस्याप्यमानत्वेन, स्वव्याघातकत्वात् । नापि
परामर्शदशायां वह्नेः सिद्धत्वात् सिद्धसाधनम् । पर्वतविशेष्य-
कवह्निविशेषणकोटेश्यप्रतीतेरसिद्धत्वात् । किंच अनुमानाप्रा-
माण्ये निष्कंपप्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः । न हि वह्निविषयकोत्कट-
संशयाद्वह्नौ निष्कंपप्रवृत्तिरुपपद्यते । एवं चानुमानस्य प्रा-
माण्ये तदधीनसंकेतग्रहणमूलकत्वात् शब्दस्यापि प्रामाण्यम् ।
किंच अनुमानस्याप्रामाण्ये अप्रामाण्यस्यैवाप्रसिद्धत्वेनानुमानं
न प्रमाणमिति साधयितुमशक्यत्वाच्च; साध्यप्रसिद्धेरभावात्
अप्रामाण्यस्य च प्रत्यक्षतो ज्ञातुमशक्यत्वेनानुमानेनैव ज्ञात-
व्यत्वात् । तस्मात् सिद्धमनुमानस्य प्रामाण्यम् ।

[80] उपमानसंभवयोरप्यत्रैवान्तर्भावात् न तयोः पृथक्
प्रामाण्यं स्वीकर्तव्यम् । तथा हि न तावत् गवयपिण्डस्य
गवयशब्दवाच्यत्वपरिच्छेदायोपमानं स्वीकर्तव्यम् तस्याति-
देशवाक्येनैव सिद्धत्वात् । यथा वासस्वी देवदत्त इत्यनेन वा-
क्येन देवदत्तस्य वाच्यत्वपरिच्छेदः । नापि गवयत्वस्य वा-
च्यत्वपरिच्छेदार्थं तत्सहकारः । गवयपदं सप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तकं
पदत्वात् घटादिपदवत् इत्यनुमानं लाघवसहकृतं सत् गवय-

त्वस्य प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तत्वं विषयीकरोति । लाघवस्य प्रमाणमा-
त्रसहकारित्वात् । अत एव क्षित्यादिकं सकर्तृकमित्यत्रैकत्व-
सिद्धिः । अत एव दण्डादीनामन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां कारणत्व-
ग्रहे दण्डत्वादेः कारणत्वावच्छेदकत्वसिद्धिः । यद्वा गवयत्वं
गवयपदप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तं तत्पदजन्यज्ञानविशेष्यवृत्तिलघुधर्म-
त्वादित्यनुमानेन गवयत्वस्य वाच्यत्वपरिच्छेदात् । एवं सं-
भवफलस्याप्यन्यथासिद्धत्वात् तदपि न स्वीकर्तव्यमेव । सह-
स्रसंख्यावच्छिन्नपदार्थनिश्चये शतसंख्यावच्छिन्नपदार्थसद्भाव-
स्यापि अनुमानेन निश्चेतुं शक्यत्वादिति दिक् ।

[81] उक्तव्याप्तेर्द्वैविध्यमाह ।

सा च व्याप्तिर्द्विधा ज्ञेया व्यतिरेकान्वयात्मिका ॥ ४० ॥

सामान्यमुखतोऽन्वेयः सोऽन्वयो व्याप्तिरुच्यते ।

साध्यसाधनयोर्व्याप्तिरभावमुखतोऽपरा ॥ ४१ ॥

सा पूर्वोक्तलक्षणलक्षिता व्याप्तिः व्यतिरेकान्वयात्मिका
व्यतिरेकान्वयस्वरूपा व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिरन्वयव्याप्तिश्चेति
द्विविधा ज्ञेयेत्यर्थः । तत्र का अन्वयव्याप्तिः का व्यतिरेक-
व्याप्तिरित्याकांक्षायामाह सामान्येति । साध्यसाधनयोः
साध्यत्वसाधनत्वाभिमतयोर्यः संबन्धः स सामान्यमुखतः
यदेवं तदेवमिति सादृश्यमुखेन विधिमुखेनेति यावत् । अन्वे-
यः अन्वयः संबन्ध इत्यर्थः । स च संबन्धः अन्वयव्याप्ति-
रित्युच्यते । यः साध्यसाधनयोः संबन्धः अभावमुखतः यन्नैवं
तन्नैवमिति व्यतिरेकमुखतः साऽपरा व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिरि-
त्यर्थः ।

[82] ईदृशव्याप्तिमदनुमानं द्विविधमित्याह ।

दृष्टं सामान्यतोदृष्टमिति तत्साधनं द्विधा ।

तत्राद्यमक्षयोग्यस्य पदार्थस्यानुमापकम् ॥ ४२ ॥

अन्यत् स्वतोऽप्यदृष्टस्य पदार्थस्यानुमापकम् ।

तद् उक्तव्याप्तिमतः साधनम् अनुमानं दृष्टं विशेषतोदृष्टं
सामान्यतोदृष्टमिति द्विधा । तत्र तयोर्मध्ये आद्यं दृष्टमनु-
मानम् । अक्षयोग्यस्य इन्द्रियेण द्रष्टुं योग्यस्य बह्यादेः पदा-
र्थस्य अनुमापकम् । अन्यत् सामान्यतोदृष्टमनुमानम् स्वतो-
ऽप्यदृष्टस्य क्वाप्यदृष्टस्य इन्द्रियायोग्यस्य इन्द्रियादेः पदार्थ-
स्यानुमापकम् ।

[83] इत्थं द्विविधमनुमानं पुनः त्रिविधं भवतीत्याह ।

अन्वयव्यतिरेकीति केवलव्यतिरेकि च ॥ ४३ ॥

केवलान्वयिरूपेण क्रमेण परिलक्ष्यते ।

केवलान्वयिरूपेण केवलान्वयीति । शेषं सुगमम् ।

[84] परिलक्ष्यत इत्युक्तं कथमित्यत आह ।

पक्षधर्मः सपक्षे सन् व्यावृत्तश्च विपक्षतः ॥ ४४ ॥

अबाधोऽसत्प्रतिपक्षो व्यतिरेकान्वयात्मकः ।

तत्र व्यतिरेकान्वयात्मकः अन्वयव्यतिरेकिहेतुः । तस्य
पञ्चरूपोपपन्नत्वं लक्षणम् । पक्षधर्मत्वसपक्षसत्त्वविपक्षा-
सत्त्वाबाधितविषयत्वासत्प्रतिपक्षत्वरूप पञ्चरूपोपपन्नः अन्व-
यव्यतिरेकिहेतुरिति यावत् ।

[85] पक्षादयः के यद्वर्मादिकं लक्षणमुक्तमित्यत आह ।

साध्यधर्मयुतः पक्षः सपक्षस्तत्सधर्मयुक् ॥ ४५ ॥

तद्विधर्मो विपक्षः स्यात् बाधो मानान्तरोद्भवः ।

साध्ये द्वयोस्त्रिरूपत्वं तेन ज्ञानाद्विपक्षता ॥ ४६ ॥

तत्र पक्षः साध्यधर्मयुतः संदिग्धसाध्यवान्। सपक्षः तत्
सधर्मयुक् निश्चिततत्समानधर्मवान्। विपक्षः तद्विधर्मः
निश्चिततद्वर्माभावलक्षण तद्विरुद्धधर्मवान्। बाधः मानान्तरो-
द्भवः। अनुष्णोऽग्निः पदार्थत्वादित्यादेरसद्देतोः अग्निरुष्ण
इति बाधः त्वगिन्द्रियप्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणान्तरसमुत्थः। सत्प्रति-
पक्षत्वं च द्वयोर्हेत्वोः कृतकत्वश्रावणत्वादिरूपयोः साध्ये नि-
त्यत्वानित्यत्वरूपे स्वस्वसाध्ये विषये त्रिरूपत्वं पक्षधर्मत्वा-
दित्रिकवत्वम्। सत्प्रतिपक्षे अबाधितत्वासत्प्रतिपक्षितत्वरूप-
योरसंभवात्।

न तु वास्तविकं त्रिरूपत्वं विरुद्धसाध्यं प्रति द्वयोर्वस्तुत-
स्त्रिरूपत्वाभावात्। तदुभयोरपि वास्तविकत्रिरूपत्वाभावे
कथं प्रतिपक्षतेत्यत आह तेनेति। तेन त्रिरूपतया ज्ञायमान-
त्वमात्रेण विपक्षता स्वरूपानुमितिप्रतिबन्धकतेत्यर्थः।

[86] केवलान्वयिकेवलव्यतिरेकिणौ लक्षयति।

निर्विपक्षोऽन्वयीहेतुर्निःसपक्षस्तथा परः।

निर्विपक्षः विपक्षरहितः केवलान्वयिसाधक इति यावत्।
तेन न सिद्ध्यसिद्धिभ्यां व्याघातः। विपक्षव्यावृत्तत्वातिरि-
क्तपूर्वोक्तचतुरूपोपपन्नत्वं केवलान्वयित्वमिति यावत्। निः-
सपक्षः सपक्षवद्भिन्नः व्यतिरेकसहचारमात्रगृहीतव्याप्तिक
इति यावत्। तेन न सिद्ध्यसिद्धिव्याघातः। परः केवलव्य-
तिरेकी। सपक्षसत्त्वरूपव्यतिरिक्तरूपचतुष्टयवत्त्वं केवलव्य-
तिरेकित्वमित्यर्थः। तेन पूर्वत्रात्र च न बाधितादावतिव्या-
प्तिः।

[87] त्रयाणां क्रमेणोदाहरणमाह।

साग्निर्देशः सधूमत्वादन्वो रसवती यथा॥ ४७॥

केनाप्यध्यासितं विश्वं कार्यं स्याद्वस्तुभावतः।

यथा कुलालसापेक्षा मृदित्येषाऽन्वयी पुनः॥ ४८॥

सदेवोत्पद्यते कार्यं क्रियमाणत्वहेतुतः।

असन्नपूर्वं क्रियते धर्मांशः शशशृङ्गवत् ॥ ४९॥

अन्यो विवादास्पदीभूतो देशः पर्वतादि। एतच्च सिद्धसा-
धनादिवारणाय। साग्निः वह्निमान् सधूमत्वात् धूमवत्त्वादि-
त्यर्थः। यदुक्तसाधनवत् तदुक्तसाध्यवत् यथा रसवती पाक-
शाला; यदुक्तसाध्यवत् न भवति तदुक्तसाधनवत् न भवति
यथा रसवती जलवती दीर्घिका इत्यावृत्त्या अन्यव्यति-
रेकदृष्टान्तद्वयं द्रष्टव्यम्। अयमन्वयव्यतिरेकीति शेषः। विश्वं
सर्वमुपादानं केनापि चेतनेनाध्यासितमधिष्ठितं सत् कार्यं
स्यात् कार्यावस्थं भवति वस्तुभावतः वस्तुत्वात् यदेवं तदेवं
यथा कुलालसापेक्षा कुलालाधिष्ठिता मृदिति एष हेतुरन्वयी
केवलान्वयीत्यर्थः।

नन्वीश्वरे केनाप्यधिष्ठितत्वस्य साध्यस्याभावात् कथ-
मस्य केवलान्वयित्वमिति चेत् मैवम्। ईश्वरे साध्याभाव-
सत्त्वेऽपि इदानीमीश्वरसाधनावसरे तस्यानिश्चयेन निर्वि-
पक्षत्वरूपं यथाश्रुतलक्षणमप्रत्यूहमेव। न चास्य हेतोस्तथा-
पीश्वरे व्यभिचारः स्यादिति वाच्यम्। ईश्वरसिद्धेः पूर्वं
व्यभिचाराज्ञानेनानुमितिप्रतिबन्धाभावात्। अनुमित्युत्तरकालं
च तत्प्रतिसंधानस्याकिंचित्करत्वात्। न च वस्तुतो व्यभि-
चारिलिङ्गजन्यत्वेनानुमितेः भ्रमत्वं स्यादिति वाच्यम्;
विषयाबाधेनैव तस्याः प्रमात्वोपपत्तेः। अथवा पुनःशब्द-

सूचितः केवलान्वयिसाधकः घटोऽभिधेयः वस्तुत्वात् द्रव्य-
त्वादित्यादिहेतुर्द्रष्टव्यः। अतो निर्विपक्षत्वलक्षणस्य विवक्षिते
केवलान्वयिसाध्यकत्वरूपार्थेऽपि न दोषः।

सर्वं कार्यं पूर्वं सदेव विद्यमानमेवोत्पद्यते क्रियमाणत्वरू-
पाद्धेतोः इत्यर्थः। कृतिविषयत्वादिति यावत्। यो धर्माशः
पूर्वमसन् न विद्यमानः सः न क्रियते कृत्या न विषयीक्रियते
यथा शशशृङ्गमित्ययं हेतुः केवलव्यतिरेकीति शेषः। सपक्षा-
भावात्। इदमेव चानुमानं यथायोग्यं सामान्यतोदृष्टविशेषतो-
दृष्टयोरप्युदाहरणं पृथक् नोदाहृतम्।

[88] एवं हेतुं निरूप्य तज्ज्ञानाधीनज्ञानत्वाद्धेतुत्वाभासान्
पूर्वोक्तपञ्चरूपेष्वेकैकविरहरूपानाह।

हेतूनां दूषणान्यत्र पञ्चोक्तानि शिवागमे।

असिद्धिः प्रथमो हेतोः पक्षवृत्तेरनिश्चये॥ ५०॥

नित्यत्वादणवो हेतुरित्यसिद्धिस्वरूपतः।

विशेषणविशेष्यादेरसिद्ध्या तत्तदात्मिका॥ ५१॥

हेतूनां दूषणान्यनुमितिप्रतिबन्धकतावच्छेदकानि अत्र शि-
वागमे पञ्च पञ्चधाविभज्योक्तानि असिद्धत्वविरुद्धत्वा-
नैकान्तिकत्वप्रकरणसमत्वकालात्ययापदिष्टत्वभेदेन; अज्ञाना-
सिद्धेरसिद्धावन्तर्भावात् अनध्यवसितस्य सव्यभिचारे अन्त-
र्भावादिति भावः। नन्वेवमपि विरुद्धसव्यभिचारयोर्व्याप्य-
त्वासिद्धावन्तर्भावसंभवात् कथं पञ्चसंख्याकत्वमिति चेन्न।
उपधेयसंकरेऽपि दूषकताप्रयोजकरूपाणां तदभासतोपाधी-
नामसंकीर्णत्वेन पृथगुपदेशात् पञ्चसंख्याकत्वम्।

[89] अत्रासिद्धिं लक्षयति असिद्धिरिति। हेतोर्व्याप्तस्य
लिङ्गस्य पक्षवृत्तेः पक्षधर्मत्वस्यानिश्चये। निश्चयाभाव एवा-
निश्चयः। असिद्धिः प्रथमो हेत्वाभासः। लिङ्गस्य व्याप्ति-
पक्षधर्मताभ्यां निश्चयविरहः असिद्धिरित्यर्थः। इदं च लक्षणं
मतान्तराभिप्रायेण। स्वमते तु व्याप्तस्य हेतोः पक्षवृत्तित्व-
विरह एवासिद्धिर्बोध्यः। इयं चासिद्धिश्चतुर्विधा स्वरूपा-
सिद्धिर्व्याप्यत्वासिद्धिराश्रयासिद्धिर्ज्ञानासिद्धिश्चेति। प्रथमं
स्वरूपासिद्धिमुदाहृत्य दर्शयति नित्यत्वादिति। अणवः पर-
माणवः हेतुः जगदुपादानं नित्यत्वादित्यत्र नित्यत्वहेतोः
स्वरूपतः असिद्धिः स्वरूपेणासिद्धिः अणूनामपि जडत्वे
सत्यनेकत्वेनानित्यत्वादिति भावः।

इतरासिद्धीनां स्वरूपानाह विशेषणेति। विशेषणस्य लिङ्ग-
विशेषणस्य व्याप्तेः, विशेष्यस्य लिङ्गविशेष्यस्य आश्रयस्य
पर्वतादेः, आदिपदेन व्याप्तिपक्षधर्मतावगाहिज्ञानस्य च अ-
सिद्ध्या तत्तदात्मिका असिद्धिः व्याप्यत्वासिद्धिः, आश्रया-
सिद्धिः, ज्ञानासिद्धिश्चेति। तत्र व्याप्यत्वासिद्धिर्द्विविधा व्या-
प्तिग्राहकप्रमाणाभावादुपाधिसद्भावाच्च। आद्या यथा शश-
विषाणोल्लेखिता भूः भूत्वात् इति। द्वितीया यथा अग्नि-
ष्टोमीयहिंसा अधर्मसाधिका हिंसात्वात् इतरहिंसावत् इति;
अत्र अविहितत्वं उपाधिः। नीलधूमत्वादेर्व्यर्थविशेषणस्यापि
अत्रैवान्तर्भावः।

आश्रयासिद्धौ यथा गगनारविन्दं सुरभि अरविन्दत्वात्
स्थलारविन्दवत् इति। सिद्धसाधनमप्याश्रयासिद्धे अन्त-
र्भूतम्। ज्ञानासिद्धिस्तु यदा धूमादिकं व्याप्तिपक्षधर्मतया न

जायते तदा धूमादेः ज्ञानासिद्धिः । हेतुगतविशेषणविशेष्ययोः
असिद्धिः स्वरूपासिद्धिः । एवमाश्रयविशेषणानामसिद्धि-
राश्रयासिद्धिरेव । यथा शब्दो नित्यः चाक्षुषत्वे सति गुण-
त्वादित्यत्र विशेषणासिद्धो हेतुः । विशेष्यासिद्धिस्तु अस्यैव
व्यत्यसेनोपन्यासे । कनकमयोऽद्रिर्वह्निमान् इत्यादौ आश्रय-
विशेषणासिद्धिरिति द्रष्टव्यम् । एतत्सर्वं च तत्तदात्मिकेत्यनेन
सूचितम् ।

[90] विरुद्धं लक्षयति ।

वर्तमानो विरुद्धस्याद्धेतुः पक्षविपक्षयोः ।

व्यापकोऽव्यापकः देशानवच्छिन्नत्वहेतुतः ॥ ५२ ॥

पक्षविपक्षयोर्वर्तमानो हेतुविरुद्धः स्यात् इति संबन्धः ।
अत्र विपक्षमात्रवृत्तित्वं विरुद्धलक्षणम् । पक्षपदं तु क्वचिद्विरु-
द्धे पक्षवृत्तित्वमपि संभवतीत्यभिप्रायेण । मात्रपदेन च साधा-
रणानैकान्तिके नातिव्याप्तिरिति द्रष्टव्यम् । उदाहरति व्याप-
क इति । व्यापकः आत्मादि अव्यापकः अविभुः देशानव-
च्छिन्नत्वात् । अयं तु हेतुरविभुत्वे साध्ये विपक्षमात्रवृत्तित्वा-
त् विरुद्धः । एवं चन्दनप्रभव वह्निमान् असुरभिधूमत्वादि-
त्यादौ साध्यहेतुगतविशेषणानां परस्परविरोधेऽपि विरुद्धहे-
त्वाभासो द्रष्टव्यः ।

[91] सव्यभिचारस्त्रिविधः साधारणः असाधारणः अन-
ध्यवसितश्चेति । तत्र साधारणं लक्षयित्वोदाहरति ।

पक्षादित्रितये वर्तमानोऽनैकान्तिको भवेत् ।

आत्मा नित्यः प्रमेयत्वादित्यत्रोदाहृतो द्विजाः ॥ ५३ ॥

पक्षादित्रितये तन्मध्ये वर्तमानः सपक्षविपक्षयोर्वर्तमानः
साधारणोऽनैकान्तिकः । सपक्षवृत्तित्वे सति विपक्षवृत्तित्वं त-
ल्लक्षणं द्रष्टव्यम् । विरुद्धे अतिव्याप्तिवारणाय सत्यन्तम् ।
सद्धेतावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय विशेष्यम् । उदाहरति आत्मा नि-
त्य इति । अत्र प्रमेयत्वहेतुः सपक्षविपक्षोभयवृत्तित्वात् सा-
धारणानैकान्तिकः ।

[92] असाधारणानध्यवसितौ लक्षयति ।

साध्याप्रयोजकः पक्ष एवानध्यवसायिकः ।

साध्याप्रयोजकः साध्याव्याप्तः तदसहचरित इत्यर्थः ।
अनेन व्याप्तिग्रहानुकूलाप्रतीतसहचारत्वमनध्यवसितत्वमि-
ति लक्षणं द्रष्टव्यम् । इदमेव चानुपसंहार्यत्वमित्यप्युच्यते ।
पक्ष एव वर्तमानः सपक्षे सतीति शेषः । एवं च सपक्षे सति
पक्षमात्रवृत्तित्वमसाधारणलक्षणम् । केवलव्यतिरेकिण्यतिव्या-
प्तिवारणाय सत्यन्तम् । सद्धेतावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय मात्रप-
दम् ।

[93] अनध्यवसितस्योदाहरणमाह ।

संतत्या वर्तते विश्वं वस्तुत्वादित्युदाहृतः ॥ ५४ ॥

विश्वं सर्वं संतत्या वर्तते संतानात्मना तत्तत्प्रवाहरूपेण
वर्तते वस्तुत्वादित्यत्र सर्वस्य पक्षीकृतत्वात् व्याप्तिग्रहानुकू-
लान्वयसहचारव्यतिरेकसहचारयोरप्रतीतत्वादनध्यवसितम् ।
भूर्नित्या गन्धवत्त्वादित्यसाधारणानैकान्तिकोदाहरणं प्रसिद्ध-
त्वादुपेक्षितम् । ननु नित्यः शब्दः शब्दत्वादित्यत्र सद्धेताव-
साधारणलक्षणमतिव्याप्तमिति चेन्न । अनुकूलतर्कावतारदशा-
यां साध्यनिश्चयेन पक्षस्यैव सपक्षत्वात् पक्षमात्रवृत्तित्वरूप-

लक्षणं तत्र नास्त्येव । तदनिश्चये च तस्य लक्ष्यत्वात् नाति-
व्याप्तिः ।

[94] बाधहेत्वाभासं निरूपयति ।

कालातीतस्तु पक्षस्य पक्षे मानविरोधतः ।

निरुपादानकं विश्वं कार्यमागन्तुकत्वतः ॥ ५५ ॥

पक्षस्य पक्षस्थसाध्यस्यानुष्णादेः पक्षे वह्न्यादौ मानविरो-
धतः स्वभावरूपोष्णग्राहकप्रत्यक्षादिविरोधात् कालातीतः
पदार्थत्वादिति हेतुबाधितविषयो नाम हेत्वाभासो भवतीत्य-
र्थः । प्रमितसाध्याभाववत्पक्षकत्वं बाधलक्षणं द्रष्टव्यम् । अत्र
प्रमितसाध्याभाववत्कत्वमित्येतावदुच्यमाने सद्धेतावतिव्या-
प्तिः स्यात् अतः पक्षपदम् । न च विरुद्धविशेषे अतिव्याप्ति-
रिति वाच्यम् । प्रमितस्वाविरुद्धसाध्याभाववत्पक्षकत्वमिति
विवक्षणात् विरुद्धे च साध्यस्य हेतुविरुद्धत्वात् नातिव्या-
प्तिः ।

उदाहरति निरुपादानकमिति । विश्वं समस्तं कार्यं निरु-
पादानकं भवितुमर्हति आगन्तुकत्वात् कादाचित्कत्वादित्य-
र्थः । इदं च “उपादानं स बिन्दुराट्”, “मायातत्त्वं जगद्बीज-
मविनाश्यशिवात्मकं विभ्वेकममलं सूक्ष्ममनाद्यव्ययमैश्वरम्”
इत्यागमबाधितं, घटादौ प्रत्यक्षबाधितं चेति द्रष्टव्यम् । प्र-
करणसमस्य तु “साध्ये द्वयोः” इत्यादिना लक्षणमुक्तम् ।
यद्यपि बाधस्यापि “बाधो मानान्तरोद्भव” इत्यादिना पूर्वं
लक्षणमुक्तं तथाप्यागमप्रत्यक्षादिबाधितत्वरूपविशेषप्रदर्शनाय
पुनः कथनमिति बोध्यम् ।

[95] ननु बाधसत्प्रतिपक्षयोर्यथाक्रमं ग्राह्याभावप्रमात्वेन
तत्सामग्रीत्वेन वा अस्तु प्रतिबन्धकत्वं इतरेषां हेत्वाभासा-
नां कथमनुमानदूषणत्वमित्यत आह ।

व्याप्तेर्यथावद्विज्ञातं साधनं साध्यसिद्धये ।

पर्याप्तमसतो हेतोर्येन केनापि वर्त्मना ॥ ५६ ॥

व्याप्तिभंगोऽनुमानस्य दूषणं प्रथमं मतम् ।

यथावद्विज्ञातं व्याप्तपक्षधर्मत्वेन प्रमीयमाणं साधनं साध्य-
सिद्धये पर्वते वह्निसिद्धये व्याप्तेः व्याप्तिबलात् इदं चोपल-
क्षणं पक्षधर्मबलाच्च पर्याप्तं समर्थमित्यर्थः । एवं हि वस्तु-
स्थितिः । तत्र असतो हेतोरसिद्धादेर्येन केनापि वर्त्मना परा-
मर्शविषयीभूतयत्किंचिद्विघटनद्वारा व्याप्तिभंगः परामर्शवि-
घटकत्वमित्यर्थः । अनुमानस्य प्रथमं दूषणं मतम् ।

[96] एवं हेत्वाभासनिरूपणप्रसंगेनान्यान्यपि निग्रहस्थाना-
नि लेशतो दर्शयति ।

अनुष्णो वह्निरित्यादि प्रतिज्ञाते सहेतुकम् ॥ ५७ ॥

पञ्चानामनुमानस्यावयवानां तु पूर्वयोः ।

वैपरीत्यं सदुद्दिष्टं दृष्टान्तस्याधुनोच्यते ॥ ५८ ॥

नित्य आत्मा विभुत्वेन यथाकाशमितीरिते ।

दृष्टान्तः साध्यविकलः साधने च तथा भवेत् ॥ ५९ ॥

अनुष्णो वह्निरिति आदिपदाद्वह्निमानयं पर्वत इति च प्र-
तिज्ञाते सहेतुकं हेतुपूर्वकं पदार्थत्वात् वह्निरनुष्ण इति धूम-
त्वात् पर्वतो वह्निमानिति च प्रतिज्ञाते अनुमानस्य न्यायवा-
क्यस्य पञ्चानामवयवानां प्रतिज्ञादीनां मध्ये पूर्वयोः
प्रतिज्ञाहेत्वोः इदं चोपलक्षणं प्रतिज्ञैकदेशस्यापि वैपरीत्यं

विपर्ययेणोपन्यासः अप्राप्तकालं नाम निग्रहस्थानं सदुद्दिष्टं दुद्दिष्टसहितं प्रतिज्ञाभासयुक्तमित्यर्थः । एतदुक्तं भवति अवयवानां विपर्यासे अप्राप्तकालं नाम निग्रहस्थानं प्रतिज्ञैकदेशस्य विपर्यये तु प्रतिज्ञाभास इति । तदुक्तं गौतमैः “अवयवविपर्यासवचनमप्राप्तकालम्” इति । एतौ च पुरुषादिदोषौ नार्थदोषौ ।

अधुना दृष्टान्तस्याभासतोच्यते उदाह्रियत इत्यर्थः । आत्मा नित्यः विभुत्वात् यदेवं तदेवं यथा गगनमितीरिते दृष्टान्तः आकाशः साध्यविकलः । शब्दतन्मात्रजन्यत्वेन नित्यत्वाभावादित्यर्थः । इदमेव साधनविकलस्याप्युदाहरणमित्याह साधने चेति । जन्यत्वेनैव उपरितनतत्त्वेषु व्यापकत्वाभावात् साधने विभुत्वलक्षणे साधनविषये विकलः साधनविकल इति यावत् । चकारेणोभयवैकल्यस्यापि इदमेवोदाहरणमिति सूचितम् । तेनैव सरोजारविन्दं सुरभि अरविन्दत्वात् गगनारविन्दवदिति स्वरूपविकलोऽपि सूचित इति द्रष्टव्यम् । एते चोदाहरणाभासाः अर्थदोषाश्च ।

अत्र तथा भवेदिति तथाशब्दप्रयोगादन्यान्यपि निग्रहस्थानानि सूचितानि छलजातयश्च । तत्रोक्तिदोषरूपोदाहरणाभासो यथा पर्वतो वह्निमान् धूमत्वादिति प्रयोगे केवलं महानसवदित्यनुपदर्शितान्वयोदाहरणाभासः । तत्रैव यथा महाह्रद इत्यनुपदर्शितव्यतिरेकोदाहरणाभासः । यत्र वह्निस्तत्र धूम यथा महानस इति विपरीतदर्शितान्वयः । यत्र धूमाभावस्तत्र वह्न्यभाव यथा महाह्रद इति विपरीतदर्शितव्यतिरेकः । निग्रहस्थानसूत्रं “प्रतिज्ञाहानिः प्रतिज्ञान्तरं प्रतिज्ञावि-

रोधः प्रतिज्ञासंन्यासः हेत्वन्तरमर्थान्तरमनर्थकमपार्थक्यम]-विज्ञातार्थकमप्राप्तकालं न्यूनमधिकं पुनरुक्तम[न]नुभाषणम-ज्ञानमप्रतिभाविक्षेपः मतानुज्ञापर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणं निरनुयोज्यानुयोगः अपसिद्धान्तः हेत्वाभासाश्च” इति निग्रहस्थानानि द्वाविंशतिः ।

साधर्म्यवैधर्म्योत्कर्षापकर्षवर्ण्यादयः चतुर्विंशतिजातयः । सामान्यच्छलोपचारच्छलवाक्छलभेदात् त्रिविधं छलमित्यादिकं द्रष्टव्यम् ।

[97] उद्देशक्रमप्राप्तं शब्दप्रमाणं निरूपयति ।

आप्तोक्तिरागमः सोऽपि परोक्षार्थैकसाधनम् ।

आप्तोक्तिः आप्तवाक्यं आगमः शब्दप्रमाणमित्यर्थः । आप्तश्च प्रकृतवाक्यार्थगोचरयथार्थज्ञानवत्त्वे सति यथार्थवक्ता । वाक्यं चात्राकांक्षासत्तिमत्पदकदंबकम् । न तु योग्यतागर्भमपि आप्तपदेनैव तल्लाभात् । योग्यतागर्भत्वे च अनन्वयनिश्चयविरहरूपा योग्यता द्रष्टव्या । इयं च योग्यता स्वरूपसत्येव हेतुः ।

आकांक्षा च अभिधानापर्यवसानम् । तदर्थस्तु यस्य पदस्य येन पदेन विना तात्पर्यविषययदर्थान्वयाननुभावकत्वं तस्य पदस्य तेन पदेन साकं तस्मिन् अन्वये साकांक्षत्वमिति । एवं च घटः कर्मत्वमानयनं कृतिरिति वाक्यं साकांक्षं चेत् क्रियाकर्मभावेनाप्यन्वयबोधं जनयेत् निराकांक्षं चेदभेदान्वयबोधमपि न जनयेदिति दूषणं परास्तम् ; क्रियाकर्मभावान्वयबोधविरहस्य स्वरूपयोग्यत्वाभावप्रयुक्तत्वेनापरपदविरहप्रयुक्तत्वाभावात् । तात्पर्यविषयेति विशेषणं च अहो विमलं

जलं नद्याः कच्छे महिषश्चरतीत्यत्र जलसंसर्गतात्पर्येण प्रयु-
क्तस्य नदीपदस्य कच्छान्वयेऽपि साकांक्षत्वनिवारणाय ।

आसत्तिश्चाव्यवधानेनान्वयप्रतियोग्युपस्थितिः । तथा च
प्रकृतवाक्यार्थगोचरयथार्थज्ञानवद्वयार्थवक्तृप्रणीताकांक्षासत्ति-
मत्पदकदंबकत्वं प्रमाणवाक्यत्वम् । अत्र पदकदंबकत्वं प्रमाण-
वाक्यत्वमित्युच्यमाने अनासन्ने गिरिभुक्तमग्निमान् देवदत्ते-
नेत्यादावतिव्याप्तिः; अत उक्तमासत्तिमदिति । तावत्युक्ते
निराकांक्षे घटः कर्मत्वमित्यादावतिव्याप्तिः; अत उक्तमा-
कांक्षेति । तावत्युक्ते विप्रलंभकवाक्ये अतिव्याप्तिः; अत
उक्तं यथार्थवक्तृप्रणीतेति । तावत्युक्ते भ्रान्तवाक्ये अतिव्या-
प्तिः; अत उक्तं यथार्थज्ञानवदिति । तस्यापि पदावलीगोचर-
यथार्थज्ञानवत्वात् तत्रैवातिव्याप्तिः; अत उक्तं प्रकृत-
वाक्यार्थगोचरेति ।

[98] ननु शब्दस्यानुमान एवान्तर्भावोऽस्तु । तथा हि एता-
नि पदानि प्रकृतपदस्मारिततात्पर्यविषयसंसर्गप्रमापूर्वकाणि
आकांक्षायोग्यतासत्तिमत्पदकदंबकत्वात् गामानय दण्डेनेति
पदकदंबकवत् । धूमोऽस्तीति वाक्ये वह्निसंसर्गप्रमापूर्वकत्वे-
नार्थान्तरवारणाय प्रकृतपदस्मारितेति । प्रमेयत्वमित्यादौ
अभेदसंसर्गप्रमापूर्वकत्वेनार्थान्तरवारणाय तात्पर्यविषयेति ।
भ्रमपूर्वकत्वेनार्थान्तरवारणाय प्रमेति । हेतौ चाकांक्षापदं अहो
विमलं जलं नद्याः कच्छे महिषश्चरतीत्यत्र नदीकच्छसंस-
र्गानभिप्रायेण प्रयुक्ते तस्मिन्नंशे व्यभिचारवारणाय । अकांक्षा
च तात्पर्यघटितैवात्र विवक्षिता । योग्यतापदं चायोग्ये वह्नि-
ना सिंचेदित्यादौ व्यभिचारवारणाय । आसन्नपदं चानासन्ने

गिरिभुक्तमित्यादौ व्यभिचारवारणाय । एवं च न शब्दस्य
पृथक् प्रामाण्यमिति चेत्,

[99] न । अत्र हेतुप्रविष्टयोग्यतापदेन अनन्वयनिश्चय-
विरहरूपयोग्यताया विवक्षितत्वे बाधितवाक्ये व्यभिचारः;
अबाधितार्थकत्वरूपयोग्यताया विवक्षितत्वे सन्दिग्धासि-
द्धिः । एवमेते पदार्था मिथः संसर्गवन्तः आकांक्षायोग्यता-
सत्तिमत्पदकदंबकत्वादित्यनुमानमपि दूषणीयम् ।

[100] नन्वेतानि पदानि स्वप्रतिपाद्यसंसर्गज्ञानपूर्वकाणि
संदर्भविशेषवत्त्वादित्यनुमानमदुष्टमस्तु; वह्निना सिंचतीत्या-
दौ संसर्गाभावेऽपि संसर्गज्ञानपूर्वकत्वस्य साध्यस्य सत्त्वात् ।
न च शुकाद्युदीरिते व्यभिचारः तत्र संदर्भविशेषाभावात्;
तद्व्यावृत्तसंदर्भानङ्गीकारे सर्वसम्मतवक्तृज्ञानानुमानोच्छेदा-
पत्तेः; न चैवं तत्रान्वयबोधानुपपत्तिः संदर्भविशेषरूपलिङ्गा-
भावादिति वाच्यम् ।

तत्रार्थबोधपूर्वकसंदर्भवदानुपूर्विसमानानुपूर्विकमित्येताव-
न्मात्रेणार्थज्ञानाभिमानात् । यथा तत्तदर्थबुबोधयिषापूर्वकचेष्टा-
विशेषसमानाकारोन्मत्तचेष्टाविशेषस्थले बुबोधयिषापूर्वकत्व-
व्याप्यचेष्टाविशेषत्वस्याभावात् तदननुमानेऽपि तत्सदृशदर्श-
नात् तत्स्मरणमात्रं तथा प्रकृतेऽपीति न कश्चिदोषः ।

न चैवमपि संसर्गस्य स्वातन्त्र्येणासिद्धेः प्रवृत्तिर्न स्पष्टि-
ति वाच्यम् । अभिप्रायविषयतया अर्थोपस्थितेरपि चेष्टादि-
स्थले प्रवर्तकत्वदर्शनादत्रापि ज्ञानविषयतया अर्थोपस्थितेरपि
प्रवर्तकत्वसंभवात् । अन्यथा चेष्टाया अपि प्रमाणान्तरत्वा-
पत्तेरिति चेत्,

[101] न। स्वातन्त्र्येणार्थज्ञानं प्रवर्तकं न तु अर्थज्ञानमात्रं तथा सति गेहे घटं संदिहे इत्यादिज्ञानस्यापि प्रवर्तकत्वापत्तिः। तस्मात् ज्ञानविषयतास्वातन्त्र्येणार्थोपस्थितिरेव प्रवर्तिका। सा च द्वेधा निर्वहति। यदि साक्षादर्थ एवानुमीयते [वा] न च तथानुमानं संभवति। अबाधितार्थकत्वरूपयोग्यताविनाकृतस्य हेतुत्वे व्यभिचारस्य, तत्सहकृतस्य तथात्वे अज्ञानासिद्धेश्चोक्तत्वात्।

[102] न चैवं चेष्टाविशेषादिजन्यानुमितेरप्यभिप्रायविषयतया अर्थविषयकत्वेन प्रवर्तकत्वं न स्यात्; अर्थाभावेऽपि तत्सत्त्वेन अर्थव्याप्त्यभावेन साक्षादर्थविषयकत्वासंभवादिति वाच्यम्। तस्य व्याप्तिबलेनाभिप्रायानुमापकत्वानङ्गीकारात्, साक्षादेवार्थज्ञापकत्वाभ्युपगमात्। न चैवं चेष्टाया अपि प्रमाणान्तरत्वापत्तिः कृप्तप्रमाणेष्वनन्तर्भूतत्वादिति वाच्यम्। संकेतसाचिव्येनार्थबोधकत्वस्य शब्दप्रमाणलक्षणत्वात् चेष्टायाश्च तादृशत्वेन शब्दप्रमाणान्तर्भावात्। न च शब्दचेष्टादेरर्थाभावस्थलेऽपि सत्त्वात् कथं साक्षादर्थबोधकत्वमिति वाच्यम्। व्याप्तावेव व्यभिचारस्य विरोधित्वेन संकेतेनार्थप्रत्यायकत्वे तस्याविरोधित्वात्। ऐतिह्यमबाधितार्थकं शब्द एवान्तर्भूतं बाधितार्थकं त्वप्रमाणमेवेति सर्वं समञ्जसम्।

[103] ननु मोक्षादिपरोक्षार्थैकबोधके वेदागमादौ अस्मदादिप्रणीतत्वासंभवादव्याप्तिरित्यत आह सोऽपीति। सोऽपि वेदागमादिरपि आप्तप्रणीत एवेति नाव्याप्तिरित्यर्थः। यथा च वेदागमयोः पौरुषेयत्वं तथोक्तमधस्तात्।

[104] ननु किमाप्तलक्षणं को वा तत्राप्तः स्यादित्यत आह।

प्रत्यक्षेणानुमानेन यदि वार्थं सुनिश्चितम् ॥ ६० ॥

यो वक्ति सोऽयमाप्तस्स्यात् तस्मादाप्ततरः शिवः।

प्रत्यक्षेण चक्षुरादिना यदि वा अनुमानेन सुनिश्चितं प्रमितमर्थं यो यथा प्रमितं वदति सोऽयमाप्तः स्यात्। अप्तलक्षणं तु निष्कृष्य प्रदर्शितमेव प्राक्। ईदृशः कस्तर्हि वेदागमादावाप्त इत्यत आह तस्मादिति। तस्मात् आप्तलक्षणलक्षितत्वात् शिवः आप्ततरः। अस्मदादिषु कदाचिदोषसंभावना स्यात् ईश्वरे सापि नास्तीति तरबर्थः।

[105] ननु “रागद्वेषादिकालुष्यं पुरुषेषूपलभ्यते” इति न्यायेन कथमीश्वरस्य निर्दुष्टत्वमित्यत आह।

सुप्रसन्नेन्द्रियग्रामः सर्वज्ञः सर्वगोचरः ॥ ६१ ॥

पक्षपातविनिर्मुक्तो यथार्थग्राहकः सदा।

अव्ययः परिपूर्णश्च स्वतन्त्रः पशुपाशहा ॥ ६२ ॥

प्रमाणमेकं तद्वाक्यं तथ्यं श्रेयोनिधिः सदा।

सुप्रसन्नेन्द्रियग्रामः सुतरां प्रसन्नः इन्द्रिय समूहो यस्य सः तथोक्तः। एतेन करणापाटवादिदोषराहित्यं शिवस्य सूच्यते। अस्मदादिवत् सार्वज्ञ्यं मलावृतं न भवतीत्याह सर्वगोचर इति। एतेन सर्वज्ञ सर्वगोचर इत्यनेन भ्रमराहित्यं प्रमादराहित्यं च सूच्यते। पक्षपातविनिर्मुक्त इत्यनेन वैषम्याभाव सूच्यते। यथार्थग्राहक इत्यनेन प्रतारकत्वाभावः सूच्यते। सदेत्यनेन अस्मदादिवैलक्षण्यं प्रति विशेषणं सूच्यते। अव्ययोनित्यः अनेन प्रतिसर्गं सर्गाद्यकाले आगमप्रवक्तृत्वं सूच्यते।

परिपूर्णः पूर्णकाम इत्यर्थः । तेन किञ्चिदभिलाषेणापि अन्यथा-
वादित्वं निवार्यते । स्वतन्त्र इत्यनेन परप्रयुक्ततयाप्यन्यथा-
भाषणं निवार्यते । पशुर्पाशहा इत्यनेन दयालुता सूच्यते । न
हि दयालुः कश्चिदयथार्थं वदतीति भावः । तद्वाक्यं तस्यैवं
विधपरमेश्वरस्य वाक्यमागमादि तथ्यमबाधितं श्रेयोनिधिः
श्रेयःसाधनं मोक्षादिश्रेयसाधनं एकं प्रमाणं केवलं प्रमाणं न तु
कदापि क्वचित् किञ्चिदपि अस्मदादिवाक्यवदप्रमाणमपीति
भावः ।

ननु कथमशरीरस्य शिवस्य सुप्रसन्नेन्द्रियग्रामत्वमिति
चेन्न । तस्य बैन्दवादिशरीराद्यभावेऽपि शाक्तशरीराभ्युपग-
मात्, “शाक्तं तस्य वपुः स्मृतम्” इत्यादिवचनाच्च । अमु-
मेवार्थं तन्त्रावतारे “प्रगुद्दिष्ट” इत्यादिना शंकापरिहाराभ्यां
स्पष्टीकरिष्यति ।

[106] नन्वेवमुक्तप्रकारेण शिवोक्तागमस्य प्रामाण्येऽपि
इह श्रूयमाणानां कामिकादिवातूलान्तानां कथं प्रामाण्यमि-
त्यत आह ।

सृष्ट्यनन्तरमेवेशः शुद्धाध्वविषयानून् ॥ ६३ ॥

स्वांशुसंस्पर्शनादेव कृत्वा दृक्क्रिययोत्कटान् ।

सदाशिवोऽपि भगवान्नादरूपतयागतम् ॥ ६४ ॥

षट्पदार्थमयं ज्ञानमनेकच्छन्द एव तत् ।

पूर्वतो दशसंख्यातं शिवभेदं तथापरम् ॥ ६५ ॥

रौद्रमष्टादशविधं तेभ्योऽवादीत् कृपानिधिः ।

तत्तद्देशक्रमान्मेरावागतं तन्त्रसागरम् ॥ ६६ ॥

ईशः शिवः सर्गाद्यकाले, सृष्ट्यनन्तरं शिवशक्तिकोभित-
कुण्डलिनीवृत्तिरूपनादात्मकशास्त्रसृष्ट्यनन्तरम् । यद्वक्ष्यति
“ततस्त्वहर्मुखे काले” इत्यादिना “शास्त्रं नादस्वरूपम्”
इत्यन्तेन । शुद्धाध्वा विषयो येषां ते शुद्धाध्वविषयाः शुद्धा-
ध्ववर्तिन इत्यर्थः । स्वांशुसंस्पर्शनादेव स्वशक्तिसंपर्कादेव
दृक्क्रियया ज्ञानक्रियाशक्तिभ्यां उत्कटान् कृत्वा अनेन तेषां
ग्रहणधारणोपदेशसमर्थत्वं सूच्यते । भगवान् शिवः सदाशिवो-
ऽपि सदाशिवात्मना स्थितः सन् पुनः नादरूपतया आगतं
पत्यादिषट्पदार्थप्रतिपादकं तदेव ज्ञानं शिवशास्त्रं अनेक-
च्छन्दः नानाविधच्छन्दोरूपेण ग्रथयित्वा पूर्वतः दशसंख्यातं
शिवभेदं शिवनामकं शास्त्रं तथा अष्टादशविधमपरं रौद्रं तु
तेभ्यः प्रणवादिभ्यो दशभ्यः शिवेभ्यः, अनन्तादिभ्यः अष्टा-
दशरुद्रेभ्यश्च कृपालुत्वादवादीत् उपदिष्टवान् । छांदसत्वात्
कर्तरि लुक् ।

तथापि कथमिहागमनमित्यत आह तत्तदिति । तत्तदूर्ध्व-
तत्त्वक्रमादधस्तत्त्वेषु मेरौ विकलादिद्वारा आगतं तन्त्रसागरं
शिवशास्त्रमवतीर्णम् । तन्त्रस्यापारत्वात् गंभीरतया च
सागरत्वेन निरूपणम् ।

[107] तैरेव प्रसिद्धकामिकादिभिः सर्वागमार्थस्यावगन्तुं
शक्यत्वादेतत्प्रणयनं किमर्थमित्याशंक्य तेषामतिविततगहन-
गंभीरत्वात् सर्वानुग्रहार्थमिदं प्रणीतमित्याह ।

तत्रेदं पौष्करं तन्त्रमर्थवादादिलोपतः ।

उद्धृत्य विप्रा युष्मभ्यं कथितं बहुयुक्तिभिः ॥ ६७ ॥

स्थापयध्वमिदं भूमौ योग्येषु गुरुवर्त्मसु ।

तत्र तस्मिन्नागमसागरे । निर्धारणे सप्तमी । अर्थवादादि-
लोपतः तत्रत्यं भुवनवर्णनादिरूपमर्थवादांशं विहाय उद्धृत्य
अमृतवत् अरविन्देषु मकरन्दमिव सारांशं बहुयुक्तिभिः सा-
र्थमादाय अत एव पौष्करसादृश्येन पौष्करनामकं तन्त्रं हे
विप्राः युष्मभ्यमतिश्रद्धाभक्तिग्रहणधारणादिसामर्थ्यसंपन्नेभ्यः
कथितम् । कथितमिति वक्ष्यमाणांशसद्भावेऽपि सिद्धवन्निर्देशः
वक्ष्यमाणांशस्य स्वल्पत्वसूचनार्थः ।

इदं तु योग्येभ्यः एवोपदेष्टव्यं न तु लोभादिना अयो-
ग्येभ्य इत्याह स्थापयध्वमिति । इदं पौष्करतन्त्रं भूमावपि
गुरुवर्त्मसु गुरव एव वर्त्म येषां ते गुरुवर्त्मानः । गुरोर्वर्त्मत्वं
तु श्रेयोमार्गप्रदर्शकत्वात् । योग्येषु भक्त्यादिश्रद्धादिसन्नीचीनेषु
स्थापयध्वं प्रवर्तयध्वं संप्रदायाविच्छेदाय प्रवर्तयध्वमित्यर्थः ।
तदुक्तं निश्वासागमे “ज्ञानं प्रकटयस्वेदं मद्भक्तानां वरानने
रक्षणीयं प्रयत्नेन तस्करेभ्यो यथा धनम्” । आगमान्तरे च
“शुद्धशैवमिदं तन्त्रं न देयं न प्रकाशयेत् । दीक्षितस्य च धीर-
स्य शिवभक्तिरतस्य च । श्रावणीयं न चान्यत्र कथनं हि प्र-
शस्यते” इति । न देयं न प्रकाशयेदिति अयोग्येभ्य इति शे-
षः । अन्यत्र अयोग्येषु न प्रशस्यत इत्यर्थः । एतदर्थप्रति-
पादिका श्रुतिरपि छान्दोग्ये मधुविद्यायां श्वेताश्वतरे षष्ठा-
ध्याये च द्रष्टव्या ।

[108] ननु ब्रह्मागमविष्णवागमादिषु सत्स्वेतदुपदेशतः एत-
च्छैवागमोपदेशः किमर्थमित्यत आह ।

अन्योऽपि मार्गो वेदादिः पशुपाशार्थदर्शकः ॥ ६८ ॥

स्वोक्ततत्त्वावधिव्याप्तिः ब्रह्मविष्णवादिकर्तृकः ।

परस्तान्मोक्षमार्गस्य स्थितिस्स्वर्गादिभोगतः ॥ ६९ ॥

ब्रह्मविष्णवादिकर्तृकः आदिपदेन बृहस्पत्यादिपरिग्रहः ।
वेदादिः वेदैकदेशः कर्मोपासनोपदेशभागः अन्यः शैवागमात्
भिन्नमार्गोऽपि ब्रह्मविष्णवागमपांचरात्रादिः पशुपाशार्थदर्शकः
पशूनां पाशरूपप्रयोजनदर्शकः न तु परममुक्तिप्रदर्शकः । तदे-
व कुत इत्यत आह स्वेति । तत्तदागमोक्तानि तत्त्वानि अव-
धिः पर्यन्तभूमिः यस्याः सा तथोक्ता तादृशी व्याप्तिः व्या-
पनं यस्य स तथोक्तः । अयमर्थः ब्रह्मविष्णवाद्यागमाः “भूत-
तन्मात्रकाक्षाणि मनोऽहंकारबुद्धयः गुणव्यक्तनराश्चैव प्राप्य-
स्थानानि वासिनाम्” इत्युक्तन्यायेन तत्तत्पदप्राप्तिरूपश्रेयः-
प्रदर्शका एव न तु परमश्रेयोरूपमोक्षप्रतिपादकाः । अत एव
च पशुपाशार्थप्रतिपादकत्वमेव । तदुक्तमन्यत्राप्यागमे “आ-
प्तोक्तिरत्र सिद्धान्तः शिव एवाप्तिमान् यतः न ताभ्यां स-
दृशः कश्चिच्छ्रेयसोऽस्ति विधायकः सिद्धान्त एव सिद्धान्त
पूर्वपक्षास्ततः परे आगमाः शिव एवैकः शिवोऽन्यस्त्वशिवो
मतः” इति । तदुक्तमधस्ताच्च “तन्त्रान्तरेषु यो सिद्धाः
पशवो व्याप्त्यभावतः शोभ्या बोध्याश्च ते येन पशुत्वस्य
व्यवस्थितेः” इति ।

ननु तत्तत्त्वावधिप्राप्तिरेव किं न मुक्तिः ? नेत्याह पर-
स्तादिति । स्वर्गादिभोगतः आदिपदाच्छिवतत्त्वपर्यन्तभुवन-
भोगा गृह्यन्ते । ततः परस्तादेव मोक्षमार्गस्य स्थितिः । तदु-
क्तमधस्तात् “योजिता लयतत्त्वे ये ते मुक्ता नापरत्र
च” इति । लयतत्त्व इति लयनामकशिव इत्यर्थः । एवं च

शैवागमोपदेशस्य परममुक्तिप्रतिपादनार्थत्वात् न तैरानर्थ-
क्यमिति भावः ।

[109] ननु तर्हि किमर्थमुपनिषदामुपदेश इति चेत् कामि-
कादिनानागमोपदेशवदुपपत्तेः उपायस्योपायान्तरादुष्टकत्वा-
त् । अयमर्थविशेषः । त्रैवर्णिकानां तु सर्वशास्त्रान्यायेन वेदा-
गमशैवागमयोर्मिलित्वा स्वार्थप्रमापकत्वमन्यान् प्रति तु शि-
वागमस्यैवेति । यथा चतुर्थवर्णस्याप्यागमाध्ययनाचार्याभिषे-
कादावधिकारः तथोक्तमधस्तात् “अभक्तमद्विजं क्रूरम्”
इत्यादिव्याख्यानसमये ।

[110] ननु आगमानां शब्दसंदर्भरूपतया वागिन्द्रियताल्वो-
ष्ठपुटव्यापारादिसाध्यत्वस्यावश्यकत्वात् सर्वतत्त्वोतीर्णस्य
निष्कलस्य तदभावात् कथमागमप्रवर्तकत्वमित्याक्षिपन्ति
ऋषयः ।

निष्कलान्नादरूपात्मा ज्ञानमार्गः प्रवर्तते ।

इत्युक्तं तन्न युक्तं स्याद्वागिन्द्रियवियोगतः ॥ ७० ॥

“सृष्ट्यनन्तरमेवेश” इत्यादिना यन्नादरूपो ज्ञानमार्गः प्र-
वर्तते इत्युक्तं तन्न युक्तं स्यात् । कुत इत्यत आह वागिन्द्रि-
येति । वचनसाधकेन्द्रियस्याभावात् । तद्युक्तेष्वेव वचनादिति
भावः ।

[111] अस्मदादीनां क्रियाशक्तेर्मलावृतत्वेन तदभिव्यक्तये
कलावद्वागिन्द्रियापेक्षा वचनार्थमुपपद्यते । शिवस्य तु अना-
वृतशक्तिकत्वेन तदनपेक्षत्वादन्तरेणापि वागिन्द्रियमागमप्र-
णेतृत्वं नित्याभिव्यक्तकर्तृशक्त्यैवोपपद्यत इत्याह ईश्वरः ।

वागिन्द्रियानपेक्षास्य शक्तिः सर्वत्र निःसृता ।

अत्यन्तविमलत्वेन तया वक्ति किमद्भुतम् ॥ ७१ ॥

अस्य शिवस्य शक्तिः क्रियाशक्तिः अत्यन्तं विमलत्वेन
कालत्रयेऽपि मलसंबन्धरहितत्वेन सर्वत्र निःसृता सर्वेषु
तत्तद्विषयेषु निःसृता उन्मुखी वागिन्द्रियानपेक्षा वागिन्द्रिया-
पेक्षाशून्या तज्जन्यमलनिवारणस्य स्वतो निर्मलत्वेनान-
पेक्षणादित्यर्थः । तथैवंविधया शक्त्या इन्द्रियमनपेक्षैवागमान्
वक्ति चेत् किमद्भुतं नात्र किञ्चिदाश्चर्यमित्यर्थः ।

[112] ननु अस्तु क्रियाशक्त्यभिव्यक्तिः तथापि निष्कल-
स्य शिवस्य वक्तृत्वं नोपपद्यते ताल्वोष्ठपुटव्यापारघटित-
त्वाद्वक्तृत्वस्येत्यत आह ।

प्रवक्तृत्वं स्वचिच्छक्तिप्रवृत्त्यनुगुणस्य च ।

नादस्य बिन्दोः प्रसृतिः शब्दानां निःसृतिस्ततः ॥ ७२ ॥

प्रवक्तृत्वं नाम स्वचिच्छक्तिप्रवृत्त्यनुगुणस्य नादस्य सू-
क्ष्मायाः पश्यन्त्या वाचः निःसृतिः न ताल्वोष्ठपुटव्यापार-
घटितमित्यर्थः । ननु तथापीश्वरोक्तनादात्मकागमस्य अस्म-
दादिश्रवणायोग्यत्वात् कथमुक्तं पुरुषार्थप्रसिद्धये आगमप्रण-
यनमिति । तत्राह बिन्दोरिति । नादात् प्रणीतात् बिन्दोर्मध्य-
मायाः प्रसृति ततो मध्यमातः शब्दानां वैखर्यात्मकानां निः-
सृतिरिति परंपरया पुरुषार्थत्वोपयोगित्वमित्यर्थः ।

[113] ननु तथाप्यागमस्य शिवज्ञानानुमापकत्वमुक्तं तन्नो-
पपद्यते श्रूयमाणशब्दस्य तदजन्यत्वादित्याशङ्क्याह ।

शब्दास्तु पारंपर्येण शिवज्ञानानुमापकाः ।

पारंपर्येण मध्यमाद्यनुमिति द्वारा शिवज्ञानानुमापकाः न
तु साक्षादित्यर्थः । तदुक्तं रत्नत्रये “जायतेऽध्वा यतः शुद्धो

वर्तते यत्र लीयते स बिन्दुः परनादाख्यो नादबिन्दुर्णकारण-
म्” इति वैखरीवर्णः । तत्र शिवागमत्वव्यवहारोऽपि न स्या-
दित्याशङ्क्य परिहरति शब्दा इति । अत्र श्रूयमाणा वर्णात्मक-
शब्दास्तु पारंपर्येण स्वकारणीभूतबिन्दुनुमापनद्वारा शिवज्ञा-
नानुमापकाः शिवज्ञानस्य “नादरूपतयागतं षट्पदार्थमयं
ज्ञानम्” इत्युक्त्या नादात्मकस्य बिन्दुकारणस्यानुमापकाः ।
तथात्र तद्व्यवहारो नादजन्यबिन्दुजन्यतया उपचारात् नि-
रुद्धलक्षणया ।

[114] नन्वेवं परमश्रेयोविधायके शिवागमे जाग्रति तदभि-
ज्ञानामपि ब्रह्मविष्णवादीनां मार्गान्तरप्रणेतृत्वं कथमित्यत
आह ।

अथवा सद्भिरप्राप्ता श्रद्धया शिवगोचराः ॥ ७३ ॥

अन्ये तु सज्जनायाताः प्रकृत्याद्यवगोचराः ।

वाशब्दस्यार्थः । अथ च विद्यमानेष्वपि शिवागमेष्वित्यर्थः ।
ते शिवगोचराः शिवविषयाः आगमाः सद्भिः शास्त्रान्तरप्र-
णेतृभिः श्रद्धया श्रद्धापूर्वकं अप्राप्ता नाधीताः । अत एव प्रकृ-
त्याद्यवगोचराः प्रकृत्याद्यर्वाचीनतत्त्वविषयाः अन्येऽप्याग-
माः पांचरात्रादयः सज्जनायाताः तेभ्यः सज्जनेभ्यो वि-
ष्णवादिभ्यः शास्त्रप्रणेतृभ्यः आयाताः आगताः प्रवृत्ता इति
यावत् ।

[115] ननु तर्ह्येवं वैमत्येन शास्त्रान्तरप्रणयने तयोः शैव-
तदन्यशास्त्रयोर्विरोधे बाध्यबाधकभावनियमः कथं स्यादि-
त्यत आह ।

ततःशिवगिरां बोधो विबोधो नान्यया गिरा ॥ ७४ ॥

न चार्षं पौरुषैर्वाक्यैः ऋषिभिर्दैविकं तथा ।

न देवैर्ब्रह्मणो वाक्यं वैष्णवं पद्मजन्मना ॥ ७५ ॥

तथा रौद्रं न हरिणा रुद्रेण च शिवात्मकम् ।

बाध्यमूर्ध्वोर्ध्ववैशिष्ट्यादधोऽधोबाध्यमूर्ध्वतः ॥ ७६ ॥

ततः आगमानामन्येषां प्रकृत्याद्यर्वाचीनतत्त्वमात्रगोचरत-
या शिवगिरां सर्वतत्त्वगोचराणां बोधः ज्ञानं अन्यया गिरा
पांचरात्रादिशास्त्रेण विबोधः विरुद्धो बोधः यस्य स विबोधः
न बाध्यो नेत्यर्थः ।

[116] यद्वा अथवा इत्यादेरपरा व्याख्या । तत्तद्देशक्रमात्
मेरावागतं तन्त्रसागरमिति शिवप्रणीता एव शब्दा गुरुपरंप-
रया मेरौ समागता इत्युक्तम् । इदानीं पक्षान्तरमाह अथवा
इति । शिवगोचराः शब्दाः सद्भिः विकलादिभिः मायाया अ-
धः अप्राप्ता एव शुद्धवर्णाः । उक्त सज्जनायाताः शब्दा अ-
न्य एव । तत्र हेतुः प्रकृत्याद्यवगोचराः प्रकृतिः माया माया-
दित्यन्या इत्यर्थः ।

तर्ह्यर्थबोधकत्वं कथमश्रूयमाणत्वात्, प्राकृतानां वा कुत्रो-
पयोग इत्यत आह तत इति । प्राकृतवर्णेभ्यः शिवगिरां बोधो
भवति तैर्हि ता व्यज्यन्त इत्यर्थः । ननु प्राकृतगिरौ वार्थ-
बोधोऽस्तीत्यत आह अन्यया गिरा प्राकृतया विबोधो वि-
शेषेण बोधो न संभवति अशुद्धया शुद्धशिवादिबोधासंभवा-
दिति भावः ।

[117] एवं चाधिकार्थाभिज्ञप्रणीतं वाक्यं नाल्पाभिज्ञप्रणीतेन
वाक्येन बाध्यते किंतु तस्यैव बाधकमित्यभिप्रायेणाह न चा-
र्षमिति । आर्षं ऋषिप्रणीतं मन्वादिशास्त्रं पौरुषैरस्मदादिवा-

क्यैः । न बाध्यमिति सर्वत्र संबन्धो द्रष्टव्यः । ऋषिभिः ऋषि-
वाक्यैः दैविकं इन्द्रादिप्रणीतं देवैः देववाक्यैः ब्रह्मणो वाक्यं
ब्रह्मप्रणीतं पद्मजन्मना ब्रह्मवाक्येन वैष्णवं पांचरात्रादि तथा
तद्देव हरिणा हरिवाक्येन रौद्रं रुद्रप्रणीतं रुद्रेण रुद्रवाक्येन
शिवात्मकं शिवप्रणीतं शास्त्रं न बाध्यम् । कुत इत्यत आह
ऊर्ध्वोर्ध्व इति । वैशिष्ट्यात् उत्कर्षात् पुरुषापेक्षया ऋषीणां
ऋष्यपेक्षया देवानामित्यादिक्रमेणोत्कर्षाः प्रसिद्धा एव ।

शिवस्य तु सर्वापेक्षयोत्कर्षः सकलश्रुतिस्मृतीतिहासपुरा-
णादिभिः पतिपटले अस्माभिः समर्थितः । ऊर्ध्वतः शिवागमे-
न रौद्रं रौद्रेण वैष्णवमित्याद्यधोऽधः क्रमेण बाध्यम् अधोऽधः
अवैशिष्ट्यात् ज्ञानादिदौर्बल्यादित्यर्थः । तदुक्तं सर्वज्ञानोत्तरे
“न पुंभिरार्षं वाक्यं वै दैविकं नार्षकैः सदा न देवैर्ब्रह्मणो
वाक्यं वैष्णवं पद्मजन्मना न शैवं वैष्णवेनापि बाध्यते तु
कदाचन” इति । श्रीमन्मतङ्गेऽपि “पञ्चमन्त्रतनू श्रीमान् स-
कलः परिपद्यते” इत्यादिना “तस्योक्तिः पौरुषैः स्थूलैः प्र-
माणैर्न च बाध्यते” इत्यन्तेन । पौरुषैरिति आर्षादीनामप्युप-
लक्षणम् ।

[118] यद्यपि “अष्टादशानामेतासां विद्यानां भिन्नवर्त्मनाम्
आदिकर्ता शिवः साक्षाच्छूलपाणिरिति श्रुतिः” इति श्रुति-
मूलकवायव्यसंहितावचनानुसारेण सर्वासां विद्यानां शिवक-
र्तृत्वाविशेषेण बाध्यबाधकभावचिन्ता नोपपद्यते तथापि त-
त्तच्छास्त्रोपप्रणेतृविष्णवादिप्रणीतशास्त्रविषयेयं चिन्त्येत्या-
कार एव स्फुटम् । नन्वेवमपि “पुराणं बाध्यते वेदैरागमैश्च
तदुक्तयः” इति उपप्रणेतृरहितस्य शिवेनैव प्रणीतस्य वेदस्य

कथमागमबाध इति चेत् वेदानभिहितायामपि कलादिसृष्टौ
आगमानुसारेण वियदधिकरणन्यायादुभयोर्वेदशिवागमयोर-
विरोधनयनं कर्तव्यमित्येवं तात्पर्यकं तद्वचनम् । अन्यथा
आगमान्तरेषु “वैदिकीं तु पुरा कृत्वा पश्चाच्छैवीं समाचरे-
त्” इति वैदिकधर्मपुरस्करणं, “वेदात् सारं समुद्धृत्य” इति
क्वचिदागमार्थस्य वेदार्थसारत्वेनौत्कृष्ट्य कथनं च विरुध्यते ।

[119] ननु उक्तवचनानुसारेण रुद्रागमेन शिवागमस्याबा-
ध्यत्वेऽपि इतरागमबाध्यत्वं किं न स्यादित्याशङ्क्य व्यापक-
बलवदागमविरोधे व्याप्यं दुर्बलमन्यथा नेतुमुचितं न तु वैप-
रीत्यमित्यभिप्रायेण आह ।

शिवागमाविरोधेन शास्त्रं सर्वं व्यवस्थितम् ।

नान्यशास्त्राविरोधेन तत्संवादतयाऽथवा ॥ ७७ ॥

शिवशास्त्रं व्यवस्थाप्यं तद् व्याप्तं व्यापकं यतः ।

सर्वं सांख्यादिशास्त्रं शिवागमविरोधे प्रसक्ते तदविरोधे-
नार्थान्तरे व्यवस्थितं व्यवस्थापनीयमित्यर्थः । शिवशास्त्रं तु
अन्यशास्त्रविरोधे प्रसक्ते अन्यशास्त्राविरोधेन अन्यैः सां-
ख्यादिभिः शास्त्रैरविरोधेन विषयान्तरे न व्यवस्थाप्यम् । अ-
थवा किंच अविरोद्धस्थलेऽपि तत्संवादतया तदेकार्थतया
शिवशास्त्रं प्रमाणमिति न व्यवस्थाप्यम् । कुत एतदित्यत
आह तदिति । यतः यस्मात् कारणात् तत् सांख्यादिशास्त्रं
शिवशास्त्रेण व्याप्तं तत्प्रतिपाद्यप्रकृत्यन्ततत्त्वजातस्यात्रापि
प्रतिपादनात् । शिवशास्त्रं तु सर्वेषां शास्त्राणां व्यापकं तद-
प्रतिपादितानामपि तत्त्वानामत्र प्रतिपादनात् तदपेक्षया बहु-
विषयज्ञानवत्प्रणीतत्वेन बलवत्त्वादिति भावः ।

[120] ननु एवं शिवशास्त्रेण सांख्यादिशास्त्राणां विरोधे सति सर्वथा किं प्रमाणं चेत्यत आह ।

यस्य यस्य हि शास्त्रस्य यावति व्याप्तिरिष्यते ॥ ७८ ॥

तावत्येव भवेद्विप्राः प्रामाण्यं तस्य तस्य च ।

यस्य यस्य हि शास्त्रस्य चार्वाकादिप्रणीतस्य यावति भूतादौ विषये व्याप्तिः व्यापनं तात्पर्यमिष्यते तावत्येव भूतादिमात्रविषये तस्य तस्य चार्वाकादिशास्त्रस्य प्रामाण्यं भवेदित्यर्थः ।

ननु “अधोऽधो बाध्यमूर्ध्वतः” इत्यादिना लोकायतादिमार्गाणां बाध्यत्वमुक्तम् । अत्र च तेषां प्रामाण्यमुच्यत इति विरुद्धमिव प्रतिभाति इति चेन्न । जीवेश्वरस्वरूपे जगत्कारणादौ च वस्त्वंशे स्वरूपनिरूपणे विरोधे सति वस्तुविकल्पासंभवात् तदंशे बाध एव । क्रियांशे तु उदितानुदित होमवत् अधिकारिभेदेन व्यवस्थया विकल्पाश्रयणेन प्रामाण्यमिति तात्पर्यात् न तु पूर्वोत्तरवचनविरोधः । एतच्च सर्वमार्गाणां प्रामाण्यं सूतसंहितादौ स्पष्टं प्रतिपादितं निरूपितं चास्माभिः आगमप्रामाण्यावसरे ।

[121] वृत्तानुवादपूर्वकं वर्तिष्यमाणं प्रतिजानीते ।

एवमागममाने तु कथिते शिष्टमुच्यते ॥ ७९ ॥

एवमुक्तप्रकारेण आगममाने शब्दप्रमाणे निरूपिते सति शिष्टं चतुर्षु प्रमाणेष्ववशिष्टमर्थापत्त्याख्यं प्रमाणं निरूप्यत इत्यर्थः ।

[122] तदेवोदाहरति ।

तच्चान्यशास्त्रसंसिद्धमोक्षतत्त्वोपदर्शनम् ।

तस्मादिति परं किञ्चित् शिवशास्त्रेण बोधितम् ॥ ८० ॥

असर्वज्ञप्रणीतत्वं गमयेत्तदसंशयम् ।

तत् अर्थापत्त्याख्यं प्रमाणं नाम अन्यशास्त्रेषु लोकायतादिशास्त्रेषु संसिद्धस्य मोक्षतत्त्वस्योपदर्शनं मोक्षतत्त्वप्रतिपादकं वाक्यजातं स्वस्य स्वार्थाभिज्ञप्रणीतत्वं विनानुपपद्यमानतया स्वार्थाभिज्ञप्रणेतारं कल्पयत् शिवतन्त्रेण शिवशास्त्रेण तस्मात् तत्तच्छास्त्रोक्तमोक्षतत्त्वात् परं उत्कृष्टं किञ्चित् मोक्षतत्त्वमस्तीति बोधितं प्रमापितमिति तत्तच्छास्त्रप्रणेतृणामसंशयमसर्वज्ञत्वकल्पनाद्वारा स्वस्यासर्वज्ञप्रणीतत्वं कल्पयेदित्यर्थः ।

यद्वान्यशास्त्रसंसिद्धं अन्येषु बुद्धाद्यागमेषु संसिद्धं पठितं यत् मोक्षतत्त्वोपदर्शनं भूतादिप्राप्तीनां मोक्षतत्त्वोपदर्शकं वाक्यं तस्मात् बुद्धाद्यागमोपदर्शितमोक्षतत्त्वात्परमुत्कृष्टं शिवसांख्यादिरूपं यच्छिवतन्त्रेण बलवता बोधितं परममुक्तितया प्रतिपादितं तत् पूर्वोक्तागमस्यासर्वज्ञप्रणीतत्वं विना अनुपपद्यमानं तस्यासर्वज्ञप्रणीतत्वं कल्पयति तदर्थापत्त्याख्यं प्रमाणमित्यर्थः । एवं व्याख्याने तस्मादिति परं किञ्चिदित्यधिकोपादानस्यान्यशास्त्रसंसिद्धमित्यस्य च स्वार्थस्येनोपपत्तिः ।

[123] एवं श्रुतार्थापत्तिमुदाहृत्य दृष्टार्थापत्तिं प्रतिज्ञापूर्वकमुदाहृत्य दर्शयति ।

प्रमाणमर्थापत्त्याख्यमन्यथा च निगद्यते ॥ ८१ ॥

दृश्यमानमसार्वज्ञ्यं कल्पयेत् स्वोपपादकम् ।

पशुत्वाख्यं पशुष्वेव सार्वज्ञ्ये शास्त्रतस्स्थिते ॥ ८२ ॥

अन्यथा च निगद्यते दृष्टार्थापत्तिरुच्यते इत्यर्थः । आत्मनि दृश्यमानमनुभूयमानमसार्वज्ञ्यं किञ्चिज्ज्ञत्वं स्वतःसर्वज्ञस्था-
त्मनः किञ्चिदावरणं विना अनुपपद्यमानं स्वोपपादकं किञ्चि-
दावरणं कल्पयेत् शास्त्रतः निर्मलत्वादिवोधकशास्त्रतः सा-
र्वज्ञ्ये अनावृतसार्वज्ञ्ये परमेश्वरे स्थिते तत्सार्वज्ञ्यबोधकप्र-
माणसहकृतं सत् पशुष्वेव पशुत्वाख्यमावरणं कल्पयतीत्य-
र्थः ।

यद्वा पशुत्वाख्यं कल्पयतीत्युक्तं तत्र नन्वितरेषु पदार्थेषु
ज्ञानाभावादेव पशूनां किञ्चिज्ज्ञत्वे सिद्धे किमर्थमावरणकं
पशुत्वं कल्पनीयमित्यत आह पशुष्वेवेति । पशुष्वेव सार्वज्ञ्ये
शास्त्रतः स्थिते सिद्धे परिदृश्यमानं असार्वज्ञ्यं कल्पयती-
त्यर्थः । एवं चानुपपद्यमानार्थपरिज्ञानात् तदुपपादकार्थान्तर-
कल्पनमर्थापत्तिरित्यर्थापत्तिलक्षणमर्थादुक्तमिति द्रष्टव्यम् ।

[124] ननु अन्यशास्त्रसंसिद्धमोक्षतत्त्वप्रतिपादकं शास्त्रं
स्वार्थाभिज्ञकर्तृकं शास्त्रत्वात् इतरशास्त्रवत् इतीदमेवानु-
मानं तस्मात् परं किञ्चिदस्तीति तत्त्वान्तरबोधकश्रुतिबाध-
सहकृतं सत्, स्वप्रणेतार्यसर्वज्ञत्वमपि साधयति यथा क्षित्यादि
सकर्तृकं कार्यत्वादित्यनुमानं साध्यतावच्छेदककोट्यप्रविष्टम-
पि कर्तुरेकत्वमिति, अर्थापत्तिविषयस्य अनुमानसिद्धत्वात् न
पृथक् प्रमाणत्वम् इत्यत आह ।

तच्चानुमानतो भिन्नं द्वयोर्विषयभेदतः ।

द्वयोरनुमानार्थापत्त्योः विषयभेदात् फलभेदात् तद् अर्था-
पत्त्याख्यं प्रमाणमनुमानात् भिन्नम् । न चोक्तानुमानेन तत्फ-
लसिद्धिः । साध्यतावच्छेदकभिन्नधर्मस्यानुमित्यविषयत्वात्,

अनुमितावुपनीतभाननिषेधात्, द्वयोर्व्याख्याने उपपाद्योपपाद-
कयोर्विरोधाच्च । एवं चैकत्वसिद्धिरपि प्रमाणान्तरेणैवेति
द्रष्टव्यम् ।

[125] इत्थमियता प्रबन्धेन षट्पदार्थान्तर्गतानि तत्त्वानि
प्रमाणानि च निरूप्य कार्यवर्गोपसंहारं तत्क्रमं च प्रतिपाद-
यति ।

एवं प्रमाणसिद्धानामर्थानां व्यत्ययेन तु ॥ ८३ ॥

उपसंहारः एष्टव्यः कार्यकारणभावतः ।

न हि कार्योपसंहारादादौ कारणसंहतिः ॥ ८४ ॥

युक्तं तदन्तिमात् कार्यात् पृथिव्याद्युपसंहतिः ।

एवमुक्तेन प्रकारेण प्रमाणसिद्धानामागमादिप्रमाणसिद्धानां
शिवतत्त्वादिपृथिवीपर्यन्तानामर्थानां तत्त्वतात्त्विकानामुपसं-
हार एष्टव्यः उपसंहारः महाप्रलयः एष्टव्यः अङ्गीकर्तव्यः ।

[126] ननु सर्वकार्योपसंहारे प्रमाणमेव नास्ति प्रत्युत का-
र्याणां प्रवाहानादित्वमेव सप्रमाणम् । तथा हि अहोरात्रमहो-
रात्रपूर्वकमहोरात्रत्वात् संप्रतिपन्नवत् एवं ब्राह्मणादिवर्णो
ब्राह्मणादिवर्णपूर्वकः ब्राह्मणादिवर्णत्वात् संप्रतिपन्नवदित्या-
दिप्रमाणसद्भावात् । किञ्च परमकारुणिकस्य शिवस्य स्वसृष्ट-
सकलप्रपञ्चोपसंहारे नैघृण्यापत्तेश्चेति चेत्,

[127] न तावत् प्रलये मानाभावः । विवादास्पदीभूतघटा-
दिकार्यसंततिः कदाचिदत्यन्तमुच्छिद्यते संततित्वात् ज्वा-
लासंततिवदिति, एककालीनमायाद्वयं कदाचित् स्वोपादेय-
परंपराध्वंसवत् उपादानत्वात् तन्त्वादिवदिति च प्रमाणस-
त्त्वात् । एककालीनेति पक्षविशेषणदानेन तदवच्छेदेन साध्य-

सिद्धेः न नानाकालीनकार्यध्वंसवत्वमादायार्थान्तरम् । न चाहोरात्रस्याहोरात्रपूर्वत्वनियमेन प्रतिरोधः; इदानीन्तनाहोरात्रस्य पक्षत्वे सिद्धसाधनात्, सर्गाद्यकालीनाहोरात्रस्य पक्षत्वे आश्रयासिद्धेरागमबाधाच्च ।

न च सर्गाद्यकालीनब्राह्मणादेः ब्राह्मणादिपूर्वकत्वाभावे कथं ब्राह्मणत्वादिसिद्धिरिति वाच्यम् । विश्वामित्रादीनामिवादृष्टविशेषोपगृहीतत्वेनैव तदुपपत्तेः । सर्वत्रादृष्टविशेषस्यैव प्रयोजकत्वात् नाननुगमः; गोमयवृश्चिकयोरिव एकशक्तिमत्त्वेन ब्राह्मणादृष्टविशेषयोरनुगमसंभवाच्च ।

[128] न च युगपत् संहारे नैघृण्यापत्तिः । संसारचक्रपरिभ्रमणेन खिन्नानां जीवानां विश्रान्त्यर्थत्वात्, पौनःपुण्येन कार्यजननात् कुण्ठितशक्तेर्मायाद्वयस्य कार्यजननौन्मुख्यसंपादनार्थत्वात्, कर्मपरिपाकार्थत्वाच्च । तदुक्तं मृगेन्द्रे “भोगसाधनमाक्षिप्य कृत्वा कारणसंश्रयं तच्च सात्मकमाक्रम्य विश्रमायावतिष्ठते भविनां भवखिन्नानां सर्वभूतहितो यतः” इति । अत्र भोगसाधनं तनुकरणभुवनादिकं मायाख्यकारणत्वीनं कृत्वा “मायादावुदरे चान्ते” इति न्यायेनान्तर्निहितजीवमाक्रम्याधिष्ठाय जीवानां विश्रमायावतिष्ठत इत्यर्थः । उक्तं च सिद्धान्तसारावल्यां त्रिलोचनशिवाचार्यैः “विश्रान्त्यै भविनां च खिन्नमनसां पाकाय कर्मावलेर्मायाया बलसंभवाय कुरुते शंभुर्महासंहतिम्” इति । भोजेनाप्यभिहितम् “संसारे खिन्नानां खिलानां प्राणिनां प्रभुः कृपया कुरुते महार्थसंहतिमेतेषामेव विश्रान्त्यै कर्मविपाचनहेतोः” इति ।

[129] स चोपसंहारो व्यत्ययेन एष्टव्यः सृष्टिक्रमविपरीतक्रमेण प्रतिलोमेनेति यावत् । तत् कुत इत्यत आह कार्यकारणभावत इति । उपादेयोपादानभावादित्यर्थः । ननुपादानोपादेयभावेऽपि अनुलोमसंहार एव किमिति नांगीक्रियत इत्यत आह न हीति । कार्योपसंहारात् उपादेयोपसंहारात् आदौ पूर्वं कारणसंहतिः उपादानसंहतिर्न युज्यते; उपादेय लयस्य स्वस्योपादाने शक्त्यात्मनावस्थानरूपस्य प्रागेवोपादानविनाशे असंभवात्, तदानीं कार्यस्य निराधारत्वप्रसंगाच्चेति भावः । परैरप्यसमवायिकारणनाशजन्यकार्यनाशस्य उपादानवृत्तित्वाङ्गीकारात् सर्वत्रासमवायिकारणनाशादेः कार्यनाशोपपत्तौ समवायिकारणनाशप्रयुक्तकार्यनाशे मानाभावादिति भावः । एवं च यतः कार्यं जायते यत्र वर्तते यत्र लीयते तदुपादानमिति श्रुत्यागमसिद्धमुपादानत्वमपि संगच्छत इति द्रष्टव्यम् । तत् तस्मात् कारणादन्तिमात् कार्यात् अन्तिमं कार्यमारभ्य पदार्थोपसंहतिर्युक्तेत्यर्थः । तदेवान्तिमकार्योपसंहारोपक्रमं विशिष्याह पृथिव्यादीति । पृथिवी आद्युपसंहतिः पूर्वोपसंहतिरित्यर्थः ।

[130] प्रतिलोमोपसंहारप्रकारमुदाहृत्य क्रमेण दर्शयति ।

तन्मात्रेष्वेव भूतानि तन्मात्राण्यप्यहंकृतौ ॥ ८५ ॥

इन्द्रियाणि मनश्चापि सा मतौ सा गुणेषु च ।

ते गुणाः प्रकृतौ सापि रागाद्यं तत्त्वपञ्चकम् ॥ ८६ ॥

मायायां लयमायान्ति सा तु नित्योपपादिता ।

तन्मात्रेष्वित्यादि । भूतानि पृथिव्यादिभूतानि क्रमेण गन्धतन्मात्रादिषु लयमायान्ति । उपरितनक्रियया सर्वत्र संबन्धो

द्रष्टव्यः। तन्मात्राण्यपि गन्धतन्मात्रादीन्यपि। इन्द्रियाणि वागादीनि पञ्चकर्मेन्द्रियाणि, ज्ञानेन्द्रियाणि घ्राणादीनि पञ्च, मनश्चापि अहंकृतौ। तत्रापि तामसाहंकारे तन्मात्राणि राज-साहंकारे कर्मेन्द्रियाणि सात्त्विकाहंकारे ज्ञानेन्द्रियाणि मनश्चेति विवेकः। सा अहंकृतिः मतौ बुद्धितत्त्वे। सा बुद्धिश्च गुणेषु गुणतत्त्वे। बहुवचनं च गुणानां विभक्तत्वाभिप्रायेण न तु तत्त्वबहुत्वाभिप्रायेण; “संभूयकार्यकर्त्वाद्” इत्यादिना तत्त्वैक्यस्य साधितत्वात्। ते गुणाः गुणतत्त्वम्। सा प्रकृतिः रागाद्यं तत्त्वपञ्चकं कालनियतिकलाविद्यागगाख्यं तत्त्वपञ्चकं च मायायां लयमायान्ति। अत्र प्रकृतिगगादीनामपि पूर्वोक्तसृष्टिप्रातिलोम्येन लयो द्रष्टव्यः। मायायास्तु नित्यत्वाल्लयो नेत्याह सा त्विति। प्रलयकालीनकर्माश्रयत्वादिना युक्तिसमूहेन नित्यत्वेनोपपादितेत्यर्थः।

[131] एवं प्रातिलोम्येन शुद्धाध्वा कुण्डलिन्यां लीयत इत्याह मायोपरीति।

मायोपरि विशुद्धाध्वा बिन्दौ प्रलयमृच्छति ॥ ८७ ॥

बिन्दुः कलादिशक्त्यात्मा शिवाधिष्ठितविग्रहः।

नित्यमास्ते शिवस्यास्य विषयात्मतयाग्रतः ॥ ८८ ॥

पुनः प्रवर्तते विश्वं जगदाभ्य बिन्दुतः।

मायोपरि वर्तमानः यो विशुद्धाध्वा विद्यातत्त्वादिः तत्त्वानि तात्त्विकानि च प्रातिलोम्येन बिन्दौ प्रलयमृच्छन्ति प्राप्नुवन्तीत्यर्थः। बिन्दुरपि मायावत् नित्यतया न लीयते किंतु शिवस्य परिग्रहशक्तिरूपतया तिष्ठतीत्याह बिन्दुरिति। कलादिशक्त्यात्मा कला निवृत्त्यादिकला आदिपदेन त-

त्त्वतात्त्विकादिसंग्रहः तेषां शक्त्यात्मा सूक्ष्मरूपः शिवाधिष्ठितविग्रहः शिवेनाधिष्ठितस्वरूपः अनन्तेशस्य मायामात्रे अधिष्ठातृत्वात् अस्याधिष्ठातुः शिवस्याग्रतः विषयात्मतया परिग्रहरूपतया नित्यमास्ते। ननु महार्थसंहारानन्तरं किं पुनः सृष्टिर्नास्तीत्यत आह पुनरिति। पुनः संहारानन्तरमपि प्राणिकर्मपाकानुसारेण बिन्दुमारभ्य आनुलोम्येन सर्वं जगत् प्रवर्तते उत्पद्यत इत्यर्थः।

इति श्रीमदुमापतिशिवाचार्यविरचिते पौष्करसंहिताभाष्ये ज्ञानपादे सप्तमः प्रमाणपटलः समाप्तः।

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Abbreviations

EFEO = École française d'Extrême-Orient

GOML = Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras

IFP = Institut Français de Pondichéry

Pauṣkara = *Pauṣkarasaṃhitā* [*Pauṣkaratantra*], *jñānapāda*, chapters 1-6 and 8: Cidambaram edn; chapter 7: pp. 215-289 of the present volume (Devanagari transcription of the 7th chapter of Cidambaram edn).

PauṣkaraBh = Umāpati's *Pauṣkarabhāṣya*, chapters 1-6 and 8: Cidambaram edn; chapter 7: pp. 215-289 of the present volume (Devanagari transcription of the 7th chapter of Cidambaram edn).

PauṣkaraV = Jñānaprakāśa's *Pauṣkaravṛtti*

TC = *Tattvacintāmaṇi*

TCĀ = *Tattvacintāmaṇi-āloka*

TCP = *Tattvacintāmaṇi-prakāśa*

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